Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Chicago Officer Williams received information from a registered informant that an individual whom the informant personally knew was selling narcotics from a gold Toyota Camry with tinted windows near 71st and Paxton. The informant gave the license plate number and the suspect's description. Williams drove to the location, saw Sands in the driver’s seat of a gold Toyota Camry at 7102 South Paxton, and parked to conduct surveillance. Officers Kilroy, Darling, and Gadzik were in another vehicle, out of sight. Williams saw Sands engage in a hand-to-hand transaction. He informed the enforcement officers that a narcotics transaction had occurred. Kilroy drove the enforcement vehicle to block the Camry. Kilroy testified that the buyer exited the Camry and ran into a store. Gadzik pursued the buyer. Kilroy approached the Camry and saw Sands, holding a firearm, which he moved to the center console. Kilroy ordered Sands to exit the car, then removed Sands, patted him down, and passed Sands to another officer. Kilroy entered the Camry, opened the console, and located Sands’s firearm, containing live ammunition, and 10-15 bags of marijuana under a false console floor. At trial on charges of being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), the court precluded Sands from arguing that Hunter placed the firearm into the console, but allowed Sands to argue that the firearm was Hunter’s. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding that ruling and denial of a motion to suppress. View "United States v. Sands" on Justia Law

Cruse, McClain, Henderson, and eight others were indicted for involvement in a long-running conspiracy to distribute controlled substances in Milwaukee. The indictment centered on two street gangs that controlled the crack-cocaine trade in adjacent neighborhoods on the city’s northwest side. The eight co-conspirators pleaded guilty and agreed to cooperate with the government. Henderson agreed to plead guilty to conspiracy but only with respect to crack and marijuana, not powder cocaine. In exchange the government would recommend the mandatory minimum sentence. Henderson pleaded guilty, but the government neglected to file an information narrowing the charged drug types as contemplated by the agreement. A jury found Cruse and McClain guilty. The Seventh Circuit affirmed as to Henderson and McClain. Henderson understood the charge against him and the possible penalty, and the judgment conforms precisely to the terms of the agreement. The court rejected claims that the trial was contaminated by two Batson violations, improperly admitted hearsay, and faulty jury instructions (about the scope of coconspirator liability). The court vacated Cruse’s conviction based the absence of a jury instruction distinguishing the buyer-seller relationship from a conspiracy. View "United States v. Henderson" on Justia Law

Garcia pled guilty to two counts of distribution of heroin, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C). The court found that Garcia had a Criminal History Category of V and a total offense level of 19, which led to a guideline range of 57 to 71 months. The government recommended a sentence of 120 months’ imprisonment, arguing that Garcia’s criminal history was almost that of a career offender and the career offender guideline range was approximately 151 to 188 months. Garcia’s counsel recommended a sentence at the low end of the range, 57 months, and argued that Garcia’s traumatic childhood and his acceptance of Christianity were strong factors in mitigation. Defendant also made a statement in allocution that addressed both of those mitigating factors. The district court sentenced Garcia to 108 months and imposed three years of supervised release without any consideration of the section 3553(a) sentencing factors. Garcia presents three issues on appeal. The Seventh Circuit remanded. The court adequately explained why an above-range sentence was appropriate, but made no statement of reasons justifying the non-mandatory conditions of supervised release or the length of the term of supervised release. View "United States v. Garcia" on Justia Law

Chapman’s sales of heroin and cocaine were recorded by an undercover informant wearing a Hawk recording device, which captured audio-video recordings of each transaction. The recordings were introduced at trial. Following his conviction, Chapman was sentenced to 200 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the district court violated his constitutional rights to a fair trial by both refusing to grant him a third expert witness to examine the informant’s recordings and by denying his motion to subpoena one of his earlier expert witnesses. The court upheld admission of the recordings at trial; denial of motion for acquittal based on a defense of entrapment; and the sentence. View "United States v. Chapman" on Justia Law

In 2001, Sherman was shot and died from multiple gunshot wounds. When an officer arrived, Sherman lay on the ground with 50-60 people gathered around. Long was tried for first degree murder. No physical evidence tied Long to the crime. The state presented four witnesses. Two witnesses named Long as the shooter during the investigation, but recanted at trial. In closing argument, the prosecutor made improper statements, resulting in reversal of Long’s conviction and a new trial. At Long’s second trial, the state again presented the four eyewitnesses. One maintained her identification of Long. The two witnesses who recanted during the first trial continued to deny having seen Long shoot Sherman, despite their prior videotaped statements. The fourth witness, Irby, gave inconsistent testimony. During closing arguments, the prosecutor made comments that no evidence or theory was presented that another individual committed the crime, referred to the movie “Gone with the Wind,” and referenced the contents of a letter written by Irby that had not been admitted into evidence. The jury found Long guilty. His state court appeals and post-conviction petitions were unsuccessful. The district court dismissed Long’s federal habeas petition, finding the prosecutorial misconduct claims procedurally defaulted and that Long had not shown a reasonable likelihood that Irby’s testimony or the closing argument prejudiced the outcome; that Long’s ineffective assistance claim was without sufficient merit to overturn the state court; and that his post-conviction counsel ineffective assistance claim was procedurally barred. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that the state’s failure to correct Irby’s denial of her recantation prejudiced Long. View "Long v. Butler" on Justia Law

Bour and Natisha met on seven or eight occasions for Bour to molest Natisha’s younger daughter, “Jane,” then four to 18 months old. Bour sexually touched Jane, penetrated her mouth and genitals, and filmed at least two encounters with her. He also photographed the genitals of Natisha’s older daughter, then three to five years old. After an acquaintance informed the FBI that Bour was paying Natisha to molest the girls, Bour pleaded guilty to purchasing a child for the production of child pornography (18 U.S.C. 2251A(b)), three counts of producing child pornography (18 U.S.C. 2251(a)), and possessing child pornography (18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(4)). At his sentencing hearing, he unsuccessfully objected to the sentencing memorandum’s discussion of homemade videos, which show him masturbating as prejudicial, irrelevant, and not offense conduct. Bour was sentenced to life for purchasing a child for the production of pornography and to 1,020 consecutive months (85 years) on the remaining counts. The judge also imposed lifetime supervised-release conditions, and, 235 days after sentencing, ordered Bour to pay $75,000 in restitution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the restitution order, the sentence, and supervised conditions. View "United States v. Bour" on Justia Law

Navarro pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute more than five kilograms of cocaine. In the plea agreement, the government and Navarro both agreed to refrain from seeking a departure from the sentencing guidelines and to recommend a sentence within the guidelines range as determined by the court. At sentencing, the court rejected an aggravated role enhancement under U.S.S.G. 3B1.1 and determined that the applicable guidelines range was 188 to 235 months in prison. The government then argued in favor of an upward departure suggested in Application Note 2 to U.S.S.G. 3B1.1(b) for defendants “who did not organize, lead, manage, or supervise another participant, but who, nevertheless, exercised management responsibility over the property, assets or activities of a criminal organization” and recommended an above-guidelines sentence of 320 months. Navarro voiced no objection. The district court departed upward and imposed a sentence of 262 months. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded for resentencing, finding that the government’s breach of the plea agreement constituted plain error. View "United States v. Navarro" on Justia Law

In 2008, Armour was sentenced to 51 months in prison and three years of supervised release after he pled guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon. After he was released from prison in 2012, Armour violated the conditions of his supervised release several times, including a conviction of aggravated battery for beating his eight-year-old son. The district court then sentenced Armour to 24 months in prison followed by one year of supervised release. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to conditions of supervised release prohibiting Armour from: using, possessing, distributing, or being present at places where controlled substances are illegally sold, used, distributed, or administered; and possessing weapons or ammunition; interacting with known felons. The conditions also required certain reports to the probation officer, that the probation officer be allowed to visit Armour’s home, and that Armour comply with any probation department order to participate in a substance abuse treatment program. View "United States v. Armour" on Justia Law

In 2012 Illinois State Police witnessed and videotaped Addison participating in crack cocaine sales at a drug house in East St. Louis. A jury later found him guilty of possession and distribution of cocaine base. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that the evidence against Addison was strong and rejecting Addison’s claim that his right to a fair trial was undermined because the government’s case agent testified that he had never prosecuted the wrong person, that one of Addison’s co-criminals had a firearm, and that the surrounding neighborhood contained no other drug houses. Any error associated with the testimony about the case agent’s record was invited; the gun and neighborhood testimony did not constitute plain error. View "United States v. Addison" on Justia Law

Two men robbed a Chicago bank. When Warfield was arrested on the day of the robbery, he told the FBI that he had robbed the bank with Hawkins. Hawkins and Warfield were indicted. During Warfield’s proffer session with the government, Warfield recanted his initial statement and, instead of Hawkins, claimed that he had robbed the bank with Brooks, also called “Stank.” (Earlier, Warfield also told a confidential informant in prison that a masked bank robber depicted on television was his “co-defendant” who was called “Stank.”) Warfield pleaded guilty, but refused to identify the other robber during his plea colloquy. Before trial, Hawkins moved to admit Warfield’s proffer statement regarding Brooks’s supposed involvement. Because Warfield intended to assert his Fifth Amendment privilege not to testify, Hawkins argued that the statement was admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) as a statement against penal interest made by an unavailable witness. The court denied Hawkins’s motion, excluding Warfield’s statement on grounds that it was not supported by corroborating circumstances that clearly indicated its trustworthiness. Hawkins was convicted of bank robbery and sentenced to 100 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed; viewed as a whole, the circumstances do not “clearly suggest” that Warfield’s statement was trustworthy. View "United States v. Hawkins" on Justia Law