Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 2007, Shannon pleaded guilty to possessing child pornography and was sentenced to 46 months’ imprisonment and lifetime supervised release. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. In 2010, Shannon was released and began supervised release. In 2011, the district court found that Shannon had violated the conditions by possessing a web camera without previously notifying his probation officer, and sentenced Shannon to 28 days of incarceration. In 2015, the probation office notified the court that Shannon had temporarily uninstalled the monitoring software on his computer, viewed legal adult pornography, encrypted digital files, possessed external storage devices, and installed “scrubbing” software. The court found that Shannon had done so and was not compliant with his release conditions, but declined to revoke his supervised release. At a subsequent a modification hearing, the parties disputed Special Condition 2, intended to require Shannon to notify the probation office before using certain electronic devices. The district court reasoned that Condition 2 was “related to the offense of conviction which involves the sexual exploitation of minors from a computer in [Shannon’s] home and will protect the public. [Shannon’s] demonstrated non‐compliance with external storage devices indicates he is at a continued risk to reoffend.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding the condition justified. View "United States v. Shannon" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his 24 month prison sentence after pleading guilty to one count of wire fraud. Defendant's conviction stemmed from his participation in a scheme to defraud companies that were interested in obtaining loans for environmentally friendly upgrades to their facilities. Defendant committed the offense while he was on probation for a felony forgery conviction in Indiana. At sentencing, the district court considered defendant's leukemia as it considered what sentence to impose, but it was unpersuaded that defendant's medical condition justified a noncustodial sentence. The court concluded that this was not a case in which the only substantively reasonable sentence would have been one that kept defendant out of prison. In this case, the district court weighed evidence supporting a noncustodial punishment, as well as evidence supporting some time in prison, including the nature of his crime, the fact that he committed it while on probation, and the factual finding that BOP would be able to serve his medical needs. The court concluded that the district court did not commit clear error in its fact finding, and the sentence was substantively reasonable. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Rothbard" on Justia Law

Petitioner, serving a 110 year sentence for two murders he committed when he was 16 years old, filed a 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(3) application seeking authorization to file a second or successive petition for a writ of habeas corpus under section 2254. Petitioner challenged his sentence under Miller v. Alabama, which was made retroactive by Montgomery v. Louisiana. The court agreed with the state that petitioner cannot state a claim to relief under Miller because his sentencing judge was afforded significant discretion by the Indiana Code to fashion an appropriate sentence and, in fact, considered petitioner's age at the time of the offense in mitigation. Accordingly, the court denied the authorization and dismissed the application. View "Kelly v. Brown" on Justia Law

In 2010, Moore stole a BMW after showing the driver a gun. He was captured by Chicago police after he crashed into another vehicle during a high-speed chase. A jury was unable to reach a verdict on a charge of carjacking, 18 U.S.C. 2119, but convicted him of carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A) and possession of a firearm following a felony conviction, section 922(g)(1). Judge Grady imposed a sentence of 240 months. The Guidelines advisory range was 360 months to life. Moore had three prior convictions for robbery, among other offenses. He had previously used a gun and had assaulted victims and a police officer. When he stole the BMW, he was still wearing an electronic monitoring bracelet. Judge Grady referred to “protecting the public.” After a re-trial on remand, a jury acquitted him of carjacking and carrying a firearm during the offense of carjacking. Judge Kocoras found Moore subject to a minimum prison term of 15 years under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1), and imposed a below-Guidelines sentence of 240 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that on remand, Judge Kocoras was bound to re-sentence him to the same 120-month sentence originally imposed on the felon-in-possession conviction and that the government waived reliance on the 15-year minimum specified by the ACCA. View "United States v. Moore" on Justia Law

The DEA received a tip that Carraway was distributing narcotics in East St. Louis. Agents arranged controlled purchases of crack cocaine from Carraway’s distributors and received authorization to wiretap Carraway’s phone. Carraway was obtaining cocaine from a barbershop; Graham was the intermediary. Carraway distributed cocaine from “the Gate.” On January 14, intercepted calls revealed that Carraway and Graham were going to retrieve narcotics from the barbershop; surveillance teams watched and intercepted calls between Carraway and Jenkins. Two weeks later, agents intercepted calls planning another pickup. Agents followed them to the Gate, where they saw the same vehicle from their previous surveillance. They described it to Illinois Trooper Leckrone. The vehicle had illegally tinted windows; the driver was not wearing a seat belt. Leckrone stopped the vehicle near the Gate. Leckrone observed that Jenkins acted nervous and an odor of burnt cannabis. Leckrone searched the dashboard and center console and found a plastic panel, concealing cocaine, plus ringing cell phones. One phone had the number from which agents had intercepted calls and showed recent calls to Carraway. Jenkins stated that the truck belonged to his cousin. Jenkins was charged with conspiracy to distribute, and possession with intent to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A)(ii), and 846, and 18 U.S.C. 2. The court denied a motion to suppress, citing the collective knowledge doctrine. Jenkins was found guilty of possession with intent to distribute. The court sentenced Jenkins to 27 months’ imprisonment, consecutive to an unrelated sentence for kidnaping and carrying a firearm. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding denial of the motion to suppress and the imposition of a consecutive sentence. View "United States v. Jenkins" on Justia Law

Minhas defrauded customers of his Chicago travel agencies and airlines through a scheme in which he collected payment for airline reservations that he canceled without his customers’ knowledge, by manipulating the two-tiered online ticket-reservation system. Minhas was convicted of wire and mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341 and 1343 in two separate cases: one that proceeded to a bench trial and one in which Minhas pleaded guilty in 2015. At a consolidated sentencing hearing, the district court imposed two partially concurrent prison terms totaling 114 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a challenge the district court’s application of the Sentencing Guidelines’ enhancement for causing “substantial financial hardship” to the two sets of victims (U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(2)). The court acknowledged that it had “seen stronger evidence,” but was not convinced that the district court committed clear error in its assessment of the record. View "United States v. Minhas" on Justia Law

Mulvania, arrested for domestic battery, refused to exit the vehicle at the jail. Officers moved her. Mulvania’s speech was slurred, she screamed obscenities, and was physically combative. Mulvania claims she was experiencing a “post‐traumatic stress disorder flashback.” Mulvania tested positive for cocaine and cannabinoids that day. Mulvania refused to change into a jail uniform. The defendants claim that misdemeanor detainees are permitted to change in a private room when they are cooperative. Two female and three male officers restrained her, placed Mulvania on her stomach, held her arms over her head, and lifted her shirt off. Mulvania banged her head against the floor and yelled, “They’re going to rape me.” After removing her clothing, the officers draped a jail uniform over her body and left the cell. Minutes later, Mulvania had a seizure and was taken to the hospital. After she returned, she was released without charges. Mulvania filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the Americans With Disabilities Act, amending her pleadings several times, claiming the jail had a widespread practice of conducting strip searches with excessive force and without accommodating people who are experiencing mental distress. Others joined the suit to challenge a policy that requires female detainees to either wear white underwear or no underwear. The Seventh Circuit affirmed rejection of Mulvania’s claims and denial of class certification, but reversed as to underwear claims. View "Mulvania v. Rock Island County Sheriff" on Justia Law

Gill was in a crowd outside a Milwaukee club when shots were fired, killing Crawley. Detectives collected security videos and interviewed witnesses. Gill’s mother told detectives that Gill had cognitive impairments. Gill voluntarily went to an interview. Gill made statements that were disproved by the video footage, about the people he was with and where he was standing. Police arrested Gill for obstruction and read Gill his Miranda rights. Gill requested a lawyer. The interview ended. Gill said that he wanted to take a polygraph test and would waive his right to a lawyer. The next morning, detectives reiterated that Gill could not take the polygraph without a lawyer present, unless he waived counsel. Gill interpreted this to mean that he could take a polygraph without a lawyer or not take one. Gill stated that he understood and would proceed. He denied any involvement with the shooting. The examination lasted six hours, followed by fives of interrogation. Gill maintained his innocence. The next morning, Gill stated that he wanted a lawyer, but detectives convinced him to waive his rights and employed various interrogation techniques, falsely stating that Gill had been identified as the shooter and had failed his polygraph test. Gill professed innocence more than 140 times, but eventually confessed. He was charged with first-degree reckless homicide and remained in jail. The court suppressed the confession, stating that Gill was “functionally illiterate” and had previously been found incompetent to stand trial for a different crime. Gill filed claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983, which were rejected on summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Gill failed to demonstrate that his right to be free from the interrogation tactics was clearly established; officers had probable cause for Gill’s arrest for obstruction. “Brady” does not require the disclosure of favorable evidence before trial. View "Gill v. City of Milwaukee" on Justia Law

Robbing Community Financial Service Center in Milwaukee, Ferrell tackled the security guard, pointing his firearm at the guard’s face. Cook entered, wearing a mask, and approached the teller, who was in on the robbery and opened the safe. Cook took $337,100. Cook and Ferrell fled. Cook was charged with conspiracy to obstruct commerce by robbery; obstruction of commerce by robbery, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a) (Hobbs Act); and brandishing a firearm during the commission of a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). Cook pled guilty to counts two and three. The government dismissed count one. The government was to recommend a three‐level increase for a loss of over $250,000; a three‐level decrease for acceptance of responsibility; a two-level increase for causing a loss to a financial institution; and a two‐level increase for physically restraining a person. The agreement allowed Cook to oppose the enhancements. The PSR mirrored the plea agreement. Cook argued that the CFSC was not a financial institution and that imposing the physical‐restraint enhancement was impermissible double counting. The court rejected his arguments, applied the calculation included in the PSR, determined that the guidelines range for count two was 77-96 months and that count three carried a mandatory minimum of 84 months’ imprisonment, and imposed consecutive sentences of 60 months on count two and 84 months on count three. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding the application of the enhancements. View "United States v. Cook" on Justia Law

In 2009, following a court-authorized interception of phone calls involving suspected drug traffickers, Milwaukee police obtained consent from Cannon’s son to search their home, found $14,000 in cash, and arrested Cannon, based on a report that a government informant had purchased cocaine, and borrowed a gun, from Cannon. Cannon posted bail but was not released because a new complaint charged him with giving a gun to an unauthorized person. Cannon eventually made bail, but was arrested after he moved without notifying the police. In 2011, Cannon was acquitted of the drug charge, but pleaded guilty to illegal possession of the gun, and a warrant issued for his arrest on new gun and drug charges. In 2013 Cannon obtained documents relating to his 2009 arrest and filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. That suit was dismissed as premature, because his appeals were pending. In 2014 he was convicted of the 2011 charges and sentenced to 16 years’ imprisonment. In 2015 he filed two 42 U.S.C. 1983 lawsuits based on the 2009 events. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of the claims as barred by the six‐year statute of limitations and noted that Cannon has incurred four strikes under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. 1915(g), so he may not file a federal civil action or appeal without prepaying all fees, unless he is in imminent danger of serious injury. View "Cannon v. Newport" on Justia Law