Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Tatum was charged with two counts of first-degree intentional homicide by use of a dangerous weapon. The case was set for a jury trial on November 29, 2010. On August 12, at Tatum’s request, counsel moved to withdraw. Lawyer 2 was subsequently allowed to withdraw. The court reset the date for January 31, 2011 for Tatum’s third lawyer, Erickson. On January 18, Erickson requested a competence evaluation. After an in-patient exam, the report concluded that Tatum was competent to understand the proceedings and assist in his defense, but was likely to be “an extremely challenging defendant.” Tatum asked the court to dismiss Erickson, stating that she was working with the state and not investigating his case to his standards. Tatum refused to meet with Erickson because of counsel’s competence challenge. Tatum stated that he wished to represent himself. After engaging in a colloquy with Tatum, the court denied his request, stating that Tatum’s limited education would make it difficult for him to understand the difficulties and disadvantages of self-representation, and refused to dismiss Erickson. Tatum, convicted and sentenced to life in prison, was unsuccessful on direct appeal and in state post-conviction proceedings. The Seventh Circuit reversed denial of a federal habeas petition; the Wisconsin courts unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent when they refused to allow Tatum to represent himself, after questioning Tatum not about his general competence, but about his educational level and understanding of the legal system. View "Tatum v. Foster" on Justia Law

In 1998 Maryetta was raped, strangled to death, and left in an abandoned garage. In 2004 Milwaukee police arrested Avery, who was convicted of first-degree homicide. Avery spent six years in prison before DNA evidence proved that a serial killer linked to nine similar homicides was responsible for the murder. Avery alleged that detectives concocted a fake confession and induced jailhouse informants to falsely incriminate him and that the detectives failed to disclose, as required by Brady v. Maryland, impeachment evidence about the informants’ false statements. Avery added a “Monell” claim against the city. The district judge rejected the Brady claims on summary judgment, reasoning that the detectives had no duty to disclose the impeachment evidence because Avery already knew the informants’ statements were false. A jury found two detectives liable for violating Avery’s due-process rights, found the city liable, and awarded $1 million, but the judge invalidated the verdict based on “mixed signals” from the Seventh Circuit on whether an officer’s fabrication of evidence is actionable as a due process violation, and holding that without a constitutional violation by the detectives, Monell liability was not possible. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Avery’s due-process claims fall “comfortably within” circuit precedent. That Avery knew the informants’ statements were false did not relieve the detectives of their duty to disclose impeachment evidence. View "Avery v. City of Milwaukee" on Justia Law

Schenian used and sold illegal drugs. While in jail on drug and firearm charges, he had his girlfriend smuggle drugs to him. His plea bargain included an agreement that the prosecutor would recommend a sentence of 144 months. Schenian told the judge that he had decided to turn his life around. The prosecutor stated that a urine sample collected the evening before sentencing showed that Schenian had one unauthorized drug in his system. The judge imposed a sentence of 144 months’ imprisonment, within the Guidelines range of 135-168 months. The prosecutor had misinterpreted the test. The lab report concluded that Schenian had not been on drugs at the time of the test. Eight days later, the prosecutor sent letters to the court and Schenian’s lawyer disclosing the error. The district court stated that it remained “convinced that the original sentence ... was sufficient but not greater than necessary to accomplish the purpose of sentencing. None of the facts contained in that letter would lead the Court to alter its decision.” The court also denied resentencing under Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(a), citing the goals in 18 U.S.C. 3553. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. If the judge did not rely on false information, there was no judicial error to be corrected under Rule 35(a). View "United States v. Schenian" on Justia Law

After the 2013 robbery of a Milwaukee auto repair shop, one of the participants, Green, called the ATF and became a confidential informant. Green did not initially admit to the auto shop robbery, but provided information about the other participants, Anglin and his brother, and gave authorities information that led to Anglin’s arrest as he was travelling to rob a drug house. A jury convicted Anglin of Hobbs Act robbery, discharging a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence (the Hobbs Act robbery) under 18 U.S.C. 924(c), and related offenses. The district court sentenced him to 230 months’ imprisonment, plus three years of supervised release. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the police arrested Anglin without probable cause, requiring suppression of the evidence. Corroborating evidence concerning Anglin’s criminal history, residence, and vehicle provided probable cause for Anglin’s arrest and the subsequent search of his vehicle, which uncovered the gun and ammunition. The court also rejected an argument that the 924(c) conviction was improper because Hobbs Act robbery is not a qualifying crime of violence. The court vacated and remanded certain conditions of supervised release. View "United States v. Anglin" on Justia Law

Cisneros pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 846. Cisneros was a high-ranking member of the Latin Kings and was involved in a large-scale drug trafficking operation in Summit, Illinois. Cisneros admitted that, in a 10-month period in 2011-2012, he was responsible for the purchase or sale of between 3.5 and five kilograms of cocaine, but he disputed the government’s calculation—accepted by the court—that the amount exceeded five kilograms. The court determined that his Sentencing Guidelines range was 188–235 months, and sentenced Cisneros to 188 months’ imprisonment, plus repayment of $34,600 in “buy money” provided to Cisneros during the course of his offense. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the district court, in calculating the Guidelines range, improperly imposed a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice based on Cisneros’ attempts to flee to Mexico to evade authorities. The court upheld the district court’s refusal to grant him a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility and its determination that his offense involved more than five kilograms of cocaine. View "United States v. Cisneros" on Justia Law

Petitioner and his associates sold cocaine base to a police informant, Hurd, and were charged in Indiana state court. The county clerk erroneously included Hurd’s name on a public filing. Weeks later, Hurd waskilled. Petitioner was then indicted on federal drug charges. The court appointed public defender Brattain to represent Petitioner. The Assistant U.S. Attorney orally informed Brattain that the government was willing to recommend a 20-year sentence in exchange for Petitioner’s cooperation with the Hurd murder investigation. Brattain met with Petitioner and discussed the proposal three times; Petitioner repeatedly rejected the plea. Brattain sent Petitioner two letters, describing thes offer, advising Petitioner that it was in his best interest, stating that the evidence made it “almost absolutely certain” that Petitioner would be convicted, and referencing a witness who would corroborate Petitioner's involvement in Hurd’s murder. Petitioner again rejected the offer. After his conviction under 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), the district court found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Petitioner participated in the murder, and applied Sentencing Guidelines, 2D1.1(d)(1) to sentence Petitioner to life imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Petitioner then sought post‐conviction relief (28 U.S.C. 2255), contending that Brattain provided ineffective assistance by not producing the government’s offer in writing and not advising him adequately. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of the petition, finding that counsel’s performance was adequate and that Petitioner could not demonstrate that, absent any deficient performance, he would have accepted the plea offer. View "Mitchell v. United States" on Justia Law

In 1998, Kashamu and others were charged with conspiracy to import heroin, 21 U.S.C. 963. Kashamu, refusing to appear (which would have required his presence in the U.S.), insisted that the crimes were committed by his dead brother. He surfaced in England six months later, beginning a four‐year unsuccessful extradition effort. Later Kashamu moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that collateral estoppel barred his prosecution. The Seventh Circuit denied that motion, reasoning that the magistrate in extradition had not ruled on Kashamu’s guilt, but had only been unconvinced regarding Kashamu’s identity. Three years later Kashamu unsuccessfully sought mandamus to dismiss the indictment on speedy‐trial grounds. The Seventh Circuit concluded that he had forfeited that right by remaining a fugitive. In 2015, after his election to the Nigerian Senate, Kashamu filed suit, claiming to have information that U.S. authorities were planning to abduct him in Nigeria. He cited the Mansfield Amendment, 22 U.S.C. 2291(c)(1), which states that “no officer or employee of the United States may directly effect an arrest in any foreign country as part of any foreign police action with respect to narcotics control efforts.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal, holding that the Amendment does not create a private right of action. Kashamu’s suit also confused a lawful attempt by U.S. agents to arrest him on a provisional warrant (a first step toward extradition) in coordination with local law enforcement, with an attempted abduction. . View "Kashamu v. Department of Justice" on Justia Law

In 2007 Sentinel Management Group collapsed. Sentinel managed short-term cash investments for futures commission merchants, individuals, hedge funds, and other entities. Its bankruptcy left customers and creditors in the lurch: over $600 million was lost. Sentinel’s president and CEO, Bloom, was convicted of 18 counts of wire fraud and investment adviser fraud, based on evidence that Bloom, despite assuring customers otherwise, put their funds at significant risk by using them as collateral for Sentinel’s risky proprietary trading; that Bloom fraudulently manipulated the rates of return paid to clients on their investments; and that Bloom continued to accept new customer funds even after he knew that Sentinel was about to collapse. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and to evidentiary rulings and claims of prosecutorial misconduct by characterization of evidence and by accusing the defense of wasting time. The court upheld the district court’s choice of a jury instruction on the meaning of a federal regulation governing futures commission merchants and its imposition of a sentence of 168 months in prison. View "United States v. Bloom" on Justia Law

A police informant, wearing a hidden camera, bought heroin and methamphetamine from Winfield during four controlled buys at Winfield’s apartment. Each time, the informant saw additional drugs and paraphernalia in the apartment. Days after the last buy, police obtained a warrant and searched Winfield’s apartment. They found almost $3000 in a closet, and a gram of heroin and drug paraphernalia in Winfield’s girlfriend’s purse. In the garage, in the trunk of Winfield’s car (in a hidden compartment in a brake‐fluid canister), they found 27 grams of methamphetamine and 38 grams of heroin. Winfield admitted that there were not more drugs in the apartment because “[h]e had flushed anything he had down the toilet when the SWAT team was approaching.” Winfield pled guilty to distributing heroin. The court applied a two‐level upward adjustment to Winfield’s sentence because he “maintained a premises for the purpose of manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance,” U.S.S.G. 2D1.1(b)(12). After calculating a guidelines range of 62-78 months, the court imposed a sentence of 55 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Nothing in the guideline requires a sentencing court to find that the defendant stored multiple kilograms of drugs over an extended time; the court need only find that a drug‐related activity was one of his “primary or principal” uses. Winfield’s drug‐related uses for his apartment were not merely “incidental” to his residence; he was “primarily living off proceeds from drug sales.” View "United States v. Winfield" on Justia Law

Featherly lived in a Wisconsin trailer park when law enforcement discovered that Featherly’s Internet‐service account was sharing child pornography. FBI agent Hauser obtained a warrant to search Featherly’s residence, stating that an agent “was able to determine the IP address of this [user’s] computer” and to ascertain that an Internet‐service provider, Charter, had assigned that unique IP address to Featherly’s account. Based on the images found, Featherly was charged with receipt and possession of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(2), 2252(a)(4). Featherly moved for a “Franks” hearing, seeking to quash the warrant and suppress evidence because Hauser had falsely stated in his affidavit that the IP address was traced to Featherly’s computer; an IP address identifies only a modem, not a particular computer. The magistrate concluded that probable cause supported the warrant, but that even if Featherly’s explanation were correct, Wilkins did not perpetrate any knowing or reckless falsehood. The judge agreed that any mistake was irrelevant because Charter's identification of the modem was sufficient to support an inference that pornography would be found on Featherly's computer. Featherly pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 144 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the inaccuracy kept the judge from considering the possibility that someone else in the trailer park connected to Featherly’s modem wirelessly, without his knowledge. Hauser's affidavit specified that he used the term “computer” consistently with 18 U.S.C. 1030(e)(1), which includes a “communications facility directly related to or operating in conjunction with” a computer. View "United States v. Featherly" on Justia Law