Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

After multiple law enforcement agencies investigated drug trafficking in the St. Louis, Missouri area, several conspirators were arrested. Syms, pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute cocaine 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(ii), and 846. The district court sentenced Syms to 151 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the mandatory minimum sentence contained in the statute violated the separation-of-powers doctrine. The court did exercise its discretion in sentencing, applying the statutory factors and the guidelines to impose a sentence above the mandatory minimum. The court noted that the sentence was at the low end of the guidelines range and rejected a disproportionality argument. The court upheld the district court’s drug-quantity calculation, imposition of a sentencing enhancement, and denial of a safety valve reduction in his sentencing, based on a finding that Syms was a manager or supervisor of the operation. View "United States v. Syms" on Justia Law

Thomas was charged with conspiracy to possess, with intent to distribute, a mixture or substance containing heroin, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 846, and two counts of possessing, with intent to distribute, a mixture or substance containing heroin, section 841(a)(1). A jury later found Thomas guilty and the court concluded that, because of four prior felony controlled substance offenses, Thomas was a career offender, and sentenced him to 216 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the conspiracy charge. The court noted that his co-conspirator, Andrews, drove Thomas to and from Chicago to buy heroin, rented vehicles for the trips, and, on at least one occasion, packaged heroin for Thomas. A jury could have concluded reasonably that Andrews was a coconspirator; any lack of profit motive on Andrews’s part does not alter that status. The court also did not err in imposing a two-level sentencing enhancement for maintaining a drug house; the record showed that Thomas lived in Andrews’s home and used that home as part of his distribution process. View "United States v. Thomas" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to possessing cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C). Because of the quantity and his criminal history, his guideline sentencing range was 151-188 months and his statutory maximum 240 months. The government recommended, and the court imposed, a 216‐month sentence. The judge generally cited the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing factors, calling the defendant “a poster child for being a career offender,” and saying “unfortunately you may be one of those people that will never be able to conform to be a law‐abiding person.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that, while the sentence lacked sophisticated analysis, “prosecutors as well as the judge are highly experienced, their hunches are likely often to be reliable.” The court suggested that, for the future, consultation with the Sentencing Commission might be a valuable resource. View "United States v. Gibbs" on Justia Law

In Presley v. Georgia (2010), the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial extends to voir dire. In one of the cases consolidated for appeal, Pinno was convicted of assisting in the mutilation of a corpse and interference with police, having assisted her son in disposing of the body of his girlfriend, whom the son had murdered. The trial judge called for a pool of more than 80 prospective jurors. To assure that enough seats were available for the prospective jurors and to prevent members of the public from influencing the jury by remarks or facial expressions, given the “gruesome and bizarre facts,” the Wisconsin state judge ordered spectators to leave and the door locked until all the prospective jurors were seated. After they were seated the door was unlocked and members of the public were able to enter. The other defendant, Seaton, was convicted of first‐degree reckless homicide. The public was, similarly, temporarily excluded. In neither case did defense counsel object. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of their habeas petitions, noting that the trial judge may have had no option but to exclude the public until all the panel members were seated and that it is possible that the defendants would have been harmed by the presence of the public. View "Seaton v. Smith" on Justia Law

While Cureton was under investigation for dealing crack cocaine, he used a gun to demand ransom from his roommate’s family; her grandfather agreed by telephone to wire Cureton $4,500. A jury convicted Cureton of interstate communication of a ransom demand (18 U.S.C. 875(a)), attempted extortion (18 U.S.C. 1951(a)), and two counts of possessing a firearm during a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. 924(c)). The first 924(c) charge, Count 2, was based on the ransom demand; Count 4, was based on attempted extortion. The case was consolidated with Cureton's drug possession case, Case 106. The guideline range in Case 106 was 360-720 months; the range for the ransom demand and attempted extortion was 240 months, the statutory maximum. The district court imposed a sentence of 360 months for Case 106 to run concurrently with a 240-month sentence for ransom and attempted extortion, adding consecutive sentences for the section 924(c) counts—84 months on Count 2 and 300 months on Count 4, for a sentence of 62 years. On first remand the district court sentenced Cureton to 37 years, eliminating the 300 months imposed on Count 4. On second remand, relating to conditions of supervised release, the court re-imposed the 444‐month sentence. In his third appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed rejection of an argument that making a ransom demand does not qualify as a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. 924(c). The court found no plain error in interpreting that federal crime as necessarily including an implied threat of physical force. View "United States v. Cureton" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The judge increased his sentencing guidelines range by four levels, U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(6)(B), for possessing the firearm in connection with the distribution of an illegal drug, to a range of 57-71 months, but then imposed a sentence only 36 months, within the guideline range if the four-level enhancement and the gun’s high-capacity magazine were ignored. The Seventh Circuit vacated the sentence, noting that Defendant’s “use” of the gun consisted of taking it as collateral pending payment for a sale of synthetic marijuana and subsequently selling it to a confidential informant. The court stated, “neither 'use' nor 'carry' accurately describes the defendant’s relation to the Glock” and that there was no evidence that the synthetic marijuana is a “scheduled” (illegal) drug. Although the sentence was within the guideline range for the offense of being a felon in possession of a gun, the judge’s remarks at sentencing suggest that his real concern was that the gun had been used in an illegal-drug transaction. The court stated that it could not “see the legal significance of the gun, taken as collateral, secreted in the garage, and then sold.” View "United States v. Gates" on Justia Law

In 2003, Murdock was convicted of first-degree murder and aggravated battery with a firearm. In connection with his post-conviction claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a suppression hearing was held to determine whether Murdock's statements to the police were voluntary, given that Murdock was 16 years old and was without an attorney or other adult present. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed denial of a motion to suppress. The federal district court denied habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254, finding that the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision was not unreasonable. The Seventh Circuit affirmed: the court applied the correct test in a reasonable manner in finding that the totality of the circumstances indicated that Murdock gave his statements voluntarily. The court considered Murdock’s age, and that he did not have an attorney or other adult present, but found that he was able to understand and provide an adequate waiver of his rights. The court considered that Murdock was detained for approximately seven hours, but noted that the interview lasted only three hours and that Murdock was given the opportunity to eat and use the restroom. There was no evidence that the officers threatened him or otherwise created a coercive environment. The court found that Murdock did not appear to be under distress or frightened on a video recording. View "Murdock v. Dorethy" on Justia Law

In 1995, Turner was convicted of murder, criminal confinement, and class A felony attempted robbery resulting in serious bodily injury. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed. He did not seek certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court; his opportunity to do so expired on September 22, 1997. In 2000, Turner successfully sought state post‐conviction relief. In 2013, the trial court reduced Turner’s robbery conviction to a Class B felony robbery conviction and resentenced Turner on that count. The order did not reference Turner’s other convictions or sentences. In 2014, Turner sought federal habeas relief, arguing that his life sentence for murder was unconstitutional under Apprendi and ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court ruled that the deadline for Turner to file had expired on September 23, 1998, one year after the last day on which he could have filed a petition for certiorari, 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1), reasoning that the state post‐conviction relief process could not toll the federal deadline because Turner’s time under federal law had expired before he sought relief. The Seventh Circuit found that Turner “has made a substantial showing of the denial of his right to effective assistance of counsel,” 28 U.S.C. 2253(c), but ultimately affirmed the dismissal. The court rejected Turner’s argument that “the date on which the judgment became final” was altered by the state court’s grant of relief on the robbery count; his murder conviction and life sentence were unaffected by the 2013 resentencing. View "Turner v. Brown" on Justia Law

In 2012, “Mickey” Davis made a $300,000 start-up loan to Ideal Motors, a Melrose Park, Illinois car dealership, owned by R.J. Serpico and his father Joseph Serpico. Within months, Joseph had gambled the money away and Ideal Motors had fallen deep in arrears. A man named “Mickey” conspired to have R.J.’s legs broken. Though the scheme was never carried out, Davis was convicted of attempted extortion and using extortionate means to collect a loan. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding the admission of out-of-court statements by several people involved in the conspiracy, noting independent evidence that the conspiracy existed and tending to show that Davis participated in it. The court affirmed the district court’s decision to allow prosecutors to impeach the testimony of a key prosecution witness with his prior inconsistent statements to government agents. The court also rejected arguments concerning witness immunity, the scope of cross-examination, and the government’s closing argument. View "United States v. Davis" on Justia Law

Hancock, charged with possession of a firearm by a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), and possession of an unregistered firearm, 26 U.S.C. 5841, 5845(a)(2), and 5861(d), unsuccessfully challenged the search warrant that had led to his arrest by requesting a “Franks” hearing. He argued that critical evidence bearing on a confidential informant’s credibility had been omitted from the probable cause affidavit. Hancock also moved to preclude the use of prior convictions as the basis for the section 922(g)(1) count, arguing that the release document issued by the Colorado Department of Corrections lulled him into believing that all of his rights, including the right to possess a weapon, had been restored. The district court, assessing the release document within its four corners, held that the document did not communicate any restoration of rights to Hancock. After his conviction on both counts, the court imposed concurrent sentences of 120 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the affidavit established probable cause, despite the omission of information about the informant’s criminal history, and that the release document did not indicate a restoration of rights. View "United States v. Hancock" on Justia Law