Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Susinka filed a third application for permission to file a successive motion under 28 U.S.C. 2255 to vacate his 20‐year sentence for participating in a RICO conspiracy, citing the Supreme Court’s 2016 holding in Hurst v. Florida, that Florida’s sentencing procedure for capital cases, whereby the jury delivers an advisory verdict but the judge decides whether to impose a death sentence, violated a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. The Seventh Circuit dismissed, noting that this is not a capital case, that Hurst was decided before his earlier petitions, and that, because Susinka was not challenging his guilt, even newly discovered evidence would be irrelevant. View "Susinka v. United States" on Justia Law

Patton was a major Chicago-area drug dealer. ATF Agents eventually arrested Patton during an unrelated firearms investigation. Patton confessed and agreed to cooperate with the ATF. Patton assisted the ATF for about a year, making several controlled purchases of firearms. However, the agent working with Patton was inexperienced and allowed Patton to pick his targets. According to the government, Patton only delivered street‐level dealers, protecting higher‐level sources, family, and friends. Patton’s efforts resulted in several convictions and removed 60 guns from the streets. In 2012, Patton learned that the government was about to appear before a grand jury and needed him to testify and that he would be indicted on the drug charges. Patton disappeared, reemerging only after the government had finished several trials and it was known that Patton was an informant. The government claims Patton only reappeared because he needed protection. Patton pleaded guilty without a plea agreement. Patton asked the court to force the prosecutor to move for a reduction in the statutory mandatory sentence and sentencing range for substantial assistance under 18 U.S.C. 3553(e). The court declined, but, in weighing the section 3553(a) factors, took into consideration Patton’s cooperation and imposed a below‐guideline sentence of 244 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed; the government acted within its discretion to refuse to file a substantial‐assistance motion. View "United States v. Patton" on Justia Law

Hoffman had nude pictures of his girlfriend’s six-year-old daughter on his phone. Although the child testified about multiple instances of sexual conduct, Hoffman was convicted of one count of exploitation of a child and one count of possession of child pornography in interstate commerce, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a); 2252(a)(4)(B). While his sentence was pending, he was convicted in Indiana state court of sexual abuse of the same child over a period of 18 months, for which he faced up to 50 years in state prison. The federal district court applied the 18 U.S.C. 3553 factors and sentenced Hoffman to 300 months’ imprisonment, to be served consecutively to his state sentence, noting that the single count of production of child pornography carried a minimum mandatory sentence of 15 years, and that other aspects of the case demanded more. Hoffman was sentenced to a term of 50 years in state prison, based on his role as a father figure to the victim, his lack of remorse, and his history of committing rapes as a juvenile. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the federal sentence, citing the court’s discretion under U.S.S.G. 5G1.3 to impose a concurrent or consecutive sentence, or to decline to impose either, when a subsequent state sentence for relevant conduct is anticipated. View "United States v. Hoffman" on Justia Law

Illinois prisoner Bell filed a civil rights suit, asserting unsafe conditions at the prison, and an application to proceed in forma pauperis. The court denied his application because Bell did not attach his inmate trust-account ledger (28 U.S.C. 1915(a)(2)) without assessing Bell’s explanation that prison staff refused to give him the ledger. The court instructed the clerk to “forward a copy of this order to the trust fund officer ... to facilitate compliance.” Three months later the court dismissed the suit. Two months later Bell wrote to the court, saying that he recently received the dismissal order and that he never had received the order denying his application and warning him to submit a completed one. The court interpreted Bell’s letter as a “motion to reconsider” and denied it because Bell still had not submitted a completed application. Now at a different prison, Bell has received the ledger. The Seventh Circuit granted him leave to appeal without prepaying fees and vacated the dismissal, noting that the court had not imposed a deadline for compliance, nor ordered prison officials to provide the ledger. “Dismissal is a harsh sanction and should not occur unless the court concludes that it is necessary because other options have failed or would fail.” View "Bell v. Supervisor Kay" on Justia Law

In 1994 Brown was convicted of four sex offenses and sentenced to prison. His projected release date was July 2009, followed by three years of mandatory supervised release. On that date, the Illinois Department of Corrections did not release Brown, but issued a “Parole Violation Report” reciting anticipatory violations of the terms of supervised release. Brown refused to accept required electronic monitoring; he lacked a place where he could lawfully reside. Illinois tries to find lawful accommodations for sex offenders who wear electronic monitoring devices, but because Brown rejected the device the system did not try to find him a place to live. The Prisoner Review Board held a hearing in October 2009 and determined that Brown had not violated the conditions of his release, but on the same date the Department of Corrections issued a second Parole Violation Report, giving the same two reasons. Brown remained in prison until January 2011, when he was released unconditionally. Brown sought damages for the delay. He did not contend that either the electronic-monitoring or the residential-location condition was invalid, but cited the lack of a hearing. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of his claims, based on qualified immunity. As of 2009, no court had held that the Fourth Amendment entitles a sex offender to release when it appears likely that, as soon as he steps is released, he will be in violation of the terms of release. View "Nathaniel Brown v. Michael Randle" on Justia Law

During an altercation at his home, Nichols threatened someone with a weapon. Officers took him into custody. Nichols consented to a search of his property, during which officers found a handgun and ammunition. Nichols, serving probation for federal felony mail fraud, claimed to have forgotten that he had the gun. Nichols, charged with two counts of possession of a firearm by a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g), unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence, then pleaded guilty to one count. In calculating his guidelines range, the court denied Nichols credit for acceptance of responsibility and imposed an enhancement for obstruction of justice. It concluded that he was not entitled to a reduction in his offense level on the ground that all the firearms and ammunition were used exclusively for sporting purposes. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his 27-month sentence, at the low end of the guidelines range. The district court was faced with opposing versions of Nichols’s confession from Nichols and his probation officer; it made a credibility determination. The court committed no reversible error in applying the obstruction enhancement and denying credit for acceptance of responsibility. Nichols’s unsupported statements failed to demonstrate that the contraband was used exclusively for lawful sporting purposes to justify a reduction under U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(2). View "United States v. Nichols" on Justia Law

Delatorre was a member of the Insane Deuces street gang. Rivera, a gang member acting as a confidential informant, recorded several meetings and conversations, providing evidence of at least four murders, 11 attempted murders, two solicitations to commit murder, several shootings, and numerous drug offenses. Delatorre was arrested and confessed to involvement in at least three murders. He was convicted of engaging in racketeering conspiracy; murder in aid of racketeering activity; conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance; assault with a dangerous weapon in aid of racketeering activity; distribution of crack cocaine; and possession of a firearm with an obliterated serial number. He was sentenced to life in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed; the Supreme Court denied certiorari. Delatorre moved to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence (28 U.S.C. 2255), arguing, based on his cooperation with authorities, that the prosecutor committed misconduct by reneging on a promise to provide a plea agreement and ineffective assistance by pretrial counsel. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of relief, finding the prosecutorial misconduct claim procedurally defaulted because it was not raised in the district court or on direct appeal. Delatorre failed to meet the cause‐and-prejudice standard to overcome procedural default. Delatorre’s pretrial counsel was not deficient and Delatorre suffered no prejudice as a result of counsel’s performance. View "Delatorre v. United States" on Justia Law

Rivera and others robbed Brew City Tap; three of them were armed, two with BB guns and one with a .40‐caliber handgun. They left with $857.25. Four days later, they robbed Sky Zone Indoor Trampoline Park, netting more than $12,000. Nearly 50 Milwaukee-area businesses suffered similar armed robberies in 2013-2015. Witnesses implicated Rivera in 30 of those robberies, but the government charged him with five counts of Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a) and 2 and, taking the position that Hobbs Act robbery constitutes a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(3), added five counts of brandishing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c) and 2. Rivera agreed to plead guilty to two of the crime‐of-violence counts and was sentenced to the mandatory minimum of 32 years’ imprisonment plus a five‐year term of supervised release, which the judge said he was “obliged” to impose. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as a “crime of violence” under 924(c) because it “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another.” The court rejected an argument that the judge’s use of “obliged” indicated a misunderstanding of the law. View "United States v. Rivera" on Justia Law

Hollins pleaded guilty to distributing cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B), and was sentenced to 92 months’ imprisonment and eight years of supervised release. After her release, Hollins tested positive for cocaine numerous times and was convicted of theft; the district court required her to spend 120 days in community confinement in jail. Following her release, Hollins tested positive for cocaine several times. The court required 120 days of confinement at an addiction treatment facility. While there, she tested positive for cocaine and was returned to jail. The court modified Hollins’s supervision conditions to add six months of in‐home confinement. While serving that sentence, she was arrested for retail theft. The district court again placed her in community confinement for 120 days. After she resumed in‐home confinement. Hollins pleaded guilty in Illinois to the retail theft charge and was sentenced to one year in state custody. Hollins then failed to report for drug testing. When she reported for her Illinois sentence, she had 31 days of federal in‐home confinement remaining to be served. While Hollins was in state custody, her probation officer petitioned to revoke her supervised release based on her theft convictions. The district court, after a remand, imposed a 28‐month sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court relied on Hollins’s criminal history, repeated violations of the terms of supervised release, and the failure of supervised release and graduated sanctions to deter Hollins’s criminal conduct, and did not commit procedural error. View "United States v. Hollins" on Justia Law

In 2008, Wenger was murdered after trying to buy drugs. Bullet casings were found near Wenger’s body, but not other physical evidence was recovered. Investigators relied on information from community members and from incarcerated individuals. Weeks after the murder, the state charged Brown, then 13 years old, and Love, 19 years old. Brown was waived into adult felony court; the two were tried together. The state’s key evidence was the testimony of Morris that, while Morris, Brown, and Love were all in the Elkhart County Jail, Brown and Love each confessed separately to involvement in the murder. Both were convicted. After exhausting state court remedies, Brown filed a federal habeas petition, claiming he was denied effective assistance of counsel when his lawyer failed to insist that the judge give the limiting instruction required when evidence of a co-defendant’s out-of-court confession is introduced in a joint trial. The court concluded that Brown had procedurally defaulted that claim by failing to assert it in state court. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that Brown is entitled to an evidentiary hearing and could overcome procedural default of his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim by demonstrating ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel and asserting a substantial claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. View "Brown v. Brown" on Justia Law