Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 1979, Karu Gene White, along with two accomplices, committed a brutal home invasion and murder of three elderly individuals in Kentucky. White, who had known the victims, planned the crime to steal money they had saved. The victims were beaten to death with a crowbar and other weapons. White was subsequently arrested and charged with burglary, robbery, and capital murder.At trial, White's defense initially focused on an alibi, but this strategy collapsed when one of his accomplices agreed to testify against him in exchange for immunity. White's counsel then pursued an insanity defense, presenting evidence of White's abusive and traumatic childhood. Despite this, the jury found White guilty on all counts and recommended the death penalty, which the trial judge imposed.White appealed his conviction and sentence, but the Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the decision, and the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari. White then sought post-conviction relief, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence. The Kentucky Supreme Court ultimately rejected this claim, finding that counsel's performance was reasonable and that additional mitigating evidence would not have changed the jury's decision.White filed for federal habeas relief, which was denied by the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky. The court found that counsel's investigation and presentation of mitigating evidence were reasonable and that the Kentucky Supreme Court's application of Strickland v. Washington was not unreasonable. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, holding that White's counsel's performance was within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance and that there was no substantial likelihood that additional mitigating evidence would have changed the jury's recommendation for the death penalty. View "White v. Plappert" on Justia Law

Bradley Patton was arrested in Rutherford County, Tennessee, and charged with drug and firearm offenses. He posted bail multiple times, but his bail was eventually increased to $126,000. Under local rules, because his bail exceeded $75,000, he had to prove in a hearing that the bail money was not derived from criminal activities. Patton filed a class-action lawsuit in federal court, claiming that this local rule violated his due-process and Eighth Amendment rights.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee dismissed Patton's claims, ruling that they were moot because he had been released from pretrial custody and there was no ongoing harm. The court also found that Patton could not rely on the putative class's standing to preserve his claims and rejected his argument that the claims were capable of repetition yet evading review.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and held that Patton's claims fell within the "inherently transitory" exception to mootness for class-action claims. The court noted that pretrial detention is inherently temporary and that other class members would likely suffer the same injury. The court also found that the district court's decision to reserve the deadline for filing a motion for class certification meant that Patton should not be penalized for not filing such a motion. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Patton v. Fitzhugh" on Justia Law

Kevin Obi provided a 21-year-old woman with a fatal dose of heroin, leading to her death. Obi and the victim, along with friends, returned to his home from a bar, where they snorted heroin and had sex. The victim became unconscious, and Obi later encouraged a friend to have sex with her. The friend realized she was not breathing, and Obi called 911, but the victim was pronounced dead. Obi initially lied to the police about drug use. He eventually pleaded guilty to providing the fatal heroin.The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan initially sentenced Obi to 300 months, including a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice and additional criminal history points. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit remanded for resentencing due to insufficient support for the obstruction enhancement. At resentencing, the district court reaffirmed the 300-month sentence, citing additional evidence and an independent discretionary basis for the sentence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding any guidelines error harmless due to the district court's discretionary basis.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed Obi's appeal of his reduced sentence following a retroactive amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines. The district court recalculated Obi's guidelines range, reducing his sentence from 300 to 293 months. Obi challenged this reduction as procedurally and substantively unreasonable. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, finding no procedural error in the guidelines calculation and determining that the district court appropriately considered the seriousness of Obi's crime and the applicable sentencing factors. The court held that the 293-month sentence was reasonable and within the amended guidelines range. View "United States v. Obi" on Justia Law

In 1995, Garr Keith Hardin and Jeffrey Clark were convicted of murdering Rhonda Sue Warford based on forensic evidence and witness testimonies. Robert Thurman, a forensic serologist, testified that a hair found at the crime scene was similar to Hardin’s hair. After over two decades in prison, DNA testing revealed that the hair did not belong to Hardin, leading a state court to vacate their convictions. Hardin and Clark then sued Thurman under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that he failed to disclose observation notes that suggested the hair might not have matched Hardin’s hair sample, violating his obligations under Brady v. Maryland.The United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky denied Thurman’s qualified-immunity defense for Hardin’s Brady claim but granted summary judgment on other claims. The court found that a reasonable jury could determine that Thurman should have recognized the exculpatory value of his notes and that the notes were material to Hardin’s defense. The court also held that Thurman could not invoke qualified immunity because Hardin’s Brady rights were clearly established before 1992.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s decision in part and dismissed in part for lack of jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to review Thurman’s arguments that the notes were not exculpatory or material, as these were mixed questions of law and fact. However, the court rejected Thurman’s argument that the law in the mid-1990s did not clearly establish that Brady’s duty of disclosure applied to forensic scientists, affirming that such duties were clearly established and applicable to Thurman. View "Clark v. Louisville-Jefferson County Metro Government" on Justia Law

In the spring of 2021, the Lexington Police Department investigated a large-scale methamphetamine distribution scheme involving Lamonte Brown. Surveillance and a cooperating source led to the discovery of significant quantities of drugs and firearms at an office building used by Brown and his associate, William Hargis. Brown was later arrested for drug trafficking, and additional firearms were found in his car. Brown, a felon, was charged with conspiring to distribute methamphetamine and being a felon in possession of a firearm.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky consolidated the two cases for sentencing, and Brown pled guilty to both charges. He received a 310-month sentence. Brown appealed several aspects of his sentence, including the application of a two-level sentencing enhancement for possessing a dangerous weapon, which was based on firearms found in the office used for drug operations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court's decision. The court upheld the two-level enhancement, finding that it was reasonably foreseeable for Brown to know that his co-conspirator possessed firearms given the large quantities of drugs involved. The court also found no procedural error in the late filing of the third addendum to the presentence investigation report, as the district court had postponed the sentencing hearing, giving Brown sufficient time to respond.Additionally, the court determined that Brown's felon-in-possession charge was not relevant conduct to the drug conspiracy and thus could be counted as part of his criminal history. The court also found that the district court adequately explained its decision to run Brown's sentences consecutively, providing sufficient justification based on the § 3553(a) factors. Consequently, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's sentencing decisions. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

Shenisa Mohammed, a citizen of Trinidad and Tobago, became a lawful permanent resident of the United States in 2010. In 2020, she pleaded guilty to arson under Virginia Code § 18.2-77. The Department of Homeland Security charged her as removable under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), alleging her arson conviction qualified as an aggravated felony. Mohammed sought cancellation of removal, but the immigration judge (IJ) concluded that her arson conviction was an aggravated felony, making her removable and ineligible for discretionary relief. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ’s decision, and Mohammed petitioned for review.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court confirmed its jurisdiction to review the BIA’s final order of removal, limited to constitutional claims or questions of law. The court reviewed de novo whether Mohammed’s state conviction for arson qualified as an aggravated felony under the INA.The court applied the categorical approach to determine if the Virginia arson statute matched the federal arson statute under 18 U.S.C. § 844(i). The Virginia statute criminalizes maliciously burning or aiding and abetting the burning of certain properties. The federal statute criminalizes maliciously damaging or destroying property used in interstate commerce by fire or explosives. The court found that both statutes prohibit malicious burning, and the federal statute implicitly includes aiding and abetting liability through 18 U.S.C. § 2.The court concluded that the Virginia arson statute is not broader than the federal arson statute, as aiding and abetting is considered an alternative theory of liability under federal law. Therefore, Mohammed’s state arson conviction qualifies as an aggravated felony. The Sixth Circuit denied Mohammed’s petition for review. View "Mohammed v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Sardar Ashrafkhan owned and operated a fraudulent medical practice where doctors wrote and billed Medicare for fake prescriptions. These prescriptions were filled at specific pharmacies, which paid Ashrafkhan kickbacks. The scheme resulted in millions of dollars in fraudulent Medicare claims and the illegal sale of opioid-based drugs. Ashrafkhan was indicted in 2013 and tried in 2015, where the government presented evidence that he masterminded the scheme. The jury convicted him of drug conspiracy, health care fraud conspiracy, and money laundering. At sentencing, he received an adjustment for being an organizer or leader of a criminal activity involving five or more participants.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan sentenced Ashrafkhan to 276 months of imprisonment, varying downward from the guidelines range of 600 months. Ashrafkhan appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed his conviction and sentence. After his sentencing, the United States Sentencing Commission promulgated a new guideline, USSG § 4C1.1, which provides a two-point reduction in the offense level for defendants with no criminal history points, known as "zero-point offenders." Ashrafkhan moved for a sentence reduction under this new guideline, but the district court denied his motion, reasoning that his aggravating role adjustment rendered him ineligible for the reduction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that to be eligible for the zero-point offender reduction under USSG § 4C1.1, a defendant must not have received an aggravating role adjustment and must not have engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise. Since Ashrafkhan received an aggravating role adjustment, he was ineligible for the reduction, regardless of whether he engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise. The court's interpretation was based on the plain text and context of the guideline, as well as precedent from similar cases. View "United States v. Ashrafkhan" on Justia Law

Raymond Erker operated a Ponzi scheme that defrauded over fifty people, primarily senior citizens, out of nine million dollars. He created two companies, GenSource and Provident Securities, and solicited investments by falsely promising safe, guaranteed returns. Instead, Erker misappropriated the funds for personal use and risky investments. To cover his tracks, he created office fronts, set up call centers, and fabricated account statements. When his investments failed, he used new investor money to pay old investors, maintaining the illusion of returns. Eventually, he ran out of money and could not repay his investors.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio indicted Erker on multiple counts, including conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud, mail fraud, wire fraud, money laundering, and making a false statement under oath. After a four-day trial, a jury convicted him on all counts. The district court sentenced him to 262 months in prison and ordered restitution. Erker appealed, challenging his money laundering conviction, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel, and objecting to various aspects of his sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court rejected Erker's argument that the government failed to prove he withdrew more than $10,000 of criminally derived property, noting that the evidence showed it was mathematically impossible for the withdrawals to include less than $10,000 of dirty money. The court also found no procedural error in the district court's sentencing, as it had considered the necessary factors and did not need to address national sentencing statistics. The court affirmed Erker's sentence but remanded for the district court to consider his eligibility for a sentence reduction under Amendment 821 to the Sentencing Guidelines. The court declined to address Erker's ineffective assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal. View "United States v. Erker" on Justia Law

Rene Ramirez Gomez unlawfully entered the United States and committed multiple crimes, including raping his biological daughter. After serving a short state-court sentence, he was deported but re-entered the U.S. illegally. He then sexually abused the three young children of his new girlfriend in Indiana. Indiana charged him with child molestation, while the federal government charged him with failure to register as a sex offender and illegal re-entry. Ramirez Gomez pled guilty to the federal charges and was sentenced to 51 months in prison, to be served consecutively to his anticipated state-court sentence.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee sentenced Ramirez Gomez to 51 months in prison for the federal charges, to run concurrently with one Tennessee sentence but consecutively to any other state sentences. Ramirez Gomez appealed, challenging the procedural aspects of his federal sentence, specifically the application of an eight-level enhancement and the imposition of a consecutive sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court correctly applied the eight-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2A3.5(b)(1)(C) based on a judicial finding that Ramirez Gomez committed a sex offense against a minor while in failure to register status, without requiring a conviction. The court also found that the district court did not err in imposing a consecutive sentence, as it had considered the relevant guideline and provided an adequate explanation for its decision. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's sentencing decision. View "U.S. v. Gomez" on Justia Law

Calvin Cogdill pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The district court determined that Cogdill had committed three prior drug offenses on different occasions, which subjected him to an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). This decision was made over Cogdill’s objection, who argued that the determination should be made by a jury, not a judge.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee sentenced Cogdill to a 15-year mandatory minimum term of imprisonment based on the ACCA enhancement. Cogdill appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit initially affirmed the sentence. However, the Supreme Court vacated this decision and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of its ruling in Erlinger v. United States, which clarified that a jury must decide whether prior offenses were committed on different occasions for ACCA purposes.Upon reconsideration, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s error for harmlessness. The court concluded that the error was not harmless because the government did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that any rational jury would have found that Cogdill’s prior offenses were committed on different occasions. The court noted that the evidence regarding the timing, proximity, and relationship of the offenses was insufficient to meet this burden.As a result, the Sixth Circuit vacated Cogdill’s sentence and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The court also left it to the district court to address any potential double jeopardy issues on remand. View "United States v. Cogdill" on Justia Law