Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
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In 1995, Garr Keith Hardin and Jeffrey Clark were convicted of murdering Rhonda Sue Warford based on forensic evidence and witness testimonies. Robert Thurman, a forensic serologist, testified that a hair found at the crime scene was similar to Hardin’s hair. After over two decades in prison, DNA testing revealed that the hair did not belong to Hardin, leading a state court to vacate their convictions. Hardin and Clark then sued Thurman under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that he failed to disclose observation notes that suggested the hair might not have matched Hardin’s hair sample, violating his obligations under Brady v. Maryland.The United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky denied Thurman’s qualified-immunity defense for Hardin’s Brady claim but granted summary judgment on other claims. The court found that a reasonable jury could determine that Thurman should have recognized the exculpatory value of his notes and that the notes were material to Hardin’s defense. The court also held that Thurman could not invoke qualified immunity because Hardin’s Brady rights were clearly established before 1992.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s decision in part and dismissed in part for lack of jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to review Thurman’s arguments that the notes were not exculpatory or material, as these were mixed questions of law and fact. However, the court rejected Thurman’s argument that the law in the mid-1990s did not clearly establish that Brady’s duty of disclosure applied to forensic scientists, affirming that such duties were clearly established and applicable to Thurman. View "Clark v. Louisville-Jefferson County Metro Government" on Justia Law

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In the spring of 2021, the Lexington Police Department investigated a large-scale methamphetamine distribution scheme involving Lamonte Brown. Surveillance and a cooperating source led to the discovery of significant quantities of drugs and firearms at an office building used by Brown and his associate, William Hargis. Brown was later arrested for drug trafficking, and additional firearms were found in his car. Brown, a felon, was charged with conspiring to distribute methamphetamine and being a felon in possession of a firearm.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky consolidated the two cases for sentencing, and Brown pled guilty to both charges. He received a 310-month sentence. Brown appealed several aspects of his sentence, including the application of a two-level sentencing enhancement for possessing a dangerous weapon, which was based on firearms found in the office used for drug operations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court's decision. The court upheld the two-level enhancement, finding that it was reasonably foreseeable for Brown to know that his co-conspirator possessed firearms given the large quantities of drugs involved. The court also found no procedural error in the late filing of the third addendum to the presentence investigation report, as the district court had postponed the sentencing hearing, giving Brown sufficient time to respond.Additionally, the court determined that Brown's felon-in-possession charge was not relevant conduct to the drug conspiracy and thus could be counted as part of his criminal history. The court also found that the district court adequately explained its decision to run Brown's sentences consecutively, providing sufficient justification based on the § 3553(a) factors. Consequently, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's sentencing decisions. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

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Shenisa Mohammed, a citizen of Trinidad and Tobago, became a lawful permanent resident of the United States in 2010. In 2020, she pleaded guilty to arson under Virginia Code § 18.2-77. The Department of Homeland Security charged her as removable under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), alleging her arson conviction qualified as an aggravated felony. Mohammed sought cancellation of removal, but the immigration judge (IJ) concluded that her arson conviction was an aggravated felony, making her removable and ineligible for discretionary relief. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ’s decision, and Mohammed petitioned for review.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court confirmed its jurisdiction to review the BIA’s final order of removal, limited to constitutional claims or questions of law. The court reviewed de novo whether Mohammed’s state conviction for arson qualified as an aggravated felony under the INA.The court applied the categorical approach to determine if the Virginia arson statute matched the federal arson statute under 18 U.S.C. § 844(i). The Virginia statute criminalizes maliciously burning or aiding and abetting the burning of certain properties. The federal statute criminalizes maliciously damaging or destroying property used in interstate commerce by fire or explosives. The court found that both statutes prohibit malicious burning, and the federal statute implicitly includes aiding and abetting liability through 18 U.S.C. § 2.The court concluded that the Virginia arson statute is not broader than the federal arson statute, as aiding and abetting is considered an alternative theory of liability under federal law. Therefore, Mohammed’s state arson conviction qualifies as an aggravated felony. The Sixth Circuit denied Mohammed’s petition for review. View "Mohammed v. Bondi" on Justia Law

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Sardar Ashrafkhan owned and operated a fraudulent medical practice where doctors wrote and billed Medicare for fake prescriptions. These prescriptions were filled at specific pharmacies, which paid Ashrafkhan kickbacks. The scheme resulted in millions of dollars in fraudulent Medicare claims and the illegal sale of opioid-based drugs. Ashrafkhan was indicted in 2013 and tried in 2015, where the government presented evidence that he masterminded the scheme. The jury convicted him of drug conspiracy, health care fraud conspiracy, and money laundering. At sentencing, he received an adjustment for being an organizer or leader of a criminal activity involving five or more participants.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan sentenced Ashrafkhan to 276 months of imprisonment, varying downward from the guidelines range of 600 months. Ashrafkhan appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed his conviction and sentence. After his sentencing, the United States Sentencing Commission promulgated a new guideline, USSG § 4C1.1, which provides a two-point reduction in the offense level for defendants with no criminal history points, known as "zero-point offenders." Ashrafkhan moved for a sentence reduction under this new guideline, but the district court denied his motion, reasoning that his aggravating role adjustment rendered him ineligible for the reduction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that to be eligible for the zero-point offender reduction under USSG § 4C1.1, a defendant must not have received an aggravating role adjustment and must not have engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise. Since Ashrafkhan received an aggravating role adjustment, he was ineligible for the reduction, regardless of whether he engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise. The court's interpretation was based on the plain text and context of the guideline, as well as precedent from similar cases. View "United States v. Ashrafkhan" on Justia Law

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Raymond Erker operated a Ponzi scheme that defrauded over fifty people, primarily senior citizens, out of nine million dollars. He created two companies, GenSource and Provident Securities, and solicited investments by falsely promising safe, guaranteed returns. Instead, Erker misappropriated the funds for personal use and risky investments. To cover his tracks, he created office fronts, set up call centers, and fabricated account statements. When his investments failed, he used new investor money to pay old investors, maintaining the illusion of returns. Eventually, he ran out of money and could not repay his investors.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio indicted Erker on multiple counts, including conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud, mail fraud, wire fraud, money laundering, and making a false statement under oath. After a four-day trial, a jury convicted him on all counts. The district court sentenced him to 262 months in prison and ordered restitution. Erker appealed, challenging his money laundering conviction, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel, and objecting to various aspects of his sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court rejected Erker's argument that the government failed to prove he withdrew more than $10,000 of criminally derived property, noting that the evidence showed it was mathematically impossible for the withdrawals to include less than $10,000 of dirty money. The court also found no procedural error in the district court's sentencing, as it had considered the necessary factors and did not need to address national sentencing statistics. The court affirmed Erker's sentence but remanded for the district court to consider his eligibility for a sentence reduction under Amendment 821 to the Sentencing Guidelines. The court declined to address Erker's ineffective assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal. View "United States v. Erker" on Justia Law

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Rene Ramirez Gomez unlawfully entered the United States and committed multiple crimes, including raping his biological daughter. After serving a short state-court sentence, he was deported but re-entered the U.S. illegally. He then sexually abused the three young children of his new girlfriend in Indiana. Indiana charged him with child molestation, while the federal government charged him with failure to register as a sex offender and illegal re-entry. Ramirez Gomez pled guilty to the federal charges and was sentenced to 51 months in prison, to be served consecutively to his anticipated state-court sentence.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee sentenced Ramirez Gomez to 51 months in prison for the federal charges, to run concurrently with one Tennessee sentence but consecutively to any other state sentences. Ramirez Gomez appealed, challenging the procedural aspects of his federal sentence, specifically the application of an eight-level enhancement and the imposition of a consecutive sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court correctly applied the eight-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2A3.5(b)(1)(C) based on a judicial finding that Ramirez Gomez committed a sex offense against a minor while in failure to register status, without requiring a conviction. The court also found that the district court did not err in imposing a consecutive sentence, as it had considered the relevant guideline and provided an adequate explanation for its decision. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's sentencing decision. View "U.S. v. Gomez" on Justia Law

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Calvin Cogdill pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The district court determined that Cogdill had committed three prior drug offenses on different occasions, which subjected him to an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). This decision was made over Cogdill’s objection, who argued that the determination should be made by a jury, not a judge.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee sentenced Cogdill to a 15-year mandatory minimum term of imprisonment based on the ACCA enhancement. Cogdill appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit initially affirmed the sentence. However, the Supreme Court vacated this decision and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of its ruling in Erlinger v. United States, which clarified that a jury must decide whether prior offenses were committed on different occasions for ACCA purposes.Upon reconsideration, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s error for harmlessness. The court concluded that the error was not harmless because the government did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that any rational jury would have found that Cogdill’s prior offenses were committed on different occasions. The court noted that the evidence regarding the timing, proximity, and relationship of the offenses was insufficient to meet this burden.As a result, the Sixth Circuit vacated Cogdill’s sentence and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The court also left it to the district court to address any potential double jeopardy issues on remand. View "United States v. Cogdill" on Justia Law

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Duane Gary Underwood, II was convicted of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, possession of a stolen firearm, and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. Underwood appealed his conviction on ten grounds, including the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), the legality of his detention and search, the validity of a search warrant for his phone, the admissibility of certain evidence, voir dire procedures, the sufficiency of the evidence, jury instructions, and the licensure status of the prosecuting Assistant U.S. Attorney (AUSA).The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan denied Underwood's pretrial motions to suppress evidence and dismiss charges. The court admitted evidence from Underwood's phone and grand jury testimony under Rule 803(5). The jury convicted Underwood on all counts, and he was sentenced to 180 months' imprisonment. Post-trial, Underwood moved to dismiss his conviction, arguing that the AUSA's administrative suspension for nonpayment of bar dues constituted prosecutorial misconduct and a jurisdictional defect. The district court denied this motion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's judgment. The court held that 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) is constitutional, the officers had reasonable suspicion to detain and search Underwood, and the search warrant for Underwood's phone was valid. The court found no abuse of discretion in admitting the contested evidence or in the voir dire procedures. The evidence was deemed sufficient to support the convictions, and the jury instructions were appropriate. The court also ruled that the AUSA's administrative suspension did not constitute prosecutorial misconduct or create a jurisdictional defect, and there was no Brady violation. View "United States v. Underwood" on Justia Law

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Lamon Simmons was investigated for drug trafficking by the Grand Rapids Vice Unit, which used a reliable informant to conduct controlled buys of cocaine from Simmons. The police obtained a warrant to search Simmons's primary residence on Weatherwood Drive and another house on Holly Street, based on evidence from the controlled buys and surveillance. The search of the Weatherwood home yielded firearms, cash, marijuana, and a money counter, while the Holly Street home contained various drugs, firearms, and other contraband. Simmons was charged with multiple drug and firearm offenses.The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan denied Simmons's motion to suppress evidence from the Weatherwood home, finding that the warrant was supported by probable cause. The court noted that the affidavit detailed Simmons's ongoing drug trafficking and the likelihood that evidence would be found at his residence. The court also found that even if the warrant lacked probable cause, the good-faith exception would apply.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the warrant affidavit provided a substantial basis for finding probable cause, given the informant's reliability, the controlled buys, and the surveillance confirming Simmons's residence. The court emphasized that ongoing drug trafficking activities create a reasonable inference that evidence would be found at the dealer's home. The court also noted that the affidavit was supported by the officer's extensive experience in drug investigations. Thus, the search of Simmons's Weatherwood home was deemed constitutional, and the motion to suppress was properly denied. View "United States v. Simmons" on Justia Law

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Raymon Risner was charged with several drug trafficking and firearms offenses. He moved to dismiss the firearm-related counts, arguing that the statutes violated the Second Amendment. The district court denied his motion, and Risner pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense. He retained the right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss and filed a timely appeal.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky denied Risner’s motion to dismiss the firearm-related counts. Risner then pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense. The district court dismissed the felon-in-possession charge pursuant to the plea agreement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that Risner lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) because the charge was dismissed and there were no collateral consequences. The court also held that 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) did not violate the Second Amendment, as the statute’s restriction on using a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime was consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. The court concluded that the Second Amendment does not protect the possession of weapons for unlawful purposes, and Risner’s challenge failed. View "United States v. Risner" on Justia Law