Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Bernhard Jakits was convicted of eight counts of child exploitation-related crimes. In late 2018, Jakits began corresponding online with a woman named Ashley, who performed sex acts for him on live videocalls for money. Ashley had two teenage daughters, Jae and Nik. While Ashley was incarcerated, Jae began communicating with Jakits using her mother's phone. Jakits offered Jae money for nude photos, which she sent. He later asked if Nik wanted to earn money as well, and Jae sent him a nude photo of Nik. Jakits then requested a live videocall with both girls, offering them more money and other incentives.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio at Columbus presided over the case. Before trial, the court granted motions to exclude evidence related to other minors and the sexual activities of Jae and Nik with other men. A jury trial resulted in Jakits being convicted on all counts except one, where he was found guilty of a lesser-included attempt charge. The district court denied Jakits’s motion for a judgment of acquittal and sentenced him to 216 months in prison.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. Jakits argued that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions, that the jury was incorrectly instructed, and that the exclusion of certain evidence violated his constitutional rights. The court found that sufficient evidence supported the convictions, including the lascivious nature of the images and the intent behind Jakits’s communications. The court also held that the jury instructions were proper and that the exclusion of evidence was not arbitrary or disproportionate. The Sixth Circuit affirmed Jakits’s convictions on all eight counts. View "U.S. v. Jakits" on Justia Law

Victor Silvers was convicted of the premeditated murder of his estranged wife, Brittney Silvers, who was an active member of the United States Army, and was shot and killed at Fort Campbell, Kentucky. Silvers was also found guilty of attempted murder, domestic violence, violation of a protection order, possession of a firearm by a prohibited person, and the use of a firearm during a crime of violence. He was sentenced to life in prison.The United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky took judicial notice that Fort Campbell was within the United States' special maritime and territorial jurisdiction. Silvers challenged this, arguing that the jury should have determined the jurisdictional status. He also moved to exclude a juror who wore a shirt supporting military veterans and had served in the Navy, claiming potential bias. Additionally, Silvers argued that his mandatory life sentence was unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not err in taking judicial notice of the jurisdictional status of Fort Campbell, as it was a legal question rather than a factual one for the jury. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision to deny Silvers's motion to exclude the juror, as the juror assured impartiality and the voir dire process was deemed adequate. Finally, the court upheld Silvers's mandatory life sentence, citing binding Supreme Court precedent and the Sixth Circuit's own precedent, which did not find such sentences to be cruel and unusual punishment.The Sixth Circuit affirmed both Silvers's conviction and his sentence. View "United States v. Silvers" on Justia Law

Armani Davis-Malone, while on probation for credit-card fraud, began selling prescription pills in Detroit, Michigan. Law enforcement, alerted by an informant, conducted two controlled buys where Davis-Malone sold oxycodone to an undercover agent. Subsequently, federal agents searched his car, finding a fully automatic handgun, over 100 oxycodone pills, and 200 grams of marijuana. Davis-Malone was charged with possessing a firearm as a felon and pleaded guilty. The district court sentenced him to 60 months, below the guidelines range of 70 to 87 months.The Sentencing Commission later amended the guidelines, reducing Davis-Malone’s range to 57 to 71 months. Davis-Malone sought a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), supported by a probation officer’s report and a joint stipulation from both parties recommending a 57-month sentence. Despite this, the district court denied the reduction, stating that the original 60-month sentence was near the lower end of the amended range.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. Davis-Malone argued that the district court erred legally by finding him ineligible for a reduction and abused its discretion by not providing a detailed explanation. The Sixth Circuit found that the district court did not commit a legal error, interpreting the order as a discretionary denial rather than a finding of ineligibility. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion, as it had considered the relevant factors and the simple facts of the case justified the use of a form order. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. View "United States v. Davis-Malone" on Justia Law

George Short was observed by police driving 25 miles per hour over the speed limit and without a car hood. When officers attempted to stop him, he led them on a high-speed chase. Upon his arrest, a rifle was found in his car. Due to his prior felony convictions, Short was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm and subsequently pled guilty. He was sentenced as an armed career criminal under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) due to his prior violent felonies.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee at Greeneville handled the initial proceedings. Short objected to the ACCA enhancement, arguing that the factual basis for his plea did not include an admission that his prior felonies were committed on separate occasions, as required by the ACCA. The district court overruled his objection, relying on Sixth Circuit precedent that allowed the court to determine whether the prior felonies were committed on different occasions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not err in accepting Short’s guilty plea despite the written factual basis not mentioning the separate occasions element. The court found that the indictment, presentence report (PSR), and sentencing hearing provided sufficient evidence that Short’s prior felonies were committed on separate occasions. The court emphasized that Rule 11(b)(3) does not require every element to be included in the written factual basis, and the entire record can be considered to determine if there is a sufficient factual basis for the plea. Consequently, the Sixth Circuit affirmed Short’s ACCA conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Short" on Justia Law

In 2018, Alexander Sittenfeld, a Cincinnati city council member, was involved in a scheme where he solicited campaign donations in exchange for promises of official action. Sittenfeld had conversations with Chinedum Ndukwe, a local developer working with the FBI, and undercover agents posing as investors. Sittenfeld solicited donations from Ndukwe and later from an undercover agent, Rob, in exchange for supporting a property development project at 435 Elm Street. Despite the conversations being recorded, the evidence was not overwhelming. However, a jury found that Sittenfeld solicited or accepted campaign donations in exchange for his promise to support the project.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio convicted Sittenfeld of attempted Hobbs Act extortion and federal-program bribery. Sittenfeld moved for a judgment of acquittal and a new trial, arguing insufficient evidence and constructive amendment of the indictment. The district court denied both motions and sentenced Sittenfeld to sixteen months' imprisonment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. Sittenfeld argued that the evidence was insufficient to prove an explicit quid pro quo and that the indictment was constructively amended. The court held that the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient for a rational jury to find Sittenfeld guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The court also found that the jury instructions, although broader than the indictment, did not result in a constructive amendment. The court affirmed Sittenfeld's conviction, concluding that the evidence supported the jury's verdict and that there was no substantial likelihood that Sittenfeld was convicted of an offense not charged in the indictment. View "United States v. Sittenfeld" on Justia Law

Javi Porter, a lawful permanent resident of the United States and a native of Jamaica, was convicted under Virginia law for possessing with intent to distribute methamphetamine. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) classified this conviction as an aggravated felony and initiated removal proceedings against him. Porter sought review of the final order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which affirmed an immigration judge’s (IJ) denial of his motion to terminate removal proceedings and found him removable as an aggravated felon.The IJ denied Porter’s motion to terminate the removal proceedings, concluding that DHS had proven by clear and convincing evidence that Porter was convicted of an aggravated felony. The IJ sustained the charge of removability and denied Porter’s subsequent motion for reconsideration. The IJ later issued a final summary order finding Porter removable as charged. Porter appealed to the BIA, arguing that the IJ erred in denying his motion to terminate the removal proceedings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Porter’s Virginia drug-trafficking conviction qualifies as an aggravated felony under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The court found that the Virginia statute under which Porter was convicted is divisible by the identity of the controlled substance and applied the modified categorical approach. The court concluded that possession with intent to distribute any amount of methamphetamine is a federal felony under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA). Therefore, Porter’s conviction under Virginia law is a categorical match to a felony offense under the CSA, rendering him removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). The court denied Porter’s petition for review. View "Porter v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Quincy Taylor was convicted by a jury of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. The charges stemmed from an incident where Taylor was involved in a car accident, and a witness, William Howell, testified that Taylor had a bag containing drugs and a firearm. Howell's testimony was the only evidence linking Taylor to the contraband.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky limited Taylor's ability to cross-examine Howell about his criminal history and potential bias. Specifically, the court allowed Taylor to ask if Howell had any felony convictions but prohibited questions about the nature of the conviction, Howell's pending felon-in-possession charge, and any benefits Howell might receive for his cooperation. Taylor argued that these limitations violated his Confrontation Clause rights under the Sixth Amendment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and found that the district court's limitations on cross-examination violated Taylor's constitutional right to confront witnesses. The court determined that the jury did not have sufficient information to assess Howell's potential bias and motive for testifying. The court also found that the error was not harmless, as Howell's testimony was crucial to the prosecution's case, and there was no other evidence linking Taylor to the contraband.As a result, the Sixth Circuit reversed Taylor's convictions and remanded the case for a new trial, holding that the district court's limitations on cross-examination violated Taylor's Confrontation Clause rights and that the error was not harmless. View "United States v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Juan Grogan was convicted by a jury of possessing a firearm as a felon, possessing a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking, and possessing fentanyl with intent to distribute. During his trial, the judge allowed the government to admit testimony about statements Grogan made during a proffer session, where he admitted ownership of drugs, a firearm, and a wallet, and his involvement in a shooting and a kidnapping. Grogan argued on appeal that the admission of these statements was erroneous because the conditions of the proffer agreement were not met.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio denied Grogan's motion to suppress evidence obtained during an inventory search of his vehicle, which led to the discovery of the drugs and firearm. Grogan testified at trial, challenging the government's evidence and the validity of the warrants. The government introduced his proffer statements to rebut his testimony, leading to his conviction on all counts.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and found that the district court erred in admitting several of Grogan's proffer statements. The court held that Grogan's invocation of the Fifth Amendment did not constitute inconsistent testimony that would allow the government to introduce his proffer statements. Additionally, the court found that Grogan's statements questioning the sufficiency of the government's evidence did not contradict his proffer admissions.The Sixth Circuit concluded that the improper admission of Grogan's proffer statements, particularly his admission of drug ownership, was not harmless error. The court determined that the government's heavy reliance on these statements likely influenced the jury's verdict. As a result, the court reversed Grogan's convictions and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "United States v. Grogan" on Justia Law

John Hale pleaded guilty to aggravated sexual battery by unlawful sexual contact in 2010 and was sentenced to eight years of imprisonment and lifetime supervision in Tennessee state court. He was required to register as a sex offender. In 2011, Hale was indicted in the Middle District of Tennessee for traveling out of state and failing to update his sex-offender registration, violating the federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to fifteen months’ imprisonment, consecutive to his state sentence, and ten years of supervised release with special conditions. Hale began his supervised release in June 2018 and violated a condition in January 2020 by consuming alcohol.Hale moved for early termination of his supervised release after serving four years and four months of his ten-year term, citing his compliance with supervision conditions, sex-offender treatment, and support letters. His federal probation officer could not recommend early termination due to office policy, but the United States did not oppose the motion. The district court denied Hale’s motion, commending his behavior but finding it insufficiently exceptional to warrant early termination. Hale appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial under the abuse-of-discretion standard. The appellate court found that the district court had relied on an incorrect legal standard by requiring “exceptionally good behavior” for early termination of supervised release. The correct standard under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1) does not mandate such a threshold. Consequently, the Sixth Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded the case for reconsideration under the proper legal standard. The appellate court did not address Hale’s argument regarding the district court’s factual findings about his state supervision terms. View "United States v. Hale" on Justia Law

Nashaun Drake pleaded guilty to several drug offenses after police found significant quantities of fentanyl, cocaine, methamphetamine, and drug trafficking tools in his apartment. He was charged with five counts of possessing illegal drugs with intent to distribute. At sentencing, the district court classified Drake as a "career offender" based on a prior marijuana conviction, resulting in a 200-month prison sentence.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio determined that Drake's prior marijuana conviction qualified as a predicate offense for the career-offender enhancement under the Sentencing Guidelines. This classification led to a sentencing range of 188 to 235 months, and the court imposed a 200-month sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. Drake argued that his prior marijuana conviction should not have triggered the career-offender enhancement and that his sentence was unreasonable. The court held that binding precedent required the use of a time-of-conviction approach to determine whether a prior offense qualifies as a "controlled substance offense" under the Sentencing Guidelines. Since hemp was included in the drug schedules at the time of Drake's 2016 conviction, his marijuana offense qualified as a controlled substance offense. The court also found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a 200-month sentence, considering Drake's extensive criminal history and the need for deterrence and public protection.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, upholding both the career-offender enhancement and the 200-month sentence. View "United States v. Drake" on Justia Law