Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Mirza called Detective Dare, told Dare that Brown was a drug dealer, and agreed to set up controlled purchases. The first controlled buy occurred in September 2005. Brown was arrested in January 2006, waived his Miranda rights, and admitted in writing that he sold cocaine to Mirza four times. Brown was released from custody. Within weeks, the state issued a criminal complaint and secured an arrest warrant. Brown was unaware of these developments until he was arrested in September 2007, pursuant to an unrelated warrant, and was arraigned. Brown was tried in February 2008. Mirza’s defense theory was that he simply permitted Mirza to use his scale to weigh cocaine that Mirza already possessed. Brown was convicted. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed. Brown sought relief from judgment, arguing that he was denied due process when exculpatory audio recordings were lost during the 20-month delay between his arrest and trial, and speedy trial violations. State courts denied relief, holding that Brown had not demonstrated good cause for failure to raise the issues on direct appeal. A federal district court then rejected Brown’s claims, applying the Barker v. Wingo, factors, to determine that no speedy-trial violation occurred. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that although the delay exceeded a year, the state was at most negligent, Brown failed to assert the right after he became aware of the charges, and, given the overwhelming evidence against him, Brown had not shown prejudice. View "Brown v. Romanowski" on Justia Law

In Wayne County, Michigan, Grundy was Assistant County Executive; Executive Director of HealthChoice, a municipal corporation chartered to promote the health and welfare of area residents; and Division Director of the County’s Patient Care Management System, which administered its programs through ProCare Plus. Grundy’s friend, Griffin, formed businesses to provide advertising and electronic medical records services to HealthChoice and ProCare Plus. Griffin would inflate the price and “kickback” the excess to Grundy. According to the government, the benefit to Grundy totaled $1,381,766. He pleaded guilty to honest services wire fraud arising from one of his three schemes, 18 U.S.C. 1343 & 1346, waiving the right to appeal if “the sentence imposed does not exceed the 210-month maximum allowed by” the agreement, which was the top end of the Guidelines range proposed by the government based on the loss associated with his conduct. Grundy proposed a range of 37-46 months, arguing that the loss amount associated with his offense of conviction was $400,000. The court imposed a 90-month term. The government obtained a restitution order for $1,380,767; Grundy argued that restitution should be capped at the $400,000 associated with the offense of conviction. The Sixth Circuit dismissed an appeal, holding that the waiver applied to the restitution order. View "United States v. Michael Grundy" on Justia Law

Defendant, a 32-year-old black man, has prior state court convictions for unlawful possession of a weapon, resisting arrest, and possession of a prohibited weapon. In 2014, Defendant was arrested by Memphis Police for possession of an assault rifle. He was convicted of being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The Sixth Circuit vacated, reversing denial of a “Batson” challenge. During voir dire, the government used peremptory strikes on five prospective jurors—all of whom were black. Defendant made a prima facie showing of discriminatory purpose. The government justified striking the last of the black prospective jurors, Dandridge, because he had changed jobs four months prior and had eight children; the government was purportedly “concerned about his ability to focus on the case at hand and listen and be attentive in a trial.” The government did not delve deeper into Dandridge’s answers by, for instance, asking about his child care arrangements, or the reasons he changed jobs. A comparative juror analysis shows that the government did not express concerns about the ability of similarly-situated white jurors to focus throughout the trial despite their large number of children and inconsistent work history. View "United States v. Atkins" on Justia Law

Nashville Detectives travelled to the residence where Abernathy lived with his girlfriend, searched the outdoor trash cans, and found: “Marijuana roaches with Marijuana residue inside;” “Several plastic vacuumed packed heat sealed bags consistent to those used to package marijuana for resale containing marijuana residue with T22 markings;” “USPS certified mail receipts addressed to Jimmy Jail Abernathy 5809 Tru Long Ct. Antioch TN;” and mail belonging to Abernathy’s girlfriend. Detective Particelli applied for a warrant, stating in his affidavit: I have received information that the occupants of 5809 Tru Long ... have been and are currently engaging in illegal drug activity. The search revealed large quantities of cash, marijuana, cocaine, and firearms. After the court denied a motion to suppress, Abernathy entered a conditional guilty plea to two counts of possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense, 18 U.S.C. 924(c) and possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The Sixth Circuit reversed denial of the motion to suppress and vacated Abernathy’s conviction. The trial court found Particelli’s statement that he had “received information” false; marijuana roaches and T2-laced plastic bags recovered from the garbage were insufficient to create a fair probability that drugs would be found in Abernathy’s home. View "United States v. Abernathy" on Justia Law

Pryor was charged with conspiring to distribute heroin. Interested persons would call to speak to “Daffy Duck” and negotiate a purchase. “Daffy” would then give a location for the transaction and inform members of the conspiracy. Deputy Shattuck listened in on four telephone calls between “Daffy” and an informant. Following the informant's drug purchase, police watched the residence where the sale occurred. While a search warrant was being drafted, Pryor entered the house. Police observed Pryor through the window as he picked up money, then returned to his car and left. They followed the car until it was stopped for traffic violations. Pryor had a pistol inside his waistband, which was properly licensed; wads of money in his pockets; and, in his car, had a cell phone that rang when the “Daffy” number was dialed. Pryor made 33 phone calls while in jail, which were recorded. Officer Shattuck concluded that Pryor’s voice matched the “Daffy” voice. After additional controlled buys, Pryor was re-arrested and, at a hearing, was uncooperative and asserted “sovereign citizen” status. Citing Pryor’s “bizarre” behavior, the magistrate ordered a competency evaluation. Pryor objected to appointed counsel (Upshaw), was found competent, refused to answer questions, and objected to Upshaw acting on his behalf. At later appearances, Pryor continued to assert his desire to appear in propria persona and contest the court’s jurisdiction but refused to cooperate. Pryor was convicted and sentenced to 235 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, upholding a finding that Pryor had waived his right of self-representation by his behavior, the admission of voice-identification testimony, and sentencing enhancements imposed for Pryor’s possession of a gun. View "United States v. Pryor" on Justia Law

Officers went to execute a search warrant at Price’s Grand Rapids home. Multiple informants had reported that Price was dealing large quantities of heroin. The officers had a description of Price’s vehicles and knew that he was a six-time narcotics felon. Three officers sat in a police-surveillance van while other officers sat in an unmarked vehicle on streets adjoining the house. Price’s truck drove past the van and stopped in the snowbound street, partially blocking it. Deputy Frederick saw Price exit the truck and walk to an idling vehicle. Price leaned his head, hands, arms, and shoulders into the vehicle—a motion that, in Frederick’s experience, indicated a drug transaction. Price spotted an officer, then fled, using a truck parked in the alley behind his house. Officers stopped Price a block away; they searched his house and found drug-dealing paraphernalia, but no illegal drugs. They found documents showing that Price rented a mailbox and a parking place occupied by a large van from a nearby storage facility. Three hours after his arrest, Price admitted that the van was his and that he kept guns there. Price consented to a search of the van, in which Frederick found an AK-47, three handguns, and 200 grams of cocaine. Convicted, Price was sentenced to 324 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of Price’s motion to suppress. Price’s arrest was lawful and did not vitiate his later consent to search his van. View "United States v. Price" on Justia Law

A confidential source met Detective Best and stated that two Hispanic men in a silver Lincoln Aviator were moving narcotics from the Chatham Village apartment complex. Best set up surveillance in an unmarked car; within 45 minutes, Best saw a silver SUV exit Chatham Village. Best followed and saw that it was a silver Lincoln Aviator. At a well-lit intersection, Best pulled up and observed what he believed were two Hispanic males in the vehicle. Best called Officer Phalen and relayed to dispatch, to Phalen, and to his partner (Trivette) that he had witnessed the driver fail to properly signal a turn. They followed the Aviator until they saw it swerve across double-yellow lines. Phalen turned on his emergency lights. The Aviator pulled over. Phalen spoke with the driver, Calderon, who had no valid driver’s license. He observed Calderon visibly shaking. Trivette, on the passenger side, noted that Pacheco was not wearing his seatbelt. Trivette asked Pacheco for identification, but Pacheco did not respond, instead rummaging through the glove compartment and glancing around the vehicle. Concerned about a possible weapon, Trivette asked Pacheco to exit the vehicle. During a pat down, Trivette felt “a large chunk of money on his right cargo pocket” and saw the top of a brick-like object, wrapped in brown paper and tape, protruding out of the top of Pacheco’s left cargo pocket. Pacheco had $3,000 in currency and a half-kilogram of brick cocaine in his pockets. The Sixth Circuit affirmed that, based on the totality of the circumstances, the officer had reasonable suspicion to justify the pat down and that the cocaine and currency were properly seized pursuant to the plain-view and plain-feel doctrines. View "United States v. Pacheco" on Justia Law

While on parole, Ritchey allegedly threatened another individual. A parole officer visited Ritchey’s home and found a handgun. He pleaded guilty as a felon in possession. The PSR identified six prior convictions for breaking and entering a building with the intent to commit a felony or larceny therein, a felony under Michigan law, and asserted each qualified as a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e) (ACCA). After a stolen firearm​ enhancement, Ritchey’s adjusted offense level was 16, but became 33 with the armed career criminal designation. Applying a reduction for acceptance of responsibility and an adjustment because Ritchey was on parole resulted in a sentencing range of 168-210 months. With ACCA’s mandatory minimum, the range became 180-210. Ritchey argued that the Michigan convictions did not qualify as “violent felonies” because the statute does not fit ACCA's definition of a “generic burglary.” The prosecution argued that, while the statute is broader than a “generic burglary,” it is divisible so that the court could determine whether Ritchey committed a generic burglary under the modified categorical approach. Felony informations for Ritchey’s prior offenses demonstrated that he “broke into and entered a … barn, a garage, or a store.” The district court found that “the Michigan statute arguably includes some things that would qualify as generic burglary and arguably some things that don’t,” such as breaking and entering a tent, but agreed with the prosecution and imposed a sentence of 180 months. The Sixth Circuit remanded for resentencing without consideration of ACCA. The Michigan statute’s terms are broader than generic burglary, and it is not divisible under the 2016 Supreme Court holding, Mathis v. United States. View "United States v. Ritchey" on Justia Law

In 2010, Bonds pled guilty to a drug-conspiracy charge and was sentenced to 120 months’ imprisonment, which represented a significant downward variance from his guideline range of 210 to 262 months. In 2015, the district court denied Bonds’s motion for a sentence reduction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2), on the erroneous ground that Bonds had been sentenced to the statutory mandatory minimum, when, in fact, there was no applicable mandatory minimum sentence. On appeal, Bonds argued for the first time that the retroactive Amendment 782 (lowering the base offense level for most drug-trafficking crimes) opens the door to applying the non-retroactive Amendment 742, which would change his criminal history from a category of VI to V. Amendment 742 struck a Guidelines provision that stated: “Add 2 points if the defendant committed the instant offense less than two years after release from imprisonment on a sentence counted under (a) or (b)." The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. Only if Amendment 742 applied in conjunction with Amendment 782 would Bonds be eligible for a sentence reduction; courts do not have the authority to consider the non-retroactive Amendment 742 in determining eligibility for a 3582(c)(2) reduction, View "United States v. Bonds" on Justia Law

In 1986, a jury found that Hutton murdered Mitchell and attempted to kill another friend. Hutton was convicted of aggravated murder with two death specifications. Following a remand, the Court of Appeals determined that the death sentence was appropriate. In 1996, Hutton filed a state petition for post-conviction relief; the court denied relief without an evidentiary hearing. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed. The Ohio Supreme Court declined further review. In 2001, Hutton unsuccessfully filed a second post-conviction petition. The Ohio Supreme Court again declined further review. Hutton unsuccessfully applied to reopen his direct appeal, contending ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. In 2005, Hutton filed a federal habeas petition, which he amended in 2011. Without conducting an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied relief. The Sixth Circuit denied five of his claim, but reversed with respect to whether a state court’s independent review of a death sentence during sentencing can cure any omission in a jury instruction. A fundamental miscarriage of justice resulted from the failure to define “aggravating circumstances” in the jury instructions. The jury, without proper instructions, could not have made a finding that aggravating circumstances existed; the harshest sentence Hutton could possibly have received without that instruction was life. View "Hutton v. Mitchell" on Justia Law