Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 2007, Harper, then 70 years old and partially paralyzed, allowed McKinney to move into his Michigan home in exchange for chores. On October 22, 2009, Harper's caregiver left the men by themselves. McKinney shot Harper at point-blank range while Harper slept, killing him. McKinney fled in Harper’s van. Police arrested him in Illinois following a traffic stop during which McKinney claimed to be Harper. Officers searched the van and discovered two handguns, including the one used to kill Harper, and Harper’s wallet. After reading McKinney his Miranda rights, officers asked for “his side of the story.” McKinney replied: Well if you don’t mind, I just assume wait until I get a public defender or whatever. The officer stated: Well that’s fine, but like I said. McKinney said, “We can talk over all the other circumstances” and proceeded to confess. McKinney successfully moved to suppress the confession. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed, holding that McKinney did not unequivocally request counsel. McKinney was convicted of first-degree murder after his videotaped confession was played at trial. A federal district court conditionally granted McKinney’s habeas petition. The Sixth Circuit reversed: the district court failed to show the requisite deference to state court decisions on habeas review. The Michigan Supreme Court’s decision was not an unreasonable application of established federal law. View "McKinney v. Hoffner" on Justia Law

In 1996 (Free Press I), the Sixth Circuit held that the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552, requires government agencies to honor requests for the booking photographs of criminal defendants who have appeared in court during ongoing proceedings. Despite that holding, the U.S. Marshals Service denied the Free Press’s 2012 request for the booking photographs of Detroit-area police officers indicted on federal charges. The district court, bound by Free Press I, granted summary judgment to the newspaper in the ensuing lawsuit. A Sixth Circuit panel affirmed in 2015, while urging the full court to reconsider the merits of Free Press I. The court subsequently reversed, overruling Free Press I. FOIA Exemption 7(C) protects a non-trivial privacy interest in keeping “personal facts away from the public eye.” Individuals do not forfeit their interest in maintaining control over information that has been made public in some form. Criminal defendants do not forfeit their interest in controlling private information while their cases remain pending. View "Detroit Free Press v. Dep't of Justice" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Jones of conspiracy to distribute heroin, 21 U.S.C. 846, three counts of distribution of heroin, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), and three counts of aiding and abetting distribution, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). A probation office initially attributed to Jones at least five but less than 10 grams of heroin. The government objected, stating that the quantity did “not reflect the scale of the offense.” U.S.S.G. 2D1.1 n.5. Based on a confidential informant’s testimony that he purchased half a gram of heroin each day for six months, the government asserted that Jones’s relevant conduct included 60 grams of heroin. After testimony from the officer who handled the confidential informant, the court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Jones’s conduct involved at least 40.3 grams, but stated: I don’t think ... that there’s clear and convincing evidence that it’s 40 grams. The court calculated Jones’s guidelines range as 63-78 months and sentenced Jones to 78 months of imprisonment . The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that due process does not require sentencing courts to employ a standard higher than preponderance-of-the-evidence, even with respect to large enhancements. The Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in Alleyne, that any fact that increases the mandatory minimum sentence must be submitted to the jury, did not address the standard of proof for judicial fact-finding at sentencing. View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law

In 1992, Messinger was murdered while working at a convenience store overnight. Hill surrendered and provided information, with which police obtained a search warrant for Carter’s apartment, where they recovered the murder weapon. During a recorded interview, Carter eventually admitted that he was the shooter. Carter was a heavy user of crack cocaine; Hill was his supplier. He admitted that he, Hill, and another had robbed “a lot” of drug dealers that evening. Carter maintained that he did not aim at Messinger, but fired a shot to scare her. Carter was referred to specialists. The evaluations indicated “malingering to avoid prosecution.” At sentencing, the defense's mitigation expert, Dr. Chiappone,spoke of trauma that Carter had experienced during childhood, but also mentioned his drug use, abuse of women, interest in violence, and animal cruelty. Jurors indicated that they could not hear the witness and later requested a transcript of Chiappone’s testimony, which was denied. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed Carter’s conviction and death sentence; the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari. State courts denied post-conviction relief; the Supreme Court again denied certiorari. In 1999, after filing a federal habeas petition, Carter unsuccessfully returned to state court, under Ohio R. App. 26(B). Carter filed another unsuccessful 26(B) application in 2000. In 2003, Carter filed another state petition, arguing that he was mentally retarded. After a remand, Carter voluntarily dismissed that petition in 2005. In 2013, following a remand, the federal district court denied a stay to allow Carter to introduce new evidence in state court and denied habeas relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments related to counsel’s eliciting unfavorable testimony from a mitigation expert and failure to call Carter's mother as a witness during the penalty phase and failure to insist that the jury receive a transcript of Chiappone’s testimony. View "Carter v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

Twelve agents went to Rafidi’s Warren, Ohio, home to execute a search warrant and “pounded” on Rafidi’s door. An agent, looking through a window, saw Rafidi pick up a handgun. The agent yelled, “put the gun down.” Rafidi replied, “‘[Y]ou mother fuckers.’” According to the agent, “the door swung open,” and Rafidi was holding a gun pointed at the agent. Detective Bordonaro was familiar with Rafidi from the community and yelled “George, it is Chris . . . . from the Police Department.” According to Bordonaro, the door flew open and a hand appeared with the gun pointing “straight out the door.” Bordonaro fired his weapon, but no bullets struck Rafidi. Rafidi emerged without his weapon and was taken into custody. According to Rafidi, he had taken pain medication before the incident, fallen asleep, and “was horribly awoken,” “afraid for [his] life,” so he grabbed his gun. Rafidi testified that he could not hear anyone yelling, nor could he see out. Rafidi was convicted of forcibly assaulting, resisting, opposing, impeding, and interfering with a federal law-enforcement officer, 18 U.S.C. 111(a)(1) and (b), and of using and brandishing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). The court sentenced Rafidi to 10 months of imprisonment (Count 1) followed by 84 months on Count 2. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that violation of section 111 cannot constitute a “crime of violence” for purposes of section 924(c); that the government violated its Brady obligations, that the district court erred in failing to investigate a juror sleeping during his trial; and that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment. View "United States v. Rafidi" on Justia Law

During a 2002 cocaine sale, Thomas held a handgun to Burdette's head and demanded the cocaine. When Burdette refused, Thomas shot him three times in the chest, then fled. Burdette later died. In 2004, Thomas was convicted of murder and sentenced to 40 years in prison. In 2006, the Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed. Thomas unsuccessfully moved to vacate on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel under Ky.R.Crim.P. 11.42(3), which requires that the movant “state all grounds for holding the sentence invalid of which the movant has knowledge.” In 2009, Thomas again sought post-conviction relief, alleging that he had recently discovered evidence (Burdette’s funeral program) that could have been used to impeach testimony. The court denied Thomas’s filing on the merits; as to his Rule 11.42 motion, the court held that the prosecution’s alleged failure to produce evidence had not prejudiced Thomas; as to his Rule 60.02 motion, the court held that Thomas’s allegations did not justify relief. In 2013, the Kentucky Supreme Court denied review. The district court dismissed his federal application, concluding that Thomas’s 2009 motion did not toll the federal habeas statute of limitations because it was “not properly filed.” The Sixth Circuit reversed. Whether an application for state post-conviction relief was properly filed does not depend whether its claims are meritorious and free of procedural bar. Thomas’s 60.02 motion was rejected on the merits, not because it failed to comply with rules governing filings, and was “properly filed” for purposes of 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(2). View "Thomas v. Meko" on Justia Law

Shuti, from Albania, entered the U.S. as a permanent resident in 2008 at age 13. In 2014, Shuti and some friends committed a “larceny of marijuana.” Shuti pleaded guilty to felony unarmed robbery, defined as “larceny of any money or other property” accomplished by “force or violence against any person” or “assault[ing] or put[ting] the person in fear.” Mich. Comp. Laws 750.530. Shuti was sentenced to more than two years in prison. DHS initiated removal, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2). A non-citizen convicted of an aggravated felony after admission is ineligible for most discretionary relief; “aggravated felony” is defined as including “a crime of violence (as defined in section 16 of Title 18 ....) for which the term of imprisonment [is] at least one year,” 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F). The cross-referenced definition of “crime of violence” is: an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another, or any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used. Shuti unsuccessfully applied for discretionary relief, claiming that his attorney “never discussed” the immigration consequences of his plea. The BIA affirmed, stating that unarmed robbery was “categorically a crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. 16(b). Meanwhile, the Supreme Court held the Armed Career Criminal Act’s residual definition of “violent felony,” 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), void for vagueness. The BIA concluded that the void-for-vagueness doctrine did not apply to “civil” deportations. The Sixth Circuit vacated the order of removal, concluding that the wide-ranging inquiry required by the two statutory phrases was the same, so the immigration code’s residual clause is also unconstitutionally vague. View "Shuti v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Cruz was to host a party in his village in Oaxaca, Mexico on New Year’s Day 2006. He went to the municipal hall to deliver invitations, where a man approached and shot him and a bystander. Both men died. The murderer fled the scene. Cruz’s family accused Martinez, then a U.S. permanent resident (a citizen since 2010) whose family lived in the village. Cruz’s widow and parents met with Martinez’s wife and brother before a town clerk and signed an agreement stating that Martinez had “committed the homicide” and that “the family of the perpetrator” would pay 50,000 pesos for “the expenses incurred,” so that “the matter shall be closed.” Days later, two eyewitnesses made sworn statements identifying Martinez as the murderer. An Oaxacan judge issued an arrest warrant. Martinez returned to Tennessee. In 2009, an American consular official asked about the status of Martinez’s arrest warrant. The Oaxacan court responded that it was “still pending and executable.” In 2012, the Mexican government filed a diplomatic note with the State Department, requesting his “provisional arrest” pursuant to the extradition treaty between the two nations. U.S. authorities arrested Martinez about a year later; Mexican officials filed a formal extradition request in 2013. Complying with the procedures identified in 18 U.S.C. 3184-3186, the Secretary of State filed the request with a federal magistrate judge, who certified that Martinez could be extradited. The Sixth Circuit affirmed rejection of Martinez’s habeas corpus action. The extradition will not violate the statute of limitations or his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. View "Cruz-Martinez v. United States" on Justia Law

In 1998, Stansell pleaded guilty to sex-related felonies. The Ohio trial court sentenced him to 20 years to life in prison; his direct appeals were unsuccessful. In 2002, a federal district court denied his habeas petition, 28 U.S.C. 2254. In 2013, Stansell returned to state court, seeking to vacate the portion of his sentence that designated him a “sexually violent predator.” A state appeals court affirmed denial of his petition, but ruled that the trial court had erred when, during Stansell’s original sentencing, it failed to impose a term of post-release control, and remanded “for the limited purpose of properly advising and imposing upon Stansell the requisite period of postrelease control.” The trial court imposed five years of post-release control with specific conditions. Stansell then returned to federal court, seeking authorization to file a second or successive habeas petition (28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(3)(A), again claiming that the state court violated his due process rights when it classified him as a sexually violent predator during his original sentencing. The Third Circuit held that the petition was not subject to the limits imposed on a “second or successive” petition and transferred the matter to the district court for consideration as an initial petition. View "In re: Stansell" on Justia Law

Investigators used peer-to-peer software to download child pornography from defendant’s computer. They later confiscated his computer and found 19 videos and 93 images depicting child pornography. Defendant was charged with receiving and distributing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(2), and possessing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(5)(B). Although defendant signed custodial statements admitting to searching for and downloading child pornography, he disavowed these statements during his trial testimony. Following the jury’s determination of guilt, the judge polled the jury: State what you believe an appropriate sentence is.’ Jurors’ responses ranged from zero to 60 months’ incarceration, with a mean of 14.5 months and median of 8 months. With one exception, every juror recommended a sentence less than half of the five-year mandatory minimum accompanying defendant’s offenses. Over the government’s objection, the district judge considered the jury poll as “one factor” in fashioning defendant’s sentence. The court imposed concurrent five-year sentences, although his calculated sentencing guidelines range was 262 to 327 months, above the statutory 20-year maximum for his offenses. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that it was satisfied with the district court’s discussion of the sentencing factors in granting defendant a downward variance. View "United States v. Collins" on Justia Law