Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 2008, Huffman found nude pictures of her 12-year-old daughter on a camera belonging to her boyfriend, Thompson. Thompson admitted taking the photos. Huffman turned the camera over to the police. That same day, the police interviewed Thompson, recording the interview on a videotape. In the interview, Thompson admitted taking the sexually explicit pictures of the child and touching the child’s breast and vagina. Thompson denied digitally penetrating the child. Charged with first-degree criminal sexual conduct, Thompson went to trial. In his opening statement, defense counsel promised that Thompson would testify and deny penetration, but counsel never called Thompson to testify, instead relying on Thompson’s statements in a taped police interview to tell his side of the story. After trial, Thompson asserted an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim based on defense counsel’s broken promise, which the Michigan courts rejected. The district court then denied Thompson’s habeas petition based on the same claim. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Michigan Court of Appeals reasonably concluded that counsel’s failure to deliver Thompson’s live testimony did not prejudice Thompson’s defense. View "Thompson v. Rapelje" on Justia Law

Franklin lived with his grandparents and uncle to escape his alcoholic mother’s abuse. As a teenager he began manifesting bizarre behavior and using marijuana. In 1997, when Franklin was 19 years old, his relatives told him to move out. After severely beating them, Franklin shot and killed his grandmother; set fire to the house, leaving his grandfather and uncle to die; then fled to Tennessee. He was apprehended and confessed, claiming his uncle had raped him. The trial court found Franklin competent. During trial, Franklin engaged in disruptive and inappropriate behavior. The jury found Franklin guilty and recommended the death penalty. On appeal, Franklin unsuccessfully argued that his attorneys were ineffective for failing to request a new competency hearing during trial and that the court should have ordered a midtrial competency hearing sua sponte because an expert witness testified that Franklin suffered from paranoid schizophrenia. The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari in 2003. Franklin sought state post-conviction relief, asserting new evidence: affidavits indicating that Franklin was not competent. The trial court rejected the claim as barred by res judicata. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed on the merits. In 2012, the Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of federal habeas relief. Franklin then sought relief from judgment under FRCP 60(b), citing the Supreme Court’s decisions in Martinez (2012), and Trevino (2013). The district court denied Franklin’s motion on the merits. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Franklin’s Rule 60(b) motion is a “second or successive” habeas application that the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider without prior authorization. View "Franklin v. Jenkins" on Justia Law

Kruger pleaded guilty to possessing pseudoephedrine with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 841(c)(1). Kruger was sentenced in 2009. Under the 2008 U.S.S.G. Kruger’s recommended sentencing range was 188-235 months of imprisonment. The court accepted the calculation, but varied downward and imposed a sentence of 120 months of imprisonment, reasoning that the proposed range overstated the seriousness of Kruger’s offense and the significance of his criminal history. Five years later, the Sentencing Commission amended the Guidelines, so that Kruger’s recommended range would have been 151-188 months of imprisonment. Kruger challenged a 2011 amendment, which prohibits the retroactive application of Guidelines amendments to defendants, like Kruger, whose sentences are for terms “less than the minimum of the amended guideline range.” Kruger claimed that the limitation violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The Sixth Circuit affirmed rejection of his claim. Kruger has no constitutional right to the retroactive application of a more lenient version of the Guidelines. The amendment does not have the effect “of increasing the measure of punishment,” but only forecloses the possibility of a reduced sentence on the basis of an amendment that did not even exist at the time Kruger was sentenced. View "United States v. Kruger" on Justia Law

On November 17, 2015, the district court entered an order denying Smotherman’s “Motion to Correct Error” filed under FRCP 60(a) in his closed criminal case. To meet the 14-day deadline, any notice of appeal needed to be filed by December 1, 2015, Fed.R.App.P. 4(b), 26(a). Smotherman’s notice of appeal, dated November 25, 2015, was officially filed by the district court on December 2, 2015, one business day after the appellate filing period had expired. The proof of service declaration accompanying the motion was signed and executed on November 25, 2016. The government filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that Smotherman’s notice of appeal was untimely on its face. The Sixth Circuit denied that motion, reasoning that under the long-established prison mailbox rule, a pro se prisoner’s notice of appeal is deemed “filed at the time [pro se prisoner] delivered it to the prison authorities for forwarding to the court clerk.” The rule is supported by important public policy considerations that are unique to unrepresented, incarcerated individuals. View "United States v. Smotherman" on Justia Law

In 2009, Beckham pleaded guilty without a plea agreement to charges of conspiring to distribute more than 500 grams of cocaine and an unspecified amount of ecstasy. The presentence report relied on the 2009 version of the Sentencing Guidelines. The district court determined that Beckham’s total offense level was 30 and that his criminal-history category was six, resulting in a Guidelines range of 168–210 months’ imprisonment. The court departed downward under U.S.S.G. 4A1.3 to a criminal-history category of four, finding that the Guidelines overstated the severity of Beckham’s criminal past, and sentenced Beckham to 135 months’ imprisonment. In 2014, the Sentencing Commission retroactively lowered the base-offense level for most drug crimes, including Beckham’s. Beckham moved to modify his sentence under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2). Meanwhile, the Commission had issued Amendment 759, which “preclude[s] district courts from reapplying any departure or variance in a sentence reduction” and forbids courts from reducing a sentence below an amended Guidelines range, with one narrow exception. The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of the motion. Because Beckham’s current sentence is below the low end of his amended Guidelines range (140 months), he is ineligible for a further reduction. View "United States v. Beckham" on Justia Law

Shimel pled guilty to second-degree murder and possession of a firearm in the commission of a felony in the shooting death of her husband. After sentencing, the trial court conducted a “Ginther” hearing and concluded that Shimel’s attorney was ineffective for failing to investigate a battered spouse self-defense theory and granted her motion to withdraw her plea. The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed, stating that the trial court impermissibly substituted its judgment for that of counsel on a matter of strategy. On collateral review, the federal district court denied Shimel’s claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to spend sufficient time consulting with her and for advising her to plead guilty rather than taking the case to trial and presenting a battered spouse self-defense theory. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Shimel did not establish prejudice. A reasonable defendant in Shimel’s situation, charged with open murder, would have accepted the plea, in light of the prosecutor’s stance that, even with expert testimony on battered spouse syndrome, he would not have reduced the charge to manslaughter. Shimel failed to establish a reasonable probability that expert testimony would have improved her result. Michigan law only permits a defendant to plead battered spouse syndrome as part of a self-defense claim. Shimel’s husband suffered nine gunshot wounds. Seven entered his body through his back. There was evidence that the shooting was precipitated by financial problems View "Shimel v. Warren" on Justia Law

Crangle agreed to plead guilty to rape with a recommended sentence of life imprisonment and parole eligibility after 10 years. Crangle acknowledged, “I have been informed that . . . after my release from prison I [May__ or Will__] be supervised under post-release control, R.C. 2967.28, which could last up to 5 years,” with a checkmark after “Will.” At the sentencing hearing, the judge and Crangle’s attorney incorrectly informed him that he would be subject to “straight parole” and not post-release control. The sentencing entry did not refer to post-release control. The Ohio Court of Appeals rejected an argument that his counsel provided ineffective assistance by encouraging him to plead guilty rather than no contest. Because Crangle did not appeal, his conviction became final in December 2008. In June 2010, the Ohio Supreme Court ordered a trial judge who “failed to include in the sentencing entry any term of postrelease control,” to issue a judgment in compliance with the statute. In November 2010, the court denied Crangle’s motion to withdraw his plea based on that case and ordered a correction to the judgment, which was backdated to Crangle’s initial sentencing. The court of appeals affirmed denial of the motion in November 2011. The Ohio Supreme Court denied leave to appeal on April 4, 2012 and in January 2013. Crangle placed a federal habeas petition in the prison mail on March 28, 2013, which was docketed on April 15, 2013, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and due process violations. The district court dismissed Crangle’s petition as untimely. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the state-court order imposing post-release control was a new judgment, that reset AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations. View "Crangle v. Kelly" on Justia Law

Six years ago, illegal immigrant Canelas-Amador was charged in Tennessee state court with felony aggravated assault. Canelas-Amador signed a “Waiver of Trial by Jury and Acceptance of Plea of Guilty.” The court approved the agreement. Before the court could enter judgment or pronounce a sentence, immigration authorities took Canelas-Amador into custody, deporting him. When Canelas-Amador failed to appear for a presentence interview, the Tennessee court issued a bench warrant. Canelas-Amador reentered the U.S. illegally, pled guilty to illegal reentry in Texas, and was sentenced to one year of imprisonment. In 2015, he was arrested in Tennessee. He pled guilty to illegal reentry. The district court imposed a sentence of 57 months’ imprisonment, finding that the state court order constituted a “conviction for a felony that is . . . a crime of violence,” mandating a 16-point enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). The Guideline does not define “conviction.” The court looked to 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(48)(A), which refers to a formal judgment of guilt of the alien entered by a court or, if adjudication of guilt has been withheld, where a judge or jury has found the alien guilty or the alien has entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or has admitted sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilt, and the judge has ordered some punishment, penalty, or restraint. The Sixth Circuit reversed. A plea agreement approved in a form order falls short of “a formal judgment of guilt.” View "United States v. Canelas-Amador" on Justia Law

Sargent pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. He received an enhanced (327-month) sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) based on convictions for arson; first-degree wanton endangerment; trafficking more than five pounds of marijuana; and first-degree rape. The Sixth Circuit affirmed application of the enhancement in 2012. Sargent filed his first 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion in 2014, claiming that it was error for the court, rather than a jury, to enhance his sentence based on his convictions, citing the Supreme Court’s 2013 decision, Alleyne v. United States. The district court denied the motion; the Sixth Circuit denied a certificate of appealability. In a second motion, Sargent cited Johnson v. United States (2015), in which the Supreme Court invalidated the “residual clause” of the ACCA as unconstitutionally vague. Sargent claimed that the district court ruled that his conviction for wanton endangerment fell within the residual clause and that his conviction for arson has been reversed and cannot qualify as a predicate offense. The Sixth Circuit authorized the district court to consider the petition, concluding that Sargent had made a prima facie showing that his claim relies on “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.” View "In re: Sargent" on Justia Law

Tanner, Becker, and unindicted co-conspirators collaborated to obtain a mortgage and two lines of credit on an Ohio house, using fraudulent financial information. The primary lender lost $670,000. The other banks lost $250,000 and $350,000. Tanner also scammed two companies to obtain new vehicles. Tanner and Becker were charged with conspiracy to commit bank fraud and three counts of bank fraud. Tanner was also charged with mail fraud for his fraudulent car-loan applications. Tanner pled guilty to all counts. The prosecutor stipulated that Tanner was not agreeing that the “leader” enhancement applied and that the parties would argue that issue at sentencing. The PSR asserted that Tanner “was an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor” of the bank fraud under U.S.S.G. 3B1.1(c). Tanner’s counsel argued that unindicted co-conspirators fed the bank-fraud scheme to Tanner, who “got swept up.” The court applied the role enhancement and a three-level decrease for acceptance of responsibility, yielding a Guidelines range of 63–78 months. Two of his seven criminal history points were attributable to a state-court criminal case that included convictions for felonious assault and domestic violence. After accounting for the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors, the court sentenced Tanner to 60 months’ imprisonment, plus $1.3 million in restitution. The Sixth Circuit vacated. Tanner is entitled to resentencing because he was erroneously assessed two criminal history points for a state-court case instead of one point. View "United States v. Tanner" on Justia Law