Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Cooperating witness, “DEA1,” provided information concerning Middleton’s heroin trafficking, including phone numbers DEA1 used to contact Middleton. DEA1 identified Middleton’s residence as the drug distribution point and set up a controlled buy. Middleton agreed to deliver the heroin, stating he would leave in “ten minutes.” A Denali arrived at Middleton’s residence. Men left minutes later with a large, dark-colored object, which was placed in a Silverado that had been parked at the residence. Both vehicles headed toward the meeting area. Police stopped the Silverado. The sole occupant was Woods, driving on a suspended license; he verbally consented to a search, which revealed a black tool case, containing a substance that field-tested as heroin. Troopers also stopped the Denali, driven by Middleton. Brown was a passenger, in possession of $4,813, cash. Officers recovered cell phones during an inventory search, including one DEA1 had used to contact Middleton. DEA obtained a warrant to search Brown’s Detroit residence. The Sixth Circuit initially affirmed, but in an amended opinion, vacated, Brown’s convictions for possession with intent to distribute marijuana, possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking, and possession of a firearm after a felony conviction. The warrant affidavit supplied a tenuous nexus between drug trafficking; under the totality of the circumstances, the warrant was issued without probable cause and the good-faith exception did not apply. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

In 2010, Eggers fired four shots into a home where he thought his rival, Bryant, was staying. A bullet struck and killed Snyder, the woman both men loved, sparing Bryant. Eggers pled guilty to felony murder. During allocution, Eggers said: “I’d like to apologize to the family. You know I loved her. You know I didn’t do this. I didn’t do this. I love you, mom. I don’t know. That’s it. I don’t know what else to say.” Days later, Eggers tried to withdraw his plea. He claimed that this “assertion of innocence” made his guilty plea involuntary, suggested that he was actually innocent, and required the state court to conduct an “Alford” hearing to ascertain the voluntariness of his plea and to ensure that there was evidence supporting his plea. The state courts upheld the guilty plea. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rejection of Eggers’ federal habeas petition, holding that the state courts did not unreasonably apply clearly established Supreme Court precedent or unreasonably determine the facts in Eggers’ case. View "Eggers v. Warden, Lebanon Corr. Inst." on Justia Law

Giles was convicted of second-degree manslaughter in 2007. The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed his conviction in an opinion dated October 21, 2010. Under Kentucky Rule 76.30(2)(a), the opinion was considered final 21 days later (November 12, 2010), as reflected by a docket notation labeled “finality.” Giles did not seek certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court, but filed a state post-conviction petition on February 23, 2011, 34 days into the one-year limitations period for his federal habeas petition. That limitations period was tolled while Giles’s state petition was pending, leaving 331 days. The state Supreme Court denied discretionary review on May 15, 2013. On May 16, the limitations period began to run, Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a); Giles had until Monday, April 14, 2014, to file. On May 1, 2014, Giles filed his federal habeas petition, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. The court found Giles’s petition untimely and that equitable tolling was not appropriate. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, the limitations period begins to run from the latest of four dates—in this case “the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review,” 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)(A). Delayed finality under Kentucky’s procedure did not entitle Giles to an additional 21 days. View "Giles v. Beckstrom" on Justia Law

McBride signed a plea agreement after being charged in five jurisdictions with six counts of bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. 2113(a), (d). The agreement included an “understand[ing]” that McBride would be sentenced as a career offender because “he ha[d] at least two prior crime of violence convictions,” USSG 4B1.1(a). The presentence report recommended designating McBride a career offender based on two prior convictions for bank robbery. McBride’s sentencing memorandum asked the court to depart downward from the advisory range of 188-235 months, but agreed that “[t]here is no dispute that McBride is a ‘career offender.’” His counsel conceded the career-offender point at sentencing. Had he not been labeled a career offender, the Guidelines range would have been 100-125 months. The court sentenced McBride to 216 months of imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting McBride’s argument that, in light of the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in Johnson v. United States, section 2113 is not a predicate offense under the career-offender guideline. Conviction for bank robbery under 2113(a) requires proving that a defendant “by force and violence, or by intimidation, takes, or attempts to take . . . any property . . . belonging to, or in the care, custody, control, management, or possession of, any bank.” View "United States v. McBride" on Justia Law

Lee, now 47, moved to the U.S. from South Korea with his family in 1982 and has lived here legally ever since. After completing high school, he became a successful Memphis restaurateur. He also became a small-time drug dealer, and, in 2009, following a sting operation, he was charged with possession of ecstasy with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The case against him was very strong. Lee’s attorney advised him to plead guilty in exchange for a lighter sentence. Lee, unlike his parents, never became an American citizen. His lawyer incorrectly assured him that he would not be subject to deportation. Possession of ecstasy with intent to distribute is an “aggravated felony,” rendering Lee deportable, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(B), 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Lee moved to vacate his conviction and sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255, contending that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Applying the Strickland v. Washington test, the Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of relief. A claimant’s ties to the U.S. should be taken into account in evaluating, alongside the legal merits, whether counsel’s bad advice caused prejudice. Lee had no bona fide defense, not even a weak one, so despite his very strong ties to the U.S., he cannot show prejudice. View "Lee v. United States" on Justia Law

Sawyer, with co-defendants, formed A&E to recover salvageable materials (copper, steel, aluminum) from the 300-acre Hamblen County site of the former Liberty Fibers rayon plant, which contained buildings, a water treatment facility, and extensive above-ground piping. The defendants knew that many of the buildings contained regulated asbestos-containing material (RACM), such as pipe-wrap, insulation, roofing, and floor tiles, much of which was marked. Demolition did not comply with National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP) governing the handling and disposal of asbestos. Workers were not provided with proper respirators or protective suits; some were asked to remove or handle friable asbestos without adequately wetting it. In a 2008 consent agreement, A&E agreed to correct the violations and comply with NESHAP during future removal and demolition. In 2009, the EPA terminated the agreement and issued an immediate compliance order. Federal agents searched the site, seized documents, and took samples of RACM. EPA, acting under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), cleaned up the site, at a cost of $16,265,418. In 2011, Sawyer and his co-defendants were charged. Sawyer pled guilty to conspiring to violate the Clean Air Act, 18 U.S.C. 371. His PSR calculated a guideline sentencing range of 87-108 months. The statutory maximum under 18 U.S.C. 371 is 60 months, so his effective range was 60 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed Sawyer’s 60-month sentence and an order holding the co-defendants jointly and severally liable for $10,388,576.71 in restitution to the EPA. View "United States v. Sawyer" on Justia Law

Wayne County Sheriff’s Officer Ferris had a confidential source who indicated that a black male was selling crack-cocaine and heroin from his residence. Farris identified individuals associated with that residence, including Crumpton, and presented Crumpton's photograph to the CI, who identified him and indicated that Crumpton “sells narcotics on a regular basis and accepts money, firearms, vehicles, and other stolen property as payment.” Farris utilized that CI to conduct a purchase of crack cocaine from the home, then obtained a search warrant. During the search, agents found that the house was divided and apparently had multiple residents. The search revealed ammunition, crack cocaine, powder cocaine, marijuana, and heroin, including in the bedroom in which Crumpton was found. ATF Agent Lotoczky read Crumpton his Miranda rights. The court denied motions to suppress Crumpton's two subsequent, recorded, statements. At the close of the government’s case, Crumpton argued inadequate Miranda warnings. The court agreed, suppressed one statement, and instructed the jury not to consider it. After Crumpton was convicted by the jury, the court ruled, sua sponte, that Crumpton’s second statement must be suppressed, which rendered the evidence insufficient to support the possession-of-ammunition verdict. The court granted Crumpton a new trial out of concern that the jury was prejudiced by hearing Crumpton’s first statement. The Sixth Circuit reversed as to the ammunition charge, reinstating the guilty verdict, and affirmed the narcotics conviction. View "United States v. Crumpton" on Justia Law

Hollis pleaded guilty to conspiracy to obtain firearms through fraudulent means and to being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 924(a)(1)(A); 922(g)(1). He was indicted on seven counts. The matter was severed into two tracks. The pretrial and discovery order advised that any motion for rearraignment must be filed at least two days before pretrial in order to avoid losing credit for acceptance of responsibility under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. Hollis moved for rearraignment one day after the deadline (13 days before trial) in Track 1 and 22 days after the deadline (a month before trial) in Track 2. At sentencing, Hollis objected to the PSR’s failure to credit him with the two-level reduction permitted under U.S.S.G. 3E1.1(a). Th court declined to grant the reduction, reasoning that the delay in moving for rearraignment wasted time and resources, and imposed a 168-month sentence. The Sixth Circuit vacated; the court focused exclusively on the preparatory work completed in anticipation of trial and did not find that the lateness of Hollis’s plea indicated that his acceptance of responsibility was not genuine. The paramount factor in determining eligibility for section 3E1.1 credit is whether the defendant truthfully admits the conduct comprising the offense or offenses of conviction. View "United States v. Hollis" on Justia Law

In 2010, Bail Bonds and Hamza jointly and severally secured a $75,000 appearance bond on behalf of Mohammed-Ali, an Ethiopian national (Hamza’s cousin), charged with smuggling a controlled substance, (khat), into the U.S., 18 U.S.C. 545. One condition of the sureties’ obligation was that Mohammed-Ali “comply with all conditions of release imposed by this court,” which included that he wear a GPS ankle bracelet. But 15 months later—at Mohammed-Ali’s request and without objection from the government—the court entered an order allowing him to remove the ankle bracelet. Neither counsel nor the court provided the sureties with notice of the motion or of the order. Mohammed-Ali fled to Ethiopia. The government sought judgment against the sureties. The district court granted the government summary judgment, reasoning that Bonds had constructive notice of the motion because it could have accessed the docket for Mohammed-Ali’s case, using the court’s electronic-filing system. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The risk the sureties agreed to accept was that Mohammed-Ali might flee notwithstanding his conditions of release, which included the ankle bracelet. That risk included the possibility that Mohammed-Ali might saw off bracelet and then flee. What the sureties did not accept was that the court would remove the bracelet for him. The purported “notice” was inadequate. View "United States v. Mohammed-Ali" on Justia Law

Nashville detectives went to Church’s home to serve him with a warrant for violating probation. Church arrived, carrying food. The detectives placed Church under arrest, agreed to allow him to enter the house and call his girlfriend, then accompanied Church inside with his consent. They stated that they smelled burnt marijuana. Church admitted that he had recently smoked marijuana and displayed a marijuana blunt. Church called his girlfriend, who arrived and told police that Church regularly smoked marijuana at the house. Detective Moseley left to prepare a search-warrant affidavit while Bowling stayed with Church. In his affidavit, Moseley recounted the detectives’ visit and conversations with Church and his girlfriend. The detectives executed a warrant for “controlled substances, [and] controlled substances paraphernalia” that afternoon. In a closet, they found 4.8 grams of marijuana and 8 dilaudid (hydromorphone) pills, plus a safe. Church refused to provide the code, so police used a prying ram to break in. The safe contained 800 dilaudid pills, a handgun, and ammunition. Church unsuccessfully sought to suppress the evidence, then pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute hydromorphone and to being a felon in possession of a firearm. He was sentenced to 170 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The affidavit established probable cause and the police did not break open the safe capriciously: they had probable cause to believe there might be drugs inside. View "United States v. Church" on Justia Law