Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Michigan Trooper Ziecina, patrolling I-75, observed Calvetti's minivan abruptly slow and change lanes without signaling. Ziecina followed; the minivan moved at or below the posted minimum speed. Ziecina pulled Calvetti over to give a citation for failure to signal, impeding traffic, and driving below the minimum speed. A passenger, Cortez, produced identification. Calvetti could not find her driver’s license. Calvetti told Ziecina that she was helping Calvetti move and that the previous day the minivan had been searched in Mississippi. Ziecina’s database check revealed that the minivan was not registered to Calvetti, as she had claimed. Calvetti authorized a search. About 15 minutes after the stop, a drug-sniffing dog arrived and showed interest in the minivan floor, but did not alert. Calvetti admitted to a non-felony drug conviction and that Cortez had a felony charge involving 50 pounds of marijuana and had been involved in a shootout. Approximately 35 minutes into the stop, officers searched the minivan. The patrol car’s system recorded a conversation: Calvetti said that she was “not doing this anymore,” told Cortez that he would take the blame, and used Cortez’s cell phone, notifying a co-conspirator of the search. Ziecina observed “discrepancies” in the minivan, suspected a hidden trap under the floor, and found 16 kilograms of cocaine. About 73 minutes after the stop, agents read the two their Miranda rights. Both signed waivers. Cortez told agents that he took the minivan to Mexico to buy cocaine. Calvetti indicated that she did not want to talk, but agents continued the questioning. With Calvetti’s permission, agents used her residence for an unsuccessful controlled delivery, then searched the residence, finding packing materials similar to those used to wrap the cocaine. Finding no Miranda violation, the court denied Calvetti’s motion to suppress and held that the officers had probable cause for the stop and reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify prolonging it. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Calvetti’s consent to search her residence did not fall within the ambit of the Fifth Amendment. Consenting to a search is not an incriminating statement it is not testimonial or communicative evidence. View "United States v. Cortez" on Justia Law

In 2000, Hill was arrested, following an undercover investigation into drug-trafficking activities between Baltimore and Charleston. Hill pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute more than 100 grams of heroin, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a), and was sentenced under the then-mandatory 2001 Sentencing Guidelines Manual. Hill had two prior felony convictions, a controlled-substance offense and second-degree assault, and was sentenced as a career offender (USSG 4B1.1) to 300 months of imprisonment, which was affirmed. Hill has brought several challenges to his sentence. In 2014, Hill filed a section 2241 habeas corpus petition, citing the Supreme Court’s 2013 Descamps decision and the Fourth Circuit’s subsequent Royal decision, to argue that his “second-degree assault conviction no longer qualifies as a ‘crime of violence,” and that he is “serving an erroneous career offender sentence" that makes him “categorically ineligible” for retroactive amendments to the guidelines that could reduce his sentence by several years. Finding section 2241 inapposite because Hill did not claim to be “actually innocent,” the district court denied Hill’s motion. The Sixth Circuit reversed, stating that section 2241 petitions may be used by prisoners who were sentenced under the mandatory guidelines regime; who are foreclosed from filing a successive petition under section 2255; and when a subsequent, retroactive change in statutory interpretation by the Supreme Court reveals that a previous conviction is not a predicate offense for a career-offender enhancement. View "Hill v. Masters" on Justia Law

A house fire took the lives of Gavitt’s wife and two daughters. Gavitt, convicted of arson and felony murder, was sentenced to life in prison in 1986. In 2012, the state court granted Gavitt’s unopposed motion for relief. Advancements in fire science research and investigation methods impugned some of the evidence on which Gavitt’s convictions were based. The judgment was vacated and Gavitt was released. Gavitt brought a civil rights action, claiming that multiple defendants violated his due process rights by intentionally misrepresenting evidence, failing to disclose exculpatory evidence, and conspiring to deprive him of his rights. The district court dismissed, except with respect the Estate of DeVries, a Michigan forensic laboratory technician who testified at Gavitt’s trial. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The record is not so clear as to permit a ruling that the Estate’s evidence-sufficiency appeal presents a purely legal issue. While the likelihood that discovery will reveal evidence of intentional or reckless wrongdoing may be minimal, it is not inconceivable. While Gavitt may have been “wronged,” he did not sufficiently allege facts to support his claims that other defendants acted with such culpable states of mind as to warrant relief under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Due process guarantees a right to a fair trial, not perfection. Using the methods of the 1980s during the 1980s did not violate the Constitution; the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. View "Gavitt v. Born" on Justia Law

Coleman sold crack cocaine to a DEA informant, pleaded guilty under 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 846, and was sentenced to 92 months of imprisonment and four years of supervised release. Six months before Coleman’s sentence ended, he was granted a transfer to a charity establishment. Two months later, Coleman escaped. U.S. Marshals found Coleman, who pleaded guilty to escape, 18 U.S.C. 751(a). Judge Hood sentenced Coleman to 15 months of imprisonment, plus supervised release. Coleman completed his prison sentences. Two months into his supervised release, Coleman admitted to using cocaine. Judge Hood ordered that Coleman serve an additional six months, followed by inpatient substance-abuse treatment. After finishing that treatment, Coleman was again released. Days later, Coleman admitted that he had recently smoked marijuana. Coleman’s urine sample tested positive for cocaine. A magistrate appointed attorney Gordon to represent Coleman and scheduled a revocation hearing before Judge Hood. Coleman moved, pro se, for new counsel. The court relieved Gordon and appointed Abell, who was present at the court’s request. Upon confirming that Abell had copies of Coleman’s reports, the court had a 14-minute recess. Abell informed the court that Coleman would not contest the drug-related charges and that Coleman was “ready to go forward today.” Judge Hood revoked supervised release and sentenced Coleman to 30 months of imprisonment—three months above the Guidelines range—without further supervised release. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that Coleman was constructively denied the assistance of counsel during his revocation hearing and that the court failed to consider relevant sentencing factors and did not justify the above-Guidelines sentence. View "United States v. Coleman" on Justia Law

A Kentucky jury sentenced Foley to death for the 1991 shootings the Vaughn brothers. After exhausting all available appeals, Foley moved under 18 U.S.C. 3599(a)(2) and (f) for the district court to appoint counsel and grant funds to retain experts in anticipation of state clemency proceedings. Foley requested a neuropsychologist to evaluate the impact of multiple head injuries on his mental functioning. He also sought a ballistics and crime scene​ reconstruction expert to support his contention that he shot Rodney in self-defense and that someone else shot Lynn. The district court granted his motion to appoint counsel but denied expert funds as not reasonably necessary for Foley’s clemency bid. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding no abuse of discretion and noting that Foley is under additional death sentences for murdering four people in 1989. View "Foley v. White" on Justia Law

Reyes entered the U.S. from Mexico, without inspection, in 1994; he became a lawful permanent resident in 1998. Reyes is married and has five children, all U.S. citizens. In 2015, Reyes was charged with removability under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) for “hav[ing] been convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude [CMT] not arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct.” The Notice listed three prior state (Ohio) criminal charges: in 2000, Reyes was convicted of soliciting; in 2003, Reyes was convicted in Hamilton for passing bad checks; in 2005, Reyes was convicted of resisting arrest The IJ found that Reyes’s prior charges for soliciting prostitution and passing bad checks were CIMTs and that solicitation of prostitution was a CIMT because it was “similar to other crimes the Board has previously found to be morally turpitudinous, including renting a room with knowledge that it will be used for prostitution, keeping a house for prostitution, and the act of prostitution.” The BIA affirmed. The Sixth Circuit denied relief. Although our society’s (and the BIA’s) views regarding prostitution and solicitation of prostitution may continue to “transform,” the BIA’s precedential opinions on prostitution are entitled to Chevron deference and they are not unreasonable. View "JReyes v. Lynch" on Justia Law

D.E., then 19 years old, took a wrong turn on his way to a Michigan summer camp and inadvertently ended up at the border with Canada. The toll-booth operator provided him with a laminated card, prepared by Customs and Border Protection (CBP) that stated: You are being allowed to turn around without traveling to Canada. Please present this card, along with your identification to an open CBP inspection booth prior to departing. Thank you. The back stated: All persons, baggage, and merchandise arriving in the Customs territory of the United States or from places outside thereof are liable to inspection and search by a Customs official. The operator directed him to turn around without crossing the border and to merge into traffic containing motorists arriving from Canada. That lane funneled D.E. to a CBP inspection booth. Despite his explanation that he had not crossed the border, CBP officers searched his vehicle and discovered marijuana and drug paraphernalia. After pleading guilty to a misdemeanor charge in state court, D.E. filed suit (42 U.S.C. 1983). The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal. A traveler’s subjective intent not to leave the country does not provide an exception to the government’s authority to conduct suspicionless searches of vehicles at the border. View "D.E. v. Doe" on Justia Law

Michigan amended its Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA), Mich. Comp. Laws 28.723, so that, in addition to the online public registry of sex offenders’ names, addresses, biometric data, and photographs, it prohibits registrants (with exceptions) from living, working, or “loitering” within 1,000 feet of a school and divides registrants into three tiers of “dangerousness,” based solely on the crime of conviction. Recent amendments also require all registrants to appear in person “immediately” to update information such as new vehicles or “internet identifiers” (new email accounts). Violations carry heavy criminal penalties. Registered offenders challenged SORA’s validity, asserting that parts are unconstitutionally vague; that it should not be construed as creating strict liability offenses; that SORA violates the First Amendment; that it violates the Fourteenth Amendment by imposing oppressive restrictions on their ability to parent, work, and travel; and that SORA’s retroactive application amounts to an unconstitutional Ex Post Facto punishment. The district court rejected most of the arguments but held that some of SORA’s provisions were unconstitutionally vague, that those required to register cannot be held strictly liable for violating its requirements, and that its retroactive requirement that offenders register on-line aliases for life violated the First Amendment. The Sixth Circuit reversed with respect to the Ex Post Facto argument. SORA does impose punishment and that retroactive application of SORA’s 2006 and 2011 amendments is unconstitutional. View "Does v. Snyder" on Justia Law

ATF investigated the theft of firearms from Michigan gun dealers, leading to two arrests. Both men admitted trading the stolen firearms with Doxey, in exchange for heroin. Another informant stated that Doxey was a heroin dealer and described his vehicle. Doxey, known to be on parole, was seen at a gas station, engaging in an apparent “hand-to-hand” narcotic transaction with another man in Doxey's vehicle. Officers watched Doxey drive away with female passengers. Doxey had a suspended license. Before officers stopped him, Doxey pulled over and exited his car. Officers approached, searched Doxey with his consent, and removed $1,560 in cash from Doxey’s pocket. Searching the car, they found a partially burnt marijuana cigarette and a digital scale. With written consent from one of the passengers, the officers searched her house and found a jar, containing heroin residue. Doxey consented to and initially cooperated with a search of his genitals and rectum, pulling his clothing down. He then began clenching his butt cheeks. He was taken to the police station. Doxey’s parole officer stated his parole required Doxey to allow complete body searches. Doxey continued to resist and had to be restrained. Officers could see “the corner tie bag in between his butt crack.” A field test confirmed that the substance in the plastic bag was heroin, weighing 8.17 grams. The Sixth Circuit affirmed his conviction under 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), rejecting a challenge to the body search and an argument that the informer's identity should have been disclosed. View "United States v. Doxey" on Justia Law

In 2008, Holbrook was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act one-year statute of limitations began to run when his conviction became final in August 2010, 90 days after the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. In May 2011, 269 days into that period, Holbrook moved for relief from judgment in state court. The trial court denied the motion. Holbrook sought leave to appeal, which the Michigan Court of Appeals denied on November 8, 2012. Michigan court rules allowed Holbrook until January 3, 2013 to seek leave to appeal. Holbrook filed his application four days after the deadline. The Michigan Supreme Court denied it as untimely on January 11. No later than March 18, 2013, Holbrook filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court dismissed Holbrook’s petition as untimely, “[b]ecause [Holbrook] did not timely seek leave to appeal with the Michigan Supreme Court, the tolling of the limitations period ended when the Michigan Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal on November 8, 2012,” rather than continuing for the 56-day period to appeal. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Holbrook’s federal habeas petition was timely filed because AEDPA’s one-year limitations period was tolled during the period in which he could have, but did not, appeal the Michigan Court of Appeals’ denial of his motion for post-conviction relief. View "Holbrook v. Curtin" on Justia Law