Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 2002, Patrick pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute and distribution of cocaine and cocaine base. The district court determined that he qualified as a career offender under the then-mandatory Guidelines based on his prior Tennessee convictions for a controlled substance offense, reckless aggravated assault, and evading arrest, and sentenced him to 262 months’ imprisonment. The district court denied Patrick’s first 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion; the Sixth Circuit denied a certificate of appealability. In 2010, Patrick filed a 28 U.S.C. 2241 petition, arguing that his conviction for reckless aggravated assault no longer qualified as a crime of violence under a 2008 Supreme Court decision. The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of that petition, but subsequently granted permission to file a second or successive section 2255 petition to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence. The court noted that its decision was based on the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in an Eleventh Circuit decision that found that Court’s 2015 holding (Johnson) inapplicable to the Sentencing Guidelines. Johnson invalidated the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act. The pending decision will presumably resolve questions related to retroactive application of a new rule of constitutional law regarding the Guidelines; the court transferred the case to the district court with instructions to hold it in abeyance pending the Court’s decision. View "In re: Patrick" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Stephen Arny, M.D., was convicted of conspiracy to distribute and unlawfully dispense prescription pain medications, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 846. Approximately three months later, but before sentencing, Arny secured new counsel, who later moved for a new trial based on trial counsel’s constitutionally ineffective assistance. The district court granted the motion based on its finding that Arny’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel had been violated by counsel’s misrepresentation that the government had stated that another doctor (Saxman) who had worked with Arny and his co-defendants either had a plea deal or would be indicted soon and that her clinic was searched; counsel’s failure to interview Saxman or call her to testify in order to explain the legitimacy of her treatment plans that Arny continued; and counsel’s failure to investigate or interview any of Arny’s patients. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The affidavits of Saxman and the former patients establish a “reasonable probability that, but for [trial] counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” View "United States v. Arny" on Justia Law

After the government charged him with selling cocaine, Christopher hired a lawyer. Christopher later claimed that, over the course of the representation, the lawyer used cocaine with Christopher more than 20 times, including several times immediately before court hearings. The government had considerable evidence: recordings of 10 phone calls in which he negotiated purchases of the drug and testimony from the leader of the conspiracy and another coconspirator that Christopher had bought the drug for resale. It had already convicted many of Christopher’s co-conspirators based on similar evidence. Three months after being convicted and sentenced to 10 years in prison, without having appealed, Christopher filed a section 2255 motion to vacate, arguing that his attorney’s behaviour caused him to forgo a favorable plea deal, with a sentence of 30-37 months. After a remand for a hearing, the Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of the motion. The trial judge did not clearly err in finding defense counsel “credible” while finding Christopher’s credibility “very much undercut.” The court thought the attorney was prepared and rendered effective counsel; the record permits that conclusion. View "Christopher v. United States" on Justia Law

In 1999, Brinkley robbed the diner where he worked at gunpoint. In jail, Brinkley, then 32, said he would get his 18 year-old girlfriend, Smith, to post his bond, that he would skip town, and that “I’m going to kill that bitch [Smith].” Smith posted the bond. After skipping his pretrial hearing, Brinkley strangled Smith, slit her throat, stole her ATM card, and used Smith’s phone to call the bus terminal. Cameras recorded Brinkley wearing Smith’s coat and trying to withdraw cash 16 times. Smith’s mother found her body. Officers found bloody footprints that matched Brinkley’s size-15 Nike shoes and a bogus note, written in Brinkley’s handwriting (bearing his thumbprint). Officers arrested Brinkley at his mother’s residence, wearing Smith’s coat and the size-15 Nike shoes. Two different teams of appointed attorneys found Brinkley extremely difficult to work with. A jury found Brinkley guilty, with death-penalty specifications. The defense elicited testimony from Brinkley’s sister, aunts, and mother. The jury found that the aggravating circumstances outweighed any mitigating circumstances and recommended the death penalty. Brinkley spoke at length on his own behalf, . The court imposed a death sentence. Ohio court rejected direct appeals and post-conviction petitions. The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of federal habeas relief, rejecting a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, a claim of ineffective assistance during the penalty phase, and a challenge to a limitation imposed on cross-examination of a prosecution witness. View "Brinkley v. Houk" on Justia Law

Rios, Casillas, and 29 co-defendants were charged in a “sprawling racketeering indictment” involving the Latin Kings. Count One, under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. 1961, alleged that the Holland, Michigan Latin Kings was a racketeering enterprise that “was and is overseen by, has always had connections to, and received directions from, the Chicago Heights” Latin Kings, alleged 129 overt acts in furtherance of the 20-year conspiracy, and contained special sentencing allegations. Rios and Casillas were each charged regarding the distribution of cocaine; Rios was charged with three assaults with the intent to commit murder. Count Fourteen alleged conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine from 2006-2012. Three witnesses described the national Latin Kings and how the Holland Latin Kings fit into that structure. Other testimony, largely from cooperating co-defendants, corroborated that testimony and provided details about specific charged acts. The jury found Rios and Casillas guilty of Counts One and Fourteen and found each responsible for the distribution of five kilograms or more of cocaine, 1993-2013. Rios was sentenced to concurrent terms of 240 months on Count One and 300 months on Count Fourteen, with 61 months of credit “for gang-related discharged terms of imprisonment.” Casillas was sentenced to concurrent terms of 200 months and 360 months, with 148 months of credit. The Sixth Circuit​ affirmed both convictions and sentences, rejecting various challenges to testimony and jury instructions. View "United States v. Casillas" on Justia Law

In 2007, Harper, then 70 years old and partially paralyzed, allowed McKinney to move into his Michigan home in exchange for chores. On October 22, 2009, Harper's caregiver left the men by themselves. McKinney shot Harper at point-blank range while Harper slept, killing him. McKinney fled in Harper’s van. Police arrested him in Illinois following a traffic stop during which McKinney claimed to be Harper. Officers searched the van and discovered two handguns, including the one used to kill Harper, and Harper’s wallet. After reading McKinney his Miranda rights, officers asked for “his side of the story.” McKinney replied: Well if you don’t mind, I just assume wait until I get a public defender or whatever. The officer stated: Well that’s fine, but like I said. McKinney said, “We can talk over all the other circumstances” and proceeded to confess. McKinney successfully moved to suppress the confession. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed, holding that McKinney did not unequivocally request counsel. McKinney was convicted of first-degree murder after his videotaped confession was played at trial. A federal district court conditionally granted McKinney’s habeas petition. The Sixth Circuit reversed: the district court failed to show the requisite deference to state court decisions on habeas review. The Michigan Supreme Court’s decision was not an unreasonable application of established federal law. View "McKinney v. Hoffner" on Justia Law

In 1996 (Free Press I), the Sixth Circuit held that the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552, requires government agencies to honor requests for the booking photographs of criminal defendants who have appeared in court during ongoing proceedings. Despite that holding, the U.S. Marshals Service denied the Free Press’s 2012 request for the booking photographs of Detroit-area police officers indicted on federal charges. The district court, bound by Free Press I, granted summary judgment to the newspaper in the ensuing lawsuit. A Sixth Circuit panel affirmed in 2015, while urging the full court to reconsider the merits of Free Press I. The court subsequently reversed, overruling Free Press I. FOIA Exemption 7(C) protects a non-trivial privacy interest in keeping “personal facts away from the public eye.” Individuals do not forfeit their interest in maintaining control over information that has been made public in some form. Criminal defendants do not forfeit their interest in controlling private information while their cases remain pending. View "Detroit Free Press v. Dep't of Justice" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Jones of conspiracy to distribute heroin, 21 U.S.C. 846, three counts of distribution of heroin, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), and three counts of aiding and abetting distribution, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). A probation office initially attributed to Jones at least five but less than 10 grams of heroin. The government objected, stating that the quantity did “not reflect the scale of the offense.” U.S.S.G. 2D1.1 n.5. Based on a confidential informant’s testimony that he purchased half a gram of heroin each day for six months, the government asserted that Jones’s relevant conduct included 60 grams of heroin. After testimony from the officer who handled the confidential informant, the court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Jones’s conduct involved at least 40.3 grams, but stated: I don’t think ... that there’s clear and convincing evidence that it’s 40 grams. The court calculated Jones’s guidelines range as 63-78 months and sentenced Jones to 78 months of imprisonment . The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that due process does not require sentencing courts to employ a standard higher than preponderance-of-the-evidence, even with respect to large enhancements. The Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in Alleyne, that any fact that increases the mandatory minimum sentence must be submitted to the jury, did not address the standard of proof for judicial fact-finding at sentencing. View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law

In 1992, Messinger was murdered while working at a convenience store overnight. Hill surrendered and provided information, with which police obtained a search warrant for Carter’s apartment, where they recovered the murder weapon. During a recorded interview, Carter eventually admitted that he was the shooter. Carter was a heavy user of crack cocaine; Hill was his supplier. He admitted that he, Hill, and another had robbed “a lot” of drug dealers that evening. Carter maintained that he did not aim at Messinger, but fired a shot to scare her. Carter was referred to specialists. The evaluations indicated “malingering to avoid prosecution.” At sentencing, the defense's mitigation expert, Dr. Chiappone,spoke of trauma that Carter had experienced during childhood, but also mentioned his drug use, abuse of women, interest in violence, and animal cruelty. Jurors indicated that they could not hear the witness and later requested a transcript of Chiappone’s testimony, which was denied. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed Carter’s conviction and death sentence; the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari. State courts denied post-conviction relief; the Supreme Court again denied certiorari. In 1999, after filing a federal habeas petition, Carter unsuccessfully returned to state court, under Ohio R. App. 26(B). Carter filed another unsuccessful 26(B) application in 2000. In 2003, Carter filed another state petition, arguing that he was mentally retarded. After a remand, Carter voluntarily dismissed that petition in 2005. In 2013, following a remand, the federal district court denied a stay to allow Carter to introduce new evidence in state court and denied habeas relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments related to counsel’s eliciting unfavorable testimony from a mitigation expert and failure to call Carter's mother as a witness during the penalty phase and failure to insist that the jury receive a transcript of Chiappone’s testimony. View "Carter v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

Twelve agents went to Rafidi’s Warren, Ohio, home to execute a search warrant and “pounded” on Rafidi’s door. An agent, looking through a window, saw Rafidi pick up a handgun. The agent yelled, “put the gun down.” Rafidi replied, “‘[Y]ou mother fuckers.’” According to the agent, “the door swung open,” and Rafidi was holding a gun pointed at the agent. Detective Bordonaro was familiar with Rafidi from the community and yelled “George, it is Chris . . . . from the Police Department.” According to Bordonaro, the door flew open and a hand appeared with the gun pointing “straight out the door.” Bordonaro fired his weapon, but no bullets struck Rafidi. Rafidi emerged without his weapon and was taken into custody. According to Rafidi, he had taken pain medication before the incident, fallen asleep, and “was horribly awoken,” “afraid for [his] life,” so he grabbed his gun. Rafidi testified that he could not hear anyone yelling, nor could he see out. Rafidi was convicted of forcibly assaulting, resisting, opposing, impeding, and interfering with a federal law-enforcement officer, 18 U.S.C. 111(a)(1) and (b), and of using and brandishing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). The court sentenced Rafidi to 10 months of imprisonment (Count 1) followed by 84 months on Count 2. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that violation of section 111 cannot constitute a “crime of violence” for purposes of section 924(c); that the government violated its Brady obligations, that the district court erred in failing to investigate a juror sleeping during his trial; and that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment. View "United States v. Rafidi" on Justia Law