Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

During a 2002 cocaine sale, Thomas held a handgun to Burdette's head and demanded the cocaine. When Burdette refused, Thomas shot him three times in the chest, then fled. Burdette later died. In 2004, Thomas was convicted of murder and sentenced to 40 years in prison. In 2006, the Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed. Thomas unsuccessfully moved to vacate on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel under Ky.R.Crim.P. 11.42(3), which requires that the movant “state all grounds for holding the sentence invalid of which the movant has knowledge.” In 2009, Thomas again sought post-conviction relief, alleging that he had recently discovered evidence (Burdette’s funeral program) that could have been used to impeach testimony. The court denied Thomas’s filing on the merits; as to his Rule 11.42 motion, the court held that the prosecution’s alleged failure to produce evidence had not prejudiced Thomas; as to his Rule 60.02 motion, the court held that Thomas’s allegations did not justify relief. In 2013, the Kentucky Supreme Court denied review. The district court dismissed his federal application, concluding that Thomas’s 2009 motion did not toll the federal habeas statute of limitations because it was “not properly filed.” The Sixth Circuit reversed. Whether an application for state post-conviction relief was properly filed does not depend whether its claims are meritorious and free of procedural bar. Thomas’s 60.02 motion was rejected on the merits, not because it failed to comply with rules governing filings, and was “properly filed” for purposes of 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(2). View "Thomas v. Meko" on Justia Law

Shuti, from Albania, entered the U.S. as a permanent resident in 2008 at age 13. In 2014, Shuti and some friends committed a “larceny of marijuana.” Shuti pleaded guilty to felony unarmed robbery, defined as “larceny of any money or other property” accomplished by “force or violence against any person” or “assault[ing] or put[ting] the person in fear.” Mich. Comp. Laws 750.530. Shuti was sentenced to more than two years in prison. DHS initiated removal, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2). A non-citizen convicted of an aggravated felony after admission is ineligible for most discretionary relief; “aggravated felony” is defined as including “a crime of violence (as defined in section 16 of Title 18 ....) for which the term of imprisonment [is] at least one year,” 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F). The cross-referenced definition of “crime of violence” is: an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another, or any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used. Shuti unsuccessfully applied for discretionary relief, claiming that his attorney “never discussed” the immigration consequences of his plea. The BIA affirmed, stating that unarmed robbery was “categorically a crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. 16(b). Meanwhile, the Supreme Court held the Armed Career Criminal Act’s residual definition of “violent felony,” 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), void for vagueness. The BIA concluded that the void-for-vagueness doctrine did not apply to “civil” deportations. The Sixth Circuit vacated the order of removal, concluding that the wide-ranging inquiry required by the two statutory phrases was the same, so the immigration code’s residual clause is also unconstitutionally vague. View "Shuti v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Cruz was to host a party in his village in Oaxaca, Mexico on New Year’s Day 2006. He went to the municipal hall to deliver invitations, where a man approached and shot him and a bystander. Both men died. The murderer fled the scene. Cruz’s family accused Martinez, then a U.S. permanent resident (a citizen since 2010) whose family lived in the village. Cruz’s widow and parents met with Martinez’s wife and brother before a town clerk and signed an agreement stating that Martinez had “committed the homicide” and that “the family of the perpetrator” would pay 50,000 pesos for “the expenses incurred,” so that “the matter shall be closed.” Days later, two eyewitnesses made sworn statements identifying Martinez as the murderer. An Oaxacan judge issued an arrest warrant. Martinez returned to Tennessee. In 2009, an American consular official asked about the status of Martinez’s arrest warrant. The Oaxacan court responded that it was “still pending and executable.” In 2012, the Mexican government filed a diplomatic note with the State Department, requesting his “provisional arrest” pursuant to the extradition treaty between the two nations. U.S. authorities arrested Martinez about a year later; Mexican officials filed a formal extradition request in 2013. Complying with the procedures identified in 18 U.S.C. 3184-3186, the Secretary of State filed the request with a federal magistrate judge, who certified that Martinez could be extradited. The Sixth Circuit affirmed rejection of Martinez’s habeas corpus action. The extradition will not violate the statute of limitations or his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. View "Cruz-Martinez v. United States" on Justia Law

In 1998, Stansell pleaded guilty to sex-related felonies. The Ohio trial court sentenced him to 20 years to life in prison; his direct appeals were unsuccessful. In 2002, a federal district court denied his habeas petition, 28 U.S.C. 2254. In 2013, Stansell returned to state court, seeking to vacate the portion of his sentence that designated him a “sexually violent predator.” A state appeals court affirmed denial of his petition, but ruled that the trial court had erred when, during Stansell’s original sentencing, it failed to impose a term of post-release control, and remanded “for the limited purpose of properly advising and imposing upon Stansell the requisite period of postrelease control.” The trial court imposed five years of post-release control with specific conditions. Stansell then returned to federal court, seeking authorization to file a second or successive habeas petition (28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(3)(A), again claiming that the state court violated his due process rights when it classified him as a sexually violent predator during his original sentencing. The Third Circuit held that the petition was not subject to the limits imposed on a “second or successive” petition and transferred the matter to the district court for consideration as an initial petition. View "In re: Stansell" on Justia Law

Investigators used peer-to-peer software to download child pornography from defendant’s computer. They later confiscated his computer and found 19 videos and 93 images depicting child pornography. Defendant was charged with receiving and distributing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(2), and possessing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(5)(B). Although defendant signed custodial statements admitting to searching for and downloading child pornography, he disavowed these statements during his trial testimony. Following the jury’s determination of guilt, the judge polled the jury: State what you believe an appropriate sentence is.’ Jurors’ responses ranged from zero to 60 months’ incarceration, with a mean of 14.5 months and median of 8 months. With one exception, every juror recommended a sentence less than half of the five-year mandatory minimum accompanying defendant’s offenses. Over the government’s objection, the district judge considered the jury poll as “one factor” in fashioning defendant’s sentence. The court imposed concurrent five-year sentences, although his calculated sentencing guidelines range was 262 to 327 months, above the statutory 20-year maximum for his offenses. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that it was satisfied with the district court’s discussion of the sentencing factors in granting defendant a downward variance. View "United States v. Collins" on Justia Law

Cooperating witness, “DEA1,” provided information concerning Middleton’s heroin trafficking, including phone numbers DEA1 used to contact Middleton. DEA1 identified Middleton’s residence as the drug distribution point and set up a controlled buy. Middleton agreed to deliver the heroin, stating he would leave in “ten minutes.” A Denali arrived at Middleton’s residence. Men left minutes later with a large, dark-colored object, which was placed in a Silverado that had been parked at the residence. Both vehicles headed toward the meeting area. Police stopped the Silverado. The sole occupant was Woods, driving on a suspended license; he verbally consented to a search, which revealed a black tool case, containing a substance that field-tested as heroin. Troopers also stopped the Denali, driven by Middleton. Brown was a passenger, in possession of $4,813, cash. Officers recovered cell phones during an inventory search, including one DEA1 had used to contact Middleton. DEA obtained a warrant to search Brown’s Detroit residence. The Sixth Circuit initially affirmed, but in an amended opinion, vacated, Brown’s convictions for possession with intent to distribute marijuana, possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking, and possession of a firearm after a felony conviction. The warrant affidavit supplied a tenuous nexus between drug trafficking; under the totality of the circumstances, the warrant was issued without probable cause and the good-faith exception did not apply. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

In 2010, Eggers fired four shots into a home where he thought his rival, Bryant, was staying. A bullet struck and killed Snyder, the woman both men loved, sparing Bryant. Eggers pled guilty to felony murder. During allocution, Eggers said: “I’d like to apologize to the family. You know I loved her. You know I didn’t do this. I didn’t do this. I love you, mom. I don’t know. That’s it. I don’t know what else to say.” Days later, Eggers tried to withdraw his plea. He claimed that this “assertion of innocence” made his guilty plea involuntary, suggested that he was actually innocent, and required the state court to conduct an “Alford” hearing to ascertain the voluntariness of his plea and to ensure that there was evidence supporting his plea. The state courts upheld the guilty plea. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rejection of Eggers’ federal habeas petition, holding that the state courts did not unreasonably apply clearly established Supreme Court precedent or unreasonably determine the facts in Eggers’ case. View "Eggers v. Warden, Lebanon Corr. Inst." on Justia Law

Giles was convicted of second-degree manslaughter in 2007. The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed his conviction in an opinion dated October 21, 2010. Under Kentucky Rule 76.30(2)(a), the opinion was considered final 21 days later (November 12, 2010), as reflected by a docket notation labeled “finality.” Giles did not seek certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court, but filed a state post-conviction petition on February 23, 2011, 34 days into the one-year limitations period for his federal habeas petition. That limitations period was tolled while Giles’s state petition was pending, leaving 331 days. The state Supreme Court denied discretionary review on May 15, 2013. On May 16, the limitations period began to run, Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a); Giles had until Monday, April 14, 2014, to file. On May 1, 2014, Giles filed his federal habeas petition, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. The court found Giles’s petition untimely and that equitable tolling was not appropriate. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, the limitations period begins to run from the latest of four dates—in this case “the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review,” 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)(A). Delayed finality under Kentucky’s procedure did not entitle Giles to an additional 21 days. View "Giles v. Beckstrom" on Justia Law

McBride signed a plea agreement after being charged in five jurisdictions with six counts of bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. 2113(a), (d). The agreement included an “understand[ing]” that McBride would be sentenced as a career offender because “he ha[d] at least two prior crime of violence convictions,” USSG 4B1.1(a). The presentence report recommended designating McBride a career offender based on two prior convictions for bank robbery. McBride’s sentencing memorandum asked the court to depart downward from the advisory range of 188-235 months, but agreed that “[t]here is no dispute that McBride is a ‘career offender.’” His counsel conceded the career-offender point at sentencing. Had he not been labeled a career offender, the Guidelines range would have been 100-125 months. The court sentenced McBride to 216 months of imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting McBride’s argument that, in light of the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in Johnson v. United States, section 2113 is not a predicate offense under the career-offender guideline. Conviction for bank robbery under 2113(a) requires proving that a defendant “by force and violence, or by intimidation, takes, or attempts to take . . . any property . . . belonging to, or in the care, custody, control, management, or possession of, any bank.” View "United States v. McBride" on Justia Law

Lee, now 47, moved to the U.S. from South Korea with his family in 1982 and has lived here legally ever since. After completing high school, he became a successful Memphis restaurateur. He also became a small-time drug dealer, and, in 2009, following a sting operation, he was charged with possession of ecstasy with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The case against him was very strong. Lee’s attorney advised him to plead guilty in exchange for a lighter sentence. Lee, unlike his parents, never became an American citizen. His lawyer incorrectly assured him that he would not be subject to deportation. Possession of ecstasy with intent to distribute is an “aggravated felony,” rendering Lee deportable, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(B), 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Lee moved to vacate his conviction and sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255, contending that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Applying the Strickland v. Washington test, the Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of relief. A claimant’s ties to the U.S. should be taken into account in evaluating, alongside the legal merits, whether counsel’s bad advice caused prejudice. Lee had no bona fide defense, not even a weak one, so despite his very strong ties to the U.S., he cannot show prejudice. View "Lee v. United States" on Justia Law