Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

ATF and the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation jointly investigated Henry following a tip from a confidential informant, who had a prior felony conviction. Meeting at Henry’s residence, the CI and an undercover agent stated that they had prior felony convictions, purchased a pistol, and arranged a second meeting at which they purchased morphine pills and an AK-47. Indicted for selling a firearm to a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(d)(1), and possession with intent to distribute and distribution of morphine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), Henry was released on his own recognizance. In random drug testing. Henry positive for morphine three times, without a valid prescription. He failed to appear for a hearing; failed to submit two monthly reports; and failed to appear for a meeting with his pretrial services officer. Arrested a year later, he pleaded guilty to both counts. The PSR started with a base offense level of 20 because the AK-47 was a semiautomatic firearm, applied a four-level increase for “trafficking” firearms, enhanced Henry’s offense level by four points for possession of the rifle in connection with another felony, and included a two-point enhancement for obstruction of justice. The Sixth Circuit vacated Henry’s sentence of 50 months’ imprisonment. The district court erroneously applied the section 2K2.1(b)(5) firearms-trafficking enhancement to Henry and a serious, unresolved issue exists as to whether his conduct satisfied the obstruction-of-justice enhancement’s willfulness requirement. View "United States v. Henry" on Justia Law

Maslenjak, an ethnic Serb and native of Bosnia, came to the U.S. in 2000 as a refugee fleeing the civil war in the former Yugoslavia. Maslenjak claimed she and her family feared persecution in Bosnia because her husband had evaded conscription into the Serbian army during the war. In fact, Maslenjak’s husband had not only been in the Serbian militia during the war but had served as an officer in a unit implicated in war crimes. Maslenjak was granted refugee status and ultimately obtained her naturalization. Based on her misrepresentations during the immigration process, she was later convicted of knowingly procuring her naturalization contrary to law, 18 U.S.C. 1425(a) and of knowingly using an unlawfully issued certificate of naturalization, 18 U.S.C. 1423. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the district court improperly instructed the jury that her false statements need not be material in order to convict Maslenjak of procuring her naturalization contrary to law or erroneously instructed the jury that it could also convict Maslenjak if the jury found that she lacked good moral character. View "United States v. Maslenjak" on Justia Law

In 2009, Patel opened a pharmacy in the building where Dr. Fowler’s clinic operated and hired Shah as the manager. Shah paid Fowler to write prescriptions and send patients to Patel’s pharmacy. Patel introduced Fowler to Taylor, a “marketer” who would bring additional patients to Fowler’s clinic. Thoran, another marketer, would visit Patel’s pharmacy, to pick up prescriptions for 5-10 patients several times per week. The fraudulent prescriptions were resold on the street. Fowler and Thoran were convicted of conspiracy to commit healthcare fraud, conspiracy to distribute controlled substances, and conspiracy to pay or receive health-care kickbacks. During Fowler’s sentencing hearing, the district court failed to calculate the Guidelines range and failed to make findings about why the sentence that served as its “starting point” was appropriate. At Thoran’s sentencing hearing, the court agreed to the parties’ stipulated Guidelines range without making any findings about why it was appropriate. The court relied on erroneous factual findings in determining the restitution amount for each defendant and sentenced Fowler to 72 months’ imprisonment and payment of restitution of $1,752,957. Thoran’s sentence was 108 months with restitution of $2,632,854. The Sixth Circuit vacated the sentences and restitution orders, but affirmed Thoran’s convictions. View "United States v. Thoran" on Justia Law

A confidential informant told ATF agent Kloostra that a man called “D” was selling cocaine out of a particular Flint residence. Kloostra later observed, first-hand, as Dionte Jones emerged from the house, got into a car registered to an owner at that residence, drove to the site of a prearranged drug deal, and sold cocaine to the informant, whom Kloostra had known for two years. Kloostra promptly obtained a search warrant for the house, where agents found cocaine, guns, scales, and cash. The district court later granted Jones’s motion to suppress all this evidence, finding that Kloostra’s affidavit in support of the warrant application did not support the state judge’s finding of probable cause. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The district court’s mistake was to think of this case as one where the police conducted a search based on an informant’s tip alone: the warrant was actually based on Kloostra’s own observations more than it was the informant’s. View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law

A confidential informant told ATF agent Kloostra that a man called “D” was selling cocaine out of a particular Flint residence. Kloostra later observed, first-hand, as Dionte Jones emerged from the house, got into a car registered to an owner at that residence, drove to the site of a prearranged drug deal, and sold cocaine to the informant, whom Kloostra had known for two years. Kloostra promptly obtained a search warrant for the house, where agents found cocaine, guns, scales, and cash. The district court later granted Jones’s motion to suppress all this evidence, finding that Kloostra’s affidavit in support of the warrant application did not support the state judge’s finding of probable cause. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The district court’s mistake was to think of this case as one where the police conducted a search based on an informant’s tip alone: the warrant was actually based on Kloostra’s own observations more than it was the informant’s. View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law

For his role in armed robberies in two different Tennessee counties, a jury convicted Vichitvongsa of two counts of conspiring to commit Hobbs Act robbery, two counts of conspiring to traffic drugs, and four counts of using a firearm to further these conspiracies (two for each robbery) 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1). His 1,219-month sentence included 984 months for the section 924(c) convictions. The Sixth Circuit vacated the section 924(c) convictions, holding that the simultaneous violation of two federal conspiracy statutes cannot support two section 924(c) charges where there was only one firearm use. The section provides that “any person who, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime . . . uses or carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm” shall be subject to additional and consecutive imprisonment. Because he simultaneously used only one firearm during the commission of two simultaneous conspiracies (Hobbs Act robbery and drug trafficking), Vichitvongsa wrongly received two section 924(c) counts for each robbery. View "United States v. Vichitvongsa" on Justia Law

Binford, convicted as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), and of possessing with intent to distribute marijuana, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(D), was given an enhanced sentence of 180 months’ imprisonment. After the Supreme Court held that the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1) was unconstitutionally vague, Binford appealed, arguing that his sentencing-guidelines range was substantially increased based on an identical provision in the Sentencing Guidelines that is also void. The Sixth CIrcuit affirmed Binford’s convictions, but vacated his sentence, and remanded for reconsideration in light of the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in Johnson v. United States. The court upheld denial of a motion to suppress evidence and incriminating statements under the exclusionary rule. An interrogation on Binford, in his bathroom while the search was in progress, lasted a short time and was not prolonged or repeated. While Binford said he was scared, he did not say he was scared into making the statements. An officer’s statement that he could help Binford if he cooperated did not amount to the level of police coercion required to suppress the statements. Binford knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights. View "United States v. Binford" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine and money laundering. The PSR calculated defendant’s criminal history score at eight points, including two for committing the offense “while under a criminal justice sentence” for a 2011 DUI conviction. Defendant had been sentenced to a 180-day jail term that was suspended on the condition that he “obey laws for 2 years.” Defendant objected to the addition of the two points, arguing that, although the difference would not affect his sentence, it would likely affect his treatment by the Bureau of Prisons. There was no cooperation or substantial assistance clause in the agreement. Defendant requested that the plea agreement be “unsealed on Pacer,” arguing that neither he, nor the government, nor the court had any legitimate interest in sealing the document, so it should remain accessible to the public. The dcourt denied his request, citing its universal policy to make plea agreements available only to the parties and court personnel, rejected his objection to the criminal history points, and sentenced defendant to a mandatory minimum 20 years in prison. The Sixth Circuit remanded for compliance with a requirement of on-the-record findings justifying nondisclosure, but otherwise affirmed. View "United States v. DeJournett" on Justia Law

Brown, convicted in 1996 of drug and firearm crimes and of aiding an intentional killing, is “a frequent filer.” He unsuccessfully brought a Civil Rule 60(d) motion for reconsideration of an earlier motion for relief from judgment and an 18 U.S.C. 3582(c) sentence-reduction motion. The Sixth Circuit dismissed the section 3582(c) appeal, finding that Brown filed his notice of appeal too late. The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure gave Brown 60 days to appeal the Rule 60(d) denial and 14 days to appeal the section 3582(c) denial. The court noted that, while civil rules apply to the Rule 60(d) denial, Brown’s section 3582(c) motion was a criminal motion. Even though Brown filed motions to reconsider and vacate the court’s decision on his section 3582(c) motion before he filed the notice of appeal, the notice was untimely. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

All American, a health agency, purportedly provided a range of therapy-related services at the homes of patients and submitted claims to Medicare for the cost therapy services that were medically unnecessary and not provided. According to the government, its office manager, Mahbub, specifically created, fabricated and falsified medical and billing documents. All American was paid $5,809,435.74 by Medicare for home-health services between September 2008 and November 2009. In 2013, a jury convicted Mahbub of conspiracy to commit healthcare fraud under 18 U.S.C. 1349, and Mahbub was sentenced to 46 months in prison. The Sixth Circuit remanded, based on a Batson challenge, “for a proper determination of whether there is an inference that the government engaged in purposeful discrimination,” but otherwise affirmed. The government had challenged a prospective juror (Syed), alleged to be the only Muslim on the panel, but had claimed that the challenge was based on Syed’s response to a question about “younger people” becoming “caught up” in criminal activity. The court rejected challenges to a jury instruction and to the sentence. View "United States v. Mahbub" on Justia Law