Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Sawyer, with co-defendants, formed A&E to recover salvageable materials (copper, steel, aluminum) from the 300-acre Hamblen County site of the former Liberty Fibers rayon plant, which contained buildings, a water treatment facility, and extensive above-ground piping. The defendants knew that many of the buildings contained regulated asbestos-containing material (RACM), such as pipe-wrap, insulation, roofing, and floor tiles, much of which was marked. Demolition did not comply with National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP) governing the handling and disposal of asbestos. Workers were not provided with proper respirators or protective suits; some were asked to remove or handle friable asbestos without adequately wetting it. In a 2008 consent agreement, A&E agreed to correct the violations and comply with NESHAP during future removal and demolition. In 2009, the EPA terminated the agreement and issued an immediate compliance order. Federal agents searched the site, seized documents, and took samples of RACM. EPA, acting under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), cleaned up the site, at a cost of $16,265,418. In 2011, Sawyer and his co-defendants were charged. Sawyer pled guilty to conspiring to violate the Clean Air Act, 18 U.S.C. 371. His PSR calculated a guideline sentencing range of 87-108 months. The statutory maximum under 18 U.S.C. 371 is 60 months, so his effective range was 60 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed Sawyer’s 60-month sentence and an order holding the co-defendants jointly and severally liable for $10,388,576.71 in restitution to the EPA. View "United States v. Sawyer" on Justia Law

Wayne County Sheriff’s Officer Ferris had a confidential source who indicated that a black male was selling crack-cocaine and heroin from his residence. Farris identified individuals associated with that residence, including Crumpton, and presented Crumpton's photograph to the CI, who identified him and indicated that Crumpton “sells narcotics on a regular basis and accepts money, firearms, vehicles, and other stolen property as payment.” Farris utilized that CI to conduct a purchase of crack cocaine from the home, then obtained a search warrant. During the search, agents found that the house was divided and apparently had multiple residents. The search revealed ammunition, crack cocaine, powder cocaine, marijuana, and heroin, including in the bedroom in which Crumpton was found. ATF Agent Lotoczky read Crumpton his Miranda rights. The court denied motions to suppress Crumpton's two subsequent, recorded, statements. At the close of the government’s case, Crumpton argued inadequate Miranda warnings. The court agreed, suppressed one statement, and instructed the jury not to consider it. After Crumpton was convicted by the jury, the court ruled, sua sponte, that Crumpton’s second statement must be suppressed, which rendered the evidence insufficient to support the possession-of-ammunition verdict. The court granted Crumpton a new trial out of concern that the jury was prejudiced by hearing Crumpton’s first statement. The Sixth Circuit reversed as to the ammunition charge, reinstating the guilty verdict, and affirmed the narcotics conviction. View "United States v. Crumpton" on Justia Law

Hollis pleaded guilty to conspiracy to obtain firearms through fraudulent means and to being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 924(a)(1)(A); 922(g)(1). He was indicted on seven counts. The matter was severed into two tracks. The pretrial and discovery order advised that any motion for rearraignment must be filed at least two days before pretrial in order to avoid losing credit for acceptance of responsibility under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. Hollis moved for rearraignment one day after the deadline (13 days before trial) in Track 1 and 22 days after the deadline (a month before trial) in Track 2. At sentencing, Hollis objected to the PSR’s failure to credit him with the two-level reduction permitted under U.S.S.G. 3E1.1(a). Th court declined to grant the reduction, reasoning that the delay in moving for rearraignment wasted time and resources, and imposed a 168-month sentence. The Sixth Circuit vacated; the court focused exclusively on the preparatory work completed in anticipation of trial and did not find that the lateness of Hollis’s plea indicated that his acceptance of responsibility was not genuine. The paramount factor in determining eligibility for section 3E1.1 credit is whether the defendant truthfully admits the conduct comprising the offense or offenses of conviction. View "United States v. Hollis" on Justia Law

In 2010, Bail Bonds and Hamza jointly and severally secured a $75,000 appearance bond on behalf of Mohammed-Ali, an Ethiopian national (Hamza’s cousin), charged with smuggling a controlled substance, (khat), into the U.S., 18 U.S.C. 545. One condition of the sureties’ obligation was that Mohammed-Ali “comply with all conditions of release imposed by this court,” which included that he wear a GPS ankle bracelet. But 15 months later—at Mohammed-Ali’s request and without objection from the government—the court entered an order allowing him to remove the ankle bracelet. Neither counsel nor the court provided the sureties with notice of the motion or of the order. Mohammed-Ali fled to Ethiopia. The government sought judgment against the sureties. The district court granted the government summary judgment, reasoning that Bonds had constructive notice of the motion because it could have accessed the docket for Mohammed-Ali’s case, using the court’s electronic-filing system. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The risk the sureties agreed to accept was that Mohammed-Ali might flee notwithstanding his conditions of release, which included the ankle bracelet. That risk included the possibility that Mohammed-Ali might saw off bracelet and then flee. What the sureties did not accept was that the court would remove the bracelet for him. The purported “notice” was inadequate. View "United States v. Mohammed-Ali" on Justia Law

Nashville detectives went to Church’s home to serve him with a warrant for violating probation. Church arrived, carrying food. The detectives placed Church under arrest, agreed to allow him to enter the house and call his girlfriend, then accompanied Church inside with his consent. They stated that they smelled burnt marijuana. Church admitted that he had recently smoked marijuana and displayed a marijuana blunt. Church called his girlfriend, who arrived and told police that Church regularly smoked marijuana at the house. Detective Moseley left to prepare a search-warrant affidavit while Bowling stayed with Church. In his affidavit, Moseley recounted the detectives’ visit and conversations with Church and his girlfriend. The detectives executed a warrant for “controlled substances, [and] controlled substances paraphernalia” that afternoon. In a closet, they found 4.8 grams of marijuana and 8 dilaudid (hydromorphone) pills, plus a safe. Church refused to provide the code, so police used a prying ram to break in. The safe contained 800 dilaudid pills, a handgun, and ammunition. Church unsuccessfully sought to suppress the evidence, then pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute hydromorphone and to being a felon in possession of a firearm. He was sentenced to 170 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The affidavit established probable cause and the police did not break open the safe capriciously: they had probable cause to believe there might be drugs inside. View "United States v. Church" on Justia Law

Acting on information from Holt, a confidential informant (CI) who had purchased oxycodone from Barnes during three recent controlled buys in coordination with law enforcement, federal agents executed a search warrant on Barnes’s trailer home in rural Eastern Tennessee. They found roughly 300 pills in the trailer, mostly in prescription bottles bearing Barnes’s name, and some in bottles prescribed to other individuals, plus at least $1700 in cash—including marked bills from the CI’s controlled buys—and ammunition and firearms. Two guns were tucked under the corners of a mattress in the living room where Barnes slept and where he was seated when agents arrived. A jury convicted Barnes of drug trafficking and firearms offenses including, possession with intent to distribute oxycodone, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C) and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c). The Sixth Circuit​ affirmed rejecting claims that insufficient evidence supported the Section 924(c) conviction, that the district court wrongly admitted evidence of calls recorded while he was in jail with respect to his possession with intent to distribute conviction, and that the district court improperly considered a 1998 drug conviction when determining Barnes’s guidelines sentencing range. View "United States v. Barnes" on Justia Law

Pawlak sold firearms to an undercover officer on four occasions. He pled guilty to four counts of possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The court calculated a base offense level of 26 (U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(a)(1)) because the offenses involved a “semiautomatic firearm that is capable of accepting a large capacity magazine,” and Pawlak had two prior “felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense.” One of Pawlak’s qualifying convictions was an Ohio third-degree burglary offense. Absent that conviction, his base level would have been 22. The court added two levels because Pawlak possessed six firearms and applied a four-level enhancement for trafficking in firearms. After deducting three levels for acceptance of responsibility, Pawlak’s total offense level was 29 with a criminal history category of IV, resulting in a Guidelines range of 121−151 months. The court varied downward by four levels and sentenced Pawlak to 105 months. The Sixth Circuit vacated, holding that the Supreme Court’s 2015 holding in Johnson v. United States, that the Armed Career Criminal Act’s “residual clause” is unconstitutionally vague, compels the same result for an identical “residual clause” in the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. The court expressly overruled its prior decisions as no longer consistent with Supreme Court precedent. View "United States v. Pawlak" on Justia Law

Michigan charged and tried the named plaintiffs as adults for acts they committed while under the age of 18. Each received a conviction for first-degree murder and a mandatory sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole. In 2010, plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the Michigan statutory scheme that barred them from parole eligibility. Since then, the Supreme Court held in Miller v. Alabama (2012), “that mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual punishments,’” Michigan amended its juvenile offender laws in light of Miller, but made some changes contingent upon either the Michigan Supreme Court or the U.S. Supreme Court announcing that Miller applied retroactively, and the U.S. Supreme Court held in Montgomery v. Louisiana (2016), that Miller’s prohibition on mandatory life without parole for juvenile offenders is retroactive. The district court held, in 2013, that Miller should apply retroactively and issued an injunction requiring compliance with Miller. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded for consideration of remedies in the context of the new legal landscape and to determine whether class certification is required to extend relief to non-plaintiffs. View "Hill v. Snyder" on Justia Law

Dubrule, a former medical doctor, was convicted of conspiracy to distribute controlled substances, 21 U.S.C. 846, and 44 counts of distributing controlled substances, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). Kim, Dubrule’s wife and medical assistant, was convicted of conspiring with her husband. The district court sentenced Dubrule to 150 months’ imprisonment and Kim to 18 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Dubrule’s arguments that the district court erred by finding him competent to stand trial and proceed with sentencing and by failing to sua sponte order a competency hearing either before or during trial; that his pre-trial attorney and standby counsel at trial provided ineffective assistance by failing to request a competency evaluation; that the district court erred by holding that he had waived his insanity defense; and that his due process and Sixth Amendment rights were violated when the court, in making its competency determination, relied upon an expert opinion that misleadingly claimed to be “peer reviewed.” View "United States v. Dubrule" on Justia Law

Sixteen members of the Bergholz, Ohio, Amish community were convicted of hate crimes and obstruction-of-justice, stemming from a spate of hair-cutting and beard-shearing attacks that followed “shunnings” and a split in their community. In 2014, the Sixth Circuit reversed the hate crime convictions because the relevant jury instruction was inconsistent with an intervening Supreme Court decision. On remand, the government declined to re-try those charges, and the district court resentenced the defendants on the remaining convictions. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting that, in their second appeal, the defendants raised challenges that could have been, but were not, raised in the first appeal. The court also upheld the sentences: time served for eight defendants and terms of 43-129 months for the others. View "United States v. Mullet" on Justia Law