Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Collazo was driving on I-40. His wife, Cinthia, was the passenger. Officer Hill initiated a traffic stop after concluding that Collazo’s van was following too closely. Hill observed a jar of what appeared to be urine between the seats and Cinthia behaving erratically. Collazo said that Cinthia might be on pain medication due to recent surgeries. Hill concluded the traffic stop 21 minutes after it began. Collazo remained by the patrol car chatting for another eight minutes, until Officer Montgomery returned with Cinthia’s purse. Montgomery had asked Cinthia if she was nervous because something illegal was in the van. She hesitated, so he asked, “is it a lot?” Cinthia said that it was a lot and handed over her purse, where Montgomery discovered a prescription bottle for Suboxone and several loose Suboxone strips. Hill returned to the van and received Cinthia’s consent to search. Hill did not ask for or obtain written consent, despite the West Tennessee Drug Task Force’s policy. The officers discovered three kilograms of cocaine in the van approximately 90 minutes into the stop. A later search, following an attempted controlled delivery of the cocaine to its intended recipient, revealed 14 kilograms more. After an unsuccessful motion to suppress, Collazo pled guilty to conspiracy to possess five kilograms or more of cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 846; 18 U.S.C. 2. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Taken together, the circumstances provided ample evidence to conclude that the officers possessed probable cause to search Collazo’s van. View "United States v. Collazo" on Justia Law

Brown was convicted of four counts of distributing heroin and crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), and sentenced to 288 months’ imprisonment. The court also revoked his supervised release. The Sixth Circuit vacated the conviction and sentence, holding that the district court violated the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. 3161, when it initiated his trial with the intent of immediately recessing after conducting voir dire and empaneling a jury. The court directed the district court to determine whether the indictment should be dismissed with or without prejudice based on the factors articulated in 18 U.S.C. 3162(a)(2). The court affirmed the revocation of supervised release. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Adams of burglary, kidnapping, two counts of rape, and three counts of aggravated murder. The court followed the jury’s recommendation and sentenced Adams to death. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio vacated Adams’s kidnapping conviction, but affirmed the remaining convictions and the death sentence. In 2003, Adams filed an unsuccessful state petition for post-conviction relief. In 2006, Adams filed a federal habeas petition, challenging the use of a stun belt during trial and to Ohio’s lethal injection protocol. In 2013, the district court denied Adams’s motions for additional discovery and to take judicial notice of another challenge to Ohio’s lethal injection protocol. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief after holding the case in abeyance pending the Supreme Court’s 2015 holding in Glossip v. Gross. The court rejected arguments that requiring Adams to wear a stun belt throughout trial denied him a fundamentally fair trial and that Ohio’s lethal injection protocol violated the Eighth Amendment. The court noted that the stun belt inflicted no harm, was unknown to the jury, and was necessary because Adams had threatened bodily harm and posed a risk for escape, View "Adams v. Bradshaw" on Justia Law

Nashville Officer Ranney’s confidential informant arranged to meet a suspected drug dealer to purchase cocaine. The informant parked in the lot at the expected time, with officers watching. Another car (matching the description provided) pulled next to the informant’s vehicle, then pulled away. Ranney did not see anything indicating a drug sale. Officers followed the car. The driver, without signaling, turned left into an apartment complex. Ranney activated his lights, stopping the car. In response to a question, the suspect, Pittman, confessed that there was cocaine in the car. Police recovered cocaine and a digital scale and found $1000 in Pittman’s pocket. An officer read Pittman his Miranda rights. Pittman suggested that there might be something at his house and signed a consent document. Police searched his house, recovering two firearms. Ranney administered Miranda warnings again. Pittman admitted that he had purchased both guns. The court denied a motion to suppress, reasoning that failing to signal provided probable cause for the stop and that Pittman consented to the search of his home. After five lawyers withdrew, the court found that Pittman had “effectively waived his right to counsel” and appointed stand-by counsel. The Sixth Circuit affirmed his conviction as a felon in possession of a firearm and for distributing cocaine, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1); 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 235-month sentence, the lowest point on the guidelines range. View "United States v. Pittman" on Justia Law

Taylor was sentenced to 72 months’ imprisonment after pleading guilty to conspiracy to manufacture 5 grams or more of methamphetamine and aiding in maintaining a place for the purpose of manufacturing methamphetamine. Her guideline range was 108-135 months. The government moved for a downward departure, based on substantial assistance, to a sentence of 87 months, Taylor separately moved for a downward variance to 48 months. The court granted both motions in imposing the 72-month sentence. Amendments 782 and 788 to the Sentencing Guidelines, effective in 2014, retroactively lowered the guidelines for drug offenses by two levels. Taylor moved for a sentence reduction. Taylor’s amended guideline range was 87-108 months. Because Taylor’s original sentence was 33 percent below the guidelines range, she sought a sentence of 58 months, 33 percent below the amended range. The court stated that 19 percent of the original reduction was attributable to substantial assistance and reduced her sentence to 70 months, reasoning that U.S.S.G. 1B1.10(b)(2)(B) is limited to departures awarded pursuant to substantial assistance motions; variances and noncooperation departures are not awarded “pursuant to” such motions, so courts lack authority under section 3582(c)(2) to grant the relief requested. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, based on the history of section 1B1.10(b)(2) and the approaches of other circuits. View "United States v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Honeycutt was in charge of sales and inventory in the Brainerd Army Store, owned by his brother Tony. In 2008, Honeycutt called the Chattanooga Police to ask if the iodine in Polar Pure water purification product could be used to manufacture methamphetamine. The Director of the Tennessee Meth and Pharmaceutical Task Force, confirmed that Polar Pure was being used to manufacture methamphetamine, urged Honeycutt not to sell it “if [he] fe[lt] uncomfortable,” and informed the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) that Honeycutt was selling Polar Pure. The Store was the only local retailer that stocked Polar Pure. The product was hidden behind the counter. Only Honeycutt and Tony sold it. In 2009, the DEA, with state and local law enforcement, began investigating. There were direct conversations with Honeycutt and Tony, to convince the brothers to stop selling the product to meth producers. A 2010 search revealed that Polar Pure was the store’s highest-grossing item. Honeycutt indicated that he and Tony had a “don’t-ask-don’t-tell” policy. Agents seized 307 bottles of Polar Pure. Tony pled guilty. Honeycutt was convicted of conspiring to and knowingly distributing iodine, 21 U.S.C. 841(c)(2), 843(a)(6), and 846, and was sentenced to 60 months’ imprisonment. The court declined to order forfeiture, reasoning that, as a salaried employee, Honeycutt did not reap the proceeds of the conspiracy. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions, but reversed with respect to forfeiture. View "United States v. Honeycutt" on Justia Law

The defendants’ 2010-2011 carjacking scheme typically involved one of the Harpers threatening a parking lot valet with a gun while other cohorts would take the keys from a few high-end cars and drive them away. The carjackers delivered the vehicles to intermediaries who took them to Edmond. Edmond fabricated new titles, altered the appearance of the vehicles, and sold them. There were five carjackings (involving 12 cars) and one attempted carjacking. A jury convicted Phillip of four carjackings plus one attempt, Frank of three carjackings, and Edmond of three carjackings and one attempt, 18 U.S.C. 2119(1), and separately convicted the three of conspiring to commit the carjackings. Because the men used firearms, the jury also convicted them of numerous counts of using a firearm during a crime of violence. The jury found Edmond guilty of operating a chop shop and of crimes related to creating false identification numbers for motor vehicles. The district court imposed sentences of 93 years for Phillip, 63 years for Frank, and 75 years for Edmond. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges, claims alleging false grand jury testimony, challenges to the composition of the jury, and a challenge to admission of evidence about another shooting. View "United States v. Edmond" on Justia Law

Inmate Troche alleges that in 2001 he was severely beaten by Officer Crabtree and that after he received treatment for his injuries, he was placed in isolation and deprived of food. Troche alleges he submitted an Informal Complaint Resolution, initiating a three-step grievance procedure. Troche never received a response and submitted a notification of grievance form to the inspector of institutional services. Receiving no response, he sent, via internal prison mail, correspondence to prison personnel to inquire about the status of his grievance. After receiving no response, he filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit. Crabtree submitted declarations that Troche had filed complaints days after the incident, but did not submit an informal complaint to Crabtree’s direct supervisor or the staff member most directly responsible for the incident, as required, and that an investigation had determined that his complaints were without merit. The court dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The Administrative Code authorizes an inmate to proceed to step two of Ohio’s grievance procedure if he does not receive a response to his informal complaint within a “reasonable time.” Such authorization is not granted to inmates who fail to receive a response to a notification of grievance form at step two of the process. Troche was not required to proceed to a step-three appeal. View "Troche v. Crabtree" on Justia Law

In 1994, a jury convicted Smith of participating in a drug conspiracy and maintaining a drug house. Although Smith’s presentence report noted that he qualified as a career offender under U.S.S.G. 4B1.1, the court sentenced him based on the Sentencing Guidelines for drug-trafficking offenses, U.S.S.G. 2D1.1. The career-offender offense level applies only if it is greater than the otherwise applicable offense level and the drug-trafficking provision produced a higher offense level than did the career-offender provision. The district court sentenced Smith to 360 months’ imprisonment. In 2014, Smith moved for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2) and Amendment 782 to the Sentencing Guidelines, which lowered the base-offense level in the Drug Quantity Table applicable to the 2.35 kilograms of cocaine base attributed to Smith. The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial. Section 3582(c)(2) does not permit a sentence reduction when the operation of another Guidelines provision prevents an amendment from having the effect of lowering the Guidelines range applicable to a defendant’s case. Even if Amendment 782 had applied when Smith was sentenced, Smith’s status as a career offender under section 4B1.1 still would have required the application of a Guidelines range of 360 months to life. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

Odeh was charged under 18 U.S.C. 1425(a), which provides that “[w]hoever knowingly procures or attempts to procure, contrary to law, the naturalization of any person” shall be fined or imprisoned. On her 1994 immigrant visa application and her 2004 naturalization application, Odeh stated that she had continuously lived in Amman since 1948 and answered “No” in response to questions of whether she had “ever been arrested, convicted, or ever been in a prison,” been convicted of “a crime involving moral turpitude,” or been “convicted of 2 or more offenses for which the aggregate sentences were 5 years or more.” Odeh lived in Israel and Lebanon before moving to Jordan in 1983. In 1969-1970, Odeh was convicted for her role in a bombing in a supermarket that killed two civilians and wounded others, and for her role in an attempted bombing of the British Consulate. One conviction related to her membership in the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, which was designated a “foreign terrorist organization” by the Secretary of State in 1997. After her conviction, the court revoked Odeh’s citizenship and sentenced her to 18 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit vacated, based on the exclusion of Odeh’s witness, an expert in post-traumatic stress disorder, from testifying about why Odeh did not know that her statements were false due to alleged torture in an Israeli prison. Such testimony is not categorically inadmissible to negate a defendant’s knowledge of the falsity of a statement. View "United Syayes v. Rasmieh Odeh" on Justia Law