Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Bašić, a Balkan native, came to the U.S. in 1994 as a refugee to escape the civil war that was tearing Yugoslavia apart. She settled in Kentucky and became a naturalized citizen. She is now accused in Bosnia, one of Yugoslavia’s successor states, of crimes committed against ethnic Serbs during the war while Bašić was a member of the Croatian army. Bosnia asked the U.S. to extradite Bašić for trial. The Department of State filed a Complaint for Extradition in 2011. A Magistrate Judge certified the complaint, concluding that Bašić was extraditable under a 1902 treaty between the U.S. and the Kingdom of Serbia, 32 Stat. 1890. Direct appeal is not available in extradition proceedings, so Bašić filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2241. The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial, rejecting arguments that the Treaty prohibits extradition of U.S. citizens to Bosnia and that the Bosnian government failed to produce a warrant for Bašić’s arrest as required by the Treaty. View "Bašic v. Steck" on Justia Law

Bankston was charged wire fraud, mail fraud, bank fraud, money laundering, identity theft, and a false statement offense in connection with three separate fraudulent schemes. In each scheme, she unlawfully obtained the personal identification information of individuals and used it to defraud commercial banks and the state and federal government. Before trial, Bankston wrote a letter to the judge complaining of a disagreement with her attorney: Bankston wanted to present as a defense her theory that evidence recovered from her home had been planted by a federal agent. Based on the letter, Count 23 charged Bankston with making false statements in matters within the jurisdiction of the judiciary, 18 U.S.C. 1001. The Sixth Circuit vacated her Count 23 conviction and remanded for resentencing, affirming her other convictions, despite claims of insufficient evidence, judicial bias, prosecutorial misconduct, ineffective assistance, and invalid waiver of counsel. Bankston’s Count 23 conduct did not clearly constitute a crime: “judicial function exception” applies when the defendant was a party to a judicial proceeding, his statements were submitted to a judge, and his statements were made in that proceeding. View "United States v. Bankston" on Justia Law

Police arrested men suspected of committing armed robberies at Detroit-area stores. One confessed that the group had robbed nine stores in Michigan and Ohio in 2010-2011, supported by a shifting collection of 15 drivers and lookouts. He gave the FBI the cell phone numbers of other participants; the FBI reviewed his call records and obtained orders under the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. 2703(d), for release of records for 16 numbers, including “[a]ll subscriber information, toll records and call detail records including listed and unlisted numbers dialed or otherwise transmitted to and from" the phones for relevant dates and “cell site information for the target telephones at call origination and at call termination” to obtain evidence against Sanders, Carpenter and others. The government charged Carpenter with six, and Sanders with two, Hobbs Act counts, 18 U.S.C. 1951, and aiding the use or carriage of a firearm during a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c), 1951(a). The records showed that each used his cellphone within one-half-to-two miles of several robberies while the robberies occurred. A jury convicted on all of the Hobbs Act counts and convicted Carpenter on all but one of the gun counts. The court sentenced Carpenter to 1,395 months’ and Sanders to 170 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting a Fourth Amendment challenge. The content of a communication is protected by the Fourth Amendment; routing information necessary to convey it is not. The court distinguished between GPS tracking and the far less precise phone locational information. View "United States v. Sanders" on Justia Law

Walker served 19 years in federal prison for distributing cocaine and pointing a gun at the police. Upon his 2013 release, he began five years of supervised release. Walker was upset that his neighbor’s dog repeatedly defecated in his yard. He contacted his neighbor and the police, to no avail. One day, he asked his neighbor to clean up a particular mess. When the neighbor approached with a stick in hand, an argument ensued, culminating with Walker attacking with a machete. Walker cut his neighbor’s arm (requiring amputation), shattered the neighbor’s other elbow, slashed his head, and severed a nerve in his leg. Walker had no injuries, and there is no evidence that the neighbor had ever threatened him or raised the stick. State authorities charged Walker with attempted murder; federal authorities alleged violation of supervised release, 18 U.S.C. 3583(d). Walker admitted the violation. The court imposed the statutory maximum, five years in prison. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Walker’s argument that he should have the benefit of Alabama’s self-defense law. Using a machete was not a reasonable response. While Walker was never disciplined in prison, even protecting a guard from an assault, had a job, had saved money, and was trying to be a productive member of society, a safe society cannot accept the behavior Walker exhibited. View "United States v. Walker" on Justia Law

Smith pled guilty to two counts of possessing firearms as a felon under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), and to other federal crimes and was sentenced to 200 months in prison. Smith challenged the enhancement of his sentence under the enumerated-offenses clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), under which a person who violates 18 U.S.C. 922(g) and has three previous convictions for a violent felony shall be imprisoned for a minimum of 15 years, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1). Under the ACCA’s enumerated-offenses clause, a “violent felony” includes a crime “punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” and “is burglary, arson, or extortion, [or] involves [the] use of explosives.” Smith argued cited the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision, Johnson v. United States, invalidating a different ACCA clause, the residual clause, as unconstitutionally vague. That clause includes as a “violent felony” a crime that “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” The Sixth Circuit rejected his argument. Limiting language in the Johnson opinion makes clear that its holding does not extend to the enumerated-offenses clause. The enumerated-offenses clause gives ordinary people fair notice of the conduct it punishes and does not invite arbitrary enforcement. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

ATF and the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation jointly investigated Henry following a tip from a confidential informant, who had a prior felony conviction. Meeting at Henry’s residence, the CI and an undercover agent stated that they had prior felony convictions, purchased a pistol, and arranged a second meeting at which they purchased morphine pills and an AK-47. Indicted for selling a firearm to a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(d)(1), and possession with intent to distribute and distribution of morphine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), Henry was released on his own recognizance. In random drug testing. Henry positive for morphine three times, without a valid prescription. He failed to appear for a hearing; failed to submit two monthly reports; and failed to appear for a meeting with his pretrial services officer. Arrested a year later, he pleaded guilty to both counts. The PSR started with a base offense level of 20 because the AK-47 was a semiautomatic firearm, applied a four-level increase for “trafficking” firearms, enhanced Henry’s offense level by four points for possession of the rifle in connection with another felony, and included a two-point enhancement for obstruction of justice. The Sixth Circuit vacated Henry’s sentence of 50 months’ imprisonment. The district court erroneously applied the section 2K2.1(b)(5) firearms-trafficking enhancement to Henry and a serious, unresolved issue exists as to whether his conduct satisfied the obstruction-of-justice enhancement’s willfulness requirement. View "United States v. Henry" on Justia Law

Maslenjak, an ethnic Serb and native of Bosnia, came to the U.S. in 2000 as a refugee fleeing the civil war in the former Yugoslavia. Maslenjak claimed she and her family feared persecution in Bosnia because her husband had evaded conscription into the Serbian army during the war. In fact, Maslenjak’s husband had not only been in the Serbian militia during the war but had served as an officer in a unit implicated in war crimes. Maslenjak was granted refugee status and ultimately obtained her naturalization. Based on her misrepresentations during the immigration process, she was later convicted of knowingly procuring her naturalization contrary to law, 18 U.S.C. 1425(a) and of knowingly using an unlawfully issued certificate of naturalization, 18 U.S.C. 1423. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the district court improperly instructed the jury that her false statements need not be material in order to convict Maslenjak of procuring her naturalization contrary to law or erroneously instructed the jury that it could also convict Maslenjak if the jury found that she lacked good moral character. View "United States v. Maslenjak" on Justia Law

In 2009, Patel opened a pharmacy in the building where Dr. Fowler’s clinic operated and hired Shah as the manager. Shah paid Fowler to write prescriptions and send patients to Patel’s pharmacy. Patel introduced Fowler to Taylor, a “marketer” who would bring additional patients to Fowler’s clinic. Thoran, another marketer, would visit Patel’s pharmacy, to pick up prescriptions for 5-10 patients several times per week. The fraudulent prescriptions were resold on the street. Fowler and Thoran were convicted of conspiracy to commit healthcare fraud, conspiracy to distribute controlled substances, and conspiracy to pay or receive health-care kickbacks. During Fowler’s sentencing hearing, the district court failed to calculate the Guidelines range and failed to make findings about why the sentence that served as its “starting point” was appropriate. At Thoran’s sentencing hearing, the court agreed to the parties’ stipulated Guidelines range without making any findings about why it was appropriate. The court relied on erroneous factual findings in determining the restitution amount for each defendant and sentenced Fowler to 72 months’ imprisonment and payment of restitution of $1,752,957. Thoran’s sentence was 108 months with restitution of $2,632,854. The Sixth Circuit vacated the sentences and restitution orders, but affirmed Thoran’s convictions. View "United States v. Thoran" on Justia Law

A confidential informant told ATF agent Kloostra that a man called “D” was selling cocaine out of a particular Flint residence. Kloostra later observed, first-hand, as Dionte Jones emerged from the house, got into a car registered to an owner at that residence, drove to the site of a prearranged drug deal, and sold cocaine to the informant, whom Kloostra had known for two years. Kloostra promptly obtained a search warrant for the house, where agents found cocaine, guns, scales, and cash. The district court later granted Jones’s motion to suppress all this evidence, finding that Kloostra’s affidavit in support of the warrant application did not support the state judge’s finding of probable cause. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The district court’s mistake was to think of this case as one where the police conducted a search based on an informant’s tip alone: the warrant was actually based on Kloostra’s own observations more than it was the informant’s. View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law

A confidential informant told ATF agent Kloostra that a man called “D” was selling cocaine out of a particular Flint residence. Kloostra later observed, first-hand, as Dionte Jones emerged from the house, got into a car registered to an owner at that residence, drove to the site of a prearranged drug deal, and sold cocaine to the informant, whom Kloostra had known for two years. Kloostra promptly obtained a search warrant for the house, where agents found cocaine, guns, scales, and cash. The district court later granted Jones’s motion to suppress all this evidence, finding that Kloostra’s affidavit in support of the warrant application did not support the state judge’s finding of probable cause. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The district court’s mistake was to think of this case as one where the police conducted a search based on an informant’s tip alone: the warrant was actually based on Kloostra’s own observations more than it was the informant’s. View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law