Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The Mizes were charged with conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute oxycodone, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a)(1); (b)(1)(C), and conspiracy to commit money laundering, 18 U.S.C. 1956(a)(1)(A)(i), (a)(1)(B)(i); 1956(h). To explain the Mize conspiracy, the government presented evidence about the Bussell conspiracy. Individuals from Tennessee would travel to Florida doctors’ offices and pain clinics, visiting several per visit. Their ringleader paid travel expenses. The “doctor shoppers” would obtain prescription opiates and oxycodone, take the pills to Tennessee, keep half, and give the rest to the ringleader for resale. One Bussell “shopper,” James Mize, involved his brother, Kelvin; their father, Jackie, accompanied Bussell on a trip to learn how the operation worked, paying his own expenses. Jackie then assembled a group to do the same thing. When Florida clinics stopped seeing patients, and pharmacists stopped filling prescriptions, absent proof of a Florida driver’s license, Bussell leased Florida property, to establish residency for his shoppers and eliminate hotel costs. Jackie followed suit. Officers executed search warrants at Bussell’s Florida houses and Jackie’s Tennessee farmhouse, where they seized prescription bottles in Jackie’s name from a Florida pharmacy, lists of Florida pain clinics, proof of Kelvin’s payment of $1,798.80 for 80 milligrams of oxycodone, and notes. The Sixth Circuit vacated the Mize convictions, finding prejudicial variance between the indictment and the proof offered at trial. The government’s extraordinary evidence about the much-larger Bussell conspiracy enabled the jury to transfer the guilt of that conspiracy to the charged Mize conspiracy. View "United States v. Mize" on Justia Law

Tessier was on probation for a 2011 Tennessee felony conviction for sexual exploitation of a minor. His probation order contained a “standard” search condition that applied to all probationers in Tennessee: “I agree to a search, without a warrant, of my person, vehicle, property, or place of residence by any Probation/Parole officer or law enforcement officer, at any time.” After being subjected to a search that was not otherwise supported by reasonable suspicion, Tessler unsuccessfully moved to suppress evidence of child pornography and pled guilty to child pornography charges. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, applying the totality-of-the-circumstances reasonableness approach employed by the Supreme Court. View "United States v. Tessier" on Justia Law

Landrum was convicted of aggravated burglary and aggravated murder for breaking into 84-year-old White’s apartment and killing him in 1985. The jury found two death penalty specifications: Landrum committed aggravated murder to escape detection for committing burglary, and Landrum was the principal offender in an aggravated murder. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed. The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari. Landrum unsuccessfully sought state post-conviction relief in 1996. The Ohio Supreme Court denied further review. In 1998, Landrum applied to reopen his appeal under Ohio Rule 26(B). The Ohio Court of Appeals denied relief, finding that Landrum failed to show good cause for delaying his application; the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed. Landrum sought federal habeas relief, arguing that his counsel was ineffective for failing to introduce testimony that his co-defendant had confessed to cutting White’s throat. The court granted a conditional writ, finding that Landrum did not procedurally default that claim because Rule 26(B) was not firmly established and regularly followed in Ohio capital cases. The Sixth Circuit reversed. In 2012, Landrum filed an FRCP 60(b)(6) motion, arguing that ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel excused the procedural default of his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present the confession claim. The district court denied relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, concluding Landrum did not present a “substantial claim” of ineffective assistance of counsel. View "Landrum v. Anderson" on Justia Law

In 1986, after Moreland waived trial by jury, a three-judge panel found Moreland guilty of the aggravated murders of his girlfriend Glenna, her adult daughter and three grandchildren, and of the attempted aggravated murders of three other grandchildren. The panel sentenced Moreland to prison and death. He exhausted direct appeal and state-post-conviction remedies. In 2005, Moreland filed a federal habeas corpus petition, which was denied. In 2012, while Moreland’s appeal of that denial was pending, Moreland filed a motion for relief from judgment under FRCP 60(b) and a motion to amend the already-denied 2005 petition under FRCP 15, seeking to raise claims about his waiver of his right to a jury trial, and trial counsel’s failure to use certain police reports and to obtain an expert to challenge the state’s blood evidence. The Sixth Circuit held that Moreland’s motions were second or successive habeas petitions that the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider. Rather than denying Moreland’s motions, that court should have transferred them as requests for permission to file. Considered as requests for such permission, Moreland’s requests do not meet the gatekeeping requirements for presenting claims in a second or successive habeas petition. Moreland has not established a basis for relief. View "Moreland v. Robinson" on Justia Law

Taylor committed burglaries from Luck’s house and neighboring Atlanta residences, 2001-2003. On August 6, 2003, Taylor, Matthews, and Marshall, went to Luck’s house to rob him. Marshall guarded Luck at gunpoint while Taylor searched the house, taking $600-800. Luck was forced outside and into his van. As Taylor drove around isolated Tennessee roads, there was a confrontation. Matthews fired a shot, which hit Luck in the arm. Taylor turned around and fired three shots, causing Luck's death later that day. Taylor and Matthews left their guns in the van, walked to the car driven by Marshall, and returned to Atlanta. During his pre-trial incarceration, Taylor was part of a group of inmates that attempted to escape. A jury convicted Taylor of carjacking resulting in death, kidnapping resulting in death, and using a firearm to commit murder while committing carjacking and kidnapping and recommended a death sentence, which the court imposed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims of juror bias, that the court erred in excluding testimony about Taylor’s “future dangerousness,” that the court erred in admitting testimony from an FBI agent concerning an interview with Marshall, that the jury instructions did not adequately address mitigating factors, and of prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments. View "United States v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Martin, Kentucky Mayor Thomasine Robinson, sought reelection. Her challenger, Howell, won by three votes. Husband James confronted and threatened to kill Howell; he was convicted in state court of terroristic threatening and menacing. Thomasine was charged with bribery, coercion, and intimidation. Testimony indicated that: Thomasine gave a woman $20 to vote for her and coerced voters to vote for her by absentee ballot; that her son Steven attempted to intimidate a voter; that James paid $10 for a vote; and that James gave an individual money with which to purchase votes. The jury returned a guilty verdict on conspiracy and vote-buying (52 U.S.C. 10307(c)) charges, but the court granted James acquittal on the conspiracy charge. Thomasine was convicted of vote-buying and conspiracy to violate civil rights (18 U.S.C. 241); Steven was found guilty of conspiracy and two counts of vote-buying, but acquitted of a third count. The court assessed a leadership enhancement to James for directing another to purchase votes and an obstruction of justice enhancement for behaving menacingly during a trial recess and sentenced him to an above-guidelines 40 months in prison. Steven was sentenced to 21 months and three years of supervised release, with a condition requiring him to abstain from the consumption of alcohol. Thomasine was sentenced to 33 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentences, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence. View "United States v. Robinson" on Justia Law

Convicted-felon Houston resided on a farm containing signs critical of government and depicting the dead bodies of an officer and his companion. Houston and his brother (Leon) were acquitted of those murders. The farm is not enclosed. The Roane Sheriff’ informed ATF that Houston possessed firearms. ATF attempted drive-by surveillance. Later, at the direction of ATF and without a warrant, the utility company installed a surveillance camera on a utility pole 200 yards from Leon’s trailer, which broadcast recordings. An ATF agent testified that the captured footage was identical to what he would have observed by driving down public roads. After 10 weeks of warrantless monitoring, ATF obtained a warrant on the same day that the Sixth Circuit expressed “some misgivings” about the constitutionality of long-term warrantless surveillance of an individual’s backyard via a pole camera. Weeks later, agents arrested Houston, away from the farm. No firearms were found on his person. Agents executed warrants for the farm and seized 17 firearms from Houston’s house, five from Leon’s trailer, and three from Leon’s person. The Sixth Circuit affirmed Houston’s conviction, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). Use of the camera did not violate Houston’s reasonable expectations of privacy because it recorded the view as seen by passersby on public roads. The court also rejected challenges to his classification as a “prohibited person” and to the reasonableness of his 108-month sentence. View "United States v. Houston" on Justia Law

Alsante pleaded guilty to failing to register as a sex offender under 42 U.S.C. 16913. At his sentencing hearing, the district court permitted the government to introduce evidence that Alsante had committed other sexual-misconduct crimes with a minor, all of which were the subject of pending Tennessee state court charges. The district court relied on that conduct in imposing a 54-month sentence, an upward variance from his advisory guidelines range of 15-21 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Alsante’s argument that his due process rights or his rights against self-incrimination were violated by permitting the government to introduce evidence related to pending state court charges at his federal sentencing hearing because any attempt to rebut the government’s evidence at the federal sentencing hearing hampered his ability to defend himself in state court. The court noted that Alsante did not seek a continuance and did not suffer “actual or threatened physical harm” for remaining silent, not face “mental coercion overbearing the will.” View "United States v. Alsante" on Justia Law

Bivens, then 33, began a sexual relationship with A.H., then 13 and living with her father near Bivens’ Kentucky home. A.H. moved to Ohio to live with her mother. A.H. took sexually explicit photos of herself at Bivens’ request and sent them to Bivens; around her fourteenth birthday. Bivens drove to Ohio and took A.H. to a hotel, where they engaged in sexual intercourse. Bivens created explicit photos, which he took home on his iPhone. Two months later, A.H. ran away from home; Bivens picked her up in Ohio and drove her to Kentucky, where the two again engaged in sex. A.H. hid in a crawl space behind a dresser and was not found until the sixth search of Bivens’ home. Bivens pled guilty to persuading A.H. to create child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a); traveling interstate to engage in illicit sexual conduct, section 2423(b); creating child pornography, section 2251(a); transporting child pornography across state lines, section 2252(a)(1); and transporting A.H. between states to engage in illegal sexual activity, section 2423(a). The Sixth Circuit affirmed his sentence of 360 months in prison, based on an advisory guidelines range of 360 months to life, upholding the court’s decision, over Bivens’ objection, not to combine the counts in determining the guidelines range. View "United States v. Bivens" on Justia Law

Cabrera, indicted as a felon in possession of a firearm after he procured a handgun for a confidential informant, claimed, in pre-trial motions and post-trial submissions, that law-enforcement agents had doctored an audio-tape recording of that transaction. Cabrera did not, however, testify in support of that theory. A jury found him guilty. At sentencing, the district judge announced that he was sentencing Cabrera to 63 months’ imprisonment, the top of his guidelines range, because Cabrera advanced a “fantastic” claim (that the tape was altered); and did not testify in support of that claim. Cabrera’s counsel raised no objection to his sentence. The Sixth Circuit vacated. Although the district judge seemed to rely on 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)(2)(A), his statements suggest that he misinterpreted the thrust of that statutory sentencing factor; he failed to substantiate his claim that Cabrera disrespected the law within the meaning of that factor so that Cabrera was punished for exercising his Sixth Amendment right to challenge the government’s case. View "United States v. Cabrera" on Justia Law