Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

For his role in armed robberies in two different Tennessee counties, a jury convicted Vichitvongsa of two counts of conspiring to commit Hobbs Act robbery, two counts of conspiring to traffic drugs, and four counts of using a firearm to further these conspiracies (two for each robbery) 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1). His 1,219-month sentence included 984 months for the section 924(c) convictions. The Sixth Circuit vacated the section 924(c) convictions, holding that the simultaneous violation of two federal conspiracy statutes cannot support two section 924(c) charges where there was only one firearm use. The section provides that “any person who, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime . . . uses or carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm” shall be subject to additional and consecutive imprisonment. Because he simultaneously used only one firearm during the commission of two simultaneous conspiracies (Hobbs Act robbery and drug trafficking), Vichitvongsa wrongly received two section 924(c) counts for each robbery. View "United States v. Vichitvongsa" on Justia Law

Binford, convicted as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), and of possessing with intent to distribute marijuana, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(D), was given an enhanced sentence of 180 months’ imprisonment. After the Supreme Court held that the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1) was unconstitutionally vague, Binford appealed, arguing that his sentencing-guidelines range was substantially increased based on an identical provision in the Sentencing Guidelines that is also void. The Sixth CIrcuit affirmed Binford’s convictions, but vacated his sentence, and remanded for reconsideration in light of the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in Johnson v. United States. The court upheld denial of a motion to suppress evidence and incriminating statements under the exclusionary rule. An interrogation on Binford, in his bathroom while the search was in progress, lasted a short time and was not prolonged or repeated. While Binford said he was scared, he did not say he was scared into making the statements. An officer’s statement that he could help Binford if he cooperated did not amount to the level of police coercion required to suppress the statements. Binford knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights. View "United States v. Binford" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine and money laundering. The PSR calculated defendant’s criminal history score at eight points, including two for committing the offense “while under a criminal justice sentence” for a 2011 DUI conviction. Defendant had been sentenced to a 180-day jail term that was suspended on the condition that he “obey laws for 2 years.” Defendant objected to the addition of the two points, arguing that, although the difference would not affect his sentence, it would likely affect his treatment by the Bureau of Prisons. There was no cooperation or substantial assistance clause in the agreement. Defendant requested that the plea agreement be “unsealed on Pacer,” arguing that neither he, nor the government, nor the court had any legitimate interest in sealing the document, so it should remain accessible to the public. The dcourt denied his request, citing its universal policy to make plea agreements available only to the parties and court personnel, rejected his objection to the criminal history points, and sentenced defendant to a mandatory minimum 20 years in prison. The Sixth Circuit remanded for compliance with a requirement of on-the-record findings justifying nondisclosure, but otherwise affirmed. View "United States v. DeJournett" on Justia Law

Brown, convicted in 1996 of drug and firearm crimes and of aiding an intentional killing, is “a frequent filer.” He unsuccessfully brought a Civil Rule 60(d) motion for reconsideration of an earlier motion for relief from judgment and an 18 U.S.C. 3582(c) sentence-reduction motion. The Sixth Circuit dismissed the section 3582(c) appeal, finding that Brown filed his notice of appeal too late. The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure gave Brown 60 days to appeal the Rule 60(d) denial and 14 days to appeal the section 3582(c) denial. The court noted that, while civil rules apply to the Rule 60(d) denial, Brown’s section 3582(c) motion was a criminal motion. Even though Brown filed motions to reconsider and vacate the court’s decision on his section 3582(c) motion before he filed the notice of appeal, the notice was untimely. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

All American, a health agency, purportedly provided a range of therapy-related services at the homes of patients and submitted claims to Medicare for the cost therapy services that were medically unnecessary and not provided. According to the government, its office manager, Mahbub, specifically created, fabricated and falsified medical and billing documents. All American was paid $5,809,435.74 by Medicare for home-health services between September 2008 and November 2009. In 2013, a jury convicted Mahbub of conspiracy to commit healthcare fraud under 18 U.S.C. 1349, and Mahbub was sentenced to 46 months in prison. The Sixth Circuit remanded, based on a Batson challenge, “for a proper determination of whether there is an inference that the government engaged in purposeful discrimination,” but otherwise affirmed. The government had challenged a prospective juror (Syed), alleged to be the only Muslim on the panel, but had claimed that the challenge was based on Syed’s response to a question about “younger people” becoming “caught up” in criminal activity. The court rejected challenges to a jury instruction and to the sentence. View "United States v. Mahbub" on Justia Law

Collazo was driving on I-40. His wife, Cinthia, was the passenger. Officer Hill initiated a traffic stop after concluding that Collazo’s van was following too closely. Hill observed a jar of what appeared to be urine between the seats and Cinthia behaving erratically. Collazo said that Cinthia might be on pain medication due to recent surgeries. Hill concluded the traffic stop 21 minutes after it began. Collazo remained by the patrol car chatting for another eight minutes, until Officer Montgomery returned with Cinthia’s purse. Montgomery had asked Cinthia if she was nervous because something illegal was in the van. She hesitated, so he asked, “is it a lot?” Cinthia said that it was a lot and handed over her purse, where Montgomery discovered a prescription bottle for Suboxone and several loose Suboxone strips. Hill returned to the van and received Cinthia’s consent to search. Hill did not ask for or obtain written consent, despite the West Tennessee Drug Task Force’s policy. The officers discovered three kilograms of cocaine in the van approximately 90 minutes into the stop. A later search, following an attempted controlled delivery of the cocaine to its intended recipient, revealed 14 kilograms more. After an unsuccessful motion to suppress, Collazo pled guilty to conspiracy to possess five kilograms or more of cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 846; 18 U.S.C. 2. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Taken together, the circumstances provided ample evidence to conclude that the officers possessed probable cause to search Collazo’s van. View "United States v. Collazo" on Justia Law

Brown was convicted of four counts of distributing heroin and crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), and sentenced to 288 months’ imprisonment. The court also revoked his supervised release. The Sixth Circuit vacated the conviction and sentence, holding that the district court violated the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. 3161, when it initiated his trial with the intent of immediately recessing after conducting voir dire and empaneling a jury. The court directed the district court to determine whether the indictment should be dismissed with or without prejudice based on the factors articulated in 18 U.S.C. 3162(a)(2). The court affirmed the revocation of supervised release. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Adams of burglary, kidnapping, two counts of rape, and three counts of aggravated murder. The court followed the jury’s recommendation and sentenced Adams to death. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio vacated Adams’s kidnapping conviction, but affirmed the remaining convictions and the death sentence. In 2003, Adams filed an unsuccessful state petition for post-conviction relief. In 2006, Adams filed a federal habeas petition, challenging the use of a stun belt during trial and to Ohio’s lethal injection protocol. In 2013, the district court denied Adams’s motions for additional discovery and to take judicial notice of another challenge to Ohio’s lethal injection protocol. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief after holding the case in abeyance pending the Supreme Court’s 2015 holding in Glossip v. Gross. The court rejected arguments that requiring Adams to wear a stun belt throughout trial denied him a fundamentally fair trial and that Ohio’s lethal injection protocol violated the Eighth Amendment. The court noted that the stun belt inflicted no harm, was unknown to the jury, and was necessary because Adams had threatened bodily harm and posed a risk for escape, View "Adams v. Bradshaw" on Justia Law

Nashville Officer Ranney’s confidential informant arranged to meet a suspected drug dealer to purchase cocaine. The informant parked in the lot at the expected time, with officers watching. Another car (matching the description provided) pulled next to the informant’s vehicle, then pulled away. Ranney did not see anything indicating a drug sale. Officers followed the car. The driver, without signaling, turned left into an apartment complex. Ranney activated his lights, stopping the car. In response to a question, the suspect, Pittman, confessed that there was cocaine in the car. Police recovered cocaine and a digital scale and found $1000 in Pittman’s pocket. An officer read Pittman his Miranda rights. Pittman suggested that there might be something at his house and signed a consent document. Police searched his house, recovering two firearms. Ranney administered Miranda warnings again. Pittman admitted that he had purchased both guns. The court denied a motion to suppress, reasoning that failing to signal provided probable cause for the stop and that Pittman consented to the search of his home. After five lawyers withdrew, the court found that Pittman had “effectively waived his right to counsel” and appointed stand-by counsel. The Sixth Circuit affirmed his conviction as a felon in possession of a firearm and for distributing cocaine, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1); 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 235-month sentence, the lowest point on the guidelines range. View "United States v. Pittman" on Justia Law

Taylor was sentenced to 72 months’ imprisonment after pleading guilty to conspiracy to manufacture 5 grams or more of methamphetamine and aiding in maintaining a place for the purpose of manufacturing methamphetamine. Her guideline range was 108-135 months. The government moved for a downward departure, based on substantial assistance, to a sentence of 87 months, Taylor separately moved for a downward variance to 48 months. The court granted both motions in imposing the 72-month sentence. Amendments 782 and 788 to the Sentencing Guidelines, effective in 2014, retroactively lowered the guidelines for drug offenses by two levels. Taylor moved for a sentence reduction. Taylor’s amended guideline range was 87-108 months. Because Taylor’s original sentence was 33 percent below the guidelines range, she sought a sentence of 58 months, 33 percent below the amended range. The court stated that 19 percent of the original reduction was attributable to substantial assistance and reduced her sentence to 70 months, reasoning that U.S.S.G. 1B1.10(b)(2)(B) is limited to departures awarded pursuant to substantial assistance motions; variances and noncooperation departures are not awarded “pursuant to” such motions, so courts lack authority under section 3582(c)(2) to grant the relief requested. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, based on the history of section 1B1.10(b)(2) and the approaches of other circuits. View "United States v. Taylor" on Justia Law