Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Honeycutt was in charge of sales and inventory in the Brainerd Army Store, owned by his brother Tony. In 2008, Honeycutt called the Chattanooga Police to ask if the iodine in Polar Pure water purification product could be used to manufacture methamphetamine. The Director of the Tennessee Meth and Pharmaceutical Task Force, confirmed that Polar Pure was being used to manufacture methamphetamine, urged Honeycutt not to sell it “if [he] fe[lt] uncomfortable,” and informed the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) that Honeycutt was selling Polar Pure. The Store was the only local retailer that stocked Polar Pure. The product was hidden behind the counter. Only Honeycutt and Tony sold it. In 2009, the DEA, with state and local law enforcement, began investigating. There were direct conversations with Honeycutt and Tony, to convince the brothers to stop selling the product to meth producers. A 2010 search revealed that Polar Pure was the store’s highest-grossing item. Honeycutt indicated that he and Tony had a “don’t-ask-don’t-tell” policy. Agents seized 307 bottles of Polar Pure. Tony pled guilty. Honeycutt was convicted of conspiring to and knowingly distributing iodine, 21 U.S.C. 841(c)(2), 843(a)(6), and 846, and was sentenced to 60 months’ imprisonment. The court declined to order forfeiture, reasoning that, as a salaried employee, Honeycutt did not reap the proceeds of the conspiracy. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions, but reversed with respect to forfeiture. View "United States v. Honeycutt" on Justia Law

The defendants’ 2010-2011 carjacking scheme typically involved one of the Harpers threatening a parking lot valet with a gun while other cohorts would take the keys from a few high-end cars and drive them away. The carjackers delivered the vehicles to intermediaries who took them to Edmond. Edmond fabricated new titles, altered the appearance of the vehicles, and sold them. There were five carjackings (involving 12 cars) and one attempted carjacking. A jury convicted Phillip of four carjackings plus one attempt, Frank of three carjackings, and Edmond of three carjackings and one attempt, 18 U.S.C. 2119(1), and separately convicted the three of conspiring to commit the carjackings. Because the men used firearms, the jury also convicted them of numerous counts of using a firearm during a crime of violence. The jury found Edmond guilty of operating a chop shop and of crimes related to creating false identification numbers for motor vehicles. The district court imposed sentences of 93 years for Phillip, 63 years for Frank, and 75 years for Edmond. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges, claims alleging false grand jury testimony, challenges to the composition of the jury, and a challenge to admission of evidence about another shooting. View "United States v. Edmond" on Justia Law

Inmate Troche alleges that in 2001 he was severely beaten by Officer Crabtree and that after he received treatment for his injuries, he was placed in isolation and deprived of food. Troche alleges he submitted an Informal Complaint Resolution, initiating a three-step grievance procedure. Troche never received a response and submitted a notification of grievance form to the inspector of institutional services. Receiving no response, he sent, via internal prison mail, correspondence to prison personnel to inquire about the status of his grievance. After receiving no response, he filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit. Crabtree submitted declarations that Troche had filed complaints days after the incident, but did not submit an informal complaint to Crabtree’s direct supervisor or the staff member most directly responsible for the incident, as required, and that an investigation had determined that his complaints were without merit. The court dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The Administrative Code authorizes an inmate to proceed to step two of Ohio’s grievance procedure if he does not receive a response to his informal complaint within a “reasonable time.” Such authorization is not granted to inmates who fail to receive a response to a notification of grievance form at step two of the process. Troche was not required to proceed to a step-three appeal. View "Troche v. Crabtree" on Justia Law

In 1994, a jury convicted Smith of participating in a drug conspiracy and maintaining a drug house. Although Smith’s presentence report noted that he qualified as a career offender under U.S.S.G. 4B1.1, the court sentenced him based on the Sentencing Guidelines for drug-trafficking offenses, U.S.S.G. 2D1.1. The career-offender offense level applies only if it is greater than the otherwise applicable offense level and the drug-trafficking provision produced a higher offense level than did the career-offender provision. The district court sentenced Smith to 360 months’ imprisonment. In 2014, Smith moved for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2) and Amendment 782 to the Sentencing Guidelines, which lowered the base-offense level in the Drug Quantity Table applicable to the 2.35 kilograms of cocaine base attributed to Smith. The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial. Section 3582(c)(2) does not permit a sentence reduction when the operation of another Guidelines provision prevents an amendment from having the effect of lowering the Guidelines range applicable to a defendant’s case. Even if Amendment 782 had applied when Smith was sentenced, Smith’s status as a career offender under section 4B1.1 still would have required the application of a Guidelines range of 360 months to life. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

Odeh was charged under 18 U.S.C. 1425(a), which provides that “[w]hoever knowingly procures or attempts to procure, contrary to law, the naturalization of any person” shall be fined or imprisoned. On her 1994 immigrant visa application and her 2004 naturalization application, Odeh stated that she had continuously lived in Amman since 1948 and answered “No” in response to questions of whether she had “ever been arrested, convicted, or ever been in a prison,” been convicted of “a crime involving moral turpitude,” or been “convicted of 2 or more offenses for which the aggregate sentences were 5 years or more.” Odeh lived in Israel and Lebanon before moving to Jordan in 1983. In 1969-1970, Odeh was convicted for her role in a bombing in a supermarket that killed two civilians and wounded others, and for her role in an attempted bombing of the British Consulate. One conviction related to her membership in the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, which was designated a “foreign terrorist organization” by the Secretary of State in 1997. After her conviction, the court revoked Odeh’s citizenship and sentenced her to 18 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit vacated, based on the exclusion of Odeh’s witness, an expert in post-traumatic stress disorder, from testifying about why Odeh did not know that her statements were false due to alleged torture in an Israeli prison. Such testimony is not categorically inadmissible to negate a defendant’s knowledge of the falsity of a statement. View "United Syayes v. Rasmieh Odeh" on Justia Law

The Mizes were charged with conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute oxycodone, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a)(1); (b)(1)(C), and conspiracy to commit money laundering, 18 U.S.C. 1956(a)(1)(A)(i), (a)(1)(B)(i); 1956(h). To explain the Mize conspiracy, the government presented evidence about the Bussell conspiracy. Individuals from Tennessee would travel to Florida doctors’ offices and pain clinics, visiting several per visit. Their ringleader paid travel expenses. The “doctor shoppers” would obtain prescription opiates and oxycodone, take the pills to Tennessee, keep half, and give the rest to the ringleader for resale. One Bussell “shopper,” James Mize, involved his brother, Kelvin; their father, Jackie, accompanied Bussell on a trip to learn how the operation worked, paying his own expenses. Jackie then assembled a group to do the same thing. When Florida clinics stopped seeing patients, and pharmacists stopped filling prescriptions, absent proof of a Florida driver’s license, Bussell leased Florida property, to establish residency for his shoppers and eliminate hotel costs. Jackie followed suit. Officers executed search warrants at Bussell’s Florida houses and Jackie’s Tennessee farmhouse, where they seized prescription bottles in Jackie’s name from a Florida pharmacy, lists of Florida pain clinics, proof of Kelvin’s payment of $1,798.80 for 80 milligrams of oxycodone, and notes. The Sixth Circuit vacated the Mize convictions, finding prejudicial variance between the indictment and the proof offered at trial. The government’s extraordinary evidence about the much-larger Bussell conspiracy enabled the jury to transfer the guilt of that conspiracy to the charged Mize conspiracy. View "United States v. Mize" on Justia Law

Tessier was on probation for a 2011 Tennessee felony conviction for sexual exploitation of a minor. His probation order contained a “standard” search condition that applied to all probationers in Tennessee: “I agree to a search, without a warrant, of my person, vehicle, property, or place of residence by any Probation/Parole officer or law enforcement officer, at any time.” After being subjected to a search that was not otherwise supported by reasonable suspicion, Tessler unsuccessfully moved to suppress evidence of child pornography and pled guilty to child pornography charges. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, applying the totality-of-the-circumstances reasonableness approach employed by the Supreme Court. View "United States v. Tessier" on Justia Law

Landrum was convicted of aggravated burglary and aggravated murder for breaking into 84-year-old White’s apartment and killing him in 1985. The jury found two death penalty specifications: Landrum committed aggravated murder to escape detection for committing burglary, and Landrum was the principal offender in an aggravated murder. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed. The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari. Landrum unsuccessfully sought state post-conviction relief in 1996. The Ohio Supreme Court denied further review. In 1998, Landrum applied to reopen his appeal under Ohio Rule 26(B). The Ohio Court of Appeals denied relief, finding that Landrum failed to show good cause for delaying his application; the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed. Landrum sought federal habeas relief, arguing that his counsel was ineffective for failing to introduce testimony that his co-defendant had confessed to cutting White’s throat. The court granted a conditional writ, finding that Landrum did not procedurally default that claim because Rule 26(B) was not firmly established and regularly followed in Ohio capital cases. The Sixth Circuit reversed. In 2012, Landrum filed an FRCP 60(b)(6) motion, arguing that ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel excused the procedural default of his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present the confession claim. The district court denied relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, concluding Landrum did not present a “substantial claim” of ineffective assistance of counsel. View "Landrum v. Anderson" on Justia Law

In 1986, after Moreland waived trial by jury, a three-judge panel found Moreland guilty of the aggravated murders of his girlfriend Glenna, her adult daughter and three grandchildren, and of the attempted aggravated murders of three other grandchildren. The panel sentenced Moreland to prison and death. He exhausted direct appeal and state-post-conviction remedies. In 2005, Moreland filed a federal habeas corpus petition, which was denied. In 2012, while Moreland’s appeal of that denial was pending, Moreland filed a motion for relief from judgment under FRCP 60(b) and a motion to amend the already-denied 2005 petition under FRCP 15, seeking to raise claims about his waiver of his right to a jury trial, and trial counsel’s failure to use certain police reports and to obtain an expert to challenge the state’s blood evidence. The Sixth Circuit held that Moreland’s motions were second or successive habeas petitions that the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider. Rather than denying Moreland’s motions, that court should have transferred them as requests for permission to file. Considered as requests for such permission, Moreland’s requests do not meet the gatekeeping requirements for presenting claims in a second or successive habeas petition. Moreland has not established a basis for relief. View "Moreland v. Robinson" on Justia Law

Taylor committed burglaries from Luck’s house and neighboring Atlanta residences, 2001-2003. On August 6, 2003, Taylor, Matthews, and Marshall, went to Luck’s house to rob him. Marshall guarded Luck at gunpoint while Taylor searched the house, taking $600-800. Luck was forced outside and into his van. As Taylor drove around isolated Tennessee roads, there was a confrontation. Matthews fired a shot, which hit Luck in the arm. Taylor turned around and fired three shots, causing Luck's death later that day. Taylor and Matthews left their guns in the van, walked to the car driven by Marshall, and returned to Atlanta. During his pre-trial incarceration, Taylor was part of a group of inmates that attempted to escape. A jury convicted Taylor of carjacking resulting in death, kidnapping resulting in death, and using a firearm to commit murder while committing carjacking and kidnapping and recommended a death sentence, which the court imposed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims of juror bias, that the court erred in excluding testimony about Taylor’s “future dangerousness,” that the court erred in admitting testimony from an FBI agent concerning an interview with Marshall, that the jury instructions did not adequately address mitigating factors, and of prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments. View "United States v. Taylor" on Justia Law