Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

An eighteen-year-old individual pleaded guilty in a Michigan court to a felony charge for carrying a concealed weapon. Rather than entering a judgment of conviction, the court placed him in a diversion program for youthful offenders under the Holmes Youthful Trainee Act, which deferred both conviction and judgment. The program allowed the court to enter a conviction at any time if the individual failed to meet its requirements. While still participating in this program and on probation, the individual was arrested and admitted possession of a firearm with an obliterated serial number, leading to federal charges.The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan presided over the federal case. At sentencing, the court adopted the presentence report’s finding that the defendant’s offense level should be increased because he was a “prohibited person” under federal law at the time of the firearm offense, due to his pending felony charge in Michigan. The court concluded that the deferred status under the Michigan program meant the original felony information remained pending, qualifying him as being “under indictment” for purposes of federal firearms restrictions. The district court sentenced him to 48 months in prison.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit considered whether participation in Michigan’s diversion program constituted being “under indictment,” thereby justifying the sentencing enhancement as a “prohibited person.” The Sixth Circuit held that, under Michigan law, the original felony charge remains pending throughout the diversion program until successful completion or revocation, and no judgment of conviction is entered unless the program is revoked. Consequently, the court affirmed that the defendant was “under indictment” during the relevant period, and thus properly subject to the federal sentencing enhancement. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Rolon" on Justia Law

Law enforcement officers responded to a report of an open door at Chad Taylor’s townhouse in Boone County, Kentucky. Inside, they found signs of recently fired gunshots, including bullet holes and spent shell casings. After obtaining search warrants, officers found ammunition and methamphetamine in Taylor’s possession. Taylor admitted to using methamphetamine and exhibited paranoid, erratic behavior, claiming people were watching him. The following day, Taylor was found at his home with a loaded Glock 19, and ballistics matched it to the earlier gunfire. Taylor had prior felony convictions for drug trafficking, intimidation, and misdemeanor domestic battery.A grand jury indicted Taylor for being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky initially detained Taylor but later released him on conditions due to his history of substance abuse and the risk he posed. Taylor moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the statute was unconstitutional both facially and as applied. The district court denied the motion, finding Taylor dangerous based on his prior convictions, and subsequently sentenced him to 30 months’ imprisonment after he pled guilty but reserved his right to appeal the constitutional issue.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) as applied to Taylor in light of recent circuit precedent. The appellate court held that the dangerousness assessment required for firearm disqualification is distinct from the assessment for pretrial detention. Applying the standard set forth in United States v. Williams, the court found that Taylor’s offense conduct and criminal history—including felony drug trafficking, intimidation, and domestic battery—demonstrated that he was dangerous. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that § 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to Taylor. View "United States v. Taylor" on Justia Law

After receiving an anonymous tip, law enforcement in Mercer County, Kentucky, stopped Steven Fellmy, who was driving a silver Ford Mustang matching the tip’s description. The stop was based on observed traffic violations, including a non-illuminated license plate and failure to signal a turn. After backup arrived, Fellmy was asked to exit the vehicle. He declined consent for a search, so a trained drug dog was led around the car. The dog briefly jumped up onto the car door and partially sniffed through the open window, ultimately alerting officers to drugs. A subsequent search revealed methamphetamine and heroin, leading to Fellmy’s arrest and charge for possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky reviewed and denied Fellmy’s pretrial motion to suppress the drugs. The court found that officers lawfully ordered Fellmy out of the vehicle after a valid traffic stop and that the dog’s actions did not constitute an unlawful search because the officers did not encourage the dog to intrude into the car’s interior. The court also denied Fellmy’s motion in limine to exclude the drug evidence, ruling that concerns about authentication and chain of custody went to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility, and could be addressed during cross-examination. The drugs were admitted, and Fellmy was convicted by jury and sentenced to 300 months’ imprisonment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings. The Sixth Circuit held that ordering Fellmy out of the car after a valid stop was lawful and that the dog’s brief contact with the car did not amount to a Fourth Amendment search under prevailing legal standards. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the drug evidence or in denying an evidentiary hearing regarding the chain of custody. The conviction and sentence were affirmed. View "United States v. Fellmy" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who became involved in a drug conspiracy in Cleveland, Ohio, during 2022 and 2023. Law enforcement conducted controlled buys and wiretaps, ultimately finding that the defendant sold significant quantities of fentanyl pills, including to an undercover agent. Upon his arrest in November 2023, authorities found illegal narcotics in his vehicle and other locations. The defendant was charged with conspiracy to distribute controlled substances, and the government alleged he had a prior “serious drug felony” conviction from April 2023, which could enhance his statutory minimum sentence under federal law.Previously, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio found that the defendant’s April 2023 conviction met the criteria for a “serious drug felony.” After holding an evidentiary hearing, the district court overruled the defendant’s objections, rejected his constitutional arguments regarding jury findings, found the prior conviction final before the current offenses, and determined it lacked authority to review the prosecutor’s discretion in seeking the enhancement. The district court also applied a career-offender enhancement based on prior convictions, resulting in a guidelines range of 262 to 327 months, but ultimately varied downward and sentenced the defendant to 160 months. The defendant appealed, renewing his challenges.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s rulings. The appellate court held that any alleged error in not submitting the statutory enhancement facts to a jury was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, as the defendant had admitted the relevant facts and would have pleaded guilty regardless. The court also held that the prosecution’s decision to seek the statutory enhancement was within its discretion and not arbitrary or vindictive, and that the prior conviction was “final” under existing precedent. Finally, the court rejected the defendant’s challenge to the career-offender enhancement, finding it foreclosed by circuit precedent. The judgment was affirmed. View "United States v. Loines" on Justia Law

Between June 2022 and February 2023, two individuals participated in a conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine in Tennessee. One defendant regularly supplied methamphetamine, while the other purchased and resold it. Law enforcement surveilled their activities, conducted searches, and utilized confidential sources to purchase drugs from both parties. Both defendants gave statements to investigators about the extent and nature of their drug transactions.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee charged each defendant with multiple counts related to methamphetamine distribution. Both pled guilty to lesser offenses in exchange for dismissal of other charges. The court calculated each defendant’s sentencing range using drug quantity estimates derived from statements and physical evidence. One defendant objected to the amount attributed, arguing that the calculation relied on unreliable statements and overstated her culpability. Despite objections, the court imposed a sentence within the adjusted Guidelines range. The other defendant requested a downward variance based on age, health, and criminal history, but the court denied this, citing insufficient evidence of mitigating circumstances.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed both sentences for procedural and substantive reasonableness under the abuse of discretion standard. The court held that the sentence for the first defendant was procedurally unreasonable because the district court relied on an uncorroborated out-of-court statement to estimate drug quantity, lacking sufficient indicia of reliability. The court reversed her sentence and remanded for resentencing, restricting the government from introducing new evidence. For the second defendant, the court found the sentence both procedurally and substantively reasonable, affirming the district court’s decision. Thus, the appellate court reversed and remanded for one defendant, and affirmed for the other. View "United States v. Crafton" on Justia Law

While released on bond for a burglary charge, the defendant evaded police during a traffic stop, abandoning his truck in a pond and fleeing on foot. The next day, officers returned and, after a series of encounters involving the defendant and his girlfriend, discovered multiple firearms and ammunition in a nearby SUV, to which the defendant later admitted ownership. Because he had a prior felony conviction, a grand jury indicted him for being a felon in possession of a firearm under federal law. The defendant entered into a plea agreement with the government, recommending certain offense levels and sentencing enhancements, but the agreement did not bind the district court.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky received a presentence report that calculated a higher base offense level than the plea agreement had contemplated, after discovering an additional prior controlled substance conviction. Both parties acknowledged the report’s accuracy at sentencing, though they advocated for a lower sentence in line with the plea agreement. The government also acknowledged the court’s independent authority to calculate the guidelines. Ultimately, the district court adopted the presentence report’s range and sentenced the defendant to 110 months, at the bottom of the applicable guidelines range.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed whether the government breached the plea agreement and whether the sentence was unreasonable. The court held that the government had not breached the plea agreement because the agreement allowed either party to argue for other guideline calculations, and the government did not recommend a higher sentence. The court also found that the sentence was both procedurally and substantively reasonable, as the district court considered the relevant statutory factors and the defendant’s history. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Messersmith" on Justia Law

In 1989, a man committed a brutal murder at a Kentucky laundromat, killing a 61-year-old employee after she asked him to leave. After his arrest, he was charged with several crimes, including murder. Five years later, he pleaded guilty to all charges. He sought to have a judge, rather than a jury, decide his sentence, hoping for a more favorable outcome due to the nature of his crimes. After a series of legal maneuvers and a failed attempt to withdraw his guilty plea, a judge ultimately sentenced him to death, despite the presentation of significant mitigating evidence about his abusive childhood and mental health struggles.On direct appeal, the Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed both his conviction and sentence, rejecting his arguments that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary and that the sentencing court had failed to consider all mitigating evidence. The court found that while the trial court’s plea colloquy did not specifically enumerate every right waived by pleading guilty, it was sufficient to show that the defendant understood the consequences. The court also concluded that the sentencing judge had considered all mitigating evidence, even if he found it unpersuasive.After exhausting state postconviction remedies, the petitioner filed a federal habeas corpus petition in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky, raising multiple grounds for relief. The district court denied relief and declined to issue a certificate of appealability. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit granted a limited certificate and reviewed two claims de novo: whether the plea was knowing and voluntary, and whether the trial court failed to consider mitigating evidence.The Sixth Circuit held that the Kentucky Supreme Court had not unreasonably applied clearly established federal law in either respect. The record affirmatively demonstrated the petitioner’s understanding of his rights, and the sentencing court’s consideration of mitigation evidence was constitutionally adequate. Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of habeas relief. View "Johnson v. Plappert" on Justia Law

Two fourteen-year-old girls residing in a group home in Dayton, Ohio, contacted Kelly Richards, a man they knew as “Scorpio,” and asked him to pick them up. Richards transported the girls to his apartment in Cincinnati, where he facilitated their drug use, sexually assaulted them, and coerced them into prostitution over several days. He controlled their movements, threatened them with weapons, and advertised them online for sex. The girls eventually escaped, and authorities began an investigation that uncovered substantial evidence connecting Richards to their exploitation, including digital communications and photographs.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio reviewed the evidence and denied Richards’s suppression motion, finding probable cause supported the search warrants. Richards proceeded to a jury trial, which resulted in convictions on two counts of sex trafficking minors, two counts of sexually exploiting children, and one count of possessing a firearm as a felon. He was sentenced to 480 months in prison and a life term of supervised release. Richards raised several legal challenges before and during trial, including claims regarding the Speedy Trial Act, search warrant validity, denial of self-representation, limits on cross-examination, and the substantive reasonableness of his sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Sixth Circuit held that Richards’s trial occurred within the statutory and constitutional limits for a speedy trial, the search warrants were supported by probable cause and did not require a Franks hearing, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying mid-trial self-representation, and limiting cross-examination of the government’s agent did not violate Richards’s rights. The court also found Richards’s below-Guidelines sentence substantively reasonable and denied his motion to file a supplemental pro se brief. The judgment and sentence were affirmed. View "United States v. Richards" on Justia Law

A former elected county prosecutor in Kentucky’s 21st Judicial Circuit was charged with Honest Services Wire Fraud, violations of the Travel Act, and Federal Program Bribery. The charges stemmed from an arrangement with a young woman, M.H., who repeatedly faced legal troubles. Evidence showed that the prosecutor agreed to help her with matters such as getting warrants withdrawn, charges reduced, and release from jail, in exchange for sexual acts and explicit images. The FBI discovered the scheme, leading to federal prosecution. At trial, the government presented incriminating text messages, testimony from M.H., and law enforcement, while the defendant claimed he did not solicit images and that M.H. was assisting in investigations—a claim disproved by evidence.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky oversaw the jury trial, which resulted in convictions on all counts. The court sentenced the defendant to 41 months in prison and imposed supervised release conditions, including refraining from excessive alcohol use. On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the defendant challenged the exclusion of certain testimony about Kentucky law, sufficiency of the evidence on several elements, the federal funding nexus for the bribery charge, the supervised release condition, and the sentencing court’s refusal to consider “collateral consequences.”The Sixth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion or violate constitutional rights in excluding expert legal opinion testimony and that the jury was properly instructed on the meaning of “official acts.” The court found overwhelming evidence supporting the verdict, including proof of a quid pro quo and an interstate nexus. The federal funding requirement was satisfied by evidence that the state received sufficient funds. The supervised release condition and sentencing decisions were not plainly erroneous. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in all respects. View "United States v. Goldy" on Justia Law

Jason Florence, while on supervised release for a prior federal child pornography conviction, was found in possession of a smartphone containing child pornography during an unscheduled home visit by his probation officer. The conditions of his supervised release prohibited him from possessing such devices without his probation officer's knowledge. A forensic analysis of the confiscated phone revealed over one hundred images and two videos of child pornography, some accessed shortly before the search. Florence admitted ownership of the phone and provided its passcode, and other evidence linked him to the device and the illicit materials.This case was tried before the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky. The parties stipulated to Florence’s prior convictions and the terms of his supervised release. After a two-day trial, a jury convicted Florence of possessing child pornography and found that the material depicted minors under 12 years old. At sentencing, the district court determined that Florence’s prior conviction triggered a statutory mandatory minimum sentence of ten years’ imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(2), and imposed a life term of supervised release. Florence objected, arguing that Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights required the jury to find the fact of his prior conviction, and he challenged the admission of his probation officer’s credibility testimony and the reasonableness of his sentence.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the district court did not err in finding the fact of Florence’s prior conviction and applying the mandatory minimum, citing the narrow exception in Almendarez-Torres v. United States, which allows a judge to find the fact of a prior conviction. The court found any error in admitting the probation officer’s credibility testimony harmless, given the overwhelming evidence of guilt. Finally, the Sixth Circuit held that the life term of supervised release was both procedurally and substantively reasonable. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Florence" on Justia Law