Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 2005, Thomas Clardy was identified by Kent Clouatre as one of the shooters in an incident at Kent's auto-repair shop, which resulted in the death of Kent's brother, Kirk, and injuries to Kent and Kirk's wife, Melissa. Clardy was charged with murder, attempted murder, and reckless endangerment. The primary evidence against Clardy was Kent's eyewitness identification. Clardy's trial counsel did not call an expert on eyewitness identification due to financial constraints and the inability to find an expert willing to work for the fees the state would pay. Clardy was convicted on all counts.Clardy filed a petition for postconviction review in state court, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to call an eyewitness expert. The state trial court denied the petition, and the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals (TCCA) affirmed, concluding that Clardy had not suffered prejudice because the expert could not negate Kent's identification. The TCCA did not evaluate whether counsel's performance was deficient.Clardy then filed a habeas corpus petition in federal court. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee granted the writ, finding that trial counsel's performance was deficient for not seeking expert funding and that the TCCA unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent in concluding that Clardy was not prejudiced.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The Sixth Circuit held that Clardy's counsel's performance was not deficient. The court noted that counsel made reasonable efforts to secure an expert and, when unsuccessful, used cross-examination and argument to highlight the weaknesses in the eyewitness identification. The court concluded that these efforts were sufficient to meet the standard of reasonably effective assistance under Strickland v. Washington. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Clardy v. Pounds" on Justia Law

Louis Chandler, a Michigan prisoner, was convicted of two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct and sentenced to concurrent terms of twenty-five to seventy-five years in prison. Chandler filed a habeas corpus petition, claiming that the trial court infringed his right to present a complete defense. The district court denied the petition, and Chandler appealed.The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan initially reviewed the case and denied Chandler's habeas corpus petition. Chandler argued that the trial court's refusal to delay the trial, exclusion of key witnesses, and prevention of presenting critical evidence violated his constitutional rights. The Michigan Court of Appeals found that the trial court had abused its discretion by denying Chandler's requests for an adjournment, barring his witnesses, and excluding evidence of the victim's prior false allegations. However, the appellate court affirmed Chandler's conviction, concluding that the errors were not outcome determinative under the state's non-constitutional error standard.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and found that the trial court's actions significantly undermined Chandler's ability to present a complete defense. The court held that the exclusion of evidence and witnesses critical to Chandler's defense violated his constitutional rights. The court concluded that the errors had a substantial and injurious effect on the jury's verdict, creating grave doubt about the trial's fairness.The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's decision, conditionally granted Chandler's habeas corpus petition, and remanded the case with instructions to order Chandler's release unless the State of Michigan grants him a new trial within ninety days. View "Chandler v. Brown" on Justia Law

Megan Miller was arrested and booked into the City of Troy’s pretrial detention facility, where she informed staff that she had been heavily using heroin and expected to go into withdrawal. Over the next two and a half days, Miller vomited continually. On the third day, she was found unconscious and unresponsive in her cell and was pronounced dead shortly after. Despite her continual vomiting, no jail official sought medical care for her, including Julie Green-Hernandez, who was responsible for monitoring detainees on the day of Miller’s death. Miller’s husband sued Green-Hernandez, claiming she violated Miller’s Fourteenth Amendment right to adequate pretrial medical care and acted with gross negligence under Michigan state law.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan denied Green-Hernandez’s motion for summary judgment, concluding she was not entitled to qualified immunity on the Fourteenth Amendment claim or state law immunity on the negligence claim. The court found that there were disputes of material fact regarding whether Green-Hernandez was deliberately indifferent to Miller’s serious medical needs and whether her conduct amounted to gross negligence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court dismissed Green-Hernandez’s appeal regarding qualified immunity due to lack of jurisdiction, as her arguments were based on factual disputes rather than purely legal questions. However, the court reversed the district court’s denial of Michigan governmental immunity. The Sixth Circuit held that while Green-Hernandez’s conduct could be considered grossly negligent, it was not the single most proximate cause of Miller’s death. The court concluded that Miller’s ingestion of fentanyl was the most immediate, efficient, and direct cause of her death, entitling Green-Hernandez to state law immunity. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Gillman v. City of Troy" on Justia Law

Shawn Lamar Peake-Wright, Jr. was a passenger in a car driven by Kimberly Manney in Kalamazoo, Michigan, when they were stopped by Sgt. Timothy Millard. Sgt. Millard recognized Peake-Wright and knew of his criminal history. During the stop, Peake-Wright exhibited strange behavior, including removing his jacket in freezing weather and repeatedly standing up despite officers' instructions to remain seated. Sgt. Millard, suspecting that Peake-Wright's jacket might contain contraband, searched it and found a loaded 9mm pistol.The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan denied Peake-Wright's motion to suppress the evidence of the firearm, holding that the search was justified under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. The court found that Peake-Wright's behavior and criminal history provided probable cause to believe that his jacket contained evidence of a crime.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the duration of the traffic stop was reasonable and that the officers had probable cause to search Peake-Wright's jacket. The court emphasized that the totality of the circumstances, including Peake-Wright's erratic behavior and criminal history, justified the search under the automobile exception. The court concluded that the search was lawful and upheld the district court's judgment. View "United States v. Peake-Wright" on Justia Law

Michael Mills was convicted of being a felon in possession of ammunition after a shootout involving members of the Detroit gang, It’s Just Us (IJU). Mills, armed with a loaded pistol-grip shotgun, fired two shots during the altercation, resulting in the death of IJU member James Matthews Jr. Mills was subsequently arrested and charged. A jury found him guilty, and the district court sentenced him to the statutory maximum of 120 months, applying a sentencing enhancement based on Mills's role in Matthews's death.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan initially sentenced Mills, but the case was remanded by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit for additional factual findings regarding the sentencing enhancement. On remand, the district court reaffirmed its findings, concluding that Mills caused Matthews's death, had the necessary mental state for second-degree murder, and rejected Mills's justification defense. The district court reimposed the same 120-month sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case again. The court held that the district court did not clearly err in finding that Mills committed second-degree murder with malice aforethought, based on his actions and social media messages indicating a premeditated intent. The court also found no clear error in the district court's rejection of Mills's justification defense, noting that Mills had viable alternatives to engaging in the shootout. Additionally, the appellate court determined that the district court properly considered the sentencing factors, including the need for deterrence and Mills's criminal history.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, upholding Mills's 120-month sentence. View "United States v. Mills" on Justia Law

Baker pled guilty to participating in a drug trafficking conspiracy. Baker had a criminal history category of IV; the plea agreement stipulated that 100-200 grams of cocaine be attributed to Baker and that his total offense level be set at 12, resulting in an agreed Guidelines range of 21-27 months’ imprisonment. The government explained that it could not prove an amount in excess of 172 grams of cocaine attributable to Baker, but the court was unconvinced and reviewed Baker’s confidential proffer statement, developed after Baker agreed to provide information about the conspiracy. The court found Baker responsible for 500 grams to two kilograms of cocaine, significantly increasing Baker’s offense level. The court acknowledged that it could not use information found only in Baker’s confidential proffer statement to determine the applicable Guidelines range, but based its finding on a post-arrest recorded phone call in which Baker stated that officers missed “twelve-five” when they searched his home; a codefendant’s proffer statement that Baker was given a “large” amount of cocaine; and a codefendant’s proffer that discussed drug transactions but did not specify any amount. The court determined that the appropriate range was 51-63 months’ imprisonment and sentenced Baker to 50 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, acknowledging that the court’s methodology “raises concerns,” but finding the sentence neither procedurally nor substantively unreasonable. View "United States v. Baker" on Justia Law

In 2014, Defendant was arrested on an outstanding warrant. Pursuant to a search incident to arrest, police found on Defendant’s person 17 rounds of ammunition. Defendant pleaded guilty as a felon in possession of ammunition, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), without a plea agreement. The probation office classified Defendant as an armed career criminal under 18 U.S.C. 924(e), due to Defendant’s two prior robbery convictions and one prior attempted-aggravated-robbery conviction. The designation enhanced Defendant’s sentencing range to 15 years to life imprisonment. At sentencing, Defendant’s only objection was that his convictions for robbery and attempted aggravated robbery on May 24, 2000, should be considered a single event under ACCA.. Each indictment listed a distinct business as the victim; the corresponding judgment cross-referenced the relevant indictment. The district court found that, despite possibly being connected by one conspiratorial agreement, the two robberies were “legally and factually distinct,” and therefore were “properly considered separate offenses,” but granted the government’s motion to reduce Defendant’s sentence (U.S.S.G. 5K1.1 and 18 U.S.C. 3553(e), and sentenced Defendant to 110 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting that Defendant admitted under oath that he and his partner “planned to hit two stores.” View "United States v. Southers" on Justia Law

Andrews was charged with conspiring to possess cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A) and 846; conspiracy to interfere with commerce by robbery and threats of physical violence, 18 U.S.C. 1951; aiding and abetting the possession of firearms in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A); and being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g). Andrews moved to dismiss, claiming outrageous government conduct. He argued that he was recruited to participate in an “all-too-easy stash-house robbery” by undercover ATF agents, who engineered and directed the scheme. The court denied the motion, crediting an agent’s testimony that a defendant first approached a confidential informant to find “drug dealers he could take down” and that ATF had provided multiple opportunities to withdraw. The court made clear that it was not deciding the strength of an entrapment defense. The court “preliminarily” accepted his conditional guilty plea, pending preparation of a presentencing report. Andrews later moved to withdraw his plea as a matter of absolute right under Rule 11(d)(1). The court denied the motion, reiterated that Andrews had made an informed, voluntary, and valid guilty plea, and sentenced Andrews to 180 months, pursuant to the agreement. The Guidelines range was 200-235 months. The Sixth Circuit reversed, noting that the district court had expressly not accepted the plea. View "United States v. Andrews" on Justia Law

Statute is not unconstitutionally vague for providing a stiffer penalty for receipt than for possession of child pornographyA Kentucky Detective used Nordic Mule, a law enforcement software package, to search for IP addresses that had recently shared child pornography on the peer-to-peer file-sharing network eDonkey, then obtained a search warrant for Dunning’s residence, where police seized electronic devices, containing over 22,000 images and videos depicting the sexual exploitation of minors. Dunning moved for discovery, seeking the source code for the software that the detective relied on for the warrant. The government responded: The program … is part of the Child Rescue Coalition, which is a private non-profit organization. The source code and program are proprietary and are not in the possession of the United States. The court denied Dunning’s discovery motion and his motion to suppress evidence, which argued that the warrant application was not supported by probable cause because the detective used software of uncertain reliability and that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his computer files. Dunning then pled guilty under 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(2) and was sentenced to 165 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the statute is unconstitutionally vague and that his sentence was unreasonable, and upholding denial of his motions. View "United States v. Dunning" on Justia Law

Sixth Circuit upholds allowing jury questions in online extortion case.Using the pseudonym “Dr. Evil,” an extortionist demanded $1 million in Bitcoin in exchange for an encryption key to Mitt Romney’s unreleased tax returns, which he claimed to have stolen from an accounting firm. He posted an image of Mike Myers’s Dr. Evil, from an Austin Powers movie, in the accounting firm’s Franklin, Tennessee office lobby. Agents traced the scheme to Brown, who had not actually stolen Romney’s returns. With 12 convictions for wire fraud and extortion, Brown was given a four-year prison sentence, and ordered to pay restitution. The Sixth Circuit affirmed his conviction, rejecting arguments that the search warrant lacked probable cause and that Brown was prejudiced by the judge allowing questions from the jury. The affidavit offered “a fair probability” that Brown’s home would contain evidence of the crime. Understanding the evidence required the jury to grasp the Secret Service’s forensic analysis of thumb drives, online posts, and Brown’s computers, Bitcoin, fingerprint matching, and digital photo manipulation-- enough complexity for a court to believe that permitting questions might aid jurors. The court vacated the sentence. Brown’s statements to prosecutors did not significantly impede the investigation, to justify the obstruction of justice enhancement. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law