Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Based on evidence that someone was downloading child pornography, agents executed a search warrant for a Halls, Tennessee home. Agents spoke to the homeowner, his wife, and their 21-year-old, live-in son, Lindell. During general questioning Lindell indicated that he had used a peer-to-peer file sharing network and had viewed child pornography when he was younger. He told agents that a friend downloaded files onto his laptop and gave them a thumb drive with child pornography. The laptop was not in the house because it was being repaired. Lindell allowed agents to look at his online activity. During a search of Lindell’s bedroom, agents found a laptop that the family failed to disclose. Lindell changed his story, stating he had viewed child pornography recently. Agents advised him of his Miranda rights. He dictated a statement. Lindell claims to have no memory of the search because of medications he was taking. Lindell was indicted for distributing and possessing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(2), (a)(4)(B). The court denied a motion to suppress and a motion to require the government to stipulate that the images recovered from his laptops depicted child pornography, obviating the need to show them to the jury. Convicted, Lindell was sentenced to 78 months in prison. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, upholding denial of the motion to require the government to stipulate to the evidence. View "United States v. Luck" on Justia Law

In 2002, King pled guilty in Ohio under three indictments, asserting that King and others had robbed and kidnapped Lundberg, robbed and kidnapped Mariano, and committed aggravated robbery against five victims, all “on or about” February 18, 2002. None of the indictments alleged times or locations. Three bills of particulars indicated that the offenses occurred 25 minutes apart and at different locations. Transcripts of King’s plea colloquies are not available. In 2015, King pleaded guilty as a felon possessing a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), which carries a maximum sentence of 10 years. The Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e), states, “a person who violates section 922(g) of this title and has three previous convictions . . . for a violent felony . . . committed on occasions different from one another, such person shall be . . . imprisoned not less than fifteen years.” The court relied on the bills of particulars and sentenced King under the ACCA. The Sixth Circuit vacated. In determining whether a defendant’s prior offenses were “committed on occasions different from one another” for purposes of the ACCA, district courts are restricted to using only evidentiary sources approved in the Supreme Court holdings, Taylor v. United States (1990) and Shepard v. United States (2005). View "United States v. King" on Justia Law

In 1998, Breeden was found dead in the Kentucky River. King was a suspect because of her sporadic relationship with Breeden, because she had bullet holes inside her home, and because, after Breeden’s disappearance, King had shared premonitions of “Breeden being found in water.” Officers unsuccessfully attempted to obtain a search warrant for King’s residence. In 2006 Detective Harwood obtained a warrant. His affidavit omitted that Breen’s bullet wounds were non-exiting and could not have caused bullet holes in King’s floor and that King had one leg and weighed 100 pounds, while Breeden weighed 187 pounds. There was no evidence that King had destroyed evidence; gunshot evidence at her home did not match bullets recovered from Breeden. King entered an “Alford plea,” maintaining her innocence. In 2012, a serial murderer (Jarrell) confessed that he had killed Breeden and recounted the crime with specific details that had not been released. Harwood visited Jarrell in jail. King alleges that Harwood intimidated Jarrell into recanting. In 2014, charges against King were dismissed. The district court dismissed King’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 as time-barred and citing qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit reversed as to King’s malicious-prosecution claim against Harwood. King raised genuine issues of material fact: whether Harwood set King’s prosecution in motion by applying for warrants and an indictment despite the lack of probable cause; whether Harwood's false statements, together with his material omissions were material to King’s prosecution; and whether any false statements, evidence, and omissions were “laying the groundwork for an indictment," not “preparatory activity” for a grand-jury hearing that would provide absolute immunity. View "King v. Harwood" on Justia Law

In 2009, Norwood-Charlier invited Lively and Bryon to his Kalamazoo, Michigan home. The men met in online chatrooms: Lively lived in California, and Quackenbush in Nevada. Norwood-Charlier lived with his father’s former wife, and her children, including Lively’s victim, then nine years old. As the men had planned, Norwood-Charlier photographed Lively performing oral sex on the boy. FBI agents, executing a warrant at Norwood-Charlier’s home, recovered Norwood-Charlier’s digital camera, containing a memory card, and a computer. Norwood-Charlier pleaded guilty to producing child-pornography videos and proffered information about Lively. In 2013, Lively and Quackenbush were arrested. The indictment alleged (18 U.S.C. 2251(a), 2251(e), and 2256(2)(A)) that Lively had produced images of himself performing oral sex on a minor using materials that had been manufactured outside Michigan, including but not limited to a Seagate hard drive manufactured in Thailand. The court held that the four-year delay did not prejudice Lively because his insanity claim was “speculative at best.” The government introduced Norwood-Charlier’s SanDisk memory card and camera as one exhibit. The court did not give a jury instruction limiting the reasons for which they could consider the camera or the memory card. The Sixth Circuit affirmed Lively’s conviction. While the government did not introduce evidence that Lively knew Norwood-Charlier owned the hard drive or intended Norwood-Charlier to copy images of Lively and the boy onto it, section 2251(a)’s interstate-commerce requirement was satisfied: the memory card bore a “Made in China” inscription. View "United States v. Lively" on Justia Law

In 1997, Louisville police discovered the bodies of a male victim with nine stab wounds and a pregnant female victim, dead as a result of manual strangulation and stabbed after her death. Wheeler, ultimately convicted of the murders and sentenced to death, changed his story several times. The Sixth Circuit held that a writ of habeas corpus must issue as to the death sentence because the trial court erroneously struck from the jury Kovatch, an eligible juror who may have been in favor of sparing Wheeler’s life. The court, after examination of Kovatch, found him not to be “problematic” as a juror but one who “could consider the entire range” of penalties. The next day the court excused him because the judge mistakenly remembered him saying he would not consider the death penalty. After the Supreme Court reversed, the Sixth Circuit reinstated the death penalty, rejecting claims: that admission of evidence as to the availability of prison furloughs in the future; concerning penalty-phase jury instructions that, allegedly, improperly instructed jurors that they were required to be unanimous regarding the presence of mitigating factors; concerning prosecutorial misstatements: and that Kentucky’s proportionality review violates the Eighth Amendment View "Wheeler v. Simpson" on Justia Law

Morrison pleaded guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g), waiving his right to appeal “any sentence . . . within the applicable guideline range, or lower, whatever that guideline range might be.” The prosecutor argued that Morrison’s prior conviction for Tennessee aggravated burglary was a “crime of violence,” setting his applicable Guidelines range at 77-96 months’ imprisonment. At the time, the Sentencing Guidelines defined “crime of violence” to include “burglary of a dwelling.” The Sixth Circuit had held that although Tennessee’s aggravated-burglary statute criminalizes more conduct than “generic” burglary under the Guidelines, the statute was “divisible,” permitting courts to review a “limited class of documents . . . to determine which alternative formed the basis of the defendant’s prior conviction.” The court examined Morrison’s plea colloquy from his earlier conviction, determined that he had burglarized a “dwelling,” and imposed a 96-month sentence. While his appeal was pending, the Supreme Court clarified what makes a statute divisible, and the Sixth Circuit granted rehearing to decide whether Tennessee’s aggravated-burglary statute criminalizes more conduct than generic burglary under the Armed Career Criminal Act, and if so, whether it is divisible under Mathis. The Sixth Circuit dismissed Morrison’s appeal, finding that his waiver foreclosed consideration of his request. View "United States v. Morrison" on Justia Law

Two victims were killed in 1999. Phillips was arrested. The primary witness was Phillips’ stepdaughter, a neighbor of the victim. She testified that she heard the confrontation, followed by shooting, and that Phillips was “intoxicated” that night. A jury convicted Phillips of both counts of first-degree murder. Judge Maricle asked whether the parties were prepared to proceed with sentencing. Phillips’s attorney, Charles, replied, “No,” but neglected to request a continuance, stating, "I don’t know anything about death penalty litigation.” Charles did not object to the prosecution's jury instructions, consulted with Phillips for less than an hour, and offered no opening statement nor evidence. The Commonwealth suggested that the aggravating factor prevented the jury from considering sentences with possible parol. Rather than clarifying the sentencing options or advocating for a particular sentence, Charles remarked: I don’t intend to take anymore of your time. The jury recommended life with no possibility of parole for 25 years. The court entered that sentence with minimal explanation. The state supreme court affirmed. Although Phillips's post-conviction attorney dropped a claim of ineffective assistance at sentencing, Maricle felt “compelled” to authorize relief on that basis. Phillips complied with Maricle's request and submitted information about evidence relevant sentencing, but Maricle was indicted and no state judge decided Phillips’s claims, which were pending for over six years. The district court dismissed his federal habeas petition, finding that Phillips had not shown prejudice. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the deferential standard is inapplicable because no Kentucky court ever decided Phillips's claims, that Phillips’s counsel was ineffective, that prejudice is presumed, and counsel’s performance actually prejudiced Phillips under Strickland. View "Phillips v. White" on Justia Law

Quarles pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g), without a plea agreement. At his original sentencing, the district court held that Quarles’s conviction for third-degree home invasion was a violent felony under the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). The district court expressly declined to rule whether that offense qualified as generic burglary and sentenced him to 204 months’ incarceration. The Sixth Circuit vacated the sentence in light of the Supreme Court’s holding in Johnson v. United States (2015), and remanded for resentencing. On remand, the district court found, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed, that Michigan’s crime of third-degree home invasion constituted a “violent felony” that was the “functional equivalent of generic burglary.” Quarles was again sentenced to 204 months’ incarceration. View "United States v. Quarles" on Justia Law

Simmerman began working at Shoreline Federal Credit Union in 1987 and became manager in 2006. She began embezzling money, by complex manipulation of ledgers, in 1998 and was discovered in 2014. She pled guilty to embezzling $1,528,000, 18 U.S.C. 657, and to structuring the deposits of the money she stole to evade the reporting requirements of 31 U.S.C. 5313(a), in violation of 31 U.S.C. 5324(a)(3) and (d)(1). The district court assessed Simmerman’s total offense level at 28, based on a base offense level of seven, a 16-level increase for a loss amount between $1 million and $2.5 million, a two-level increase for sophisticated means, four-level increase for jeopardizing the soundness of a financial institution, a two-level increase for abuse of a position of trust, and a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility and a timely plea. With a criminal history category of I, Simmerman’s guideline range was 78-97 months and she was sentenced to 78 months on Count 1 and 60 months on Count 2, to be served concurrently. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, upholding the imposition of enhancements for sophisticated means (U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(10)(C)); jeopardizing the soundness of a financial institution (U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(16)(B)(i)); and abuse of a position of trust (U.S.S.G. 3B1.3). View "United States v. Simmerman" on Justia Law

Between 2012 and 2014, three University of Michigan students (plaintiffs) rented rooms from Alawi, which collected $2550 in security deposits from the three. When they moved out, they received their security deposits back, minus small deductions for minor damages to the properties. Plaintiffs believed that Alawi had not complied with Michigan law, which requires landlords to deposit security deposits in a regulated financial institution and to provide the address of that institution to the tenant. The plaintiffs sued Alawi for $6.6 million on behalf of a putative class of six years’ worth of tenants, alleging violations of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and Michigan law; alleging that Alawi was not entitled to hold security deposits at all (given these alleged breaches of Michigan law), and that knowingly taking security deposits anyway constituted a pattern of federal wire, mail, and bank fraud. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal, finding that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the RICO claim. The complaint failed to articulate any concrete injury; its allegations were too vague to meet the particularity requirement of fraud allegations under Civil Rule 9(b). View "Wall v. Michigan Rental" on Justia Law