Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Martin, Kentucky Mayor Thomasine Robinson, sought reelection. Her challenger, Howell, won by three votes. Husband James confronted and threatened to kill Howell; he was convicted in state court of terroristic threatening and menacing. Thomasine was charged with bribery, coercion, and intimidation. Testimony indicated that: Thomasine gave a woman $20 to vote for her and coerced voters to vote for her by absentee ballot; that her son Steven attempted to intimidate a voter; that James paid $10 for a vote; and that James gave an individual money with which to purchase votes. The jury returned a guilty verdict on conspiracy and vote-buying (52 U.S.C. 10307(c)) charges, but the court granted James acquittal on the conspiracy charge. Thomasine was convicted of vote-buying and conspiracy to violate civil rights (18 U.S.C. 241); Steven was found guilty of conspiracy and two counts of vote-buying, but acquitted of a third count. The court assessed a leadership enhancement to James for directing another to purchase votes and an obstruction of justice enhancement for behaving menacingly during a trial recess and sentenced him to an above-guidelines 40 months in prison. Steven was sentenced to 21 months and three years of supervised release, with a condition requiring him to abstain from the consumption of alcohol. Thomasine was sentenced to 33 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentences, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence. View "United States v. Robinson" on Justia Law

Convicted-felon Houston resided on a farm containing signs critical of government and depicting the dead bodies of an officer and his companion. Houston and his brother (Leon) were acquitted of those murders. The farm is not enclosed. The Roane Sheriff’ informed ATF that Houston possessed firearms. ATF attempted drive-by surveillance. Later, at the direction of ATF and without a warrant, the utility company installed a surveillance camera on a utility pole 200 yards from Leon’s trailer, which broadcast recordings. An ATF agent testified that the captured footage was identical to what he would have observed by driving down public roads. After 10 weeks of warrantless monitoring, ATF obtained a warrant on the same day that the Sixth Circuit expressed “some misgivings” about the constitutionality of long-term warrantless surveillance of an individual’s backyard via a pole camera. Weeks later, agents arrested Houston, away from the farm. No firearms were found on his person. Agents executed warrants for the farm and seized 17 firearms from Houston’s house, five from Leon’s trailer, and three from Leon’s person. The Sixth Circuit affirmed Houston’s conviction, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). Use of the camera did not violate Houston’s reasonable expectations of privacy because it recorded the view as seen by passersby on public roads. The court also rejected challenges to his classification as a “prohibited person” and to the reasonableness of his 108-month sentence. View "United States v. Houston" on Justia Law

Alsante pleaded guilty to failing to register as a sex offender under 42 U.S.C. 16913. At his sentencing hearing, the district court permitted the government to introduce evidence that Alsante had committed other sexual-misconduct crimes with a minor, all of which were the subject of pending Tennessee state court charges. The district court relied on that conduct in imposing a 54-month sentence, an upward variance from his advisory guidelines range of 15-21 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Alsante’s argument that his due process rights or his rights against self-incrimination were violated by permitting the government to introduce evidence related to pending state court charges at his federal sentencing hearing because any attempt to rebut the government’s evidence at the federal sentencing hearing hampered his ability to defend himself in state court. The court noted that Alsante did not seek a continuance and did not suffer “actual or threatened physical harm” for remaining silent, not face “mental coercion overbearing the will.” View "United States v. Alsante" on Justia Law

Bivens, then 33, began a sexual relationship with A.H., then 13 and living with her father near Bivens’ Kentucky home. A.H. moved to Ohio to live with her mother. A.H. took sexually explicit photos of herself at Bivens’ request and sent them to Bivens; around her fourteenth birthday. Bivens drove to Ohio and took A.H. to a hotel, where they engaged in sexual intercourse. Bivens created explicit photos, which he took home on his iPhone. Two months later, A.H. ran away from home; Bivens picked her up in Ohio and drove her to Kentucky, where the two again engaged in sex. A.H. hid in a crawl space behind a dresser and was not found until the sixth search of Bivens’ home. Bivens pled guilty to persuading A.H. to create child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a); traveling interstate to engage in illicit sexual conduct, section 2423(b); creating child pornography, section 2251(a); transporting child pornography across state lines, section 2252(a)(1); and transporting A.H. between states to engage in illegal sexual activity, section 2423(a). The Sixth Circuit affirmed his sentence of 360 months in prison, based on an advisory guidelines range of 360 months to life, upholding the court’s decision, over Bivens’ objection, not to combine the counts in determining the guidelines range. View "United States v. Bivens" on Justia Law

Cabrera, indicted as a felon in possession of a firearm after he procured a handgun for a confidential informant, claimed, in pre-trial motions and post-trial submissions, that law-enforcement agents had doctored an audio-tape recording of that transaction. Cabrera did not, however, testify in support of that theory. A jury found him guilty. At sentencing, the district judge announced that he was sentencing Cabrera to 63 months’ imprisonment, the top of his guidelines range, because Cabrera advanced a “fantastic” claim (that the tape was altered); and did not testify in support of that claim. Cabrera’s counsel raised no objection to his sentence. The Sixth Circuit vacated. Although the district judge seemed to rely on 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)(2)(A), his statements suggest that he misinterpreted the thrust of that statutory sentencing factor; he failed to substantiate his claim that Cabrera disrespected the law within the meaning of that factor so that Cabrera was punished for exercising his Sixth Amendment right to challenge the government’s case. View "United States v. Cabrera" on Justia Law

Esquivel-Quintana was admitted to the U.S. as a lawful permanent resident in 2000. In 2009, he pleaded guilty to unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor in California. Esquivel-Quintana moved to Michigan. DHS initiated removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), which states that an alien can be removed if he is convicted of an aggravated felony such as “sexual abuse of a minor,” An immigration judge ruled that Esquivel-Quintana’s conviction under California Penal Code section 261.5(c) constituted “sexual abuse of a minor” and ordered him removed to Mexico. The BIA and Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the term “sexual abuse of a minor” was permissibly interpreted to include the conviction. The BIA employed a categorical approach and held that the age differential in California’s statute—which requires an age gap of more than three years— was meaningful. View "Esquivel-Quintana v. Lynch" on Justia Law

In 2011, Asakevich pleaded guilty to distributing child pornography and attempting to entice a minor via the internet, 18 U.S.C. 2422(b). The district court sentenced Asakevich to life in prison. The Sixth Circuit dismissed his appeal. The U.S. Supreme Court denied Asakevich’s petition for a writ of certiorari on October 7, 2013, so that Asakevich’s conviction became final. He had one year to file a motion to vacate his sentence, 28 U.S.C. 2255(f)(1). Asakevich has not filed a section 2255 motion. On October 6, 2014, Asakevich filed a pro se “Motion for Extension of Time to File 28 U.S.C. 2255 Motion,” seeking pre-approval for a 90-day extension. The district court denied Asakevich’s motion, reasoning that there was no published authority for enlarging the time for filing a section 2255 motion before the statute of limitations expires. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Federal courts do not lightly grant relief in non-existent cases or offer advisory opinions about what they might do if an action were filed. Asakevich requested an advisory opinion about whether he could obtain an extension for an action not yet in existence and one that may never come into existence. View "United States v. Asakevich" on Justia Law

In 2005, Watkins was sentenced to 185-months’ imprisonment for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Watkins had three prior convictions: arson, felony escape, and voluntary manslaughter and was sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e). After unsuccessful direct appeals and a post-conviction petition, which was rejected as untimely, Watkins sought authorization to file a second or successive habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2255, based on the Supreme Court’s 2015 ruling in Johnson v. United States, that imposition of an increased sentence under the ACCA residual clause violates due process because the residual clause is unconstitutionally vague. The Sixth Circuit granted the petition, stating that Johnson announced “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.” The residual clause defines the term “violent felony” to include a crime that “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” View "In re: Watkins" on Justia Law

In 2008, Javidan shadowed Shahab, who was involved with fraudulent home-health agencies. Javidan, Shahab, and two others purchased Acure Home Care. Javidan managed Acure, signing Medicare applications and maintaining payroll. She had sole signature authority on Acure’s bank account and, was solely responsible for Medicare billing. Javidan illegally recruited patients by paying “kickbacks” to corrupt physicians and by using “marketers” to recruit patients by offering cash or prescription medications in exchange for Medicare numbers and signatures on blank Medicare forms. Javidan hired Meda as a physical therapist. Meda signed revisit notes for patients that he did not visit. He told Javidan which patients were not homebound and which demanded money for their Medicare information. The government charged both with health care fraud conspiracy (18 U.S.C. 1347) and conspiracy to receive kickbacks (18 U.S.C. 371). At trial, Javidan testified that she did not participate in and was generally unaware of Acure’s fraudulent business practices. Meda called no witnesses. Javidan and Meda were sentenced to terms of 65 and 46 months of imprisonment, respectively. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Meda’s claims that his conviction violated the Double Jeopardy Clause and that he was subjected to prosecutorial vindictiveness for refusing to plead guilty and requesting a jury trial in prior case and Javidan’s claims of improper evidentiary rulings and sentence calculation errors. View "United States v. Javidan" on Justia Law

When Michigan police officers arrested Bachynski on suspicion of murder, she invoked her right to remain silent and asked for an attorney. During later interactions between the officers and Bachynski, she changed her mind, eventually pointing to a detective and saying: “I want to talk to you.” She then waived her Miranda rights three times and confessed three times to a slew of crimes, including murder. A jury convicted her, and the state courts upheld the conviction over challenges to her confession. The federal district court granted her petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that the detectives impermissibly interrogated her without an attorney present. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that the state courts reasonably construed the Supreme Court’s holdings in this area. Ample evidence rebutted showed that Bachynski voluntarily and knowingly waived her Miranda rights and there was ample, admissible evidence of her guilt even without the confession. View "Bachynski v. Stewart" on Justia Law