Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In the Detroit Metropolitan Airport, Customs and Border Patrol officers stopped Gyamfi while he was traveling to Detroit from Ghana. They found at least one kilogram of heroin packed in the inner lining of Gyamfi’s suitcase, allegedly without his knowledge. Gyamfi was charged with importing heroin, 21 U.S.C. 952(a), and possession with the intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). At trial, four CBP officers testified that Gyamfi appeared “nervous” while responding to questions about his travel plans and the contents of his suitcase. The jury found Gyamfi guilty, and the district court sentenced Gyamfi to 72 months in prison. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the district court improperly admitted conclusory testimony as to Gyamfi’s mental state without laying a proper foundation. The officers merely described their “own sensory and experiential observations,” distinct from any broad conclusions or allegations directed to the merits of the case. View "United States v. Gyamfi" on Justia Law

In 1987, Abdur’Rahman was convicted of first-degree murder, assault with intent to commit first-degree murder, and armed robbery. He was sentenced to death. The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed. Abdur’Rahman unsuccessfully sought state post-conviction relief, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing and failure to turn over exculpatory evidence. Abdur’Rahman sought 28 U.S.C. 2254 relief. The Sixth Circuit vacated an order of habeas relief, concluding that Abdur’Rahman was not prejudiced by counsel’s performance. Abdur’Rahman filed a Rule 60(b) motion. The Sixth Circuit held that the prosecution did not violate Brady with respect to the codefendant’s pretrial statements and that trial counsel interviewed the police officer about, and could have obtained a separate report, concerning an incident following arrest. A cumulative error claim was defaulted as not raised in state court. In 2013, Abdur’Rahman sought to reopen claims in light of the Supreme Court holding, Martinez v. Ryan (2012). Abdur’Rahman specified: cumulative error affecting sentencing arising from prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance and an improper jury instruction regarding accomplice testimony and counsel’s failure to challenge the instruction. After the district court denied relief and issued its certificate of applicability, Abdur’Rahman moved for remand in light of intervening Sixth Circuit decisions. The Sixth Circuit affirmed and denied remand.As a change in decisional law, Marinez did not constitute an extraordinary circumstance meriting Rule 60(b)(6) relief. None of the claims involve substantial claims of ineffective assistance that were procedurally defaulted by inadequate post-conviction counsel. View "Abdur'Rahman v. Carpenter" on Justia Law

Seventeen days into his parole for a state drug conviction, James was caught selling drugs while carrying a pistol. Michigan revoked his parole, returning him to prison for five more years. The federal government indicted him for carrying a firearm while drug trafficking, which has a mandatory minimum five-year prison term and potentially a life sentence. Months later, James was transferred to federal custody. A federal court imposed a below-guidelines 15-year sentence, concurrent to James’ pre-existing state sentence; James would serve the beginning of his federal sentence in state prison. The court stated that he would receive “credit” for time “in custody of the federal marshal.” Later, the federal Bureau of Prisons told James that he would not receive credit for presentence time in federal custody because it, not the court, calculates presentence credit, and awarding James such credit would “double credit” him since Michigan had given him state credit for the same time. On James’s motion, the court added to the original judgment that James “shall get credit for time served beginning July 20, 2006, to January 4, 2007.” Worried that the amended judgment failed to “credit” his time in state prison after January 4, 2007, he appealed. The Sixth Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, finding that James had no injury. View "United States v. James" on Justia Law

Moon and a co-conspirator acquired credit card numbers issued to third parties and used the information to create counterfeit credit cards and gift cards, which they used to purchase merchandise. Moon pled guilty to wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 343 and 1349; the government agreed to move for dismissal of access device fraud and aggravated identity theft counts at sentencing. Moon also waived his right to appeal his conviction and a sentence “within the applicable guideline range, along with the manner in which the sentence was determined on the grounds set forth in 18 U.S.C. 3742 or any other grounds.” The district court sentenced Moon to 96 months’ imprisonment followed by for years supervised release and ordered restitution of $80,320.61. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding the sentence reasonable even if Moon had not waived his right to appeal. The court rejected an argument that the calculation of intended loss by assuming a $500 minimum loss for each stolen number overstated the severity of the offense and that that the district court should have calculated loss by including only actual losses from the usable card numbers. View "United States v. Moon" on Justia Law

Mateen pled guilty to possession of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252. A few years earlier, Mateen had pled guilty to gross sexual imposition, Ohio Code 2907.05, which prohibits sexual contact that is non-consensual by virtue of force or threats of force; administration of drugs or other intoxicants; a victim less than 13 years old; or a victim substantially impaired in his ability to resist or consent. A violation of section 2252(a)(4) carries a maximum sentence of 10 years for first-time violators, but the statute includes a sentencing enhancement for offenders with certain qualifying convictions, including those “under the laws of any State relating to aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or ward.” Such a person “shall be . . . imprisoned for not less than 10 years nor more than 20 years.” At sentencing, the district court found that Mateen’s Ohio conviction “categorically” qualified for enhancement, defining “abuse” as “misuse . . . to use or treat so as to injure, hurt, or damage . . . to commit indecent assault on” and “sexual” as “intent to seek sexual or libidinal gratification,” and sentenced Mateen to 130 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Mateen" on Justia Law

Christian was part of a truck theft ring, working with Dubose, Davis, and Lanton. The theft ring first struck in May 2011. In August 2011 and June 2012, they stole three semis containing tires. A sting operation caught Davis selling tires. Davis unwittingly led police to a storage unit, rented by Christian’s girlfriend, where police observed the others loading stolen tires into Lanton’s car and arrested them. At the time, Christian had an unrelated state prosecution, on which he was represented by the same attorney who then represented Lanton. Lanton’s girlfriend and the attorney convinced Christian to sign an affidavit affirming that “Lanton had no knowledge about the heist,” a statement Christian knew was not true. Christian pled guilty. Christian’s PSR recommended: a 14-level specific offense characteristic based on the amount of loss ; a two-level upward adjustment for managerial role; and a three-level downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility. He had a lengthy criminal history, resulting in a guideline range at 63–78 months of imprisonment. After learning of the false affidavit, the government declined to seek a substantial-assistance departure. On Halloween 2013, Christian knowingly drove a stolen truck. After that arrest, Christian’s attorney abandoned objections to the amount-of-loss calculation. The court overruled Christian’s objection to the managerial-role adjustment, sentencing him to 105 months. The Sixth Circuit vacated, finding the adjustment for a managerial role to be in error. View "United States v. Christian" on Justia Law

Coleman was convicted of armed robbery, as a felon-in-possession of a firearm, and of possession of a firearm in the commission of a felony and was sentenced to 22-32 years in prison. Coleman filed an unsuccessful pro se motion for a new trial. His direct appeal was unsuccessful. Coleman then moved for relief from judgment, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel because his appellate attorney failed to argue that he was allowed to proceed without counsel on his motion for a new trial. The state trial judge denied Coleman’s motion, noting that he had warned Coleman against proceeding without counsel, albeit at the end of the hearing rather than the outset. The Court of Appeals and the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. The district court denied his federal habeas petition on the merits. The Sixth Circuit granted review, then vacated the COA as improvidently granted, The Supreme Court has never held that a hearing on a motion for a new trial is a critical stage of a criminal proceeding, so there is no “clearly established Federal law” creating a right to counsel at a hearing on a motion for a new trial and no basis on which Coleman’s appellate attorney could have argued before the Michigan Court of Appeals that a violation of the Sixth Amendment had occurred. View "Coleman v. Bergh" on Justia Law

In 2005, Trimble shot and killed his girlfriend and her seven-year-old son with an assault rifle. Later that night, he broke into the apartment of a female college student, held her hostage, and eventually killed her with a handgun. He admitted his guilt to two family members and the police; there was significant forensic evidence tying him to the murders, and eyewitness testimony. A jury convicted him of the three murders and the judge, upon the jury’s recommendation, imposed three death sentences. The district court conditionally granted Trimble habeas relief because it determined that an alternate juror who was later empaneled during the penalty phase of Trimble’s trial could not set aside his personal views on the death penalty and apply the law. The Sixth Circuit reversed, concluding that the alternate juror was not an automatic-death-penalty juror, and that Trimble’s other claims of prejudicial admission of weapons and prosecutorial misconduct were without merit. View "Trimble v. Bobby" on Justia Law

Hodge’s 15-year-old stepdaughter found a micro video recording device that had recorded her exiting the shower naked and wrapping a towel around herself. She also saw that Hodge had setting up a camera on one of her bedroom shelves. The girl called her mother, Hodge’s wife, who came home. Hodge told her he had destroyed the recording. Hodge’s wife called the police, who obtained a search warrant. A police forensic investigation of Hodge’s laptop computer uncovered multiple child pornography images. Hodge pleaded guilty to one count of receipt of child pornography. 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(2). At sentencing, the district court declined to give him a two-point base-offense-level reduction under USSG 2G2.2(b)(1) that applies when “the defendant’s conduct was limited to the receipt or solicitation of material involving the sexual exploitation of a minor” with no intent “to traffic in, or distribute, such material.” The Sixth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that Hodge was also secretly recording videos of his stepdaughter naked, so his “conduct” was not “limited to” the receipt or solicitation of child pornography. The court rejected Hodge’s argument that his video voyeurism was not conduct that was “relevant” to his “offense conduct” under USSG 1B1.3. View "United States v. Hodge" on Justia Law

From 2006 to 2008, Andrews asked friends and colleagues to loan him money, roughly two million dollars in total, explaining that he needed money to purchase property in Indianapolis or to improve property that he owned in the area. Andrews never owned, bought, or improved property in Indianapolis. Andrews mostly used the money to fund a day-trading account with TD Ameritrade. Most of the money vanished. Andrews’s victims lost over 1.4 million dollars. Andrews was convicted of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343, sentenced to 87 months in prison and ordered to repay the full amount his victims had lost. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that all of the loans were part of a single “scheme . . . to defraud.” The court noted a common false statement of a need for funds, usually related to nonexistent Indianapolis property; a common group of victims, usually friends or colleagues, who loaned money to Andrews repeatedly; and a common purpose for the funds, usually the need to fund Andrews’s day-trading account. The final loan occurred on September 25, 2008, fewer than five years before the government indicted Andrews, so prosecution of the entire scheme was not time-barred. View "United States v. Andrews" on Justia Law