Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 2018, Alexander Sittenfeld, a Cincinnati city council member, was involved in a scheme where he solicited campaign donations in exchange for promises of official action. Sittenfeld had conversations with Chinedum Ndukwe, a local developer working with the FBI, and undercover agents posing as investors. Sittenfeld solicited donations from Ndukwe and later from an undercover agent, Rob, in exchange for supporting a property development project at 435 Elm Street. Despite the conversations being recorded, the evidence was not overwhelming. However, a jury found that Sittenfeld solicited or accepted campaign donations in exchange for his promise to support the project.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio convicted Sittenfeld of attempted Hobbs Act extortion and federal-program bribery. Sittenfeld moved for a judgment of acquittal and a new trial, arguing insufficient evidence and constructive amendment of the indictment. The district court denied both motions and sentenced Sittenfeld to sixteen months' imprisonment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. Sittenfeld argued that the evidence was insufficient to prove an explicit quid pro quo and that the indictment was constructively amended. The court held that the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient for a rational jury to find Sittenfeld guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The court also found that the jury instructions, although broader than the indictment, did not result in a constructive amendment. The court affirmed Sittenfeld's conviction, concluding that the evidence supported the jury's verdict and that there was no substantial likelihood that Sittenfeld was convicted of an offense not charged in the indictment. View "United States v. Sittenfeld" on Justia Law

Javi Porter, a lawful permanent resident of the United States and a native of Jamaica, was convicted under Virginia law for possessing with intent to distribute methamphetamine. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) classified this conviction as an aggravated felony and initiated removal proceedings against him. Porter sought review of the final order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which affirmed an immigration judge’s (IJ) denial of his motion to terminate removal proceedings and found him removable as an aggravated felon.The IJ denied Porter’s motion to terminate the removal proceedings, concluding that DHS had proven by clear and convincing evidence that Porter was convicted of an aggravated felony. The IJ sustained the charge of removability and denied Porter’s subsequent motion for reconsideration. The IJ later issued a final summary order finding Porter removable as charged. Porter appealed to the BIA, arguing that the IJ erred in denying his motion to terminate the removal proceedings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Porter’s Virginia drug-trafficking conviction qualifies as an aggravated felony under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The court found that the Virginia statute under which Porter was convicted is divisible by the identity of the controlled substance and applied the modified categorical approach. The court concluded that possession with intent to distribute any amount of methamphetamine is a federal felony under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA). Therefore, Porter’s conviction under Virginia law is a categorical match to a felony offense under the CSA, rendering him removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). The court denied Porter’s petition for review. View "Porter v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Quincy Taylor was convicted by a jury of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. The charges stemmed from an incident where Taylor was involved in a car accident, and a witness, William Howell, testified that Taylor had a bag containing drugs and a firearm. Howell's testimony was the only evidence linking Taylor to the contraband.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky limited Taylor's ability to cross-examine Howell about his criminal history and potential bias. Specifically, the court allowed Taylor to ask if Howell had any felony convictions but prohibited questions about the nature of the conviction, Howell's pending felon-in-possession charge, and any benefits Howell might receive for his cooperation. Taylor argued that these limitations violated his Confrontation Clause rights under the Sixth Amendment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and found that the district court's limitations on cross-examination violated Taylor's constitutional right to confront witnesses. The court determined that the jury did not have sufficient information to assess Howell's potential bias and motive for testifying. The court also found that the error was not harmless, as Howell's testimony was crucial to the prosecution's case, and there was no other evidence linking Taylor to the contraband.As a result, the Sixth Circuit reversed Taylor's convictions and remanded the case for a new trial, holding that the district court's limitations on cross-examination violated Taylor's Confrontation Clause rights and that the error was not harmless. View "United States v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Juan Grogan was convicted by a jury of possessing a firearm as a felon, possessing a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking, and possessing fentanyl with intent to distribute. During his trial, the judge allowed the government to admit testimony about statements Grogan made during a proffer session, where he admitted ownership of drugs, a firearm, and a wallet, and his involvement in a shooting and a kidnapping. Grogan argued on appeal that the admission of these statements was erroneous because the conditions of the proffer agreement were not met.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio denied Grogan's motion to suppress evidence obtained during an inventory search of his vehicle, which led to the discovery of the drugs and firearm. Grogan testified at trial, challenging the government's evidence and the validity of the warrants. The government introduced his proffer statements to rebut his testimony, leading to his conviction on all counts.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and found that the district court erred in admitting several of Grogan's proffer statements. The court held that Grogan's invocation of the Fifth Amendment did not constitute inconsistent testimony that would allow the government to introduce his proffer statements. Additionally, the court found that Grogan's statements questioning the sufficiency of the government's evidence did not contradict his proffer admissions.The Sixth Circuit concluded that the improper admission of Grogan's proffer statements, particularly his admission of drug ownership, was not harmless error. The court determined that the government's heavy reliance on these statements likely influenced the jury's verdict. As a result, the court reversed Grogan's convictions and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "United States v. Grogan" on Justia Law

John Hale pleaded guilty to aggravated sexual battery by unlawful sexual contact in 2010 and was sentenced to eight years of imprisonment and lifetime supervision in Tennessee state court. He was required to register as a sex offender. In 2011, Hale was indicted in the Middle District of Tennessee for traveling out of state and failing to update his sex-offender registration, violating the federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to fifteen months’ imprisonment, consecutive to his state sentence, and ten years of supervised release with special conditions. Hale began his supervised release in June 2018 and violated a condition in January 2020 by consuming alcohol.Hale moved for early termination of his supervised release after serving four years and four months of his ten-year term, citing his compliance with supervision conditions, sex-offender treatment, and support letters. His federal probation officer could not recommend early termination due to office policy, but the United States did not oppose the motion. The district court denied Hale’s motion, commending his behavior but finding it insufficiently exceptional to warrant early termination. Hale appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial under the abuse-of-discretion standard. The appellate court found that the district court had relied on an incorrect legal standard by requiring “exceptionally good behavior” for early termination of supervised release. The correct standard under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1) does not mandate such a threshold. Consequently, the Sixth Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded the case for reconsideration under the proper legal standard. The appellate court did not address Hale’s argument regarding the district court’s factual findings about his state supervision terms. View "United States v. Hale" on Justia Law

Nashaun Drake pleaded guilty to several drug offenses after police found significant quantities of fentanyl, cocaine, methamphetamine, and drug trafficking tools in his apartment. He was charged with five counts of possessing illegal drugs with intent to distribute. At sentencing, the district court classified Drake as a "career offender" based on a prior marijuana conviction, resulting in a 200-month prison sentence.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio determined that Drake's prior marijuana conviction qualified as a predicate offense for the career-offender enhancement under the Sentencing Guidelines. This classification led to a sentencing range of 188 to 235 months, and the court imposed a 200-month sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. Drake argued that his prior marijuana conviction should not have triggered the career-offender enhancement and that his sentence was unreasonable. The court held that binding precedent required the use of a time-of-conviction approach to determine whether a prior offense qualifies as a "controlled substance offense" under the Sentencing Guidelines. Since hemp was included in the drug schedules at the time of Drake's 2016 conviction, his marijuana offense qualified as a controlled substance offense. The court also found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a 200-month sentence, considering Drake's extensive criminal history and the need for deterrence and public protection.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, upholding both the career-offender enhancement and the 200-month sentence. View "United States v. Drake" on Justia Law

In 2005, Thomas Clardy was identified by Kent Clouatre as one of the shooters in an incident at Kent's auto-repair shop, which resulted in the death of Kent's brother, Kirk, and injuries to Kent and Kirk's wife, Melissa. Clardy was charged with murder, attempted murder, and reckless endangerment. The primary evidence against Clardy was Kent's eyewitness identification. Clardy's trial counsel did not call an expert on eyewitness identification due to financial constraints and the inability to find an expert willing to work for the fees the state would pay. Clardy was convicted on all counts.Clardy filed a petition for postconviction review in state court, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to call an eyewitness expert. The state trial court denied the petition, and the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals (TCCA) affirmed, concluding that Clardy had not suffered prejudice because the expert could not negate Kent's identification. The TCCA did not evaluate whether counsel's performance was deficient.Clardy then filed a habeas corpus petition in federal court. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee granted the writ, finding that trial counsel's performance was deficient for not seeking expert funding and that the TCCA unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent in concluding that Clardy was not prejudiced.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The Sixth Circuit held that Clardy's counsel's performance was not deficient. The court noted that counsel made reasonable efforts to secure an expert and, when unsuccessful, used cross-examination and argument to highlight the weaknesses in the eyewitness identification. The court concluded that these efforts were sufficient to meet the standard of reasonably effective assistance under Strickland v. Washington. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Clardy v. Pounds" on Justia Law

Louis Chandler, a Michigan prisoner, was convicted of two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct and sentenced to concurrent terms of twenty-five to seventy-five years in prison. Chandler filed a habeas corpus petition, claiming that the trial court infringed his right to present a complete defense. The district court denied the petition, and Chandler appealed.The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan initially reviewed the case and denied Chandler's habeas corpus petition. Chandler argued that the trial court's refusal to delay the trial, exclusion of key witnesses, and prevention of presenting critical evidence violated his constitutional rights. The Michigan Court of Appeals found that the trial court had abused its discretion by denying Chandler's requests for an adjournment, barring his witnesses, and excluding evidence of the victim's prior false allegations. However, the appellate court affirmed Chandler's conviction, concluding that the errors were not outcome determinative under the state's non-constitutional error standard.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and found that the trial court's actions significantly undermined Chandler's ability to present a complete defense. The court held that the exclusion of evidence and witnesses critical to Chandler's defense violated his constitutional rights. The court concluded that the errors had a substantial and injurious effect on the jury's verdict, creating grave doubt about the trial's fairness.The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's decision, conditionally granted Chandler's habeas corpus petition, and remanded the case with instructions to order Chandler's release unless the State of Michigan grants him a new trial within ninety days. View "Chandler v. Brown" on Justia Law

Megan Miller was arrested and booked into the City of Troy’s pretrial detention facility, where she informed staff that she had been heavily using heroin and expected to go into withdrawal. Over the next two and a half days, Miller vomited continually. On the third day, she was found unconscious and unresponsive in her cell and was pronounced dead shortly after. Despite her continual vomiting, no jail official sought medical care for her, including Julie Green-Hernandez, who was responsible for monitoring detainees on the day of Miller’s death. Miller’s husband sued Green-Hernandez, claiming she violated Miller’s Fourteenth Amendment right to adequate pretrial medical care and acted with gross negligence under Michigan state law.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan denied Green-Hernandez’s motion for summary judgment, concluding she was not entitled to qualified immunity on the Fourteenth Amendment claim or state law immunity on the negligence claim. The court found that there were disputes of material fact regarding whether Green-Hernandez was deliberately indifferent to Miller’s serious medical needs and whether her conduct amounted to gross negligence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court dismissed Green-Hernandez’s appeal regarding qualified immunity due to lack of jurisdiction, as her arguments were based on factual disputes rather than purely legal questions. However, the court reversed the district court’s denial of Michigan governmental immunity. The Sixth Circuit held that while Green-Hernandez’s conduct could be considered grossly negligent, it was not the single most proximate cause of Miller’s death. The court concluded that Miller’s ingestion of fentanyl was the most immediate, efficient, and direct cause of her death, entitling Green-Hernandez to state law immunity. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Gillman v. City of Troy" on Justia Law

Shawn Lamar Peake-Wright, Jr. was a passenger in a car driven by Kimberly Manney in Kalamazoo, Michigan, when they were stopped by Sgt. Timothy Millard. Sgt. Millard recognized Peake-Wright and knew of his criminal history. During the stop, Peake-Wright exhibited strange behavior, including removing his jacket in freezing weather and repeatedly standing up despite officers' instructions to remain seated. Sgt. Millard, suspecting that Peake-Wright's jacket might contain contraband, searched it and found a loaded 9mm pistol.The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan denied Peake-Wright's motion to suppress the evidence of the firearm, holding that the search was justified under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. The court found that Peake-Wright's behavior and criminal history provided probable cause to believe that his jacket contained evidence of a crime.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the duration of the traffic stop was reasonable and that the officers had probable cause to search Peake-Wright's jacket. The court emphasized that the totality of the circumstances, including Peake-Wright's erratic behavior and criminal history, justified the search under the automobile exception. The court concluded that the search was lawful and upheld the district court's judgment. View "United States v. Peake-Wright" on Justia Law