Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The defendant was convicted of possessing a machinegun conversion device, known as a Glock switch, which both parties agreed qualified as a machinegun under federal law. He had pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement but subsequently moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the statute criminalizing possession of machineguns, 18 U.S.C. § 922(o), violated his Second Amendment rights.The United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss, holding that his plea agreement did not bar his constitutional challenge and rejecting his Second Amendment argument. The defendant then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, maintaining that the Supreme Court’s decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen had undermined prior circuit precedent upholding § 922(o).The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial de novo, as the case involved the constitutionality of a federal statute. The appellate court held that its prior decision in Hamblen v. United States, which relied on District of Columbia v. Heller, remained binding after Bruen. The court explained that Bruen did not overrule Heller or Hamblen, and that the tradition of prohibiting “dangerous and unusual weapons” such as machineguns was reaffirmed. The court concluded that the Second Amendment does not protect the possession of machineguns covered by § 922(o). Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the defendant’s conviction. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

An orthopedic surgeon was convicted by a jury in Ohio of two counts of gross sexual imposition and one count of tampering with records, following allegations by two patients of inappropriate conduct during medical examinations. The prosecution’s case included testimony from the alleged victims, peer physicians, and investigators, as well as various exhibits such as interview recordings and medical records. The trial court admitted these exhibits, and the jury found the defendant guilty on all counts, resulting in a sentence of jail time, work release, community control, a fine, and sex offender registration.The defendant appealed to the Ohio Court of Appeals, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions, specifically challenging the proof of sexual gratification and intent to defraud. The appellate court affirmed the convictions, finding that a rational juror could infer the necessary elements from the evidence presented. The Ohio Supreme Court declined to review the case further. The defendant then filed a federal habeas corpus petition in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, raising several claims and seeking to supplement the record with additional documents, including trial exhibits. The magistrate judge allowed some supplementation but excluded certain trial exhibits. The district court denied both the motion to expand the record and the habeas petition, concluding that the state court record, including the trial transcript, was sufficient for review.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit considered whether the district court erred by adjudicating the habeas petition without including all trial exhibits in the record. The Sixth Circuit held that the district court was not required to review every trial exhibit, as long as it had the relevant portions of the record necessary to evaluate the claims. The court found no error in the district court’s process and affirmed the denial of the motion to expand the record. View "Heiney v. Moore" on Justia Law

The defendant was previously convicted of transporting child pornography and, after serving most of his sentence, was released to a halfway house. While there, he engaged in a series of text conversations with his preteen daughter, asking her about his past conviction, her views on sex, and whether she thought there was anything wrong with adults or children engaging in sexual acts, as depicted in pictures or videos. He also instructed her to keep their conversations secret. The defendant’s ex-sister-in-law, who had access to the daughter's phone records, became concerned and forwarded the messages to the FBI. A subsequent investigation of the defendant’s phone, despite his attempts to delete its contents, revealed incriminating text messages, bookmarks to websites with suggestive titles, and 163 images sexualizing children, seven of which were alleged to be child pornography.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan denied the defendant’s pretrial motions to exclude most of the images and the website bookmarks, finding them relevant to knowledge and intent. The court also denied his motion to dismiss the indictment on First Amendment grounds. At trial, the government presented evidence including the images, text messages, and testimony from the investigating agent and the ex-sister-in-law. The defendant argued that others at the halfway house could have accessed his phone and that he only sought “child erotica,” not child pornography. The jury found him guilty of knowing receipt of child pornography and specifically found the seven images met the statutory definition.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence de novo and held that a rational jury could find the images constituted child pornography. The court also found no error in admitting the website bookmarks or the text messages with the defendant’s daughter, as they were relevant to intent and not unfairly prejudicial. The court rejected both facial and as-applied First Amendment challenges to the statute. The conviction was affirmed. View "United States v. Mercer-Kinser" on Justia Law

A man in Michigan was found by sheriff’s deputies shooting a rifle in his backyard while intoxicated and under the influence of marijuana. Upon investigation, deputies discovered multiple firearms, three pipe bombs, and a large amount of ammunition in his home. The man admitted to regularly using marijuana and building the pipe bombs himself. He was convicted under state law for possessing a firearm while intoxicated and later pleaded guilty in federal court to possessing unregistered firearms (the pipe bombs).The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan, following the Sentencing Guidelines, determined that the defendant was a “prohibited person” under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) due to his unlawful drug use and firearm possession. This resulted in a higher base offense level and a sentencing range of 46 to 57 months; the court imposed a 52-month sentence. The defendant objected, arguing that applying § 922(g)(3) to him violated the Second Amendment, but the district court rejected this argument, finding that he posed a threat to the public.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed whether § 922(g)(3) could constitutionally be applied to the defendant. The court held that, under its precedent and Supreme Court guidance, Congress may disarm groups it deems dangerous, provided individuals have an opportunity to show they are not actually dangerous. The court found that the defendant’s conduct—firing a rifle while drunk and high in a residential area—demonstrated he was dangerous. Therefore, the application of § 922(g)(3) to him was constitutional, and the district court’s sentence was affirmed. View "United States v. VanOchten" on Justia Law

A physician was recruited by staffing and telehealth companies to perform “chart reviews” for patients who were purportedly in need of durable medical equipment (DME) such as braces. She believed she was reviewing and approving charts for patients already evaluated by other providers. The companies she worked with were later found to be engaged in a scheme to defraud Medicare by using physicians’ signatures to order DME and submit claims. The physician never personally examined the patients, and there was no evidence she submitted claims to Medicare or knew the amounts billed. She received approximately $78,000 in compensation for her work over three years.A grand jury indicted her on six counts of healthcare fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1347. At trial in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, the government argued she defrauded Medicare by signing DME orders for patients she had not personally evaluated. The jury heard testimony from patients, Medicare investigators, and a physician, none of whom were qualified as expert witnesses. The district court excluded exculpatory statements the physician made to an insurance investigator about her belief that patients had been previously examined. The jury found her guilty on all counts.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the district court erred in three ways: by failing to instruct the jury that the government must prove the defendant knew her conduct was unlawful; by excluding the physician’s statements reflecting her contemporaneous state of mind; and by allowing lay witnesses to testify about medical necessity without expert qualification. The court found these errors were not harmless, vacated the convictions, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "United States v. Singh" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who, while driving in Memphis, Tennessee, nearly collided with a police vehicle. When officers attempted to stop him, he fired several shots at them, with one bullet striking the police car and narrowly missing an officer. After a pursuit that ended in a crash, the defendant was arrested. A search of his vehicle revealed a loaded Glock 23 handgun equipped with a device that converted it into a machinegun, as defined by federal law. The defendant did not have a valid registration for the machinegun and did not dispute that the weapon met the statutory definition.A grand jury indicted the defendant for possessing a machinegun in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(o). He moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the statute was unconstitutional under the Second Amendment, both facially and as applied to him, in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen. The United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee denied the motion, holding that § 922(o) was constitutional. The defendant then pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 108 months in prison, after which he appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that its prior decision in Hamblen v. United States, which upheld the constitutionality of § 922(o) under District of Columbia v. Heller, remained binding after Bruen because Bruen did not alter the relevant aspects of Heller. The court further conducted an independent analysis under the text-and-history methodology set forth in Heller and Bruen, concluding that § 922(o) is consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of prohibiting private possession of dangerous and unusual weapons. The court therefore affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that § 922(o) is constitutional both on its face and as applied to the defendant. View "United States v. Bridges" on Justia Law

After completing a prison sentence for a prior conviction of being a felon in possession of a firearm, the defendant began a term of supervised release. Less than two months later, he was arrested after police responded to a report that he had threatened someone with a gun. Officers found a firearm at the scene, and the defendant admitted to possessing it. He was initially charged in state court, but the state charges were dismissed after a federal indictment for being a felon in possession of a firearm was issued. The conduct also constituted a violation of the conditions of his supervised release from the earlier federal conviction.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio handled both the new substantive offense and the supervised-release violation in joint proceedings. The defendant pleaded guilty to the new firearm charge and, at a subsequent hearing, admitted to the supervised-release violation. The district court sentenced him to 96 months for the new offense and 24 months for the supervised-release violation, to be served consecutively. The defendant appealed, arguing that he did not knowingly waive his right to a revocation hearing, that the district court misapplied sentencing factors for the supervised-release violation, and that his sentence for the substantive offense was based on an improper application of the career-offender enhancement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to a revocation hearing and that the district court properly applied the career-offender enhancement for the substantive offense. However, the appellate court held that the district court erred by considering retributive and punishment factors, which are not permitted under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) as clarified by the Supreme Court’s decision in Esteras v. United States, when sentencing for the supervised-release violation. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the substantive offense sentence, reversed the revocation sentence, and remanded for resentencing on the supervised-release violation. View "United States v. Hoyle" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who, after being excluded from Medicare and Medicaid as part of a civil False Claims Act settlement, purchased a Medicare-participating home healthcare company using an alias and forged documents. The company then submitted hundreds of fraudulent claims to Medicare, resulting in over $2.7 million in payments for services that were never provided. The defendant transferred the proceeds to India, where they remain unrecovered. During the criminal investigation, the defendant also attempted to prevent a former employee from testifying by impersonating another person and making false reports to U.S. authorities, which led to the employee’s visa being denied.A grand jury in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan indicted the defendant on charges including health care fraud, money laundering, conspiracy, aggravated identity theft, and witness tampering. The trial was delayed, and shortly before it began, the defendant’s counsel experienced internal conflict, leading to motions to withdraw and requests for a mistrial, all of which the district court denied. During trial, the defense sought to call a surprise witness, an unindicted co-conspirator, on the last day. The district court excluded this witness, citing a violation of a discovery order and concerns about delay, prejudice, and the likelihood the witness would invoke the Fifth Amendment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed whether the district court violated the defendant’s constitutional rights by excluding the witness, denying counsel’s motion to withdraw, and excluding the defendant from an in-chambers conference. The Sixth Circuit held that the exclusion of the witness did not violate the Sixth Amendment, as the district court reasonably balanced the defendant’s right to present a defense against countervailing interests, and the defendant failed to show what exculpatory evidence the witness would have provided. The court also found no abuse of discretion in denying the motion to withdraw and no reversible error in excluding the defendant from the conference. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Pancholi" on Justia Law

Devante Glenn was accused of selling drugs that led to the overdose death of Renee Ducatman. He was convicted on two counts of distributing carfentanil and one count of using a telecommunications device to facilitate the transaction. Ducatman had multiple interactions with Glenn and others through text messages and phone calls, seeking drugs. On the night of her death, she and Glenn exchanged messages and met, after which she overdosed on carfentanil.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio conducted the trial. The jury convicted Glenn on all charges, and the court sentenced him to 240 months of imprisonment on one count and 48 months on the other counts, to be served concurrently. Glenn appealed, arguing insufficient evidence and improper expert testimony by Agent Orlando Almonte, who interpreted text messages between Glenn and Ducatman.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court erred in allowing Agent Almonte to testify as an expert on the meaning of common words and phrases in the text messages, as the jury was capable of interpreting them without expert assistance. The court determined that this error was not harmless, as the text messages were a significant part of the evidence against Glenn. Consequently, the court vacated Glenn’s conviction and remanded the case for further proceedings, allowing for a retrial without the improper expert testimony. View "United States v. Glenn" on Justia Law

Mark Hartman was indicted for three counts of rape in Montgomery County, Ohio, following a late-night encounter. After a bench trial, he was convicted on all counts. Hartman filed a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. He argued that his trial counsel improperly cross-examined witnesses and misled him into waiving his right to a jury trial. Ohio courts rejected his claims on the merits.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio granted Hartman relief on his cross-examination claim, finding that his counsel introduced evidence of force that the state had not proven, making the trial fundamentally unfair. However, the court denied relief on Hartman’s jury-waiver claim, holding that the strategy to advise a bench trial was sound and that Hartman failed to show prejudice.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed the district court’s grant of habeas relief on the cross-examination claim, finding that the Ohio Court of Appeals reasonably determined that trial counsel pursued a valid impeachment strategy during cross-examination. The court noted that the strategy aimed to reveal inconsistencies in the victim’s testimony, which is a common and reasonable trial tactic.Regarding the jury-waiver claim, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of relief. The court held that the Ohio Court of Appeals reasonably concluded that trial counsel’s advice to waive a jury trial was within the wide range of reasonable professional conduct. The court found that counsel’s advice, despite some factual inaccuracies, did not render the waiver unknowing or unintelligent.In conclusion, the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of a conditional habeas writ on the cross-examination claim, affirmed the denial of the jury-waiver claim, and remanded with instructions to deny Hartman’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. View "Hartman v. Yost" on Justia Law