Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Tyler Venema, an inmate with a history of mental illness and suicide attempts, committed suicide by asphyxiation with a plastic bag while in the custody of the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) at Woodland Center Correctional Facility (WCC). Venema's estate filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Jodi DeAngelo, the warden of WCC, alleging that her failure to train and supervise corrections officers led to Venema's death, violating his Eighth Amendment rights. The estate claimed that DeAngelo knew about the risk posed by plastic bags and the officers' failure to remove them from at-risk inmates' cells.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan denied DeAngelo's motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity, finding that the estate's allegations were sufficient to establish that DeAngelo implicitly authorized or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of her subordinates. DeAngelo appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the estate plausibly alleged that DeAngelo knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of her subordinates by failing to train and supervise them properly. The court also found a causal connection between DeAngelo's actions and Venema's death, as her failure to enforce policies against providing plastic bags to at-risk inmates could reasonably be expected to result in harm. The court concluded that Venema's Eighth Amendment rights were clearly established at the time of the violation, and thus, DeAngelo was not entitled to qualified immunity. View "Venema v. West" on Justia Law

Jeffrey Campbell, the owner and lead doctor at Physicians Primary Care (PPC), and Mark Dyer, a nurse practitioner at PPC, were indicted in 2020 on multiple counts related to overprescribing opioids and engaging in a scheme to seek fraudulent reimbursements from health insurance providers. The indictment included charges of unlawfully distributing controlled substances, conspiracy to unlawfully distribute controlled substances, health-care fraud, conspiracy to commit health-care fraud, and money laundering.The case proceeded to trial in the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky. The jury found Campbell guilty on several counts, including conspiracy to unlawfully distribute controlled substances, health-care fraud, conspiracy to commit health-care fraud, and money laundering. Dyer was also found guilty on similar counts. The district court sentenced Campbell to 105 months of imprisonment and Dyer to 60 months, followed by three years of supervised release for both. The district court also ordered restitution payments from both defendants.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The defendants challenged the jury instructions, sufficiency of the evidence, and the district court’s evidentiary rulings. The appellate court found that the jury instructions, although not fully compliant with the Supreme Court's decision in Ruan v. United States, were adequate under the court's precedents. The court also found sufficient evidence to support the convictions for conspiracy to unlawfully distribute controlled substances, health-care fraud, and money laundering. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony of government experts and other evidence.The appellate court affirmed the convictions and sentences, concluding that any potential errors in the district court’s intended-loss calculation for sentencing were harmless, as the sentences imposed were well below the applicable Guidelines range. The court also noted that the defendants failed to properly appeal the restitution order, making it outside the scope of the current appeal. View "United States v. Campbell" on Justia Law

In the summer of 2020, Adam Fox and Barry Croft, Jr. planned to kidnap Michigan Governor Gretchen Whitmer. They were convicted by a federal jury on all charges, with Fox receiving a 192-month sentence and Croft a 235-month sentence. On appeal, they argued insufficient evidence for their convictions, errors by the district court in not conducting a "Remmer" hearing for a biased juror, limiting cross-examination time, and restricting the admissibility of certain informant statements.The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan initially tried the case, resulting in a hung jury for Fox and Croft, while co-defendants Harris and Caserta were acquitted. Upon retrial, Fox and Croft were found guilty. They appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.The Sixth Circuit reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence de novo and found ample evidence supporting the convictions. The court noted that Fox and Croft's actions, including reconnaissance missions and detailed planning, demonstrated a clear agreement to kidnap Governor Whitmer. The court also found sufficient evidence for Croft's possession of an unregistered destructive device and rejected the entrapment defense, citing substantial predisposition to commit the crimes.Regarding the "Remmer" hearing, the Sixth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion, as the allegations of juror bias were not credible. The court also found no abuse of discretion in limiting cross-examination time, as defense counsel had ample warning and opportunity to question witnesses effectively. Lastly, the court ruled that the exclusion of certain informant statements was harmless error, as the evidence of guilt was overwhelming.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions of Fox and Croft on all counts. View "United States v. Croft" on Justia Law

Tyler Ross, a manager and co-CEO of ROCO Real Estate LLC and ROCO Management LLC, pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit an offense against the United States. Ross was involved in a scheme to provide mortgage lenders with inflated income information about properties owned by his real-estate-investment firm. The scheme involved submitting false financial documents to mortgage lending businesses to make underperforming properties appear more profitable than they were, thereby obtaining favorable mortgage valuations and refinancing terms.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan applied a sentencing enhancement for defendants who derived more than $1,000,000 in gross receipts from one or more financial institutions as a result of their offense. The district court found that Ross's conduct met the enhancement's requirements, as he received over $2 million from a property sale financed by a loan from JPMorgan Chase Bank, which relied on falsified financial documents provided by Ross. The district court sentenced Ross to 12 months and one day of imprisonment, granting a downward variance from the guideline range of 46-57 months.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's judgment. The court held that the gross-receipts enhancement was correctly applied because Ross's offense targeted financial institutions, and he derived gross receipts from a financial institution as a result of his offense. The court rejected Ross's arguments that the enhancement should only apply when a defendant causes loss to a financial institution and that his receipts were derived from a real-estate firm rather than a financial institution. The court emphasized that the enhancement applies to gross receipts obtained directly or indirectly from a financial institution as a result of the offense. View "United States v. Ross" on Justia Law

In 1979, Karu Gene White, along with two accomplices, committed a brutal home invasion and murder of three elderly individuals in Kentucky. White, who had known the victims, planned the crime to steal money they had saved. The victims were beaten to death with a crowbar and other weapons. White was subsequently arrested and charged with burglary, robbery, and capital murder.At trial, White's defense initially focused on an alibi, but this strategy collapsed when one of his accomplices agreed to testify against him in exchange for immunity. White's counsel then pursued an insanity defense, presenting evidence of White's abusive and traumatic childhood. Despite this, the jury found White guilty on all counts and recommended the death penalty, which the trial judge imposed.White appealed his conviction and sentence, but the Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the decision, and the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari. White then sought post-conviction relief, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence. The Kentucky Supreme Court ultimately rejected this claim, finding that counsel's performance was reasonable and that additional mitigating evidence would not have changed the jury's decision.White filed for federal habeas relief, which was denied by the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky. The court found that counsel's investigation and presentation of mitigating evidence were reasonable and that the Kentucky Supreme Court's application of Strickland v. Washington was not unreasonable. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, holding that White's counsel's performance was within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance and that there was no substantial likelihood that additional mitigating evidence would have changed the jury's recommendation for the death penalty. View "White v. Plappert" on Justia Law

Bradley Patton was arrested in Rutherford County, Tennessee, and charged with drug and firearm offenses. He posted bail multiple times, but his bail was eventually increased to $126,000. Under local rules, because his bail exceeded $75,000, he had to prove in a hearing that the bail money was not derived from criminal activities. Patton filed a class-action lawsuit in federal court, claiming that this local rule violated his due-process and Eighth Amendment rights.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee dismissed Patton's claims, ruling that they were moot because he had been released from pretrial custody and there was no ongoing harm. The court also found that Patton could not rely on the putative class's standing to preserve his claims and rejected his argument that the claims were capable of repetition yet evading review.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and held that Patton's claims fell within the "inherently transitory" exception to mootness for class-action claims. The court noted that pretrial detention is inherently temporary and that other class members would likely suffer the same injury. The court also found that the district court's decision to reserve the deadline for filing a motion for class certification meant that Patton should not be penalized for not filing such a motion. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Patton v. Fitzhugh" on Justia Law

Kevin Obi provided a 21-year-old woman with a fatal dose of heroin, leading to her death. Obi and the victim, along with friends, returned to his home from a bar, where they snorted heroin and had sex. The victim became unconscious, and Obi later encouraged a friend to have sex with her. The friend realized she was not breathing, and Obi called 911, but the victim was pronounced dead. Obi initially lied to the police about drug use. He eventually pleaded guilty to providing the fatal heroin.The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan initially sentenced Obi to 300 months, including a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice and additional criminal history points. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit remanded for resentencing due to insufficient support for the obstruction enhancement. At resentencing, the district court reaffirmed the 300-month sentence, citing additional evidence and an independent discretionary basis for the sentence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding any guidelines error harmless due to the district court's discretionary basis.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed Obi's appeal of his reduced sentence following a retroactive amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines. The district court recalculated Obi's guidelines range, reducing his sentence from 300 to 293 months. Obi challenged this reduction as procedurally and substantively unreasonable. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, finding no procedural error in the guidelines calculation and determining that the district court appropriately considered the seriousness of Obi's crime and the applicable sentencing factors. The court held that the 293-month sentence was reasonable and within the amended guidelines range. View "United States v. Obi" on Justia Law

In 1995, Garr Keith Hardin and Jeffrey Clark were convicted of murdering Rhonda Sue Warford based on forensic evidence and witness testimonies. Robert Thurman, a forensic serologist, testified that a hair found at the crime scene was similar to Hardin’s hair. After over two decades in prison, DNA testing revealed that the hair did not belong to Hardin, leading a state court to vacate their convictions. Hardin and Clark then sued Thurman under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that he failed to disclose observation notes that suggested the hair might not have matched Hardin’s hair sample, violating his obligations under Brady v. Maryland.The United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky denied Thurman’s qualified-immunity defense for Hardin’s Brady claim but granted summary judgment on other claims. The court found that a reasonable jury could determine that Thurman should have recognized the exculpatory value of his notes and that the notes were material to Hardin’s defense. The court also held that Thurman could not invoke qualified immunity because Hardin’s Brady rights were clearly established before 1992.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s decision in part and dismissed in part for lack of jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to review Thurman’s arguments that the notes were not exculpatory or material, as these were mixed questions of law and fact. However, the court rejected Thurman’s argument that the law in the mid-1990s did not clearly establish that Brady’s duty of disclosure applied to forensic scientists, affirming that such duties were clearly established and applicable to Thurman. View "Clark v. Louisville-Jefferson County Metro Government" on Justia Law

In the spring of 2021, the Lexington Police Department investigated a large-scale methamphetamine distribution scheme involving Lamonte Brown. Surveillance and a cooperating source led to the discovery of significant quantities of drugs and firearms at an office building used by Brown and his associate, William Hargis. Brown was later arrested for drug trafficking, and additional firearms were found in his car. Brown, a felon, was charged with conspiring to distribute methamphetamine and being a felon in possession of a firearm.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky consolidated the two cases for sentencing, and Brown pled guilty to both charges. He received a 310-month sentence. Brown appealed several aspects of his sentence, including the application of a two-level sentencing enhancement for possessing a dangerous weapon, which was based on firearms found in the office used for drug operations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court's decision. The court upheld the two-level enhancement, finding that it was reasonably foreseeable for Brown to know that his co-conspirator possessed firearms given the large quantities of drugs involved. The court also found no procedural error in the late filing of the third addendum to the presentence investigation report, as the district court had postponed the sentencing hearing, giving Brown sufficient time to respond.Additionally, the court determined that Brown's felon-in-possession charge was not relevant conduct to the drug conspiracy and thus could be counted as part of his criminal history. The court also found that the district court adequately explained its decision to run Brown's sentences consecutively, providing sufficient justification based on the § 3553(a) factors. Consequently, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's sentencing decisions. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

Shenisa Mohammed, a citizen of Trinidad and Tobago, became a lawful permanent resident of the United States in 2010. In 2020, she pleaded guilty to arson under Virginia Code § 18.2-77. The Department of Homeland Security charged her as removable under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), alleging her arson conviction qualified as an aggravated felony. Mohammed sought cancellation of removal, but the immigration judge (IJ) concluded that her arson conviction was an aggravated felony, making her removable and ineligible for discretionary relief. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ’s decision, and Mohammed petitioned for review.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court confirmed its jurisdiction to review the BIA’s final order of removal, limited to constitutional claims or questions of law. The court reviewed de novo whether Mohammed’s state conviction for arson qualified as an aggravated felony under the INA.The court applied the categorical approach to determine if the Virginia arson statute matched the federal arson statute under 18 U.S.C. § 844(i). The Virginia statute criminalizes maliciously burning or aiding and abetting the burning of certain properties. The federal statute criminalizes maliciously damaging or destroying property used in interstate commerce by fire or explosives. The court found that both statutes prohibit malicious burning, and the federal statute implicitly includes aiding and abetting liability through 18 U.S.C. § 2.The court concluded that the Virginia arson statute is not broader than the federal arson statute, as aiding and abetting is considered an alternative theory of liability under federal law. Therefore, Mohammed’s state arson conviction qualifies as an aggravated felony. The Sixth Circuit denied Mohammed’s petition for review. View "Mohammed v. Bondi" on Justia Law