Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

“Overwhelming evidence” established that brothers Eric and Carlos ran a lucrative Detroit narcotics and money-laundering conspiracy. After an Arizona DEA investigation snared a middleman (Morawa), who had received large quantities of marijuana, cocaine, and heroin from Mexico and arranged the transportation of drugs and cash to and from customers in the midwest. Morawa cooperated with the government. Detroit DEA agents gathered evidence by: obtaining warrants for prospective real-time cell-phone location data; using a cell-site simulator to identify unknown cell phones used by the suspects; placing a GPS tracking device on Eric’s pickup truck; and monitoring cameras installed on public utility poles near “stash” locations. The surveillance led agents to request that the Michigan State Police make traffic stops that resulted in the seizure of drugs and cash. Defendants did not challenge the validity of the stops, but argued that the evidence should be suppressed as fruit of earlier illegal searches or seizures. The court denied defendants’ motions to suppress; struck the brothers' motions claiming to revoke their citizenship and terminate the court’s power; and denied motions to proceed pro se. While the jury was deliberating, Carlos, Eric, and Proge fled. They were convicted on drug, firearms, and money-laundering counts and subsequently apprehended. They received life sentences. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding denial of the motions to suppress that had been based on challenges to the DEA surveillance tactics. The court remanded in part, finding error in the court’s denial of a request, by Proge’s counsel, to withdraw. View "United States v. Powell" on Justia Law

After a night of heavy drinking, LaVictor and his girlfriend, C.B., returned to LaVictor’s mother’s house on the Chippewa Reservation. During the night, LaVictor contacted emergency services because C.B. was bleeding from her vagina. Tribal police arrived with emergency personnel. LaVictor stated that he and C.B. had engaged in consensual sex. C.B. told the first stated that, while having sex, LaVictor became angry and stuck an unknown object inside of her. She later reported that the object was a wine bottle and that the relationship was abusive. C.B. was taken to the emergency room and had surgery to repair a two-centimeter perineal laceration and lacerations extending up the vaginal mucosa. C.B. testified that the sex was consensual. LaVictor was sentenced to 355 months in prison for: Attempted Sexual Abuse, 18 U.S.C. 242(2)(B); Aggravated Sexual Abuse through vaginal penetration, 18 U.S.C. 2241(a)(1); Aggravated Sexual Abuse through anal penetration; Assault Resulting in Serious Bodily Injury, 18 U.S.C. 113(a)(6); Domestic Assault Habitual Offender, 18 U.S.C. 117; Witness Tampering, 18 U.S.C. 1512(b)(1). The Sixth Circuit affirmed, upholding the admission of expert testimony on domestic violence and victim recantation, of testimony about LaVictor’s prior acts of violence against other women, and of C.B.’s grand jury testimony, and the court’s refusal to give a jury instruction on consent. View "United States v. LaVictor" on Justia Law

Porter led a large Clarksville, Tennessee cocaine-trafficking organization; Vance distributed the cocaine to Parnell, Duncan, and others, using a stash house in the Summit Heights housing projects and a cookhouse nearby. Parnell and Duncan then sold the cocaine and crack cocaine. DEA agents obtained wiretap and search warrants, which provided enough evidence to arrest 26 individuals, including Young, Duncan, Parnell, and Vance. Porter was in the process of selling thousands of dollars in cocaine to Young when he was arrested. The next morning, agents executed search warrants and seized drugs, guns, cash, and drug paraphernalia from their homes; 33 of the 36 individuals charged pleaded guilty, including Vance, who was sentenced to a below-Guidelines term of 200-months’ imprisonment. Duncan, Young, and Parnell were each found guilty of multiple offenses and sentenced to mandatory terms of life imprisonment without parole. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The affidavit underlying the wiretap application established probable cause; the court did not err in denying a Franks hearing because the record demonstrates that Duncan did not put forth a strong preliminary showing that the agent intended to mislead and exclude critical information. The court upheld the admission of co-conspirator statements; an agent’s testimony concerning background evidence about the investigation; cooperating witness testimony about their guilty pleas; evidence of gun crimes committed by co-conspirators; and evidence of other crimes committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. View "United States v. Young" on Justia Law

In 2000, Leonard followed his former fiancé, Flick, to her home, where he handcuffed Flick and pointed a gun as Flick called to tell Gries that she was not coming to his house. Gries determined that she was in danger. Gries and Minges rushed to Flick’s house. When Leonard heard Gries’s truck, he shot Flick three times in the head, then fired through the door, striking Gries. Gries and Minges left to call the police. Leonard fled. He later surrendered and, in custody, gave a taped confession to Flick’s murder, to attempting to have sex with Flick while she was restrained, and to shooting at Gries and Minges. The defense’s theory was that Leonard was trying to salvage his relationship with Flick, had not intended to kill her, and had not acted with prior calculation. A jury found Leonard guilty of aggravated murder, kidnapping, attempted rape, and felonious assault, but acquitted Leonard of rape and attempted murder. The court imposed a death sentence. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed. His state post-conviction efforts were unsuccessful. The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari. Leonard sought federal habeas relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of the petition, rejecting arguments concerning: the court’s decision to have Leonard wear a stun belt; alleged prosecutorial misconduct; an alleged conflict of interest involving counsel; ineffective assistance in investigation and failure to impeach Gries and Minges; Ohio’s death penalty scheme; sufficiency of the evidence for an attempted rape conviction; and Ohio’s post-conviction process. View "Leonard v. Warden, Ohio State Penitentiary" on Justia Law

Kelly was convicted, in Ohio state court, of felony murder, felonious assault, and assault for his involvement in a 2009 fight near Kent State University and was sentenced to 15 years to life imprisonment. On direct appeal, he raised a claim that his trial counsel was ineffective. Kelly’s counsel on direct appeal included the wife and business partner of his trial counsel. Kelly’s direct appeal and state post-conviction claims were unsuccessful. With new counsel, Kelly brought a federal claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel in a 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas petition, advancing a theory of his trial counsel’s ineffectiveness that had not been fully presented before the Ohio state courts. Kelly also argued that his appellate counsel was constitutionally ineffective, a claim that had been properly presented before the Ohio state courts, and that his appellate counsel’s ineffectiveness should excuse his procedurally defaulted ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim under Supreme Court precedent. The district court rejected both arguments, concluding that the actions of Kelly's appellate counsel, even if allegedly ineffective, could not excuse Kelly’s procedurally defaulted ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim, and that his ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel claim could not overcome AEDPA deference. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, citing the deference due strategic decisions made by counsel. View "Kelly v. Lazaroff" on Justia Law

The accreditation of White’s travel agency, CTC, was revoked in 2003 after audits conducted by United Airlines uncovered fraudulent ticketing schemes that cost the airline $100,000 in airfares. White continued working as a subcontractor for other travel agencies and continued to obtain fraudulent ticket fares by providing false information about her clients’ ages, possession of discount certificates, and military status. White charged service fees and airfare directly to her clients’ credit cards, sometimes for persons other than those clients, and sometimes without their permission. When travel agencies violate an airline’s fare policy and cause financial loss, the airline issues Agency Debit Memoranda (ADM), requiring payment. A travel agent testified that within two years, his agency received more than $100,000 in ADMs based on airfare that White booked. When White was asked for proof that her customers qualified for military discounts, she created false Armed Forces Identification cards using customers’ real names and dates of birth. The airlines determined that the cards were fraudulent and notified the Secret Service. White was charged with wire fraud and aggravated identity theft. The district court permitted White to examine witnesses about actual repayments that were made to victims; White was not permitted to disclose loss-recoupment negotiations that took place long after White was confronted by her victims. White was sentenced to a total of 94 months in prison. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments the district court read an improper definition of the term “use” into the aggravated identity theft statute; erred in refusing to admit evidence of White’s intention to repay some of the losses; and erred in calculating victims’ losses. View "United States v. White" on Justia Law

Pouncy, age 18, was charged with carjacking, armed robbery, felony firearm possession, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. The Michigan state court appointed attorney Breczinski to represent Pouncy. Before trial, Pouncy complained that he had not been able to talk to Breczinski and that Breczinski had not investigated his defenses. Based on an erroneous calculation, the court told Pouncy that he was subject to a guidelines range of 135-337 months in prison; in reality his guidelines range was 225-562 months. Breczinski did not correct the court’s mistake. Pouncy, insisting on his innocence, rejected a plea offer. Breczinski lost pre-trial evidentiary motions. Pouncy requested to give his own opening statement, reiterating that he still had not had any conversations with Breczinski, and that Breczinski had not followed up on his defenses. The court replied: if you make the opening statement, you’ll have to represent yourself through this trial. The court declined to appoint new counsel or to allow Pouncy to attempt to retain private counsel. Breczinski gave an opening statement, after which Pouncy again asked to represent himself. The court agreed. The trial lasted six days. Convicted, Pouncy was sentenced to 586-824 months of imprisonment. A month later, Pouncy represented himself in a bench trial on charges arising out of a third carjacking. He was, again, convicted. His state appeals and petitions for post-conviction relief were unsuccessful. A federal district court granted habeas relief, concluding that Pouncy faced a “Hobson’s choice,” so that his waiver of counsel was involuntary. The Sixth Circuit reversed, citing the highly deferential standards applicable to federal collateral review of state-court convictions. View "Pouncy v. Palmer" on Justia Law

Mirza called Detective Dare, told Dare that Brown was a drug dealer, and agreed to set up controlled purchases. The first controlled buy occurred in September 2005. Brown was arrested in January 2006, waived his Miranda rights, and admitted in writing that he sold cocaine to Mirza four times. Brown was released from custody. Within weeks, the state issued a criminal complaint and secured an arrest warrant. Brown was unaware of these developments until he was arrested in September 2007, pursuant to an unrelated warrant, and was arraigned. Brown was tried in February 2008. Mirza’s defense theory was that he simply permitted Mirza to use his scale to weigh cocaine that Mirza already possessed. Brown was convicted. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed. Brown sought relief from judgment, arguing that he was denied due process when exculpatory audio recordings were lost during the 20-month delay between his arrest and trial, and speedy trial violations. State courts denied relief, holding that Brown had not demonstrated good cause for failure to raise the issues on direct appeal. A federal district court then rejected Brown’s claims, applying the Barker v. Wingo, factors, to determine that no speedy-trial violation occurred. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that although the delay exceeded a year, the state was at most negligent, Brown failed to assert the right after he became aware of the charges, and, given the overwhelming evidence against him, Brown had not shown prejudice. View "Brown v. Romanowski" on Justia Law

In Wayne County, Michigan, Grundy was Assistant County Executive; Executive Director of HealthChoice, a municipal corporation chartered to promote the health and welfare of area residents; and Division Director of the County’s Patient Care Management System, which administered its programs through ProCare Plus. Grundy’s friend, Griffin, formed businesses to provide advertising and electronic medical records services to HealthChoice and ProCare Plus. Griffin would inflate the price and “kickback” the excess to Grundy. According to the government, the benefit to Grundy totaled $1,381,766. He pleaded guilty to honest services wire fraud arising from one of his three schemes, 18 U.S.C. 1343 & 1346, waiving the right to appeal if “the sentence imposed does not exceed the 210-month maximum allowed by” the agreement, which was the top end of the Guidelines range proposed by the government based on the loss associated with his conduct. Grundy proposed a range of 37-46 months, arguing that the loss amount associated with his offense of conviction was $400,000. The court imposed a 90-month term. The government obtained a restitution order for $1,380,767; Grundy argued that restitution should be capped at the $400,000 associated with the offense of conviction. The Sixth Circuit dismissed an appeal, holding that the waiver applied to the restitution order. View "United States v. Michael Grundy" on Justia Law

Defendant, a 32-year-old black man, has prior state court convictions for unlawful possession of a weapon, resisting arrest, and possession of a prohibited weapon. In 2014, Defendant was arrested by Memphis Police for possession of an assault rifle. He was convicted of being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The Sixth Circuit vacated, reversing denial of a “Batson” challenge. During voir dire, the government used peremptory strikes on five prospective jurors—all of whom were black. Defendant made a prima facie showing of discriminatory purpose. The government justified striking the last of the black prospective jurors, Dandridge, because he had changed jobs four months prior and had eight children; the government was purportedly “concerned about his ability to focus on the case at hand and listen and be attentive in a trial.” The government did not delve deeper into Dandridge’s answers by, for instance, asking about his child care arrangements, or the reasons he changed jobs. A comparative juror analysis shows that the government did not express concerns about the ability of similarly-situated white jurors to focus throughout the trial despite their large number of children and inconsistent work history. View "United States v. Atkins" on Justia Law