Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
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Kelly was convicted, in Ohio state court, of felony murder, felonious assault, and assault for his involvement in a 2009 fight near Kent State University and was sentenced to 15 years to life imprisonment. On direct appeal, he raised a claim that his trial counsel was ineffective. Kelly’s counsel on direct appeal included the wife and business partner of his trial counsel. Kelly’s direct appeal and state post-conviction claims were unsuccessful. With new counsel, Kelly brought a federal claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel in a 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas petition, advancing a theory of his trial counsel’s ineffectiveness that had not been fully presented before the Ohio state courts. Kelly also argued that his appellate counsel was constitutionally ineffective, a claim that had been properly presented before the Ohio state courts, and that his appellate counsel’s ineffectiveness should excuse his procedurally defaulted ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim under Supreme Court precedent. The district court rejected both arguments, concluding that the actions of Kelly's appellate counsel, even if allegedly ineffective, could not excuse Kelly’s procedurally defaulted ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim, and that his ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel claim could not overcome AEDPA deference. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, citing the deference due strategic decisions made by counsel. View "Kelly v. Lazaroff" on Justia Law

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The accreditation of White’s travel agency, CTC, was revoked in 2003 after audits conducted by United Airlines uncovered fraudulent ticketing schemes that cost the airline $100,000 in airfares. White continued working as a subcontractor for other travel agencies and continued to obtain fraudulent ticket fares by providing false information about her clients’ ages, possession of discount certificates, and military status. White charged service fees and airfare directly to her clients’ credit cards, sometimes for persons other than those clients, and sometimes without their permission. When travel agencies violate an airline’s fare policy and cause financial loss, the airline issues Agency Debit Memoranda (ADM), requiring payment. A travel agent testified that within two years, his agency received more than $100,000 in ADMs based on airfare that White booked. When White was asked for proof that her customers qualified for military discounts, she created false Armed Forces Identification cards using customers’ real names and dates of birth. The airlines determined that the cards were fraudulent and notified the Secret Service. White was charged with wire fraud and aggravated identity theft. The district court permitted White to examine witnesses about actual repayments that were made to victims; White was not permitted to disclose loss-recoupment negotiations that took place long after White was confronted by her victims. White was sentenced to a total of 94 months in prison. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments the district court read an improper definition of the term “use” into the aggravated identity theft statute; erred in refusing to admit evidence of White’s intention to repay some of the losses; and erred in calculating victims’ losses. View "United States v. White" on Justia Law

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Pouncy, age 18, was charged with carjacking, armed robbery, felony firearm possession, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. The Michigan state court appointed attorney Breczinski to represent Pouncy. Before trial, Pouncy complained that he had not been able to talk to Breczinski and that Breczinski had not investigated his defenses. Based on an erroneous calculation, the court told Pouncy that he was subject to a guidelines range of 135-337 months in prison; in reality his guidelines range was 225-562 months. Breczinski did not correct the court’s mistake. Pouncy, insisting on his innocence, rejected a plea offer. Breczinski lost pre-trial evidentiary motions. Pouncy requested to give his own opening statement, reiterating that he still had not had any conversations with Breczinski, and that Breczinski had not followed up on his defenses. The court replied: if you make the opening statement, you’ll have to represent yourself through this trial. The court declined to appoint new counsel or to allow Pouncy to attempt to retain private counsel. Breczinski gave an opening statement, after which Pouncy again asked to represent himself. The court agreed. The trial lasted six days. Convicted, Pouncy was sentenced to 586-824 months of imprisonment. A month later, Pouncy represented himself in a bench trial on charges arising out of a third carjacking. He was, again, convicted. His state appeals and petitions for post-conviction relief were unsuccessful. A federal district court granted habeas relief, concluding that Pouncy faced a “Hobson’s choice,” so that his waiver of counsel was involuntary. The Sixth Circuit reversed, citing the highly deferential standards applicable to federal collateral review of state-court convictions. View "Pouncy v. Palmer" on Justia Law

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Mirza called Detective Dare, told Dare that Brown was a drug dealer, and agreed to set up controlled purchases. The first controlled buy occurred in September 2005. Brown was arrested in January 2006, waived his Miranda rights, and admitted in writing that he sold cocaine to Mirza four times. Brown was released from custody. Within weeks, the state issued a criminal complaint and secured an arrest warrant. Brown was unaware of these developments until he was arrested in September 2007, pursuant to an unrelated warrant, and was arraigned. Brown was tried in February 2008. Mirza’s defense theory was that he simply permitted Mirza to use his scale to weigh cocaine that Mirza already possessed. Brown was convicted. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed. Brown sought relief from judgment, arguing that he was denied due process when exculpatory audio recordings were lost during the 20-month delay between his arrest and trial, and speedy trial violations. State courts denied relief, holding that Brown had not demonstrated good cause for failure to raise the issues on direct appeal. A federal district court then rejected Brown’s claims, applying the Barker v. Wingo, factors, to determine that no speedy-trial violation occurred. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that although the delay exceeded a year, the state was at most negligent, Brown failed to assert the right after he became aware of the charges, and, given the overwhelming evidence against him, Brown had not shown prejudice. View "Brown v. Romanowski" on Justia Law

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In Wayne County, Michigan, Grundy was Assistant County Executive; Executive Director of HealthChoice, a municipal corporation chartered to promote the health and welfare of area residents; and Division Director of the County’s Patient Care Management System, which administered its programs through ProCare Plus. Grundy’s friend, Griffin, formed businesses to provide advertising and electronic medical records services to HealthChoice and ProCare Plus. Griffin would inflate the price and “kickback” the excess to Grundy. According to the government, the benefit to Grundy totaled $1,381,766. He pleaded guilty to honest services wire fraud arising from one of his three schemes, 18 U.S.C. 1343 & 1346, waiving the right to appeal if “the sentence imposed does not exceed the 210-month maximum allowed by” the agreement, which was the top end of the Guidelines range proposed by the government based on the loss associated with his conduct. Grundy proposed a range of 37-46 months, arguing that the loss amount associated with his offense of conviction was $400,000. The court imposed a 90-month term. The government obtained a restitution order for $1,380,767; Grundy argued that restitution should be capped at the $400,000 associated with the offense of conviction. The Sixth Circuit dismissed an appeal, holding that the waiver applied to the restitution order. View "United States v. Michael Grundy" on Justia Law

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Defendant, a 32-year-old black man, has prior state court convictions for unlawful possession of a weapon, resisting arrest, and possession of a prohibited weapon. In 2014, Defendant was arrested by Memphis Police for possession of an assault rifle. He was convicted of being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The Sixth Circuit vacated, reversing denial of a “Batson” challenge. During voir dire, the government used peremptory strikes on five prospective jurors—all of whom were black. Defendant made a prima facie showing of discriminatory purpose. The government justified striking the last of the black prospective jurors, Dandridge, because he had changed jobs four months prior and had eight children; the government was purportedly “concerned about his ability to focus on the case at hand and listen and be attentive in a trial.” The government did not delve deeper into Dandridge’s answers by, for instance, asking about his child care arrangements, or the reasons he changed jobs. A comparative juror analysis shows that the government did not express concerns about the ability of similarly-situated white jurors to focus throughout the trial despite their large number of children and inconsistent work history. View "United States v. Atkins" on Justia Law

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Nashville Detectives travelled to the residence where Abernathy lived with his girlfriend, searched the outdoor trash cans, and found: “Marijuana roaches with Marijuana residue inside;” “Several plastic vacuumed packed heat sealed bags consistent to those used to package marijuana for resale containing marijuana residue with T22 markings;” “USPS certified mail receipts addressed to Jimmy Jail Abernathy 5809 Tru Long Ct. Antioch TN;” and mail belonging to Abernathy’s girlfriend. Detective Particelli applied for a warrant, stating in his affidavit: I have received information that the occupants of 5809 Tru Long ... have been and are currently engaging in illegal drug activity. The search revealed large quantities of cash, marijuana, cocaine, and firearms. After the court denied a motion to suppress, Abernathy entered a conditional guilty plea to two counts of possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense, 18 U.S.C. 924(c) and possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The Sixth Circuit reversed denial of the motion to suppress and vacated Abernathy’s conviction. The trial court found Particelli’s statement that he had “received information” false; marijuana roaches and T2-laced plastic bags recovered from the garbage were insufficient to create a fair probability that drugs would be found in Abernathy’s home. View "United States v. Abernathy" on Justia Law

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Pryor was charged with conspiring to distribute heroin. Interested persons would call to speak to “Daffy Duck” and negotiate a purchase. “Daffy” would then give a location for the transaction and inform members of the conspiracy. Deputy Shattuck listened in on four telephone calls between “Daffy” and an informant. Following the informant's drug purchase, police watched the residence where the sale occurred. While a search warrant was being drafted, Pryor entered the house. Police observed Pryor through the window as he picked up money, then returned to his car and left. They followed the car until it was stopped for traffic violations. Pryor had a pistol inside his waistband, which was properly licensed; wads of money in his pockets; and, in his car, had a cell phone that rang when the “Daffy” number was dialed. Pryor made 33 phone calls while in jail, which were recorded. Officer Shattuck concluded that Pryor’s voice matched the “Daffy” voice. After additional controlled buys, Pryor was re-arrested and, at a hearing, was uncooperative and asserted “sovereign citizen” status. Citing Pryor’s “bizarre” behavior, the magistrate ordered a competency evaluation. Pryor objected to appointed counsel (Upshaw), was found competent, refused to answer questions, and objected to Upshaw acting on his behalf. At later appearances, Pryor continued to assert his desire to appear in propria persona and contest the court’s jurisdiction but refused to cooperate. Pryor was convicted and sentenced to 235 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, upholding a finding that Pryor had waived his right of self-representation by his behavior, the admission of voice-identification testimony, and sentencing enhancements imposed for Pryor’s possession of a gun. View "United States v. Pryor" on Justia Law

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Officers went to execute a search warrant at Price’s Grand Rapids home. Multiple informants had reported that Price was dealing large quantities of heroin. The officers had a description of Price’s vehicles and knew that he was a six-time narcotics felon. Three officers sat in a police-surveillance van while other officers sat in an unmarked vehicle on streets adjoining the house. Price’s truck drove past the van and stopped in the snowbound street, partially blocking it. Deputy Frederick saw Price exit the truck and walk to an idling vehicle. Price leaned his head, hands, arms, and shoulders into the vehicle—a motion that, in Frederick’s experience, indicated a drug transaction. Price spotted an officer, then fled, using a truck parked in the alley behind his house. Officers stopped Price a block away; they searched his house and found drug-dealing paraphernalia, but no illegal drugs. They found documents showing that Price rented a mailbox and a parking place occupied by a large van from a nearby storage facility. Three hours after his arrest, Price admitted that the van was his and that he kept guns there. Price consented to a search of the van, in which Frederick found an AK-47, three handguns, and 200 grams of cocaine. Convicted, Price was sentenced to 324 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of Price’s motion to suppress. Price’s arrest was lawful and did not vitiate his later consent to search his van. View "United States v. Price" on Justia Law

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A confidential source met Detective Best and stated that two Hispanic men in a silver Lincoln Aviator were moving narcotics from the Chatham Village apartment complex. Best set up surveillance in an unmarked car; within 45 minutes, Best saw a silver SUV exit Chatham Village. Best followed and saw that it was a silver Lincoln Aviator. At a well-lit intersection, Best pulled up and observed what he believed were two Hispanic males in the vehicle. Best called Officer Phalen and relayed to dispatch, to Phalen, and to his partner (Trivette) that he had witnessed the driver fail to properly signal a turn. They followed the Aviator until they saw it swerve across double-yellow lines. Phalen turned on his emergency lights. The Aviator pulled over. Phalen spoke with the driver, Calderon, who had no valid driver’s license. He observed Calderon visibly shaking. Trivette, on the passenger side, noted that Pacheco was not wearing his seatbelt. Trivette asked Pacheco for identification, but Pacheco did not respond, instead rummaging through the glove compartment and glancing around the vehicle. Concerned about a possible weapon, Trivette asked Pacheco to exit the vehicle. During a pat down, Trivette felt “a large chunk of money on his right cargo pocket” and saw the top of a brick-like object, wrapped in brown paper and tape, protruding out of the top of Pacheco’s left cargo pocket. Pacheco had $3,000 in currency and a half-kilogram of brick cocaine in his pockets. The Sixth Circuit affirmed that, based on the totality of the circumstances, the officer had reasonable suspicion to justify the pat down and that the cocaine and currency were properly seized pursuant to the plain-view and plain-feel doctrines. View "United States v. Pacheco" on Justia Law