Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Nashville Detectives travelled to the residence where Abernathy lived with his girlfriend, searched the outdoor trash cans, and found: “Marijuana roaches with Marijuana residue inside;” “Several plastic vacuumed packed heat sealed bags consistent to those used to package marijuana for resale containing marijuana residue with T22 markings;” “USPS certified mail receipts addressed to Jimmy Jail Abernathy 5809 Tru Long Ct. Antioch TN;” and mail belonging to Abernathy’s girlfriend. Detective Particelli applied for a warrant, stating in his affidavit: I have received information that the occupants of 5809 Tru Long ... have been and are currently engaging in illegal drug activity. The search revealed large quantities of cash, marijuana, cocaine, and firearms. After the court denied a motion to suppress, Abernathy entered a conditional guilty plea to two counts of possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense, 18 U.S.C. 924(c) and possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The Sixth Circuit reversed denial of the motion to suppress and vacated Abernathy’s conviction. The trial court found Particelli’s statement that he had “received information” false; marijuana roaches and T2-laced plastic bags recovered from the garbage were insufficient to create a fair probability that drugs would be found in Abernathy’s home. View "United States v. Abernathy" on Justia Law

Pryor was charged with conspiring to distribute heroin. Interested persons would call to speak to “Daffy Duck” and negotiate a purchase. “Daffy” would then give a location for the transaction and inform members of the conspiracy. Deputy Shattuck listened in on four telephone calls between “Daffy” and an informant. Following the informant's drug purchase, police watched the residence where the sale occurred. While a search warrant was being drafted, Pryor entered the house. Police observed Pryor through the window as he picked up money, then returned to his car and left. They followed the car until it was stopped for traffic violations. Pryor had a pistol inside his waistband, which was properly licensed; wads of money in his pockets; and, in his car, had a cell phone that rang when the “Daffy” number was dialed. Pryor made 33 phone calls while in jail, which were recorded. Officer Shattuck concluded that Pryor’s voice matched the “Daffy” voice. After additional controlled buys, Pryor was re-arrested and, at a hearing, was uncooperative and asserted “sovereign citizen” status. Citing Pryor’s “bizarre” behavior, the magistrate ordered a competency evaluation. Pryor objected to appointed counsel (Upshaw), was found competent, refused to answer questions, and objected to Upshaw acting on his behalf. At later appearances, Pryor continued to assert his desire to appear in propria persona and contest the court’s jurisdiction but refused to cooperate. Pryor was convicted and sentenced to 235 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, upholding a finding that Pryor had waived his right of self-representation by his behavior, the admission of voice-identification testimony, and sentencing enhancements imposed for Pryor’s possession of a gun. View "United States v. Pryor" on Justia Law

Officers went to execute a search warrant at Price’s Grand Rapids home. Multiple informants had reported that Price was dealing large quantities of heroin. The officers had a description of Price’s vehicles and knew that he was a six-time narcotics felon. Three officers sat in a police-surveillance van while other officers sat in an unmarked vehicle on streets adjoining the house. Price’s truck drove past the van and stopped in the snowbound street, partially blocking it. Deputy Frederick saw Price exit the truck and walk to an idling vehicle. Price leaned his head, hands, arms, and shoulders into the vehicle—a motion that, in Frederick’s experience, indicated a drug transaction. Price spotted an officer, then fled, using a truck parked in the alley behind his house. Officers stopped Price a block away; they searched his house and found drug-dealing paraphernalia, but no illegal drugs. They found documents showing that Price rented a mailbox and a parking place occupied by a large van from a nearby storage facility. Three hours after his arrest, Price admitted that the van was his and that he kept guns there. Price consented to a search of the van, in which Frederick found an AK-47, three handguns, and 200 grams of cocaine. Convicted, Price was sentenced to 324 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of Price’s motion to suppress. Price’s arrest was lawful and did not vitiate his later consent to search his van. View "United States v. Price" on Justia Law

A confidential source met Detective Best and stated that two Hispanic men in a silver Lincoln Aviator were moving narcotics from the Chatham Village apartment complex. Best set up surveillance in an unmarked car; within 45 minutes, Best saw a silver SUV exit Chatham Village. Best followed and saw that it was a silver Lincoln Aviator. At a well-lit intersection, Best pulled up and observed what he believed were two Hispanic males in the vehicle. Best called Officer Phalen and relayed to dispatch, to Phalen, and to his partner (Trivette) that he had witnessed the driver fail to properly signal a turn. They followed the Aviator until they saw it swerve across double-yellow lines. Phalen turned on his emergency lights. The Aviator pulled over. Phalen spoke with the driver, Calderon, who had no valid driver’s license. He observed Calderon visibly shaking. Trivette, on the passenger side, noted that Pacheco was not wearing his seatbelt. Trivette asked Pacheco for identification, but Pacheco did not respond, instead rummaging through the glove compartment and glancing around the vehicle. Concerned about a possible weapon, Trivette asked Pacheco to exit the vehicle. During a pat down, Trivette felt “a large chunk of money on his right cargo pocket” and saw the top of a brick-like object, wrapped in brown paper and tape, protruding out of the top of Pacheco’s left cargo pocket. Pacheco had $3,000 in currency and a half-kilogram of brick cocaine in his pockets. The Sixth Circuit affirmed that, based on the totality of the circumstances, the officer had reasonable suspicion to justify the pat down and that the cocaine and currency were properly seized pursuant to the plain-view and plain-feel doctrines. View "United States v. Pacheco" on Justia Law

While on parole, Ritchey allegedly threatened another individual. A parole officer visited Ritchey’s home and found a handgun. He pleaded guilty as a felon in possession. The PSR identified six prior convictions for breaking and entering a building with the intent to commit a felony or larceny therein, a felony under Michigan law, and asserted each qualified as a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e) (ACCA). After a stolen firearm​ enhancement, Ritchey’s adjusted offense level was 16, but became 33 with the armed career criminal designation. Applying a reduction for acceptance of responsibility and an adjustment because Ritchey was on parole resulted in a sentencing range of 168-210 months. With ACCA’s mandatory minimum, the range became 180-210. Ritchey argued that the Michigan convictions did not qualify as “violent felonies” because the statute does not fit ACCA's definition of a “generic burglary.” The prosecution argued that, while the statute is broader than a “generic burglary,” it is divisible so that the court could determine whether Ritchey committed a generic burglary under the modified categorical approach. Felony informations for Ritchey’s prior offenses demonstrated that he “broke into and entered a … barn, a garage, or a store.” The district court found that “the Michigan statute arguably includes some things that would qualify as generic burglary and arguably some things that don’t,” such as breaking and entering a tent, but agreed with the prosecution and imposed a sentence of 180 months. The Sixth Circuit remanded for resentencing without consideration of ACCA. The Michigan statute’s terms are broader than generic burglary, and it is not divisible under the 2016 Supreme Court holding, Mathis v. United States. View "United States v. Ritchey" on Justia Law

In 2010, Bonds pled guilty to a drug-conspiracy charge and was sentenced to 120 months’ imprisonment, which represented a significant downward variance from his guideline range of 210 to 262 months. In 2015, the district court denied Bonds’s motion for a sentence reduction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2), on the erroneous ground that Bonds had been sentenced to the statutory mandatory minimum, when, in fact, there was no applicable mandatory minimum sentence. On appeal, Bonds argued for the first time that the retroactive Amendment 782 (lowering the base offense level for most drug-trafficking crimes) opens the door to applying the non-retroactive Amendment 742, which would change his criminal history from a category of VI to V. Amendment 742 struck a Guidelines provision that stated: “Add 2 points if the defendant committed the instant offense less than two years after release from imprisonment on a sentence counted under (a) or (b)." The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. Only if Amendment 742 applied in conjunction with Amendment 782 would Bonds be eligible for a sentence reduction; courts do not have the authority to consider the non-retroactive Amendment 742 in determining eligibility for a 3582(c)(2) reduction, View "United States v. Bonds" on Justia Law

In 1986, a jury found that Hutton murdered Mitchell and attempted to kill another friend. Hutton was convicted of aggravated murder with two death specifications. Following a remand, the Court of Appeals determined that the death sentence was appropriate. In 1996, Hutton filed a state petition for post-conviction relief; the court denied relief without an evidentiary hearing. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed. The Ohio Supreme Court declined further review. In 2001, Hutton unsuccessfully filed a second post-conviction petition. The Ohio Supreme Court again declined further review. Hutton unsuccessfully applied to reopen his direct appeal, contending ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. In 2005, Hutton filed a federal habeas petition, which he amended in 2011. Without conducting an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied relief. The Sixth Circuit denied five of his claim, but reversed with respect to whether a state court’s independent review of a death sentence during sentencing can cure any omission in a jury instruction. A fundamental miscarriage of justice resulted from the failure to define “aggravating circumstances” in the jury instructions. The jury, without proper instructions, could not have made a finding that aggravating circumstances existed; the harshest sentence Hutton could possibly have received without that instruction was life. View "Hutton v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

In 2008, Huffman found nude pictures of her 12-year-old daughter on a camera belonging to her boyfriend, Thompson. Thompson admitted taking the photos. Huffman turned the camera over to the police. That same day, the police interviewed Thompson, recording the interview on a videotape. In the interview, Thompson admitted taking the sexually explicit pictures of the child and touching the child’s breast and vagina. Thompson denied digitally penetrating the child. Charged with first-degree criminal sexual conduct, Thompson went to trial. In his opening statement, defense counsel promised that Thompson would testify and deny penetration, but counsel never called Thompson to testify, instead relying on Thompson’s statements in a taped police interview to tell his side of the story. After trial, Thompson asserted an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim based on defense counsel’s broken promise, which the Michigan courts rejected. The district court then denied Thompson’s habeas petition based on the same claim. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Michigan Court of Appeals reasonably concluded that counsel’s failure to deliver Thompson’s live testimony did not prejudice Thompson’s defense. View "Thompson v. Rapelje" on Justia Law

Franklin lived with his grandparents and uncle to escape his alcoholic mother’s abuse. As a teenager he began manifesting bizarre behavior and using marijuana. In 1997, when Franklin was 19 years old, his relatives told him to move out. After severely beating them, Franklin shot and killed his grandmother; set fire to the house, leaving his grandfather and uncle to die; then fled to Tennessee. He was apprehended and confessed, claiming his uncle had raped him. The trial court found Franklin competent. During trial, Franklin engaged in disruptive and inappropriate behavior. The jury found Franklin guilty and recommended the death penalty. On appeal, Franklin unsuccessfully argued that his attorneys were ineffective for failing to request a new competency hearing during trial and that the court should have ordered a midtrial competency hearing sua sponte because an expert witness testified that Franklin suffered from paranoid schizophrenia. The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari in 2003. Franklin sought state post-conviction relief, asserting new evidence: affidavits indicating that Franklin was not competent. The trial court rejected the claim as barred by res judicata. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed on the merits. In 2012, the Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of federal habeas relief. Franklin then sought relief from judgment under FRCP 60(b), citing the Supreme Court’s decisions in Martinez (2012), and Trevino (2013). The district court denied Franklin’s motion on the merits. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Franklin’s Rule 60(b) motion is a “second or successive” habeas application that the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider without prior authorization. View "Franklin v. Jenkins" on Justia Law

Kruger pleaded guilty to possessing pseudoephedrine with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 841(c)(1). Kruger was sentenced in 2009. Under the 2008 U.S.S.G. Kruger’s recommended sentencing range was 188-235 months of imprisonment. The court accepted the calculation, but varied downward and imposed a sentence of 120 months of imprisonment, reasoning that the proposed range overstated the seriousness of Kruger’s offense and the significance of his criminal history. Five years later, the Sentencing Commission amended the Guidelines, so that Kruger’s recommended range would have been 151-188 months of imprisonment. Kruger challenged a 2011 amendment, which prohibits the retroactive application of Guidelines amendments to defendants, like Kruger, whose sentences are for terms “less than the minimum of the amended guideline range.” Kruger claimed that the limitation violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The Sixth Circuit affirmed rejection of his claim. Kruger has no constitutional right to the retroactive application of a more lenient version of the Guidelines. The amendment does not have the effect “of increasing the measure of punishment,” but only forecloses the possibility of a reduced sentence on the basis of an amendment that did not even exist at the time Kruger was sentenced. View "United States v. Kruger" on Justia Law