Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was in the getaway car during a store robbery and saw Caldwell give a firearm to Tripp, who robbed the cashier at gunpoint. Weeks later, Caldwell remained in the car while defendant and Williams brandished firearms and robbed a bank. Weeks later, defendant accompanied Caldwell and Williams to another bank, but remained outside while Williams placed the firearm against the manager’s head and pistol-whipped a guard. Defendant was charged with two counts of conspiracy to commit “Hobbs Act robbery” (18 U.S.C. 1951(a), 1951(b)(1), and 2); three counts of using, carrying and brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A) and 2); and two counts of armed bank robbery (18 U.S.C. 2113(a), 2113(d), and 2). The court initially adjudged defendant incompetent, but he later passed multiple competency evaluations. The others pleaded guilty. At defendant’s request, the court conducted an extended self-representation colloquy and allowed him to self-represent with appointed counsel as standby. Defendant cross-examined some witnesses but did not present an affirmative defense. The jury found defendant guilty. The court sentenced him to 664 months’ incarceration. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence that he aided the store robbery and second bank robbery, and claims that the court erred in allowing him to self-represent and in imposing consecutive sentences on his section 924(c) convictions, and that Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence. View "United States v. Gooch" on Justia Law

In 1997, a Memphis armored truck driver was shot while working; he died two years later, as a result. The shooter took the cash and left in a getaway car. Authorities identified Thomas as the shooter and Bond as the getaway driver. In a federal trial before Day’s death, Thomas was convicted of interfering with interstate commerce, carrying a firearm during a crime of violence, and being a felon in possession of a firearm, and was sentenced to life in prison. After Day died, Thomas was convicted of felony murder in state court, was sentenced to death, and exhausted state post-conviction remedies. Jackson, Thomas’s girlfriend, was the pivotal witness in both trials, placing Thomas at the scene of the shooting. After the federal trial, but before the state prosecution, the FBI paid Jackson $750 on behalf of the Task Force. Jackson testified that she did not receive any “reward” money and that she testified because it was the “right thing to do.” Thomas was never notified of this payment and discovered it during his federal habeas hearing. State prosecutors were provided with evidence of the payment, but later argued that they lacked “actual” knowledge. The Sixth Circuit granted habeas relief in the death penalty case, finding that the prosecutor had a duty to disclose the payment, but affirmed the denial of relief in the federal case. The state court Brady violation, failure to disclose that Jackson had received compensation after her federal testimony, occurred after Thomas’s federal trial. View "Thomas v. United States" on Justia Law

In 1997, Day, a Memphis armored truck driver, was shot on the job. The shooter took the cash and left in a getaway car. Day died two years later, of complications from his injuries. Authorities identified Thomas as the shooter and Bond as the getaway car driver. In a federal trial before Day’s death, Thomas was convicted of interfering with interstate commerce, carrying a firearm in relation to a crime of violence, and being a felon in possession of a firearm, and was sentenced to life in prison. After Day died, Thomas was convicted of felony murder in state court and was sentenced to death. Thomas exhausted his Tennessee post-conviction remedies. Jackson, Thomas’s girlfriend, was the pivotal witness in both trials, placing Thomas at the scene of the shooting. After the federal trial, but before the state prosecution, the FBI paid Jackson $750 on behalf of the Safe Streets Task Force. Jackson testified that she did not receive any “reward” money and that she testified because it was the “right thing to do.” Thomas was never notified of this payment and discovered it years later during his federal habeas hearing. State prosecutors were provided with evidence of the payment, but later argued that they lacked “actual” knowledge. The district court denied Thomas habeas relief in the death penalty case, reasoning that the payment was not sufficiently “material.” The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that the prosecutor had a duty to disclose the payment rather than allow Jackson to commit perjury. View "Thomas v. Westbrooks" on Justia Law

Witzke is currently serving four sentences in the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) for using forged financial instruments. In May 2013, the Parole Board released Witzke on parole for a 15-month term. A year later, authorities arrested him for eight alleged parole violations, including a new criminal conviction for using a fake check. An MDOC agent found probable cause for all eight counts. Witzke pled guilty to two counts. At a second hearing, another MDOC officer dismissed all remaining counts except the fraudulent check violation. Finding Witzke guilty of that violation, the officer recommended revocation of Witzke’s parole. The Parole Board adopted the recommendation. Without seeking relief in Michigan courts, Witzke filed a pro se habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254, alleging violation of his due process rights and requesting a new hearing before the Parole Board. The district court summarily dismissed his petition without prejudice for failure to exhaust state remedies. While his appeal was pending, the Parole Board re-released Witzke on parole. He will finish serving his sentence for his underlying criminal conviction in May 2017. The Sixth Circuit dismissed his appeal as moot, stating that there was nothing to remedy. View "Witzke v. Brewer" on Justia Law

Before his jury trial on charges of murder, Watkins submitted four times to psychiatric evaluation. Though the first evaluator found him incompetent, subsequent evaluators found him competent and criminally responsible for his actions. Despite his bizarre behavior during trial, including exhibiting paranoid beliefs and urinating on a television screen, defense counsel did not request a fifth psychiatric evaluation. A jury found Watkins guilty. Nearly four years after filing a timely habeas petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel for “failure to investigate and raise a defense,” Watkins filed an amended petition arguing ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to request another psychiatric evaluation after Watkins’ conduct during trial. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of habeas relief. Watkins cannot establish that his amended petition relates back to his original petition or that he is entitled to equitable tolling; the petition was, therefore, untimely. View "Watkins v. DeAngelo-Kipp" on Justia Law

Moore was convicted in 1994 of kidnapping, robbery, and murder. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed denial of post-conviction relief. The Ohio Supreme Court denied review. Moore applied to reopen his appeal, claiming ineffective assistance by counsel in his first appeal. The Ohio Court of Appeals denied the application as untimely and based on res judicata. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed. The district court granted federal habeas relief on claims that Moore had received ineffective assistance at sentencing and alleging improper jury instructions in the penalty phase. The Sixth Circuit remanded in part, holding that a 2011 Supreme Court decision precluded the district court from considering additional evidence that Moore had introduced in support of his ineffective assistance claim and rejecting Moore’s argument that the Supreme Court’s 2012 Martinez decision required remand for factual development of the claim. Moore moved to set aside the judgment, arguing that the Supreme Court’s 2013 Trevino decision permitted him to use newly-developed evidence of ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel to establish cause for his failure to present evidence to support his post-conviction claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The district court denied relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Trevino expanded Martinez only to cases in which an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim could not have been made meaningfully on direct appeal. Moore made that claim on direct appeal; the Ohio Supreme Court adjudicated it on the merits. View "Moore v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

Turner robbed four Memphis-area businesses at gunpoint in October 2007 and was arrested by officers working with a joint federal-state anticrime task force. He was charged with aggravated robbery under Tennessee law and retained attorney McDaniel. During the pendency of the state proceedings, the U.S. Attorney’s Office told McDaniel that the United States planned to bring federal charges against Turner under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951, for interference with commerce by threats or violence, and for using a firearm during a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c). Turner rejected a federal plea offer (15 years imprisonment) regarding the uncharged case, but subsequently pled guilty to those charges with a 25-year sentence. He moved, under 28 U.S.C. 2255 to vacate or set aside his federal conviction based on ineffective assistance of counsel during federal plea negotiations. The government argued that Turner had no Sixth Amendment right to counsel regarding plea negotiations conducted before the filing of formal charges. The district court denied the motion without reaching the merits of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, citing its precedent holding that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not attach before formal charges are filed. View "Turner v. United States" on Justia Law

King confessed to an acquaintance and to a Tennessee Bureau of Investigation agent that, after drinking large amounts of alcohol, ingesting LSD, and Quaaludes, and engaging in sexual intercourse, King drove Smith to a wooded area and shot her in the back of the head. King’s trial counsel suspected that King had brain damage as a result of a childhood head injury and substance abuse. An expert report concluded that King did not manifest evidence of psychotic thought process nor organic brain syndrome, but recommended an electroencephalogram and psychological testing. The expert later testified that an electroencephalogram was not necessary; the court denied a motion for such testing. Defense counsel suggested in his opening statement that King’s intoxicated state influenced his actions. The defense changed strategy after King’s former girlfriend testified about his violence against her. There was testimony about King sniffing gasoline “several times a week.” The jury found King guilty of first-degree murder and recommended death by electrocution, which the trial court imposed. King’s appeals and petitions for state post-conviction relief, based on ineffective assistance of counsel, were unsuccessful. The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of a federal habeas petition, rejecting arguments that counsel was ineffective for failing to present testimony about King’s intoxication at the time of the murder and failing to investigate adequately King’s mental health and to obtain expert assistance in a timely manner. View "King v. Westbrooks" on Justia Law

“Overwhelming evidence” established that brothers Eric and Carlos ran a lucrative Detroit narcotics and money-laundering conspiracy. After an Arizona DEA investigation snared a middleman (Morawa), who had received large quantities of marijuana, cocaine, and heroin from Mexico and arranged the transportation of drugs and cash to and from customers in the midwest. Morawa cooperated with the government. Detroit DEA agents gathered evidence by: obtaining warrants for prospective real-time cell-phone location data; using a cell-site simulator to identify unknown cell phones used by the suspects; placing a GPS tracking device on Eric’s pickup truck; and monitoring cameras installed on public utility poles near “stash” locations. The surveillance led agents to request that the Michigan State Police make traffic stops that resulted in the seizure of drugs and cash. Defendants did not challenge the validity of the stops, but argued that the evidence should be suppressed as fruit of earlier illegal searches or seizures. The court denied defendants’ motions to suppress; struck the brothers' motions claiming to revoke their citizenship and terminate the court’s power; and denied motions to proceed pro se. While the jury was deliberating, Carlos, Eric, and Proge fled. They were convicted on drug, firearms, and money-laundering counts and subsequently apprehended. They received life sentences. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding denial of the motions to suppress that had been based on challenges to the DEA surveillance tactics. The court remanded in part, finding error in the court’s denial of a request, by Proge’s counsel, to withdraw. View "United States v. Powell" on Justia Law

After a night of heavy drinking, LaVictor and his girlfriend, C.B., returned to LaVictor’s mother’s house on the Chippewa Reservation. During the night, LaVictor contacted emergency services because C.B. was bleeding from her vagina. Tribal police arrived with emergency personnel. LaVictor stated that he and C.B. had engaged in consensual sex. C.B. told the first stated that, while having sex, LaVictor became angry and stuck an unknown object inside of her. She later reported that the object was a wine bottle and that the relationship was abusive. C.B. was taken to the emergency room and had surgery to repair a two-centimeter perineal laceration and lacerations extending up the vaginal mucosa. C.B. testified that the sex was consensual. LaVictor was sentenced to 355 months in prison for: Attempted Sexual Abuse, 18 U.S.C. 242(2)(B); Aggravated Sexual Abuse through vaginal penetration, 18 U.S.C. 2241(a)(1); Aggravated Sexual Abuse through anal penetration; Assault Resulting in Serious Bodily Injury, 18 U.S.C. 113(a)(6); Domestic Assault Habitual Offender, 18 U.S.C. 117; Witness Tampering, 18 U.S.C. 1512(b)(1). The Sixth Circuit affirmed, upholding the admission of expert testimony on domestic violence and victim recantation, of testimony about LaVictor’s prior acts of violence against other women, and of C.B.’s grand jury testimony, and the court’s refusal to give a jury instruction on consent. View "United States v. LaVictor" on Justia Law