Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Officers went to execute a search warrant at Price’s Grand Rapids home. Multiple informants had reported that Price was dealing large quantities of heroin. The officers had a description of Price’s vehicles and knew that he was a six-time narcotics felon. Three officers sat in a police-surveillance van while other officers sat in an unmarked vehicle on streets adjoining the house. Price’s truck drove past the van and stopped in the snowbound street, partially blocking it. Deputy Frederick saw Price exit the truck and walk to an idling vehicle. Price leaned his head, hands, arms, and shoulders into the vehicle—a motion that, in Frederick’s experience, indicated a drug transaction. Price spotted an officer, then fled, using a truck parked in the alley behind his house. Officers stopped Price a block away; they searched his house and found drug-dealing paraphernalia, but no illegal drugs. They found documents showing that Price rented a mailbox and a parking place occupied by a large van from a nearby storage facility. Three hours after his arrest, Price admitted that the van was his and that he kept guns there. Price consented to a search of the van, in which Frederick found an AK-47, three handguns, and 200 grams of cocaine. Convicted, Price was sentenced to 324 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of Price’s motion to suppress. Price’s arrest was lawful and did not vitiate his later consent to search his van. View "United States v. Price" on Justia Law

A confidential source met Detective Best and stated that two Hispanic men in a silver Lincoln Aviator were moving narcotics from the Chatham Village apartment complex. Best set up surveillance in an unmarked car; within 45 minutes, Best saw a silver SUV exit Chatham Village. Best followed and saw that it was a silver Lincoln Aviator. At a well-lit intersection, Best pulled up and observed what he believed were two Hispanic males in the vehicle. Best called Officer Phalen and relayed to dispatch, to Phalen, and to his partner (Trivette) that he had witnessed the driver fail to properly signal a turn. They followed the Aviator until they saw it swerve across double-yellow lines. Phalen turned on his emergency lights. The Aviator pulled over. Phalen spoke with the driver, Calderon, who had no valid driver’s license. He observed Calderon visibly shaking. Trivette, on the passenger side, noted that Pacheco was not wearing his seatbelt. Trivette asked Pacheco for identification, but Pacheco did not respond, instead rummaging through the glove compartment and glancing around the vehicle. Concerned about a possible weapon, Trivette asked Pacheco to exit the vehicle. During a pat down, Trivette felt “a large chunk of money on his right cargo pocket” and saw the top of a brick-like object, wrapped in brown paper and tape, protruding out of the top of Pacheco’s left cargo pocket. Pacheco had $3,000 in currency and a half-kilogram of brick cocaine in his pockets. The Sixth Circuit affirmed that, based on the totality of the circumstances, the officer had reasonable suspicion to justify the pat down and that the cocaine and currency were properly seized pursuant to the plain-view and plain-feel doctrines. View "United States v. Pacheco" on Justia Law

While on parole, Ritchey allegedly threatened another individual. A parole officer visited Ritchey’s home and found a handgun. He pleaded guilty as a felon in possession. The PSR identified six prior convictions for breaking and entering a building with the intent to commit a felony or larceny therein, a felony under Michigan law, and asserted each qualified as a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e) (ACCA). After a stolen firearm​ enhancement, Ritchey’s adjusted offense level was 16, but became 33 with the armed career criminal designation. Applying a reduction for acceptance of responsibility and an adjustment because Ritchey was on parole resulted in a sentencing range of 168-210 months. With ACCA’s mandatory minimum, the range became 180-210. Ritchey argued that the Michigan convictions did not qualify as “violent felonies” because the statute does not fit ACCA's definition of a “generic burglary.” The prosecution argued that, while the statute is broader than a “generic burglary,” it is divisible so that the court could determine whether Ritchey committed a generic burglary under the modified categorical approach. Felony informations for Ritchey’s prior offenses demonstrated that he “broke into and entered a … barn, a garage, or a store.” The district court found that “the Michigan statute arguably includes some things that would qualify as generic burglary and arguably some things that don’t,” such as breaking and entering a tent, but agreed with the prosecution and imposed a sentence of 180 months. The Sixth Circuit remanded for resentencing without consideration of ACCA. The Michigan statute’s terms are broader than generic burglary, and it is not divisible under the 2016 Supreme Court holding, Mathis v. United States. View "United States v. Ritchey" on Justia Law

In 2010, Bonds pled guilty to a drug-conspiracy charge and was sentenced to 120 months’ imprisonment, which represented a significant downward variance from his guideline range of 210 to 262 months. In 2015, the district court denied Bonds’s motion for a sentence reduction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2), on the erroneous ground that Bonds had been sentenced to the statutory mandatory minimum, when, in fact, there was no applicable mandatory minimum sentence. On appeal, Bonds argued for the first time that the retroactive Amendment 782 (lowering the base offense level for most drug-trafficking crimes) opens the door to applying the non-retroactive Amendment 742, which would change his criminal history from a category of VI to V. Amendment 742 struck a Guidelines provision that stated: “Add 2 points if the defendant committed the instant offense less than two years after release from imprisonment on a sentence counted under (a) or (b)." The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. Only if Amendment 742 applied in conjunction with Amendment 782 would Bonds be eligible for a sentence reduction; courts do not have the authority to consider the non-retroactive Amendment 742 in determining eligibility for a 3582(c)(2) reduction, View "United States v. Bonds" on Justia Law

In 1986, a jury found that Hutton murdered Mitchell and attempted to kill another friend. Hutton was convicted of aggravated murder with two death specifications. Following a remand, the Court of Appeals determined that the death sentence was appropriate. In 1996, Hutton filed a state petition for post-conviction relief; the court denied relief without an evidentiary hearing. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed. The Ohio Supreme Court declined further review. In 2001, Hutton unsuccessfully filed a second post-conviction petition. The Ohio Supreme Court again declined further review. Hutton unsuccessfully applied to reopen his direct appeal, contending ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. In 2005, Hutton filed a federal habeas petition, which he amended in 2011. Without conducting an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied relief. The Sixth Circuit denied five of his claim, but reversed with respect to whether a state court’s independent review of a death sentence during sentencing can cure any omission in a jury instruction. A fundamental miscarriage of justice resulted from the failure to define “aggravating circumstances” in the jury instructions. The jury, without proper instructions, could not have made a finding that aggravating circumstances existed; the harshest sentence Hutton could possibly have received without that instruction was life. View "Hutton v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

In 2008, Huffman found nude pictures of her 12-year-old daughter on a camera belonging to her boyfriend, Thompson. Thompson admitted taking the photos. Huffman turned the camera over to the police. That same day, the police interviewed Thompson, recording the interview on a videotape. In the interview, Thompson admitted taking the sexually explicit pictures of the child and touching the child’s breast and vagina. Thompson denied digitally penetrating the child. Charged with first-degree criminal sexual conduct, Thompson went to trial. In his opening statement, defense counsel promised that Thompson would testify and deny penetration, but counsel never called Thompson to testify, instead relying on Thompson’s statements in a taped police interview to tell his side of the story. After trial, Thompson asserted an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim based on defense counsel’s broken promise, which the Michigan courts rejected. The district court then denied Thompson’s habeas petition based on the same claim. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Michigan Court of Appeals reasonably concluded that counsel’s failure to deliver Thompson’s live testimony did not prejudice Thompson’s defense. View "Thompson v. Rapelje" on Justia Law

Franklin lived with his grandparents and uncle to escape his alcoholic mother’s abuse. As a teenager he began manifesting bizarre behavior and using marijuana. In 1997, when Franklin was 19 years old, his relatives told him to move out. After severely beating them, Franklin shot and killed his grandmother; set fire to the house, leaving his grandfather and uncle to die; then fled to Tennessee. He was apprehended and confessed, claiming his uncle had raped him. The trial court found Franklin competent. During trial, Franklin engaged in disruptive and inappropriate behavior. The jury found Franklin guilty and recommended the death penalty. On appeal, Franklin unsuccessfully argued that his attorneys were ineffective for failing to request a new competency hearing during trial and that the court should have ordered a midtrial competency hearing sua sponte because an expert witness testified that Franklin suffered from paranoid schizophrenia. The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari in 2003. Franklin sought state post-conviction relief, asserting new evidence: affidavits indicating that Franklin was not competent. The trial court rejected the claim as barred by res judicata. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed on the merits. In 2012, the Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of federal habeas relief. Franklin then sought relief from judgment under FRCP 60(b), citing the Supreme Court’s decisions in Martinez (2012), and Trevino (2013). The district court denied Franklin’s motion on the merits. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Franklin’s Rule 60(b) motion is a “second or successive” habeas application that the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider without prior authorization. View "Franklin v. Jenkins" on Justia Law

Kruger pleaded guilty to possessing pseudoephedrine with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 841(c)(1). Kruger was sentenced in 2009. Under the 2008 U.S.S.G. Kruger’s recommended sentencing range was 188-235 months of imprisonment. The court accepted the calculation, but varied downward and imposed a sentence of 120 months of imprisonment, reasoning that the proposed range overstated the seriousness of Kruger’s offense and the significance of his criminal history. Five years later, the Sentencing Commission amended the Guidelines, so that Kruger’s recommended range would have been 151-188 months of imprisonment. Kruger challenged a 2011 amendment, which prohibits the retroactive application of Guidelines amendments to defendants, like Kruger, whose sentences are for terms “less than the minimum of the amended guideline range.” Kruger claimed that the limitation violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The Sixth Circuit affirmed rejection of his claim. Kruger has no constitutional right to the retroactive application of a more lenient version of the Guidelines. The amendment does not have the effect “of increasing the measure of punishment,” but only forecloses the possibility of a reduced sentence on the basis of an amendment that did not even exist at the time Kruger was sentenced. View "United States v. Kruger" on Justia Law

On November 17, 2015, the district court entered an order denying Smotherman’s “Motion to Correct Error” filed under FRCP 60(a) in his closed criminal case. To meet the 14-day deadline, any notice of appeal needed to be filed by December 1, 2015, Fed.R.App.P. 4(b), 26(a). Smotherman’s notice of appeal, dated November 25, 2015, was officially filed by the district court on December 2, 2015, one business day after the appellate filing period had expired. The proof of service declaration accompanying the motion was signed and executed on November 25, 2016. The government filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that Smotherman’s notice of appeal was untimely on its face. The Sixth Circuit denied that motion, reasoning that under the long-established prison mailbox rule, a pro se prisoner’s notice of appeal is deemed “filed at the time [pro se prisoner] delivered it to the prison authorities for forwarding to the court clerk.” The rule is supported by important public policy considerations that are unique to unrepresented, incarcerated individuals. View "United States v. Smotherman" on Justia Law

In 2009, Beckham pleaded guilty without a plea agreement to charges of conspiring to distribute more than 500 grams of cocaine and an unspecified amount of ecstasy. The presentence report relied on the 2009 version of the Sentencing Guidelines. The district court determined that Beckham’s total offense level was 30 and that his criminal-history category was six, resulting in a Guidelines range of 168–210 months’ imprisonment. The court departed downward under U.S.S.G. 4A1.3 to a criminal-history category of four, finding that the Guidelines overstated the severity of Beckham’s criminal past, and sentenced Beckham to 135 months’ imprisonment. In 2014, the Sentencing Commission retroactively lowered the base-offense level for most drug crimes, including Beckham’s. Beckham moved to modify his sentence under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2). Meanwhile, the Commission had issued Amendment 759, which “preclude[s] district courts from reapplying any departure or variance in a sentence reduction” and forbids courts from reducing a sentence below an amended Guidelines range, with one narrow exception. The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of the motion. Because Beckham’s current sentence is below the low end of his amended Guidelines range (140 months), he is ineligible for a further reduction. View "United States v. Beckham" on Justia Law