Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Shimel pled guilty to second-degree murder and possession of a firearm in the commission of a felony in the shooting death of her husband. After sentencing, the trial court conducted a “Ginther” hearing and concluded that Shimel’s attorney was ineffective for failing to investigate a battered spouse self-defense theory and granted her motion to withdraw her plea. The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed, stating that the trial court impermissibly substituted its judgment for that of counsel on a matter of strategy. On collateral review, the federal district court denied Shimel’s claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to spend sufficient time consulting with her and for advising her to plead guilty rather than taking the case to trial and presenting a battered spouse self-defense theory. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Shimel did not establish prejudice. A reasonable defendant in Shimel’s situation, charged with open murder, would have accepted the plea, in light of the prosecutor’s stance that, even with expert testimony on battered spouse syndrome, he would not have reduced the charge to manslaughter. Shimel failed to establish a reasonable probability that expert testimony would have improved her result. Michigan law only permits a defendant to plead battered spouse syndrome as part of a self-defense claim. Shimel’s husband suffered nine gunshot wounds. Seven entered his body through his back. There was evidence that the shooting was precipitated by financial problems View "Shimel v. Warren" on Justia Law

Crangle agreed to plead guilty to rape with a recommended sentence of life imprisonment and parole eligibility after 10 years. Crangle acknowledged, “I have been informed that . . . after my release from prison I [May__ or Will__] be supervised under post-release control, R.C. 2967.28, which could last up to 5 years,” with a checkmark after “Will.” At the sentencing hearing, the judge and Crangle’s attorney incorrectly informed him that he would be subject to “straight parole” and not post-release control. The sentencing entry did not refer to post-release control. The Ohio Court of Appeals rejected an argument that his counsel provided ineffective assistance by encouraging him to plead guilty rather than no contest. Because Crangle did not appeal, his conviction became final in December 2008. In June 2010, the Ohio Supreme Court ordered a trial judge who “failed to include in the sentencing entry any term of postrelease control,” to issue a judgment in compliance with the statute. In November 2010, the court denied Crangle’s motion to withdraw his plea based on that case and ordered a correction to the judgment, which was backdated to Crangle’s initial sentencing. The court of appeals affirmed denial of the motion in November 2011. The Ohio Supreme Court denied leave to appeal on April 4, 2012 and in January 2013. Crangle placed a federal habeas petition in the prison mail on March 28, 2013, which was docketed on April 15, 2013, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and due process violations. The district court dismissed Crangle’s petition as untimely. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the state-court order imposing post-release control was a new judgment, that reset AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations. View "Crangle v. Kelly" on Justia Law

Six years ago, illegal immigrant Canelas-Amador was charged in Tennessee state court with felony aggravated assault. Canelas-Amador signed a “Waiver of Trial by Jury and Acceptance of Plea of Guilty.” The court approved the agreement. Before the court could enter judgment or pronounce a sentence, immigration authorities took Canelas-Amador into custody, deporting him. When Canelas-Amador failed to appear for a presentence interview, the Tennessee court issued a bench warrant. Canelas-Amador reentered the U.S. illegally, pled guilty to illegal reentry in Texas, and was sentenced to one year of imprisonment. In 2015, he was arrested in Tennessee. He pled guilty to illegal reentry. The district court imposed a sentence of 57 months’ imprisonment, finding that the state court order constituted a “conviction for a felony that is . . . a crime of violence,” mandating a 16-point enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). The Guideline does not define “conviction.” The court looked to 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(48)(A), which refers to a formal judgment of guilt of the alien entered by a court or, if adjudication of guilt has been withheld, where a judge or jury has found the alien guilty or the alien has entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or has admitted sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilt, and the judge has ordered some punishment, penalty, or restraint. The Sixth Circuit reversed. A plea agreement approved in a form order falls short of “a formal judgment of guilt.” View "United States v. Canelas-Amador" on Justia Law

Sargent pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. He received an enhanced (327-month) sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) based on convictions for arson; first-degree wanton endangerment; trafficking more than five pounds of marijuana; and first-degree rape. The Sixth Circuit affirmed application of the enhancement in 2012. Sargent filed his first 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion in 2014, claiming that it was error for the court, rather than a jury, to enhance his sentence based on his convictions, citing the Supreme Court’s 2013 decision, Alleyne v. United States. The district court denied the motion; the Sixth Circuit denied a certificate of appealability. In a second motion, Sargent cited Johnson v. United States (2015), in which the Supreme Court invalidated the “residual clause” of the ACCA as unconstitutionally vague. Sargent claimed that the district court ruled that his conviction for wanton endangerment fell within the residual clause and that his conviction for arson has been reversed and cannot qualify as a predicate offense. The Sixth Circuit authorized the district court to consider the petition, concluding that Sargent had made a prima facie showing that his claim relies on “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.” View "In re: Sargent" on Justia Law

Tanner, Becker, and unindicted co-conspirators collaborated to obtain a mortgage and two lines of credit on an Ohio house, using fraudulent financial information. The primary lender lost $670,000. The other banks lost $250,000 and $350,000. Tanner also scammed two companies to obtain new vehicles. Tanner and Becker were charged with conspiracy to commit bank fraud and three counts of bank fraud. Tanner was also charged with mail fraud for his fraudulent car-loan applications. Tanner pled guilty to all counts. The prosecutor stipulated that Tanner was not agreeing that the “leader” enhancement applied and that the parties would argue that issue at sentencing. The PSR asserted that Tanner “was an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor” of the bank fraud under U.S.S.G. 3B1.1(c). Tanner’s counsel argued that unindicted co-conspirators fed the bank-fraud scheme to Tanner, who “got swept up.” The court applied the role enhancement and a three-level decrease for acceptance of responsibility, yielding a Guidelines range of 63–78 months. Two of his seven criminal history points were attributable to a state-court criminal case that included convictions for felonious assault and domestic violence. After accounting for the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors, the court sentenced Tanner to 60 months’ imprisonment, plus $1.3 million in restitution. The Sixth Circuit vacated. Tanner is entitled to resentencing because he was erroneously assessed two criminal history points for a state-court case instead of one point. View "United States v. Tanner" on Justia Law

Michigan Trooper Ziecina, patrolling I-75, observed Calvetti's minivan abruptly slow and change lanes without signaling. Ziecina followed; the minivan moved at or below the posted minimum speed. Ziecina pulled Calvetti over to give a citation for failure to signal, impeding traffic, and driving below the minimum speed. A passenger, Cortez, produced identification. Calvetti could not find her driver’s license. Calvetti told Ziecina that she was helping Calvetti move and that the previous day the minivan had been searched in Mississippi. Ziecina’s database check revealed that the minivan was not registered to Calvetti, as she had claimed. Calvetti authorized a search. About 15 minutes after the stop, a drug-sniffing dog arrived and showed interest in the minivan floor, but did not alert. Calvetti admitted to a non-felony drug conviction and that Cortez had a felony charge involving 50 pounds of marijuana and had been involved in a shootout. Approximately 35 minutes into the stop, officers searched the minivan. The patrol car’s system recorded a conversation: Calvetti said that she was “not doing this anymore,” told Cortez that he would take the blame, and used Cortez’s cell phone, notifying a co-conspirator of the search. Ziecina observed “discrepancies” in the minivan, suspected a hidden trap under the floor, and found 16 kilograms of cocaine. About 73 minutes after the stop, agents read the two their Miranda rights. Both signed waivers. Cortez told agents that he took the minivan to Mexico to buy cocaine. Calvetti indicated that she did not want to talk, but agents continued the questioning. With Calvetti’s permission, agents used her residence for an unsuccessful controlled delivery, then searched the residence, finding packing materials similar to those used to wrap the cocaine. Finding no Miranda violation, the court denied Calvetti’s motion to suppress and held that the officers had probable cause for the stop and reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify prolonging it. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Calvetti’s consent to search her residence did not fall within the ambit of the Fifth Amendment. Consenting to a search is not an incriminating statement it is not testimonial or communicative evidence. View "United States v. Cortez" on Justia Law

In 2000, Hill was arrested, following an undercover investigation into drug-trafficking activities between Baltimore and Charleston. Hill pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute more than 100 grams of heroin, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a), and was sentenced under the then-mandatory 2001 Sentencing Guidelines Manual. Hill had two prior felony convictions, a controlled-substance offense and second-degree assault, and was sentenced as a career offender (USSG 4B1.1) to 300 months of imprisonment, which was affirmed. Hill has brought several challenges to his sentence. In 2014, Hill filed a section 2241 habeas corpus petition, citing the Supreme Court’s 2013 Descamps decision and the Fourth Circuit’s subsequent Royal decision, to argue that his “second-degree assault conviction no longer qualifies as a ‘crime of violence,” and that he is “serving an erroneous career offender sentence" that makes him “categorically ineligible” for retroactive amendments to the guidelines that could reduce his sentence by several years. Finding section 2241 inapposite because Hill did not claim to be “actually innocent,” the district court denied Hill’s motion. The Sixth Circuit reversed, stating that section 2241 petitions may be used by prisoners who were sentenced under the mandatory guidelines regime; who are foreclosed from filing a successive petition under section 2255; and when a subsequent, retroactive change in statutory interpretation by the Supreme Court reveals that a previous conviction is not a predicate offense for a career-offender enhancement. View "Hill v. Masters" on Justia Law

A house fire took the lives of Gavitt’s wife and two daughters. Gavitt, convicted of arson and felony murder, was sentenced to life in prison in 1986. In 2012, the state court granted Gavitt’s unopposed motion for relief. Advancements in fire science research and investigation methods impugned some of the evidence on which Gavitt’s convictions were based. The judgment was vacated and Gavitt was released. Gavitt brought a civil rights action, claiming that multiple defendants violated his due process rights by intentionally misrepresenting evidence, failing to disclose exculpatory evidence, and conspiring to deprive him of his rights. The district court dismissed, except with respect the Estate of DeVries, a Michigan forensic laboratory technician who testified at Gavitt’s trial. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The record is not so clear as to permit a ruling that the Estate’s evidence-sufficiency appeal presents a purely legal issue. While the likelihood that discovery will reveal evidence of intentional or reckless wrongdoing may be minimal, it is not inconceivable. While Gavitt may have been “wronged,” he did not sufficiently allege facts to support his claims that other defendants acted with such culpable states of mind as to warrant relief under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Due process guarantees a right to a fair trial, not perfection. Using the methods of the 1980s during the 1980s did not violate the Constitution; the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. View "Gavitt v. Born" on Justia Law

Coleman sold crack cocaine to a DEA informant, pleaded guilty under 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 846, and was sentenced to 92 months of imprisonment and four years of supervised release. Six months before Coleman’s sentence ended, he was granted a transfer to a charity establishment. Two months later, Coleman escaped. U.S. Marshals found Coleman, who pleaded guilty to escape, 18 U.S.C. 751(a). Judge Hood sentenced Coleman to 15 months of imprisonment, plus supervised release. Coleman completed his prison sentences. Two months into his supervised release, Coleman admitted to using cocaine. Judge Hood ordered that Coleman serve an additional six months, followed by inpatient substance-abuse treatment. After finishing that treatment, Coleman was again released. Days later, Coleman admitted that he had recently smoked marijuana. Coleman’s urine sample tested positive for cocaine. A magistrate appointed attorney Gordon to represent Coleman and scheduled a revocation hearing before Judge Hood. Coleman moved, pro se, for new counsel. The court relieved Gordon and appointed Abell, who was present at the court’s request. Upon confirming that Abell had copies of Coleman’s reports, the court had a 14-minute recess. Abell informed the court that Coleman would not contest the drug-related charges and that Coleman was “ready to go forward today.” Judge Hood revoked supervised release and sentenced Coleman to 30 months of imprisonment—three months above the Guidelines range—without further supervised release. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that Coleman was constructively denied the assistance of counsel during his revocation hearing and that the court failed to consider relevant sentencing factors and did not justify the above-Guidelines sentence. View "United States v. Coleman" on Justia Law

A Kentucky jury sentenced Foley to death for the 1991 shootings the Vaughn brothers. After exhausting all available appeals, Foley moved under 18 U.S.C. 3599(a)(2) and (f) for the district court to appoint counsel and grant funds to retain experts in anticipation of state clemency proceedings. Foley requested a neuropsychologist to evaluate the impact of multiple head injuries on his mental functioning. He also sought a ballistics and crime scene​ reconstruction expert to support his contention that he shot Rodney in self-defense and that someone else shot Lynn. The district court granted his motion to appoint counsel but denied expert funds as not reasonably necessary for Foley’s clemency bid. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding no abuse of discretion and noting that Foley is under additional death sentences for murdering four people in 1989. View "Foley v. White" on Justia Law