Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Reyes entered the U.S. from Mexico, without inspection, in 1994; he became a lawful permanent resident in 1998. Reyes is married and has five children, all U.S. citizens. In 2015, Reyes was charged with removability under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) for “hav[ing] been convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude [CMT] not arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct.” The Notice listed three prior state (Ohio) criminal charges: in 2000, Reyes was convicted of soliciting; in 2003, Reyes was convicted in Hamilton for passing bad checks; in 2005, Reyes was convicted of resisting arrest The IJ found that Reyes’s prior charges for soliciting prostitution and passing bad checks were CIMTs and that solicitation of prostitution was a CIMT because it was “similar to other crimes the Board has previously found to be morally turpitudinous, including renting a room with knowledge that it will be used for prostitution, keeping a house for prostitution, and the act of prostitution.” The BIA affirmed. The Sixth Circuit denied relief. Although our society’s (and the BIA’s) views regarding prostitution and solicitation of prostitution may continue to “transform,” the BIA’s precedential opinions on prostitution are entitled to Chevron deference and they are not unreasonable. View "JReyes v. Lynch" on Justia Law

D.E., then 19 years old, took a wrong turn on his way to a Michigan summer camp and inadvertently ended up at the border with Canada. The toll-booth operator provided him with a laminated card, prepared by Customs and Border Protection (CBP) that stated: You are being allowed to turn around without traveling to Canada. Please present this card, along with your identification to an open CBP inspection booth prior to departing. Thank you. The back stated: All persons, baggage, and merchandise arriving in the Customs territory of the United States or from places outside thereof are liable to inspection and search by a Customs official. The operator directed him to turn around without crossing the border and to merge into traffic containing motorists arriving from Canada. That lane funneled D.E. to a CBP inspection booth. Despite his explanation that he had not crossed the border, CBP officers searched his vehicle and discovered marijuana and drug paraphernalia. After pleading guilty to a misdemeanor charge in state court, D.E. filed suit (42 U.S.C. 1983). The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal. A traveler’s subjective intent not to leave the country does not provide an exception to the government’s authority to conduct suspicionless searches of vehicles at the border. View "D.E. v. Doe" on Justia Law

Michigan amended its Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA), Mich. Comp. Laws 28.723, so that, in addition to the online public registry of sex offenders’ names, addresses, biometric data, and photographs, it prohibits registrants (with exceptions) from living, working, or “loitering” within 1,000 feet of a school and divides registrants into three tiers of “dangerousness,” based solely on the crime of conviction. Recent amendments also require all registrants to appear in person “immediately” to update information such as new vehicles or “internet identifiers” (new email accounts). Violations carry heavy criminal penalties. Registered offenders challenged SORA’s validity, asserting that parts are unconstitutionally vague; that it should not be construed as creating strict liability offenses; that SORA violates the First Amendment; that it violates the Fourteenth Amendment by imposing oppressive restrictions on their ability to parent, work, and travel; and that SORA’s retroactive application amounts to an unconstitutional Ex Post Facto punishment. The district court rejected most of the arguments but held that some of SORA’s provisions were unconstitutionally vague, that those required to register cannot be held strictly liable for violating its requirements, and that its retroactive requirement that offenders register on-line aliases for life violated the First Amendment. The Sixth Circuit reversed with respect to the Ex Post Facto argument. SORA does impose punishment and that retroactive application of SORA’s 2006 and 2011 amendments is unconstitutional. View "Does v. Snyder" on Justia Law

ATF investigated the theft of firearms from Michigan gun dealers, leading to two arrests. Both men admitted trading the stolen firearms with Doxey, in exchange for heroin. Another informant stated that Doxey was a heroin dealer and described his vehicle. Doxey, known to be on parole, was seen at a gas station, engaging in an apparent “hand-to-hand” narcotic transaction with another man in Doxey's vehicle. Officers watched Doxey drive away with female passengers. Doxey had a suspended license. Before officers stopped him, Doxey pulled over and exited his car. Officers approached, searched Doxey with his consent, and removed $1,560 in cash from Doxey’s pocket. Searching the car, they found a partially burnt marijuana cigarette and a digital scale. With written consent from one of the passengers, the officers searched her house and found a jar, containing heroin residue. Doxey consented to and initially cooperated with a search of his genitals and rectum, pulling his clothing down. He then began clenching his butt cheeks. He was taken to the police station. Doxey’s parole officer stated his parole required Doxey to allow complete body searches. Doxey continued to resist and had to be restrained. Officers could see “the corner tie bag in between his butt crack.” A field test confirmed that the substance in the plastic bag was heroin, weighing 8.17 grams. The Sixth Circuit affirmed his conviction under 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), rejecting a challenge to the body search and an argument that the informer's identity should have been disclosed. View "United States v. Doxey" on Justia Law

In 2008, Holbrook was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act one-year statute of limitations began to run when his conviction became final in August 2010, 90 days after the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. In May 2011, 269 days into that period, Holbrook moved for relief from judgment in state court. The trial court denied the motion. Holbrook sought leave to appeal, which the Michigan Court of Appeals denied on November 8, 2012. Michigan court rules allowed Holbrook until January 3, 2013 to seek leave to appeal. Holbrook filed his application four days after the deadline. The Michigan Supreme Court denied it as untimely on January 11. No later than March 18, 2013, Holbrook filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court dismissed Holbrook’s petition as untimely, “[b]ecause [Holbrook] did not timely seek leave to appeal with the Michigan Supreme Court, the tolling of the limitations period ended when the Michigan Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal on November 8, 2012,” rather than continuing for the 56-day period to appeal. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Holbrook’s federal habeas petition was timely filed because AEDPA’s one-year limitations period was tolled during the period in which he could have, but did not, appeal the Michigan Court of Appeals’ denial of his motion for post-conviction relief. View "Holbrook v. Curtin" on Justia Law

In 2002, Patrick pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute and distribution of cocaine and cocaine base. The district court determined that he qualified as a career offender under the then-mandatory Guidelines based on his prior Tennessee convictions for a controlled substance offense, reckless aggravated assault, and evading arrest, and sentenced him to 262 months’ imprisonment. The district court denied Patrick’s first 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion; the Sixth Circuit denied a certificate of appealability. In 2010, Patrick filed a 28 U.S.C. 2241 petition, arguing that his conviction for reckless aggravated assault no longer qualified as a crime of violence under a 2008 Supreme Court decision. The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of that petition, but subsequently granted permission to file a second or successive section 2255 petition to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence. The court noted that its decision was based on the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in an Eleventh Circuit decision that found that Court’s 2015 holding (Johnson) inapplicable to the Sentencing Guidelines. Johnson invalidated the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act. The pending decision will presumably resolve questions related to retroactive application of a new rule of constitutional law regarding the Guidelines; the court transferred the case to the district court with instructions to hold it in abeyance pending the Court’s decision. View "In re: Patrick" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Stephen Arny, M.D., was convicted of conspiracy to distribute and unlawfully dispense prescription pain medications, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 846. Approximately three months later, but before sentencing, Arny secured new counsel, who later moved for a new trial based on trial counsel’s constitutionally ineffective assistance. The district court granted the motion based on its finding that Arny’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel had been violated by counsel’s misrepresentation that the government had stated that another doctor (Saxman) who had worked with Arny and his co-defendants either had a plea deal or would be indicted soon and that her clinic was searched; counsel’s failure to interview Saxman or call her to testify in order to explain the legitimacy of her treatment plans that Arny continued; and counsel’s failure to investigate or interview any of Arny’s patients. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The affidavits of Saxman and the former patients establish a “reasonable probability that, but for [trial] counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” View "United States v. Arny" on Justia Law

After the government charged him with selling cocaine, Christopher hired a lawyer. Christopher later claimed that, over the course of the representation, the lawyer used cocaine with Christopher more than 20 times, including several times immediately before court hearings. The government had considerable evidence: recordings of 10 phone calls in which he negotiated purchases of the drug and testimony from the leader of the conspiracy and another coconspirator that Christopher had bought the drug for resale. It had already convicted many of Christopher’s co-conspirators based on similar evidence. Three months after being convicted and sentenced to 10 years in prison, without having appealed, Christopher filed a section 2255 motion to vacate, arguing that his attorney’s behaviour caused him to forgo a favorable plea deal, with a sentence of 30-37 months. After a remand for a hearing, the Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of the motion. The trial judge did not clearly err in finding defense counsel “credible” while finding Christopher’s credibility “very much undercut.” The court thought the attorney was prepared and rendered effective counsel; the record permits that conclusion. View "Christopher v. United States" on Justia Law

In 1999, Brinkley robbed the diner where he worked at gunpoint. In jail, Brinkley, then 32, said he would get his 18 year-old girlfriend, Smith, to post his bond, that he would skip town, and that “I’m going to kill that bitch [Smith].” Smith posted the bond. After skipping his pretrial hearing, Brinkley strangled Smith, slit her throat, stole her ATM card, and used Smith’s phone to call the bus terminal. Cameras recorded Brinkley wearing Smith’s coat and trying to withdraw cash 16 times. Smith’s mother found her body. Officers found bloody footprints that matched Brinkley’s size-15 Nike shoes and a bogus note, written in Brinkley’s handwriting (bearing his thumbprint). Officers arrested Brinkley at his mother’s residence, wearing Smith’s coat and the size-15 Nike shoes. Two different teams of appointed attorneys found Brinkley extremely difficult to work with. A jury found Brinkley guilty, with death-penalty specifications. The defense elicited testimony from Brinkley’s sister, aunts, and mother. The jury found that the aggravating circumstances outweighed any mitigating circumstances and recommended the death penalty. Brinkley spoke at length on his own behalf, . The court imposed a death sentence. Ohio court rejected direct appeals and post-conviction petitions. The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of federal habeas relief, rejecting a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, a claim of ineffective assistance during the penalty phase, and a challenge to a limitation imposed on cross-examination of a prosecution witness. View "Brinkley v. Houk" on Justia Law

Rios, Casillas, and 29 co-defendants were charged in a “sprawling racketeering indictment” involving the Latin Kings. Count One, under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. 1961, alleged that the Holland, Michigan Latin Kings was a racketeering enterprise that “was and is overseen by, has always had connections to, and received directions from, the Chicago Heights” Latin Kings, alleged 129 overt acts in furtherance of the 20-year conspiracy, and contained special sentencing allegations. Rios and Casillas were each charged regarding the distribution of cocaine; Rios was charged with three assaults with the intent to commit murder. Count Fourteen alleged conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine from 2006-2012. Three witnesses described the national Latin Kings and how the Holland Latin Kings fit into that structure. Other testimony, largely from cooperating co-defendants, corroborated that testimony and provided details about specific charged acts. The jury found Rios and Casillas guilty of Counts One and Fourteen and found each responsible for the distribution of five kilograms or more of cocaine, 1993-2013. Rios was sentenced to concurrent terms of 240 months on Count One and 300 months on Count Fourteen, with 61 months of credit “for gang-related discharged terms of imprisonment.” Casillas was sentenced to concurrent terms of 200 months and 360 months, with 148 months of credit. The Sixth Circuit​ affirmed both convictions and sentences, rejecting various challenges to testimony and jury instructions. View "United States v. Casillas" on Justia Law