Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Ohio’s execution protocol allows for lethal injection using a three-drug combination of midazolam; either vecuronium bromide, pancuronium bromide, or rocuronium bromide, which are paralytics; and potassium chloride, which stops the heart. The midazolam is intended to ensure that the person being executed is insensate to the pain that the other drugs cause. If midazolam does not “render the prisoner unconscious,” then “there is a substantial, constitutionally unacceptable risk of suffocation . . . and pain” from the second two drugs. The district court granted a preliminary injunction to allow for further litigation regarding midazolam’s efficacy before Ohio executes three men. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The ultimate question is whether use of midazolam “entails a substantial risk of severe pain” as compared to “a known and available alternative.” Plaintiffs demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of that claim. The public has an interest in sentences being carried out, but also also has an interest in ensuring that those sentences are carried out in a constitutional manner. The court cited estoppel, noting that Ohio represented that it was not going to use pancuronium bromide or potassium bromide “going forward,” and that there was “no possibility” it would revert to using those drugs and subsequently acted inconsistently with those representations. View "In re: Ohio Execution Protocol" on Justia Law

Convicted as a felon in possession of a firearm, Harris was sentenced to 300 months’ imprisonment under the Armed Career Criminal Act’s residual clause. After the Supreme Court invalidated the residual clause, Harris received a new sentence of 115 months—the top of a range set in part by the district court’s determination that Harris’s two prior convictions for Michigan felonious assault were crimes of violence under the Guidelines. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Harris’s argument that Michigan felonious assault does not categorically involve the “use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force,” as required by the “elements clause,” U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(a). Michigan’s felonious assault statute obliges a jury to find at least attempted or threatened offensive touching and use of a dangerous weapon; those two elements together add up to violent force. The categorical approach does not require that each element of an offense involve use of force; it requires that the offense overall include use of violent force. View "United States v. Harris" on Justia Law

Akron police stopped Patterson for a traffic violation. They noticed an open container of alcohol and found a pistol in the driver’s door. Patterson stated that he had bought the gun on “the street.” Police learned that it had been stolen. Patterson pleaded guilty in September 2014 to receiving stolen property and to driving under suspension under state law. In August 2014, a federal grand jury indicted Patterson as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). Patterson had pleaded guilty in 2001 to two counts of aggravated robbery and aggravated robbery with a firearm specification, arising from armed robberies at three different businesses. The district court rejected Patterson’s motion to dismiss the federal charge on double jeopardy grounds, but declined to treat his robbery convictions as violent felonies under the Armed Career Criminal Act. The presentence report calculated Patterson’s base offense level as if aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon qualified as a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(a); because the three convictions counted as a single sentence, only one of the convictions impacted Patterson’s base offense level. The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of the motion to dismiss, but remanded for resentencing. Patterson’s prior convictions meet the requirements of the Sentencing Guidelines and the Armed Career Criminal Act. View "United States v. Patterson" on Justia Law

Based on evidence that someone was downloading child pornography, agents executed a search warrant for a Halls, Tennessee home. Agents spoke to the homeowner, his wife, and their 21-year-old, live-in son, Lindell. During general questioning Lindell indicated that he had used a peer-to-peer file sharing network and had viewed child pornography when he was younger. He told agents that a friend downloaded files onto his laptop and gave them a thumb drive with child pornography. The laptop was not in the house because it was being repaired. Lindell allowed agents to look at his online activity. During a search of Lindell’s bedroom, agents found a laptop that the family failed to disclose. Lindell changed his story, stating he had viewed child pornography recently. Agents advised him of his Miranda rights. He dictated a statement. Lindell claims to have no memory of the search because of medications he was taking. Lindell was indicted for distributing and possessing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(2), (a)(4)(B). The court denied a motion to suppress and a motion to require the government to stipulate that the images recovered from his laptops depicted child pornography, obviating the need to show them to the jury. Convicted, Lindell was sentenced to 78 months in prison. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, upholding denial of the motion to require the government to stipulate to the evidence. View "United States v. Luck" on Justia Law

In 2002, King pled guilty in Ohio under three indictments, asserting that King and others had robbed and kidnapped Lundberg, robbed and kidnapped Mariano, and committed aggravated robbery against five victims, all “on or about” February 18, 2002. None of the indictments alleged times or locations. Three bills of particulars indicated that the offenses occurred 25 minutes apart and at different locations. Transcripts of King’s plea colloquies are not available. In 2015, King pleaded guilty as a felon possessing a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), which carries a maximum sentence of 10 years. The Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e), states, “a person who violates section 922(g) of this title and has three previous convictions . . . for a violent felony . . . committed on occasions different from one another, such person shall be . . . imprisoned not less than fifteen years.” The court relied on the bills of particulars and sentenced King under the ACCA. The Sixth Circuit vacated. In determining whether a defendant’s prior offenses were “committed on occasions different from one another” for purposes of the ACCA, district courts are restricted to using only evidentiary sources approved in the Supreme Court holdings, Taylor v. United States (1990) and Shepard v. United States (2005). View "United States v. King" on Justia Law

In 1998, Breeden was found dead in the Kentucky River. King was a suspect because of her sporadic relationship with Breeden, because she had bullet holes inside her home, and because, after Breeden’s disappearance, King had shared premonitions of “Breeden being found in water.” Officers unsuccessfully attempted to obtain a search warrant for King’s residence. In 2006 Detective Harwood obtained a warrant. His affidavit omitted that Breen’s bullet wounds were non-exiting and could not have caused bullet holes in King’s floor and that King had one leg and weighed 100 pounds, while Breeden weighed 187 pounds. There was no evidence that King had destroyed evidence; gunshot evidence at her home did not match bullets recovered from Breeden. King entered an “Alford plea,” maintaining her innocence. In 2012, a serial murderer (Jarrell) confessed that he had killed Breeden and recounted the crime with specific details that had not been released. Harwood visited Jarrell in jail. King alleges that Harwood intimidated Jarrell into recanting. In 2014, charges against King were dismissed. The district court dismissed King’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 as time-barred and citing qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit reversed as to King’s malicious-prosecution claim against Harwood. King raised genuine issues of material fact: whether Harwood set King’s prosecution in motion by applying for warrants and an indictment despite the lack of probable cause; whether Harwood's false statements, together with his material omissions were material to King’s prosecution; and whether any false statements, evidence, and omissions were “laying the groundwork for an indictment," not “preparatory activity” for a grand-jury hearing that would provide absolute immunity. View "King v. Harwood" on Justia Law

In 2009, Norwood-Charlier invited Lively and Bryon to his Kalamazoo, Michigan home. The men met in online chatrooms: Lively lived in California, and Quackenbush in Nevada. Norwood-Charlier lived with his father’s former wife, and her children, including Lively’s victim, then nine years old. As the men had planned, Norwood-Charlier photographed Lively performing oral sex on the boy. FBI agents, executing a warrant at Norwood-Charlier’s home, recovered Norwood-Charlier’s digital camera, containing a memory card, and a computer. Norwood-Charlier pleaded guilty to producing child-pornography videos and proffered information about Lively. In 2013, Lively and Quackenbush were arrested. The indictment alleged (18 U.S.C. 2251(a), 2251(e), and 2256(2)(A)) that Lively had produced images of himself performing oral sex on a minor using materials that had been manufactured outside Michigan, including but not limited to a Seagate hard drive manufactured in Thailand. The court held that the four-year delay did not prejudice Lively because his insanity claim was “speculative at best.” The government introduced Norwood-Charlier’s SanDisk memory card and camera as one exhibit. The court did not give a jury instruction limiting the reasons for which they could consider the camera or the memory card. The Sixth Circuit affirmed Lively’s conviction. While the government did not introduce evidence that Lively knew Norwood-Charlier owned the hard drive or intended Norwood-Charlier to copy images of Lively and the boy onto it, section 2251(a)’s interstate-commerce requirement was satisfied: the memory card bore a “Made in China” inscription. View "United States v. Lively" on Justia Law

In 1997, Louisville police discovered the bodies of a male victim with nine stab wounds and a pregnant female victim, dead as a result of manual strangulation and stabbed after her death. Wheeler, ultimately convicted of the murders and sentenced to death, changed his story several times. The Sixth Circuit held that a writ of habeas corpus must issue as to the death sentence because the trial court erroneously struck from the jury Kovatch, an eligible juror who may have been in favor of sparing Wheeler’s life. The court, after examination of Kovatch, found him not to be “problematic” as a juror but one who “could consider the entire range” of penalties. The next day the court excused him because the judge mistakenly remembered him saying he would not consider the death penalty. After the Supreme Court reversed, the Sixth Circuit reinstated the death penalty, rejecting claims: that admission of evidence as to the availability of prison furloughs in the future; concerning penalty-phase jury instructions that, allegedly, improperly instructed jurors that they were required to be unanimous regarding the presence of mitigating factors; concerning prosecutorial misstatements: and that Kentucky’s proportionality review violates the Eighth Amendment View "Wheeler v. Simpson" on Justia Law

Morrison pleaded guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g), waiving his right to appeal “any sentence . . . within the applicable guideline range, or lower, whatever that guideline range might be.” The prosecutor argued that Morrison’s prior conviction for Tennessee aggravated burglary was a “crime of violence,” setting his applicable Guidelines range at 77-96 months’ imprisonment. At the time, the Sentencing Guidelines defined “crime of violence” to include “burglary of a dwelling.” The Sixth Circuit had held that although Tennessee’s aggravated-burglary statute criminalizes more conduct than “generic” burglary under the Guidelines, the statute was “divisible,” permitting courts to review a “limited class of documents . . . to determine which alternative formed the basis of the defendant’s prior conviction.” The court examined Morrison’s plea colloquy from his earlier conviction, determined that he had burglarized a “dwelling,” and imposed a 96-month sentence. While his appeal was pending, the Supreme Court clarified what makes a statute divisible, and the Sixth Circuit granted rehearing to decide whether Tennessee’s aggravated-burglary statute criminalizes more conduct than generic burglary under the Armed Career Criminal Act, and if so, whether it is divisible under Mathis. The Sixth Circuit dismissed Morrison’s appeal, finding that his waiver foreclosed consideration of his request. View "United States v. Morrison" on Justia Law

Two victims were killed in 1999. Phillips was arrested. The primary witness was Phillips’ stepdaughter, a neighbor of the victim. She testified that she heard the confrontation, followed by shooting, and that Phillips was “intoxicated” that night. A jury convicted Phillips of both counts of first-degree murder. Judge Maricle asked whether the parties were prepared to proceed with sentencing. Phillips’s attorney, Charles, replied, “No,” but neglected to request a continuance, stating, "I don’t know anything about death penalty litigation.” Charles did not object to the prosecution's jury instructions, consulted with Phillips for less than an hour, and offered no opening statement nor evidence. The Commonwealth suggested that the aggravating factor prevented the jury from considering sentences with possible parol. Rather than clarifying the sentencing options or advocating for a particular sentence, Charles remarked: I don’t intend to take anymore of your time. The jury recommended life with no possibility of parole for 25 years. The court entered that sentence with minimal explanation. The state supreme court affirmed. Although Phillips's post-conviction attorney dropped a claim of ineffective assistance at sentencing, Maricle felt “compelled” to authorize relief on that basis. Phillips complied with Maricle's request and submitted information about evidence relevant sentencing, but Maricle was indicted and no state judge decided Phillips’s claims, which were pending for over six years. The district court dismissed his federal habeas petition, finding that Phillips had not shown prejudice. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the deferential standard is inapplicable because no Kentucky court ever decided Phillips's claims, that Phillips’s counsel was ineffective, that prejudice is presumed, and counsel’s performance actually prejudiced Phillips under Strickland. View "Phillips v. White" on Justia Law