Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Quarles pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g), without a plea agreement. At his original sentencing, the district court held that Quarles’s conviction for third-degree home invasion was a violent felony under the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). The district court expressly declined to rule whether that offense qualified as generic burglary and sentenced him to 204 months’ incarceration. The Sixth Circuit vacated the sentence in light of the Supreme Court’s holding in Johnson v. United States (2015), and remanded for resentencing. On remand, the district court found, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed, that Michigan’s crime of third-degree home invasion constituted a “violent felony” that was the “functional equivalent of generic burglary.” Quarles was again sentenced to 204 months’ incarceration. View "United States v. Quarles" on Justia Law

Simmerman began working at Shoreline Federal Credit Union in 1987 and became manager in 2006. She began embezzling money, by complex manipulation of ledgers, in 1998 and was discovered in 2014. She pled guilty to embezzling $1,528,000, 18 U.S.C. 657, and to structuring the deposits of the money she stole to evade the reporting requirements of 31 U.S.C. 5313(a), in violation of 31 U.S.C. 5324(a)(3) and (d)(1). The district court assessed Simmerman’s total offense level at 28, based on a base offense level of seven, a 16-level increase for a loss amount between $1 million and $2.5 million, a two-level increase for sophisticated means, four-level increase for jeopardizing the soundness of a financial institution, a two-level increase for abuse of a position of trust, and a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility and a timely plea. With a criminal history category of I, Simmerman’s guideline range was 78-97 months and she was sentenced to 78 months on Count 1 and 60 months on Count 2, to be served concurrently. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, upholding the imposition of enhancements for sophisticated means (U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(10)(C)); jeopardizing the soundness of a financial institution (U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(16)(B)(i)); and abuse of a position of trust (U.S.S.G. 3B1.3). View "United States v. Simmerman" on Justia Law

Between 2012 and 2014, three University of Michigan students (plaintiffs) rented rooms from Alawi, which collected $2550 in security deposits from the three. When they moved out, they received their security deposits back, minus small deductions for minor damages to the properties. Plaintiffs believed that Alawi had not complied with Michigan law, which requires landlords to deposit security deposits in a regulated financial institution and to provide the address of that institution to the tenant. The plaintiffs sued Alawi for $6.6 million on behalf of a putative class of six years’ worth of tenants, alleging violations of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and Michigan law; alleging that Alawi was not entitled to hold security deposits at all (given these alleged breaches of Michigan law), and that knowingly taking security deposits anyway constituted a pattern of federal wire, mail, and bank fraud. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal, finding that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the RICO claim. The complaint failed to articulate any concrete injury; its allegations were too vague to meet the particularity requirement of fraud allegations under Civil Rule 9(b). View "Wall v. Michigan Rental" on Justia Law

Sizemore drove his car through Great Smoky Mountains National Park with three passengers: Mathes, Clapper, and Trent. All four had been drinking alcohol. At 1:35 a.m., Sizemore crashed the vehicle, killing Trent, and seriously injuring Mathes and Clapper. The Tennessee Highway Patrol determined that Sizemore was driving approximately 97 miles per hour two seconds before the crash.The speed limit was 45 miles per hour. Sizemore pleaded guilty to involuntary manslaughter, 18 U.S.C. 1112 and 7(3), agreeing that the court would order restitution for losses to the victims. The probation office assessed restitution under 18 U.S.C. 3663 at $230,839.37: $9,000 for Trent’s funeral expenses; $29,808.27 to Blue Cross Insurance for Clapper; $3,990.74 to Clapper; $11,787.76 to Blue Cross for Mathes; $2,801.17 to Farm Bureau Insurance for Mathes; and $173,451.43 to Trent’s minor child. Sizemore agreed to the full restitution amount as to the minor, but did not agree to any of the other allotments. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court in rejecting his objections, ordering restitution in the total amount of $230,839.37, denying Sizemore’s request for credits for payments made by his insurance provider, and in sentencing Sizemore to 36 months of imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release. View "United States v. Sizemore" on Justia Law

The Internal Revenue Service classified Ballard, a securities broker, as a non-filer in 2008 and investigated. Ballard lied about his income, hid money in family members’ bank accounts, and filed then dismissed several Chapter 13 bankruptcy petitions, attempting to avoid paying $848,798 in taxes arising from his income between 2000 and 2008. He eventually pled guilty to violating 26 U.S.C. 7212(a), which prohibits “corruptly . . . obstruct[ing] or imped[ing] . . . administration of [the tax laws].” Ballard urged the court to use the U.S.S.G. for obstruction of justice. The district court rejected Ballard’s argument that he never intended to evade paying his taxes but was merely delaying the payments and used the tax evasion guideline to calculate a higher offense level and an increase in the sentencing range from eight–14 months to 24–30 months. Ballard was sentenced to 18 months’ incarceration. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. What matters in the choice between guidelines sections is which section is more precisely tailored to reflect offense characteristics—like tax evasion and tax loss—and which section covers a more closely related group of crimes. What Ballard did, and what the government charged, was a lie to the tax collector about his earnings. View "United States v. Ballard" on Justia Law

Defendant was in the getaway car during a store robbery and saw Caldwell give a firearm to Tripp, who robbed the cashier at gunpoint. Weeks later, Caldwell remained in the car while defendant and Williams brandished firearms and robbed a bank. Weeks later, defendant accompanied Caldwell and Williams to another bank, but remained outside while Williams placed the firearm against the manager’s head and pistol-whipped a guard. Defendant was charged with two counts of conspiracy to commit “Hobbs Act robbery” (18 U.S.C. 1951(a), 1951(b)(1), and 2); three counts of using, carrying and brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A) and 2); and two counts of armed bank robbery (18 U.S.C. 2113(a), 2113(d), and 2). The court initially adjudged defendant incompetent, but he later passed multiple competency evaluations. The others pleaded guilty. At defendant’s request, the court conducted an extended self-representation colloquy and allowed him to self-represent with appointed counsel as standby. Defendant cross-examined some witnesses but did not present an affirmative defense. The jury found defendant guilty. The court sentenced him to 664 months’ incarceration. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence that he aided the store robbery and second bank robbery, and claims that the court erred in allowing him to self-represent and in imposing consecutive sentences on his section 924(c) convictions, and that Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence. View "United States v. Gooch" on Justia Law

In 1997, a Memphis armored truck driver was shot while working; he died two years later, as a result. The shooter took the cash and left in a getaway car. Authorities identified Thomas as the shooter and Bond as the getaway driver. In a federal trial before Day’s death, Thomas was convicted of interfering with interstate commerce, carrying a firearm during a crime of violence, and being a felon in possession of a firearm, and was sentenced to life in prison. After Day died, Thomas was convicted of felony murder in state court, was sentenced to death, and exhausted state post-conviction remedies. Jackson, Thomas’s girlfriend, was the pivotal witness in both trials, placing Thomas at the scene of the shooting. After the federal trial, but before the state prosecution, the FBI paid Jackson $750 on behalf of the Task Force. Jackson testified that she did not receive any “reward” money and that she testified because it was the “right thing to do.” Thomas was never notified of this payment and discovered it during his federal habeas hearing. State prosecutors were provided with evidence of the payment, but later argued that they lacked “actual” knowledge. The Sixth Circuit granted habeas relief in the death penalty case, finding that the prosecutor had a duty to disclose the payment, but affirmed the denial of relief in the federal case. The state court Brady violation, failure to disclose that Jackson had received compensation after her federal testimony, occurred after Thomas’s federal trial. View "Thomas v. United States" on Justia Law

In 1997, Day, a Memphis armored truck driver, was shot on the job. The shooter took the cash and left in a getaway car. Day died two years later, of complications from his injuries. Authorities identified Thomas as the shooter and Bond as the getaway car driver. In a federal trial before Day’s death, Thomas was convicted of interfering with interstate commerce, carrying a firearm in relation to a crime of violence, and being a felon in possession of a firearm, and was sentenced to life in prison. After Day died, Thomas was convicted of felony murder in state court and was sentenced to death. Thomas exhausted his Tennessee post-conviction remedies. Jackson, Thomas’s girlfriend, was the pivotal witness in both trials, placing Thomas at the scene of the shooting. After the federal trial, but before the state prosecution, the FBI paid Jackson $750 on behalf of the Safe Streets Task Force. Jackson testified that she did not receive any “reward” money and that she testified because it was the “right thing to do.” Thomas was never notified of this payment and discovered it years later during his federal habeas hearing. State prosecutors were provided with evidence of the payment, but later argued that they lacked “actual” knowledge. The district court denied Thomas habeas relief in the death penalty case, reasoning that the payment was not sufficiently “material.” The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that the prosecutor had a duty to disclose the payment rather than allow Jackson to commit perjury. View "Thomas v. Westbrooks" on Justia Law

Witzke is currently serving four sentences in the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) for using forged financial instruments. In May 2013, the Parole Board released Witzke on parole for a 15-month term. A year later, authorities arrested him for eight alleged parole violations, including a new criminal conviction for using a fake check. An MDOC agent found probable cause for all eight counts. Witzke pled guilty to two counts. At a second hearing, another MDOC officer dismissed all remaining counts except the fraudulent check violation. Finding Witzke guilty of that violation, the officer recommended revocation of Witzke’s parole. The Parole Board adopted the recommendation. Without seeking relief in Michigan courts, Witzke filed a pro se habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254, alleging violation of his due process rights and requesting a new hearing before the Parole Board. The district court summarily dismissed his petition without prejudice for failure to exhaust state remedies. While his appeal was pending, the Parole Board re-released Witzke on parole. He will finish serving his sentence for his underlying criminal conviction in May 2017. The Sixth Circuit dismissed his appeal as moot, stating that there was nothing to remedy. View "Witzke v. Brewer" on Justia Law

Before his jury trial on charges of murder, Watkins submitted four times to psychiatric evaluation. Though the first evaluator found him incompetent, subsequent evaluators found him competent and criminally responsible for his actions. Despite his bizarre behavior during trial, including exhibiting paranoid beliefs and urinating on a television screen, defense counsel did not request a fifth psychiatric evaluation. A jury found Watkins guilty. Nearly four years after filing a timely habeas petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel for “failure to investigate and raise a defense,” Watkins filed an amended petition arguing ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to request another psychiatric evaluation after Watkins’ conduct during trial. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of habeas relief. Watkins cannot establish that his amended petition relates back to his original petition or that he is entitled to equitable tolling; the petition was, therefore, untimely. View "Watkins v. DeAngelo-Kipp" on Justia Law