Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Jerry Perea died in 2011 after an incident involving Officers David Baca and Andrew Jaramillo. Merlinda Perea called 911 and told the operator that her son, Perea, was on “very bad drugs” and that she was afraid of what he might do. Baca and Jaramillo were sent to perform a welfare check. The officers were informed that they were responding to a verbal fight and that no weapons were involved. They were also informed that Perea suffered from mental illness and may have been on drugs. The officers located Perea pedaling his bicycle. The officers used their patrol cars to force Perea to pedal into a parking lot. Jaramillo left his vehicle to pursue Perea on foot. After a brief chase, Jaramillo pushed Perea off his bicycle. The officers did not tell Perea why they were following him or why he was being seized, and they never asked Perea to halt or stop. After pushing Perea off his bicycle, Jaramillo reached for Perea’s hands in an attempt to detain him. Perea struggled and thrashed while holding a crucifix. After Perea began to struggle, Baca told Jaramillo to use his taser against Perea. The district court denied Baca and Jaramillo qualified immunity against a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim, and they appealed. After reviewing the district court record in this matter, the Tenth Circuit held that the officers’ repeated tasering of Perea after he was subdued constituted excessive force, and that it was clearly established at the time of the taserings that such conduct was unconstitutional. The Court affirmed the denial of the officers request for qualified immunity. View "Perea v. Baca" on Justia Law

Defendant Eric Alexander was convicted by a jury of one count of failing to register under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). It was undisputed that Alexander was a sex offender as defined by federal law. After being paroled, Alexander registered as a sex offender in the City of Santa Ana, California. In doing so, Alexander did not list a fixed address and instead registered as a transient. Though registering as a transient required Alexander to “re-register every [thirty] days,” it was undisputed that Alexander failed to do so. In April 2013, Alexander “violated the conditions of his parole by absconding from parole supervision, having access to a firearm, [providing] false identification to a police officer, and [having] access to ammunition or [a] firearm.” Later that year, Alexander traveled by bus to Las Cruces, New Mexico. Cynthia Williams picked up Alexander from the bus station and took him to her apartment. According to Williams, Alexander arrived in Las Cruces with only a backpack of clothing and personal items. Leticia Bullard, Williams’ sister, lived in the same apartment complex and encountered Alexander several times during the time he was staying at Williams’ apartment. On approximately September 17, 2013, Bullard learned about Alexander’s status as a sex offender. She then contacted a law enforcement officer. That in turn led to officers from the United States Marshals Service arresting Alexander at Williams’ apartment complex on September 23, 2013, for parole violations. On January 3, 2014, a criminal complaint was filed against Alexander in federal district court in New Mexico charging him with one count of failing to register under SORNA. Alexander appealed his SORNA conviction, arguing court error in instructing the jury. The Tenth Circuit agreed that there was an erroneous and prejudicial jury instruction given at Alexander's trial. The conviction was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Alexander" on Justia Law

Defendant Adan Humberto Dominguez-Rodriguez pleaded guilty to one count of illegally reentering the United States after having previously been deported. Prior to sentencing, the probation office recommended that the district court impose a sixteen-level enhancement to Dominguez-Rodriguez’s base offense level because Dominguez-Rodriguez was previously deported after having been convicted in federal court of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. Dominguez-Rodriguez objected to the proposed sixteen-level enhancement. At sentencing, the district court sustained Dominguez-Rodriguez’s objection, imposed an eight-level enhancement, and sentenced Dominguez-Rodriguez to six months’ imprisonment. The government appealed, arguing that the district court erred in failing to impose the sixteen-level enhancement. After review of the parties' arguments on appeal ,the Tenth Circuit agreed with the government and consequently remanded this case with instructions to vacate Dominguez-Rodriguez’s sentence and resentence. View "United States v. Dominguez-Rodriguez" on Justia Law

Petitioner-appellant Steven Bonney sought habeas relief. When he was 17, five of his child relatives accused him of sexual abuse. Bonney entered into a plea agreement with the State of Wyoming and pleaded guilty to charges involving two of the children. The state district court accepted the plea, entering a judgment of conviction and sentenced Bonney to two consecutive terms of 15-20 years’ imprisonment (with the second term suspended in favor of probation for 15 years). Bonney sought post-conviction relief, arguing that his trial counsel had been ineffective. The state district court denied relief on some claims and granted summary judgment to the State on other claims. Bonney then brought this federal habeas action. The federal district court granted habeas relief, but the Tenth Circuit reversed. On remand the district court granted summary judgment to the respondents the Warden of the Wyoming State Penitentiary, the Wyoming Director of the Department of Corrections and the Wyoming Attorney General, and Bonney appealed. The Tenth Circuit reversed in part and affirmed in part. In the habeas petition, Bonney claimed in part that his trial counsel had failed to adequately investigate the children’s accounts. The state district court declined to consider the merits of this claim, reasoning that Bonney had not raised the claim through a direct appeal. As a result, the federal district court considered the habeas claim procedurally defaulted. Because the federal district court erred in applying procedural default, it erred in not considering Bonney's claim on its merits. For this reason, the Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded for further proceedings. The Court affirmed in all other respects. View "Bonney v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Federal prisoner William Kurtz appealed the district court’s denial of his motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2). His appointed counsel submitted an "Anders" brief stating this appeal presented no non-frivolous grounds for reversal. After carefully examining the record, the Tenth Circuit agreed, granted counsel’s motion to withdraw and dismissed this appeal. View "United States v. Kurtz" on Justia Law

Defendant Ismael Mendoza appealed the denial of his motion to suppress drugs found in two ice chests in a vehicle he was driving. He argued: (1) that his consent to search the vehicle was invalid because he gave his consent while an officer was unlawfully detaining him; (2) that the search of the first chest exceeded the scope of his consent when the officer dumped its packaged contents (frozen seafood) on the pavement and pried open the chest’s lining; and (3) that the search and destruction of the second ice chest was unlawful because the officers did not have probable cause specific to that chest. After review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. The officer had reasonable suspicion justifying Defendant’s detention when he consented to the search. The search of the first chest did not exceed the scope of Defendant’s consent; Defendant, who was observing the search, raised no objection to the manner of the search, and the officers’ actions did not destroy or render useless the chest or its contents before they saw a drug package in the lining. And the search of the second chest was lawful because the officers had probable cause to search the vehicle and destruction of the chest was reasonable in the circumstances. View "United States v. Mendoza" on Justia Law

Defendant Marvin Iverson was convicted by jury of engaging in a scheme to defraud JPMorgan Chase and Big Horn Federal Savings. The statute under which he was convicted required that the victims be “financial institutions.” To establish that element of the offense, the government offered the testimony of an FBI agent to try to prove that JPMorgan and Big Horn were insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). On appeal Defendant argued that the agent’s testimony was inadmissible hearsay and violated the best-evidence rule. He also argued that even if the evidence was admissible, it was insufficient to prove that JPMorgan and Big Horn had FDIC insurance at the time of the offense. Despite the government’s concession to the contrary, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the agent’s testimony was not inadmissible hearsay; it was either not hearsay or fell within a hearsay exception. As for the best-evidence rule, Defendant did not raise the issue below and he had not shown plain error. The Court also rejected defendant’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge. View "United States v. Iverson" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Keith Courtney was convicted by jury of three counts of wire fraud, for which he received a 24-month prison sentence followed by three years’ supervised release and ordered to forfeit $1,601,825.84, the full value of the fraudulent wire transfers at issue in the underlying case. In addition, the court imposed $493,230.88 in restitution. On appeal, defendant argued that: (1) the forfeiture order must be reduced by the amount the lenders received from the properties through mortgage payments and the sale of the properties; and (2) he should have been allowed to inform the jury of the possible sentence and its power to acquit him if they believed the conviction would be unjust. After review, the Tenth Circuit agreed with defendant on his first contention and reversed, and affirmed on the second. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Courtney" on Justia Law

Ashley Stephens, an agent with the federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, received several tips that defendant-appellant Ralph Carloss, a previously convicted felon, was unlawfully in possession of a firearm, possibly a machine gun, and was selling methamphetamine. In order to investigate these tips, Agent Stephens, along with Tahlequah, Oklahoma police investigator Elden Graves, went one afternoon to the home where Carloss was staying to talk with him. There was no evidence of any fence or other enclosure around the house or yard, but there were several “No Trespassing” signs placed in the yard and on the front door. Specifically there was a “No Trespassing” sign on an approximately three-foot-high wooden post located beside the driveway, on the side farthest from the house, and another sign tacked to a tree in the side yard, both stating “Private Property No Trespassing.” In this direct criminal appeal, Carloss contended that the two police officers violated his Fourth Amendment rights by knocking on his front door seeking to speak with him. Ordinarily a police officer, like any citizen, has an implied license to approach a home, knock on the front door, and ask to speak with the occupants. Carloss, however, claimed that “No Trespassing” signs posted around the house and on the front door of his home revoked that implied license. After review of this matter, the Tenth Circuit concluded, to the contrary, that under the circumstances presented here, those “No Trespassing” signs would not have conveyed to an objective officer that he could not approach the house and knock on the front door seeking to have a consensual conversation with the occupants. "Nor did the officers exceed the implied license to knock on the front door by knocking too long." The Court also upheld the district court’s factual finding that Carloss voluntarily consented to the officers entering the house. Therefore, the district court’s decision to deny Carloss’ motion to suppress evidence that the officers discovered as a result of their consensual interaction with Carloss after he responded to their knocking, was affirmed. View "United States v. Carloss" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Humberto Llantada pleaded guilty to charges arising from a drug conspiracy in 2014. The district court sentenced him to 168 months’ imprisonment, followed by terms of supervised release ranging from one to five years, and imposed a number of special conditions that would apply when he was released. He challenged those conditions on vagueness grounds. He also challenged the district court’s refusal to award him a sentence reduction because of his relatively minor role in the conspiracy. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the sentence and conditions: "Our decision in 'United States v. Munoz,( ___ F.3d ___, 2016 WL 502863 (10th Cir. 2016)) resolves most of the challenges to the special conditions imposed in this case. […] The conditions of supervised release imposed here are sufficiently clear to inform a parolee of what conduct will result in a return to prison." View "United States v. Llantada" on Justia Law