Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 2013, a grand jury charged Defendant Christopher Craig with three separate counts as part of a twenty-seven-count indictment containing nine other codefendants. The first count charged Defendant with conspiring to: manufacture, possess with intent to distribute, and distribute cocaine, cocaine base, and marijuana; and maintain a drug involved premises. The other two counts charged Defendant with using a communication facility to commit this conspiracy. After Defendant pleaded guilty to these charges, the district court at sentencing calculated his total offense level as 43 after applying a murder cross-reference under United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.) section 2D1.1(d), a leadership enhancement under U.S.S.G. section 3B1.1(a), and an obstruction of justice enhancement under U.S.S.G. section 3C1.1. Combined with his category III criminal history, this corresponded to a sentence of life imprisonment for the conspiracy count and 48 months’ imprisonment for the two communications facility counts. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court erred in applying these enhancements and imposing the life sentence on him. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "United States v. Craig" on Justia Law

Petitioners Neil and Andrea Feinberg and Kelly McDonald run Total Health Concepts (THC), a Colorado marijuana dispensary. Colorado has legalized the sale of marijuana, but this permissible use runs in defiance of federal criminal law. Officials at the IRS have refused to recognize business expense deductions claimed by companies like THC on the ground that their conduct violates federal criminal drug laws. Petitioners have challenged the IRS’s policy after the agency disallowed their business expense deductions. Among other things, petitioners argued that the agency lacked authority to determine whether THC trafficked in an unlawful substance and, as a result, they suggested that their deductions should have been allowed like those of any other business. As the litigation progressed, the IRS issued discovery requests asking the petitioners about the nature of their business. Petitioners resisted these requests, asserting that their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination relieved them of the duty to respond. The IRS responded to petitioners’ invocation of the Fifth Amendment by moving to compel production of the discovery it sought. Ultimately, the tax court sided with the IRS and ordered petitioners to produce the discovery the agency demanded. Because the tax court proceedings were still ongoing and no final order existed that would give the Tenth Circuit jurisdiction over this appeal, petitioners sought a writ of mandamus. The Tenth Circuit concluded after review that petitioners did not carry their burden for mandamus relief, and denied their petition. View "In re: Feinberg" on Justia Law

Defendant Blake Snowden pleaded guilty to unlawfully obtaining information from a protected computer and to intercepting emails. In calculating his offense level under the sentencing guidelines, the district court applied a 16-level enhancement after finding that these crimes caused losses exceeding a million dollars. The resulting guideline sentencing range was 41–51 months’ imprisonment. The court ultimately imposed a 30-month sentence. Defendant argues that the district court erred in calculating loss and thereby arrived at an unduly high guideline sentencing range. After review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that if there was any error, it was harmless because it did not affect the sentence: the trial court, after thoroughly exploring the matter, explained why the sentence was proper under 18 U.S.C. 3553 and unequivocally stated that it would impose the same sentence even if 30 months exceeded the correct guideline range. On one ground, however, the Tenth Circuit reversed: the district court ordered restitution in the amount of $25,354. Both parties agreed that this was an oversight that should have been corrected on remand to $24,174. View "United States v. Snowden" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellants Iqbal Makkar and Gaurav Sehgal ran the “Gitter Done,” a small town convenience store in northeastern Oklahoma. Questions surfaced about a certain incense they carried on their shelves. The men spoke with state law enforcement officers, offered to have the officers test the incense to determine its legality, and offered as well to stop selling the product until the results came in. Ultimately they were indicted and convicted for violating the Controlled Substance Analogue Enforcement Act (Analogue Act), conspiracy, and money laundering. In this appeal defendants argued that the trial court erred in instructing the jury, and for excluding evidence of their cooperation with law enforcement. “The government’s instructional inference invited the jury to infer the presence of one essential element from another, effectively collapsing two independent statutory inquiries into one. … the fact that one drug produces a similar effect to a second drug just doesn’t give rise to a rational inference - let alone rationally suggest beyond a reasonable doubt - that the first drug shares a similar chemical structure with the second drug. And it most certainly does not give rise to a qualifying inference that the first drug shares a similar chemical structure with a third drug - as the government was, in fact, allowed to argue to the jury in this case.” The government argued this error was harmless, but the Tenth Circuit disagreed and vacated both defendants’ convictions. View "United States v. Makkar" on Justia Law

A federal grand jury indicted inmate Mark Jordan for the 1999 murder of David Stone and three related assaults. Stone died after he was stabbed three times with a shank in the recreation yard at the United States Penitentiary in Florence, Colorado (“USP Florence”). In 2005, a jury found him guilty on all counts. In 2012, Sean Riker, another inmate who was present in the prison recreation yard that day, confessed to stabbing Stone and agreed to provide Jordan’s counsel a DNA sample. Jordan’s DNA expert then linked Riker’s DNA to DNA found on the murder weapon. Based on Riker’s confession and the new DNA analysis, Jordan moved for a new trial under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 due to newly discovered evidence. After the conclusion of the Rule 33 hearing, the district court denied Jordan’s motion for a new trial. On appeal, Jordan argued: (1) the district court should not have admitted and considered new government evidence; and (2) even if Rule 33 permits new government evidence, the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Confrontation Clause each should have barred admission of Stone’s dying declarations. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Jordan" on Justia Law

Petitioner Jose Ramon Cespedes, a native and citizen of Venezuela, entered the United States as a nonimmigrant tourist in 2011. His status was adjusted to conditional lawful permanent resident in 2012. Later he was charged in Utah state court with domestic violence; and in 2013, that court issued a protective order against him under Utah’s Cohabitant Abuse Procedures Act. In late 2013, Cespedes pleaded guilty to attempted violation of a protective order. He did not dispute that he was convicted of violating a protective order entered under the Cohabitant Abuse Procedures Act or that the provision of the order that he was convicted of violating was the provision stating that “the defendant shall not contact . . . the protected party.” A few months later, the Department of Homeland Security brought a charge to remove Cespedes under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii). In a hearing before an immigration judge (IJ), Cespedes argued that his violation of the protection order did not come within the federal statute. The IJ rejected his argument and ordered him removed from the United States. He appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which affirmed the IJ. The issue presented for the Tenth Circuit’s review was whether violation of an order prohibiting contact with a potential victim satisfied the statute. The Tenth Circuit held that it did, and affirmed the BIA. View "Cespedes v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Delray Quiver pled guilty to assaulting, resisting, and injuring a federal officer. At sentencing, the district court applied a four-level Sentencing Guidelines enhancement for Quiver’s “use” of a “dangerous weapon” (the officer’s Taser) during the assault. Quiver appealed the application of the enhancement. As the officer tried to subdue Quiver to arrest him, Quiver managed to turn over and punch the officer in the face, breaking his glasses. During the ensuing struggle, Quiver took control of the Taser and drive-stunned the officer’s leg. Quiver’s pressing the Taser against the officer’s thigh left two burn marks. The Tenth Circuit concluded that the Taser, even in stun-mode, was a dangerous weapon. The Court also concluded that in Quiver momentarily taking control of the Taser, he “used” it against the officer. For these simple reasons, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court’s conclusion that the four-level enhancement applied. View "United States v. Quiver" on Justia Law

These consolidated cases arose from a sting operation designed to determine if police officers in the Kansas City, Kansas Police Department’s (KCKPD) “SCORE” Unit were stealing from residences while executing search warrants. As a result of the sting operation, three officers were indicted and pled guilty to federal crimes. The remaining officers brought claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983, asserting violations of their Fourth Amendment rights for arrests without probable cause. The individual Defendants-Appellants appealed the district court’s denial of their motions for summary judgment based upon qualified immunity. The entity Defendant-Appellant (Unified Government of Wyandotte County/Kansas City) also appealed, arguing that should the Tenth Circuit determine a constitutional violation did not occur, it should reverse and render judgment in its favor. After review, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity on the basis that the law was not clearly established at the time of the arrests in question. The Court dismissed the Unified Government’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Callahan v. Unified Govt of Wyandotte" on Justia Law

In July 2005, defendant-appellant Laura Wetzel-Sanders pled guilty to one count of bank robbery. For purposes of sentencing, she was deemed a career offender based upon a 2000 Kansas state conviction for criminal threat (for which she received a seven-month sentence) and a 2002 federal conviction for bank robbery (for which she received an 18-month sentence). On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, defendant argued that she was sentenced on materially incorrect information: that after the Court’s decision in “United States v. Brooks,” (751 F.3d 1204 (10th Cir. 2014)), defendant’s state criminal threat conviction did not qualify as a predicate offense for purposes of applying the career-offender guideline. The Tenth Circuit reversed, finding that this appeal was defendant’s third successive section 2255 motion, and that the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear it. The Tenth Circuit vacated the district court’s order on the merits and dismissed the appeal. View "United States v. Wetzel-Sanders" on Justia Law

Walter Flaugher pled guilty in 2006 to one count of conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, for which he was sentenced to 57 months in prison and 5 years of supervised release. In 2014, the U.S. Probation Office filed a petition to revoke his supervised release, alleging several violations. Flaugher stipulated to one of the violations, use of methamphetamine. The district court revoked his supervised release, resentenced him to another 12 months and 1 day in prison, and imposed 3 years of supervised release. Over his counsel’s objections, the court also imposed a condition to the supervised release, requiring Flaugher to be subject to a search of his house, car or person, by a probation officer. On appeal, Flaugher argued that 18 U.S.C. 3583(d) prohibited district courts from imposing warrantless-search conditions except in cases involving felons required to register under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”). He challenged the condition because he was not required to register under SORNA. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court. View "United States v. Flaugher" on Justia Law