Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Jose Antonio Duque-Ramirez, born in Mexico, entered the United States unlawfully as a child and lived in Oklahoma City for over two decades. He married a U.S. citizen, has U.S.-citizen children, and attempted but failed to adjust his immigration status through various legal avenues. In October 2023, he was stopped by law enforcement while driving with security gear and firearms in his vehicle. He was found to be unlawfully present in the U.S. and subsequently indicted for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(A), which prohibits firearm possession by noncitizens unlawfully in the country.The United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma first rejected his facial challenge to the statute, assuming without deciding that he was among “the people” protected by the Second Amendment. After pleading guilty, withdrawing his plea, and raising a new as-applied Second Amendment challenge (relying on recent Supreme Court precedent, including United States v. Rahimi), the district court again denied his motion to dismiss, reasoning that historical laws supported disarming those who had not demonstrated allegiance to the sovereign.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The Tenth Circuit assumed, without deciding, that Duque-Ramirez was among those protected by the Second Amendment. Applying the framework from New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen and Rahimi, the court held that § 922(g)(5)(A) is consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation, specifically citing founding-era laws that disarmed persons who had not demonstrated allegiance. The court concluded that an individualized determination of dangerousness was not required and affirmed the conviction, rejecting Duque-Ramirez’s as-applied Second Amendment challenge. View "United States v. Duque-Ramirez" on Justia Law

The defendant was involved in a motorcycle accident in Oklahoma with his girlfriend as a passenger. After socializing with friends and drinking alcohol, and possibly vaping marijuana, he drove his motorcycle at or below the speed limit but lost control on a dark, shoulderless road, resulting in a crash that caused his girlfriend’s death. At the scene, law enforcement observed signs of possible intoxication, such as the odor of alcohol and bloodshot eyes, and administered sobriety tests. The defendant’s blood sample, taken shortly after the accident, revealed a blood alcohol level below the legal limit and the presence of other substances, but the forensic toxicologist could not definitively state whether he was impaired at the time.A grand jury in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma indicted the defendant for involuntary manslaughter in Indian Country, predicated on violating the Oklahoma misdemeanor DUI statute for driving under the combined influence of alcohol and other intoxicants. At trial, the jury was instructed using the Oklahoma statutory language but, during deliberations, asked the court to clarify whether “under the influence” required mere presence of substances or actual impairment rendering the defendant incapable of safe driving. The district court declined to clarify, instructing the jury to rely on the given instructions. Shortly after, the jury convicted the defendant, and the court imposed a sentence of forty-one months in prison.Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion by failing to provide a clarifying supplemental instruction in response to the jury’s explicit legal uncertainty. The appellate court found this error was not harmless because it likely affected the verdict, given the jury’s demonstrated confusion about the correct legal standard. The court vacated the conviction and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Kirby" on Justia Law

The defendant was involved in a series of crimes that began when he picked up an acquaintance from a motel and, instead of taking her home, brought her to his house where he and his girlfriend assaulted her. During the assault, the defendant’s girlfriend held the victim at gunpoint with the defendant’s shotgun. The defendant subsequently forced the victim into the trunk of his car, drove her to the motel, and confronted another individual in a motel room, threatening him and stealing his possessions as well as his car keys. The defendant and his girlfriend then left the scene, with the stolen items and the shotgun in the original car, and the defendant driving the stolen car. During their flight, the victim managed to escape, and law enforcement later apprehended the defendant and recovered both the shotgun and the stolen property.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma held a jury trial in which the defendant was convicted of several offenses, including carjacking, robbery in Indian Country, and using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). The defendant moved for acquittal on the § 924(c)(1)(A) count, arguing insufficient evidence that he carried a firearm during the robberies because he did not have the shotgun on his person during the “taking” phase of the offenses. The district court denied the motion, and the jury found the defendant guilty, specifying that he carried (but did not use) the firearm during the robberies.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence de novo. The court held that “carrying” under § 924(c)(1)(A) includes constructive possession and transportation of a firearm during the commission or flight from a continuing offense such as robbery. The court concluded that evidence supported the jury’s verdict, as the defendant constructively carried the firearm during his escape from the robberies. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the conviction. View "United States v. McHenry" on Justia Law

A man living in Muskogee, Oklahoma, fatally shot his neighbor after developing the belief that the neighbor had harmed his daughter, despite no history of conflict or any evidence supporting this belief. The shooter had been prescribed unusually high doses of Adderall, and a Bureau of Prisons psychologist concluded that he suffered from amphetamine-induced psychosis at the time of the shooting. At trial, the defendant admitted to the killing but raised the affirmative defense of involuntary intoxication due to his prescribed medication, asserting he could not appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions. Both parties presented expert and lay testimony regarding the defendant’s mental state and drug use, including the possibility of methamphetamine use.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma presided over a jury trial. The court instructed the jury on involuntary intoxication but included categorical disqualifiers: the jury was told that the defense could not apply if the defendant had knowledge of Adderall’s possible intoxicating effects, or if he had used illegal drugs while on Adderall. The court also denied the defense’s request for an instruction on involuntary manslaughter based on “imperfect defense of another.” The jury rejected the involuntary intoxication defense and convicted the defendant of first-degree murder and related firearm offenses.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the district court’s jury instructions on involuntary intoxication were legally erroneous. Specifically, the Tenth Circuit found it was improper to instruct the jury that any knowledge of possible intoxicating effects, or any illegal drug use while taking Adderall, categorically barred the defense. The court reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial, holding that the errors were not harmless. The Tenth Circuit also concluded the district court erred by failing to give the requested imperfect defense of another instruction, which may be relevant at retrial. View "United States v. Rainford" on Justia Law

The defendant, Eric Honors, was accused of sexually assaulting his sixteen-year-old stepdaughter, B.J., both in the sleeper cab of his semi-truck outside their Wichita, Kansas home and during a subsequent drive from Kansas to Texas. Throughout these events, Honors held B.J. captive, repeatedly assaulted her, and made various videos documenting the abuse. Three such videos were recovered by investigators, all recorded in Kansas; other videos described by B.J. that were made in Oklahoma and Texas were not recovered.Honors was indicted by a federal grand jury in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas on two counts: transportation of a minor with intent to engage in criminal sexual activity and production of child pornography. At trial, the jury convicted him on both counts. The district court sentenced Honors to a total of sixty years in prison and ten years of supervised release. It also imposed a special condition prohibiting Honors from contacting B.J. or her family, including his wife and four biological children, during supervised release. Initially, the district court declined to extend the no-contact order to his prison term, reasoning it lacked authority, but later reconvened and imposed the order during incarceration as a civil injunction.Honors appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, raising three issues: (1) whether the jury instructions constructively amended the indictment by omitting language limiting the offense to Kansas, (2) whether the district court had authority to impose the no-contact order during incarceration, and (3) whether there was sufficient justification for prohibiting contact with his wife and children during supervised release. The Tenth Circuit held that any error regarding the jury instructions was not plain, affirmed the conviction on Count 2, vacated the custodial no-contact order in its entirety for lack of jurisdiction, and vacated the supervised release condition prohibiting contact with his wife and biological children, finding no compelling justification. View "United States v. Honors" on Justia Law

A man was charged with aggravated sexual abuse of a minor that occurred in a home on the Choctaw Nation reservation in Oklahoma. The victim was a six-year-old boy, and the defendant, who had recently moved in with his stepdaughter, was alleged to have committed the offense within two days of his arrival. The prosecution charged the defendant under federal law, which required proof that the victim was an Indian and the defendant was a non-Indian.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma presided over the trial. The government presented testimony from the defendant’s stepdaughter and three law enforcement officers, as well as driver’s license records, to establish that the defendant was not an Indian. The stepdaughter testified she did not know of any tribal membership or Indian identity for the defendant. Law enforcement witnesses stated the defendant did not identify as Native American and that inquiries with five major Oklahoma tribes yielded no information about his tribal status. The defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal under Rule 29, arguing the evidence was insufficient to prove he was a non-Indian. The district court denied the motion, and the jury convicted the defendant, resulting in a 30-year prison sentence.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed whether the evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was a non-Indian, as required by 18 U.S.C. § 1152. The court held that the government failed to meet its burden, finding the evidence presented was too speculative and insufficient to establish the defendant’s non-Indian status. The Tenth Circuit vacated the conviction and remanded the case to the district court with instructions to enter a judgment of acquittal. View "United States v. Hebert" on Justia Law

In 2003, the defendant was convicted by a jury of armed bank robbery in federal court. At sentencing, the government sought a mandatory life sentence under the federal “three strikes” law, 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c), which requires a life sentence for certain repeat offenders convicted of “serious violent felonies.” The government identified five prior convictions it argued qualified as “serious violent felonies.” The district court imposed a life sentence, finding the defendant had three qualifying strikes, but did not specify which prior convictions or which statutory definitions it relied upon.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit previously affirmed the conviction and sentence on direct appeal. The defendant’s first motion for collateral relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 was denied by the United States District Court for the District of Utah, and that denial was affirmed on appeal. In 2020, the Tenth Circuit authorized the defendant to file a second or successive § 2255 motion, based on recent Supreme Court decisions finding similar statutory “residual clauses” unconstitutionally vague. The defendant argued that his life sentence was imposed under the residual clause of § 3559(c), which he claimed was unconstitutional.Reviewing the district court’s denial of relief de novo, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the defendant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the sentencing court relied on the residual clause to enhance his sentence. The court found that, at the time of sentencing, the legal environment permitted the use of a circumstance-specific approach, allowing the defendant’s California robbery conviction to qualify as a strike under the enumerated clause. As a result, the defendant did not meet the burden required for relief under § 2255. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion. View "United States v. Cooper" on Justia Law

Over a fourteen-month period, the defendant and his wife engaged in a scheme to purchase seven high-end used vehicles from Kansas dealerships, financing the purchases with bank loans obtained through fraudulent misrepresentations on loan applications. After acquiring the vehicles, they altered title documents to remove the banks’ liens, enabling them to obtain false clear titles. These clear titles were then used to either sell the vehicles or secure title loans for cash. The defendant made few or no payments on the original car loans, and the fraudulent activity involved both Kansas and Georgia vehicle registrations.The United States District Court for the District of Kansas initially indicted both the defendant and his wife on seventeen counts, including conspiracy, bank fraud, wire fraud, and money laundering. The court severed the wife’s case after she agreed to testify against the defendant in exchange for dismissal of her charges, though she ultimately did not testify. At trial, the government dismissed one count and renumbered the remaining charges. The jury convicted the defendant on all sixteen counts, and the district court imposed concurrent forty-six-month sentences. After sentencing, the government dismissed all charges against the wife.On direct appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence for seven of the defendant’s convictions. The court reversed the bank fraud conviction on Count 2, finding no evidence that the defendant aided or abetted his wife’s fraudulent loan. It also reversed the wire fraud conviction on Count 9 due to insufficient proof of the interstate commerce element. However, the court affirmed the money laundering convictions on Counts 12 through 16, concluding that sufficient evidence supported the finding that the defendant’s transactions were designed, at least in part, to conceal or disguise the proceeds of bank fraud. The case was remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Cunningham" on Justia Law

While serving a federal sentence in Bureau of Prisons custody, the defendant was temporarily housed at a federal facility in Oklahoma. There, he used a distress alarm to summon a correctional officer and, when the officer arrived, exposed himself and masturbated in view of the officer through his cell door window. This was not the first such incident; the defendant had previously been disciplined for similar acts of public masturbation on four occasions at another federal prison. The government charged him with indecent exposure under Oklahoma law, assimilated through federal law.The United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma presided over the case. Before trial, the government sought to introduce evidence of the defendant’s prior acts, including disciplinary logs and incident reports, to show intent, knowledge, and lack of mistake. The district court conducted the required analysis and admitted the logs and incident reports under the business records exception to the hearsay rule, and after balancing probative value against prejudicial effect. The first trial ended in a mistrial, but at retrial, the evidence was again admitted, and the jury convicted the defendant. The district court sentenced him to three years’ imprisonment.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, the defendant challenged the admission of the prior-acts evidence and the procedural reasonableness of his sentence. The Tenth Circuit held that the defendant had waived his argument under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) and forfeited his argument under Rule 803(6), and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence under Rule 403. The court also found no plain error in admitting the evidence as business records and concluded that the district court properly applied the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). The Tenth Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who, after years of being teased and picked on by his housemates, fatally stabbed one of them during a night of drinking and verbal taunting. The defendant, a member of the Choctaw Nation, lived with several relatives in Oklahoma. On the night in question, the group engaged in typical banter and name-calling, with the victim and another housemate calling the defendant derogatory names, including in the Choctaw language. After retreating to his room, the defendant emerged with a knife, confronted the victim, and, following a struggle, stabbed him multiple times, resulting in the victim’s death. The defendant admitted to the stabbing during a 9-1-1 call, expressing remorse and attributing his actions to the ongoing verbal abuse.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma presided over the trial. The defendant did not dispute that he killed the victim but argued that he acted in the heat of passion, seeking a conviction for voluntary manslaughter rather than first-degree murder. The district court, over the government’s objection, instructed the jury on the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter. At the government’s request, and over the defendant’s objection, the court also instructed the jury that “words alone” cannot negate malice aforethought and create heat of passion. The jury convicted the defendant of first-degree murder.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed whether the “words alone” instruction was legally correct and whether it improperly affected the jury’s deliberations. The court held that the instruction accurately reflected longstanding legal principles: mere words, no matter how aggravating or insulting, are insufficient as a matter of law to constitute adequate provocation for heat of passion manslaughter under federal law. The court affirmed the conviction. View "United States v. Sockey" on Justia Law