Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The case concerns a fatal car accident that occurred in February 2017 on a state highway within the Chickasaw Nation Reservation in Oklahoma. Lloyd Ray Hatley, while driving slightly above the speed limit, glanced at a vehicle parked on the shoulder. When he looked back, he saw another car, driven by Gay Ott and carrying Mary Nappa, had swerved into his lane and was braking. Hatley was unable to stop in time and collided with the car, resulting in Nappa’s death. Emergency responders extricated the passengers, but Nappa was pronounced dead at the scene. Hatley was not injured. Data from the vehicles indicated the Pontiac attempted an illegal left turn and Hatley was accelerating before braking sharply to avoid the collision.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma indicted Hatley on four counts related to the accident, including involuntary manslaughter in Indian country. The government sought to prove Hatley’s Indian status—an essential element for federal jurisdiction—using a tribal verification letter and testimony from Derrick Vann, a Cherokee Nation records custodian. Hatley objected to the admissibility of this evidence, arguing lack of foundation and hearsay. The district court admitted the evidence, and the jury convicted Hatley of involuntary manslaughter under Count 4, acquitting him on other counts. Hatley was sentenced to 48 months’ imprisonment and ordered to pay restitution.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the government was required to prove Hatley’s Indian status at the time of the offense. The court found that the district court abused its discretion by admitting the tribal verification letter and Vann’s testimony, as neither was properly authenticated nor admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence. Because no other competent evidence established Hatley’s Indian status at the relevant time, the error was not harmless. The Tenth Circuit reversed Hatley’s conviction and remanded with instructions to vacate the conviction and conduct further proceedings. View "United States v. Hatley" on Justia Law

The defendant, a young man with a history of firearm-related offenses, was previously adjudicated delinquent for shooting at a person, making him a “Category I restricted person” under Utah law and barring him from possessing firearms. Despite this, he was found in possession of a handgun in April 2022 and was charged with a felony for possessing a dangerous weapon as a restricted person. On the day of his arraignment for that charge, he purchased another firearm. Later, in October 2022, he was found with this new firearm after allegedly firing it at a group of people.Following the October incident, a federal grand jury indicted him for illegal receipt of a firearm by a person under indictment, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(n). He moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that § 922(n) is facially unconstitutional under the Second Amendment, as interpreted by New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen. The United States District Court for the District of Utah denied his motion, finding that while the Second Amendment presumptively protected his conduct, § 922(n) was consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. The court cited historical laws disarming dangerous groups and surety laws as analogues. The defendant then entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal, and was sentenced to 21 months’ imprisonment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the constitutionality of § 922(n) de novo. The court held that § 922(n) is facially constitutional, finding it “relevantly similar” to founding-era practices of pretrial detention and bail, which imposed comparable, temporary restrictions on the right to bear arms for those accused of serious crimes. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss and upheld the conviction. View "United States v. Ogilvie" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who was convicted of knowingly engaging in a sexual act with a minor in Indian Country. The minor was his half-sister, and the sexual relationship began when he was 23 and she was 14, continuing for approximately eight years. After the relationship ended, the defendant was charged and convicted under federal law. At sentencing, the district court determined an adjusted base offense level of 20, which would have resulted in a guideline range of 33 to 41 months. However, the court varied upward, using a guideline range corresponding to a higher offense level, and imposed a 96-month prison sentence. The court also imposed a five-year term of supervised release, including a prohibition on viewing adult pornography.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma imposed the sentence and the supervised release conditions. The defendant appealed, arguing that the 96-month sentence was substantively unreasonable and that the prohibition on adult pornography was not adequately explained and infringed on his constitutional rights. He contended that the district court gave too much weight to the nature and circumstances of the offense, did not sufficiently consider a psychosexual evaluation indicating a low risk of reoffending, and failed to address the risk of unwarranted sentencing disparities. He also challenged the pornography restriction as lacking a compelling justification.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. Applying an abuse-of-discretion standard, the court held that the 96-month sentence was substantively reasonable given the length and harm of the abuse, and that the district court did not err in weighing the statutory factors. Regarding the pornography restriction, the Tenth Circuit found no plain error because the record supported a basis for the condition, given the defendant’s history and admissions. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Doty" on Justia Law

In October 2022, law enforcement officers stopped and searched a vehicle in which the defendant was a passenger. During the search, they discovered an Anderson Manufacturing AM-15 machinegun, a .357 caliber Glock handgun, and a “Glock switch” device capable of converting a handgun to fire automatically. Video evidence showed the defendant firing a Glock handgun equipped with the switch, operating as a fully automatic weapon. The defendant was subsequently indicted on two counts of knowingly and unlawfully possessing a machinegun, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(o).The United States District Court for the District of Kansas reviewed the defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment, which argued that § 922(o) violated the Second Amendment as applied to him. The district court agreed, finding that both the AM-15 machinegun and the Glock switch were “bearable arms” within the plain text of the Second Amendment. The court further concluded that the government had not demonstrated that § 922(o) was consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation, and therefore dismissed the indictment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision. The Tenth Circuit held that the defendant failed to meet his burden under the first step of the framework established in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen. Specifically, the court found that the defendant did not show that the machineguns he possessed were “arms” in “common use” for self-defense by law-abiding citizens, as required by District of Columbia v. Heller and subsequent precedent. As a result, the Tenth Circuit concluded that § 922(o) is constitutional as applied to the defendant, reversed the dismissal of the indictment, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "United States v. Morgan" on Justia Law

Police officers in Oklahoma conducted a warrantless search of a storage unit rented by an individual whose email and payment information were on the rental agreement, though the agreement was signed by another person. Employees of the storage facility initially entered the unit after finding its door ajar, observing what appeared to be drugs and firearms, and then notified police. Upon arrival, officers looked into the unit, with one officer peeking his head inside to observe suspected contraband, and another officer later entering the unit and opening a drawer before a warrant was obtained. The officers then used their observations to obtain a search warrant for the storage unit, which led to the discovery of drugs and firearms. Based on this evidence, they secured a second warrant to search the renter’s home, where additional contraband was found.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma denied the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence from both searches, finding no Fourth Amendment violation in the officers’ actions. The defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to drug and firearm charges, reserving the right to appeal the suppression ruling, and was sentenced to 188 months in prison.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the officers’ warrantless entry and search of the storage unit violated the Fourth Amendment. The court determined that, after excising the unconstitutionally obtained information from the search warrant affidavit, the remaining content failed to establish probable cause. The court also found that the good faith exception did not apply because the affidavit was so facially deficient that officers could not reasonably rely on it. Consequently, the evidence from both the storage unit and the home was ordered suppressed. The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of the suppression motion, vacated the conviction and sentence, and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Blasdel" on Justia Law

Victor Kearney was indicted for filing a false tax return for 2011 and for conspiring to defraud the United States by impeding the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The government alleged that Kearney, with the assistance of his tax attorney, Robert Fiser, failed to report taxable trust income on his tax returns from 2007 to 2011. Fiser, who was both an attorney and a certified public accountant, prepared Kearney’s returns during those years, reporting negative income despite Kearney’s receipt of trust income. At trial, Kearney argued that he relied in good faith on Fiser’s advice and was unaware of his personal tax obligations. The defense also challenged Fiser’s credibility, highlighting his ethical violations and criminal history.The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico conducted the trial. The jury convicted Kearney on both counts: filing a false tax return and conspiracy to defraud the United States. The district court sentenced him to 27 months in prison for each count, to run concurrently, and denied his motion for a new trial. Kearney appealed, challenging only his conspiracy conviction. He argued that the district court erred by misinstructing the jury on the elements of conspiracy to defraud and by failing to include the conspiracy charge in the advice-of-counsel instruction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case and found two plain errors. First, the jury instruction for conspiracy did not require the government to prove that Kearney used deceitful or dishonest means, an essential element of conspiracy to defraud under 18 U.S.C. § 371. Second, the advice-of-counsel instruction was limited to the false return charge and did not inform the jury that this defense applied to the conspiracy charge as well. The court held that these errors prejudiced Kearney’s defense, vacated his conspiracy conviction, and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Kearney" on Justia Law

A 17-year-old defendant was charged with ten serious offenses, including murder and assault, after a violent confrontation at the home of his rivals. The incident stemmed from a feud with a classmate and escalated when the defendant, accompanied by his family, armed himself and attacked the victims’ home. The attack resulted in the death of one individual and severe injuries to others. The defendant, an enrolled member of the Cherokee Nation, was charged under federal law for crimes committed within the Cherokee Nation Indian Reservation.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma first reviewed the case. The government moved to transfer the defendant from juvenile to adult criminal proceedings under the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act. After an evidentiary hearing, the magistrate judge recommended granting the transfer, and the district court adopted this recommendation after conducting a de novo review. The district court weighed the statutory factors, including the defendant’s age, social background, psychological maturity, prior delinquency record, past treatment efforts, and the availability of rehabilitative programs, and found that most factors favored transfer to adult status.On interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision for abuse of discretion. The appellate court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in weighing the statutory transfer factors and found no clear error in its factual findings. The court also rejected the defendant’s Eighth Amendment argument that transfer was unconstitutional due to the potential punishments, holding that the challenge was unripe under circuit precedent. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order transferring the defendant to adult criminal proceedings. View "United States v. J.D.V., Jr." on Justia Law

A man was stopped by police in Lawton, Oklahoma, for a traffic violation. During the stop, officers smelled marijuana and, after searching his car, found a loaded revolver and various marijuana products. The man did not have a medical marijuana card and was arrested on state charges for marijuana possession, paraphernalia, and a traffic offense. Subsequently, a federal grand jury indicted him for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), which prohibits firearm possession by anyone who is an unlawful user of or addicted to a controlled substance.The United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment. The district court found that the Second Amendment’s text covered the defendant’s conduct and held that applying § 922(g)(3) to non-intoxicated marijuana users was inconsistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. The court reasoned that historical regulations only permitted disarming those who had acted dangerously in the past, not those merely believed to pose a risk of future danger. The government appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. After the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Rahimi clarified the methodology for Second Amendment challenges, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the historical tradition supports disarming individuals believed to pose a risk of future danger, not just those who have acted dangerously before. However, the appellate court found that the government must show that non-intoxicated marijuana users pose such a risk. The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine whether the government can meet this burden. View "United States v. Harrison" on Justia Law

Three former members of a religious organization alleged that the organization intentionally misrepresented its history and the use of member tithing payments. They claimed that, had they known the true facts, they would not have joined or contributed financially. The plaintiffs asserted two main theories under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO): first, that the organization’s leaders made fraudulent statements about the group’s history and beliefs that they did not sincerely hold; and second, that the organization misrepresented how tithing funds would be used, including using them for commercial purposes contrary to representations.The United States District Court for the District of Utah initially dismissed the complaint, finding that the First Amendment’s Religion Clauses and the church autonomy doctrine barred adjudication of claims requiring inquiry into the truth or falsity of religious beliefs. After amendments to the complaint, the district court allowed a RICO claim based on the tithing theory to proceed, viewing it as a secular dispute. However, after further amendments and additional plaintiffs, the district court ultimately dismissed all claims, holding that the church autonomy doctrine barred claims based on religious misrepresentations and that the plaintiffs failed to adequately plead reliance or a pattern of predicate acts for the tithing-based RICO claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. It held that the church autonomy doctrine bars civil RICO claims premised on alleged misrepresentations about religious history or doctrine, as such claims would require courts to adjudicate ecclesiastical questions. Regarding the tithing theory, the court held that the plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege a causal link between the organization’s statements about tithing and their own financial contributions, as required for a civil RICO claim. The court therefore affirmed the dismissal of all claims. View "Gaddy v. Corp. of the President of the Church of Jesus" on Justia Law

A man was accused of picking up a woman in El Paso, Texas, under the pretense of giving her a ride, then driving her across state lines to his home in Anthony, New Mexico, where he violently sexually assaulted her. The woman testified that she was handcuffed, physically assaulted, and raped multiple times before escaping at a stoplight in El Paso and seeking help. The defendant’s adopted daughter also testified that he had sexually assaulted her repeatedly when she was a minor and again as an adult.A federal grand jury in the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico indicted the defendant for kidnapping and transporting an individual across state lines with intent to engage in illegal sexual activity. At trial, the defendant argued that the encounter with the woman was consensual and related to commercial sex, and he sought to introduce evidence of her prior prostitution to support his consent defense. The district court excluded this evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 412, finding it irrelevant to consent. The court also allowed the adopted daughter’s testimony under Rule 413, concluding that her allegations of prior sexual assault by the defendant were admissible and not unduly prejudicial under Rule 403. The jury convicted the defendant on both counts.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s evidentiary rulings. The court held that excluding evidence of the victim’s prior prostitution did not violate the defendant’s constitutional rights, as such evidence is not probative of consent under established precedent. The court also affirmed the admission of the adopted daughter’s testimony, holding that Rule 413 applies based on the conduct underlying the charges, not the statutory elements, and that the district court did not abuse its discretion under Rule 403. The court further found that the defendant had waived arguments regarding limitations on cross-examination of the adopted daughter. The convictions were affirmed. View "United States v. Clay" on Justia Law