Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Aqudre Quailes and Ayinda Harper were separately charged with being felons in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Harper was on Pennsylvania state probation and parole when his probation officer discovered photographs of him holding firearms on social media. During a home visit, officers found a semiautomatic pistol in his residence. Harper had thirteen prior felony convictions. Quailes, on parole for one of his six prior felony convictions, was arrested for absconding from parole. Authorities found firearms and ammunition in his girlfriend’s apartment, where he had been staying.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania dismissed both indictments, ruling that § 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional under the Second Amendment. The court reasoned that the defendants' status as parolees or probationers did not negate their Second Amendment rights. The Government appealed, arguing that § 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to state parolees and probationers.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that § 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to Quailes and Harper because neither had completed their criminal sentences. The court referenced its en banc decision in Range v. Attorney General, which held that § 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional for a felon who had completed his sentence, and United States v. Moore, which upheld the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) for felons still serving their sentences. The court concluded that historical practices support disarming convicts who are still serving their sentences, including those on state parole or probation. Consequently, the Third Circuit reversed the District Court’s orders and remanded the cases for further proceedings. View "USA v. Quailes" on Justia Law

Dwayne Sherman was indicted for several offenses related to drug trafficking in Central Pennsylvania, including six counts of money laundering, one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine, and one count of conspiracy to launder money. The charges stemmed from activities between 2012 and 2018. Evidence presented at trial included testimony from a drug dealer, Paul Alston, who bought cocaine from Sherman, and FBI informant Ruben Martin, who received large sums of cash from Sherman intended for Mexico. Sherman admitted to selling cocaine and making money drops but claimed ignorance of the money's criminal origins.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania denied Sherman’s motion for a new trial but vacated three of his money-laundering convictions, finding they were separate means of committing a single offense. At sentencing, the court applied a dangerous-weapon enhancement based on Sherman’s testimony about having access to handguns while storing drug proceeds at home, resulting in a 262-month imprisonment sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. Sherman argued that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions, the government’s proof of the drug conspiracy varied from the indictment, and the district court erred in applying the dangerous-weapon enhancement. The Third Circuit found that the evidence supported the jury’s verdict, including Sherman’s knowledge and intent regarding the money laundering and drug conspiracy charges. The court also found no impermissible variance between the indictment and the trial evidence and upheld the district court’s application of the dangerous-weapon enhancement. Consequently, the Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "USA v. Sherman" on Justia Law

Jorge Rivera-Guadalupe was living in a rooming house in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, when he was mugged and robbed. His friend, Christopher Valkosak, came to stay with him for protection. The next evening, Valkosak was shot by a stranger in the hallway outside Rivera-Guadalupe’s room. Detective Jacob Pierce investigated the incident, interviewed a neighbor who described the shooter as a tall Black male, and obtained a search warrant for Rivera-Guadalupe’s room. The search yielded marijuana, a knife, and IDs but no gun. Rivera-Guadalupe was arrested and charged with multiple offenses, including attempted homicide and possession of marijuana. He was acquitted of all charges after being incarcerated for over eighteen months.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania dismissed claims against other defendants but allowed the malicious prosecution claim against Det. Pierce to proceed. Det. Pierce sought dismissal based on qualified immunity, arguing that probable cause for some charges precluded a malicious prosecution claim. The District Court, referencing Johnson v. Knorr, held that probable cause for one charge does not insulate officers from liability for malicious prosecution on other charges lacking probable cause. Det. Pierce’s motion for judgment on the pleadings was denied, and he appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that the right to be prosecuted only on charges supported by probable cause was not clearly established at the time of Rivera-Guadalupe’s prosecution due to conflicting precedents within the circuit and among other circuits. The court reversed the District Court’s denial of qualified immunity for Det. Pierce and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss on that basis. The court clarified that the any-crime rule applies to false arrest claims but not to malicious prosecution claims. View "Rivera-Guadalupe v. Pierce" on Justia Law

Francis was identified by an eyewitness as the triggerman in a 2011 fatal shooting on St. Thomas. Francis admitted that he was present during the shooting and claimed Fahie wielded the weapon. Both Fahie and Francis were charged with the murder and related crimes. Francis worked out a plea deal: in exchange for reduced charges, he agreed to testify against Fahie, which he did, swearing that Fahie was the sole shooter. The jury found Fahie guilty. After an unsuccessful appeal to the Virgin Islands Supreme Court, Fahie successfully petitioned the Third Circuit certiorari. That court concluded that it had jurisdiction under the 2012 version of the Organic Act, 48 U.S.C. 1613; upheld the decision to give an “aiding and abetting” instruction, concluding that the theory was presented at trial; and declined to address whether the V.I. Supreme Court used the correct standard to assess whether another supposed error in the jury instructions was harmless. View "Fahie v. People of the Virgin Islands" on Justia Law

Counsel was ineffective in failing to object to jury instruction concerning eyewitness testimony, using the words “may not” rather than “need not.” Bey was convicted of murder, attempted murder, and possessing an instrument of crime, based on a nonfatal shooting and a fatal shooting that took place in 2001. Philadelphia Police Officer Taylor was in the parking lot during the shooting: his identification of Bey as the shooter was consistent and unequivocal. However, in statements to Bey’s then-defense counsel, the surviving victim said that his shooter was not Bey. Defense counsel requested a “Kloiber” jury instruction. In instructing the jury, the court changed a word, telling jurors that they “may not” receive an identification with caution rather than instructing them that they “need not” receive the identification with caution. Defense counsel did not object. In his unsuccessful petition for state post-conviction relief, Bey raised an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on the Kloiber instruction, but failed to highlight the “may not” language. The federal district court held that, to the extent that Bey’s ineffective assistance claims were not procedurally defaulted, Bey could not show prejudice because “there was overwhelming evidence of guilt.” The Third Circuit reversed, based on the Kloiber claim, finding cause to excuse Bey’s procedural default. View "Bey v. Superintendent Greene SCI" on Justia Law

Conviction for failing to report murder does not preclude eligibility for withholding of removal. Flores, a Guatemalan native, entered the U.S. illegally. In 2007, she began and ended a relationship Sibrian. Flores returned to South Carolina with a new boyfriend, Perez, in 2008; Sibrian killed Perez. Flores claims she did not report the murder because Sibrian threatened to kill her and her three-year-old daughter. Flores eventually pleaded guilty to accessory after the fact for failing to report the murder. There was no evidence that Flores covered up the homicide, lied to law enforcement, or assisted Sibrian. After serving her prison term, Flores was removed. She re-entered illegally, was arrested for prostitution, and was detained. She stated that she feared returning to Guatemala because: her father wanted to kill her; she had been raped by local gang member following her previous removal; and she feared persecution as a lesbian. The asylum officer determined that Flores had a reasonable fear of persecution. An IJ found that Flores’s accessory conviction rendered her ineligible for withholding of removal and that Flores failed to adequately establish that she would be subjected to torture in Guatemala, as required by the Convention Against Torture. The BIA affirmed. The Third Circuit remanded. Flores’s accessory-after-the-fact conviction is not an offense “relating to obstruction of justice,” nor is it an “aggravated felony” or a “particularly serious crime” under the statute; Flores is eligible for withholding of removal. View "Flores v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

Pretrial detainee’s due process rights were not violated by placement in administrative segregation and restriction of phone privileges pending investigation of misconduct. While Steele was a pretrial detainee at New Jersey’s Middlesex County Adult Correction Center, officials received credible information that Steele was threatening other detainees in order to coerce them into using Speedy Bail Bond Service and was receiving compensation from Speedy. After interviewing Steele and advising him of the allegations, officials placed him in administrative segregation while they investigated. Steele’s telephone privileges were restricted to legal calls only. Steele filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming violations of his due process rights when the defendants transferred him to administrative segregation and restricted his phone privileges, interfering with his ability to find a co-signer for his own bail. The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment for all defendants. Defendants’ limitation of Steele’s phone privileges did not “shock the conscience.” Steele has not met his heavy burden of showing that defendants exaggerated their response to the genuine security considerations that actuated his move. Steele’s transfer was for institutional security reasons rather than for discipline or punishment and he was accorded the required level of process. View "Steele v. Cicchi" on Justia Law

The Third Circuit affirmed denial of a sentencing reduction while rejecting the government’s “novel” challenge to its jurisdiction. The court concluded that the denial was a final order under 28 U.S.C. 1291 and that 18 U.S.C. 3742(a)(1)does not bar review for reasonableness. In 2012, Rodriguez pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 846, and conspiracy to possess firearms in furtherance of drug trafficking, 18 U.S.C. 924(o). The drug quantity was more than 15 and less than 50 kilograms of cocaine. Rodriguez was also responsible for multiple drug-related robberies. His sentencing range was 120-150 months; he was sentenced to 123 months’ imprisonment. In 2016, Rodriguez sought a sentencing reduction under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2), based on Amendment 782 of the Sentencing Guidelines, which retroactively reduced by two the offense levels for drug quantities that trigger a mandatory minimum sentence. The district court found Rodriguez eligible for an Amendment 782 sentencing reduction, but denied relief in the exercise of its discretion, stating that Rodriguez had engaged in “an unyielding and escalating pattern of drug-related and violent behavior which has been undeterred by prior and substantial terms of imprisonment.” The courts rejected an argument that the sentence was substantively unreasonable, based on the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors. View "United States v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

Repak was the Executive Director of the Johnstown Redevelopment Authority (JRA), which receives federal and state funding. JRA’s Board of Directors awards contracts to remediate industrial proprieties and issues grants, relying on the Executive Director for recommendations. Repak solicited from JRA contractors, items such as concert tickets, sporting event tickets, and golf outings. One contractor testified, Repak “would sometimes . . . provide some innuendos like, ‘I’m reviewing some invoice here of yours.’” In 2009, JRA contractor EADS replaced the roof on Repak’s home at no cost to Repak and another JRA contractor performed excavating services at a gym owned by Repak’s son. Repak was convicted under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a), for knowing obstruction, delay, or effect on commerce “by extortion” through the solicitation and receipt of goods and services, “which were not due him or his office, and to which he was not entitled, . . . in exchange for [his] official action and influence … to facilitate the award of [JRA] contracting work,” and of violations of the federal program bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. 666(a)(1)(B). The Third Circuit affirmed. While the district court’s Rule 404(b) analysis, was lacking, even under a proper Rule 404(b) analysis, the government’s other-acts evidence was admissible. View "United States v. Repak" on Justia Law

While investigating Doe concerning online child pornography, agents executed a warrant and seized iPhones and a computer with attached hard drives, all protected with encryption software. Forensic analysts discovered the password for the computer and found an image of a pubescent girl in a sexually provocative position, logs showing that it had been used to visit sites with titles common in child exploitation, and that Doe had downloaded thousands of known child pornography files, which were stored on the encrypted external drives and could not be accessed. Doe's sister related that Doe had shown her hundreds of child pornography images on those drives. A magistrate, acting under the All Writs Act, ordered Doe to produce his devices and drives in an unencrypted state. Doe did not appeal the order but unsuccessfully moved to quash, arguing that his decrypting the devices would violate his Fifth Amendment privilege. The magistrate held that, because the government possessed Doe’s devices and knew the contents included child pornography, the decryption would not be testimonial. Doe did not appeal. Doe produced the unencrypted iPhone, which contained adult pornography, a video of Doe’s four-year-old niece wearing only underwear, and approximately 20 photographs focused on the genitals of Doe’s six-year-old niece. Doe stated that he could not remember the hard drive passwords and entered incorrect passwords during the examination. The court held Doe in civil contempt and ordered his incarceration. The Third Circuit affirmed, noting that Doe bore the burden of proving that he could not produce the passwords and had waived his Fifth Amendment arguments. View "United States v. Apple Macpro Computer" on Justia Law