Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

An employee of a telecommunications company, who also served as a union representative, was charged with defrauding a pharmacy benefits management company by orchestrating the submission of fraudulent claims for compounded medications. The government alleged that he induced another individual to obtain medically unnecessary compounded drugs and arranged for a doctor to sign prescriptions without a medical examination or determination of necessity. The prescriptions were then used to submit claims to the company’s health plan, and the employee received a percentage of the reimbursement. The government further alleged that the employee paid the individual to participate in the scheme and later instructed him to lie to investigators.The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the superseding indictment. The court found that the indictment failed to allege any actionable misrepresentation or omission under 18 U.S.C. § 1347, did not specify how the fraudulent claims were submitted or by whom, and did not identify any false statements or omissions in the claims. The court also expressed concern about the use of the term “medically unnecessary,” finding it vague and undefined.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the sufficiency of the indictment de novo. The Third Circuit held that the indictment adequately alleged an implicit misrepresentation: that the prescriptions, incorporated into the claims, falsely implied medical necessity and a legitimate doctor-patient relationship. The court found that such implicit misrepresentations are actionable under the health care fraud statute. The court also determined that the indictment’s language was sufficiently clear to apprise the defendant of the charges. Accordingly, the Third Circuit reversed the District Court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "USA v. Mattia" on Justia Law

Nita and Kirtish Patel operated two companies that provided mobile diagnostic medical services. To obtain Medicare reimbursement for neurological testing, they falsely represented that a licensed neurologist would supervise the tests. In reality, Kirtish, who lacked a medical license, wrote the reports, and Nita forged a physician’s signature. Their fraudulent scheme generated over $4 million, including substantial Medicare payments.In 2014, a former employee filed a sealed qui tam action in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, alleging healthcare fraud and asserting claims under the False Claims Act. The Patels were subsequently arrested and each pleaded guilty to one count of healthcare fraud. Their plea agreements did not address or preclude future civil or administrative actions. After their guilty pleas, the Government intervened in the qui tam action and obtained summary judgment against the Patels, relying on collateral estoppel from their criminal admissions. The District Court trebled the Medicare loss and imposed civil penalties, resulting in a judgment exceeding $7 million. Nita appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed her liability under the False Claims Act.Both Patels later moved to vacate their criminal sentences under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel because their attorneys did not advise them that their guilty pleas could have collateral estoppel effects in the civil qui tam action. The District Court denied their motions, finding that counsel’s performance was not objectively unreasonable and that the Patels were aware their plea agreements did not preclude civil actions.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the Sixth Amendment does not require criminal defense counsel to advise clients of collateral consequences such as civil liability under the False Claims Act. The court affirmed the District Court’s judgment, concluding that Padilla v. Kentucky’s holding is limited to deportation consequences and does not extend to civil liability. View "Patel v. USA" on Justia Law

Two men were apprehended by the United States Coast Guard in international waters south of Puerto Rico after being observed jettisoning bales of cocaine from a vessel that lacked any indication of nationality. The Coast Guard recovered approximately 306 kilograms of cocaine and eventually transported the men, including the appellant, to St. Thomas in the U.S. Virgin Islands. The government asserted that the men were never brought to Puerto Rico, though the appellant disputed this. A grand jury in the District of the Virgin Islands indicted the appellant on multiple drug trafficking charges under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA), as well as related offenses.The appellant moved to dismiss the indictment for improper venue, arguing that the MDLEA’s “any district” venue provision was unconstitutional and that venue was proper in Puerto Rico, where he claimed he was first brought. He also sought a pretrial evidentiary hearing on venue and the issuance of subpoenas for Coast Guard witnesses. The United States District Court of the Virgin Islands denied these motions, holding that the MDLEA’s venue provision was constitutional and that the Virgin Islands was a proper venue. The court also found that mere passage through Puerto Rico’s territorial waters did not constitute being “first brought” there under 18 U.S.C. § 3238, and denied the request for an evidentiary hearing, finding no colorable factual dispute that would affect the outcome.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the District Court’s decisions. The Third Circuit held that the MDLEA’s “any district” venue provision is constitutional, both facially and as applied, for offenses committed on the high seas. The court also found that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying a pretrial evidentiary hearing on venue. Accordingly, the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s orders. View "USA v. Cuevas-Almonte" on Justia Law

A federal inmate serving a 210-month sentence challenged the method used by the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to calculate his good conduct time credits under 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1), as amended by the First Step Act of 2018. The inmate argued that, following the amendments, he should receive a full 54 days of good conduct time credit for the last six months of his sentence, rather than a prorated amount. The BOP, however, interpreted the amended statute to require prorating the credit for any partial year, resulting in the inmate receiving 26 days of credit for the final six months instead of 54.The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey denied the inmate’s habeas petition. The court found that the plain language of the amended statute allowed for proration of good conduct time credits for partial years. As an alternative basis, the District Court also relied on Chevron deference to uphold the BOP’s interpretation. The court rejected the inmate’s additional claims under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the Due Process Clause, finding them either precluded by statute or inapplicable to the rulemaking context.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the statutory interpretation de novo. The Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment, holding that the First Step Act’s amendments, while deleting the word “prorated,” introduced language (“for each year”) that sets a rate of 54 days per year, thereby requiring proration for any partial year. The court concluded that the statute’s natural reading supports the BOP’s method of prorating credits for the last portion of a sentence. The Third Circuit also rejected the inmate’s constitutional and APA-based arguments, and found no basis for applying the rule of lenity. View "Thieme v. Warden Fort Dix FCI" on Justia Law

A Nigerian citizen who became a lawful permanent resident of the United States in 2005 was placed in removal proceedings after being convicted of conspiracy to commit passport fraud. He had lived in the U.S. for many years, had a long-term partner, and was the father of four U.S. citizen children. His conviction stemmed from a scheme to obtain fraudulent U.S. passports for noncitizens, for which he was sentenced to 27 months in prison. After serving his sentence and briefly fleeing to Canada, he was returned to the U.S. and charged as inadmissible for committing a crime involving moral turpitude. In removal proceedings, he applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), claiming past persecution and fear of future harm in Nigeria due to his former union activities and threats from a militia group.An Immigration Judge (IJ) found him inadmissible, denied all forms of relief, and determined that his conviction constituted a particularly serious crime, barring asylum and withholding. The IJ also found his and his partner’s testimony not credible and denied CAT relief, concluding he had not shown a likelihood of torture with government acquiescence. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed, agreeing with the IJ’s findings and further holding that the absence of an interpreter did not violate due process, that the conviction was a particularly serious crime, and that he was not eligible for a waiver of inadmissibility.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the BIA misapplied the legal standard for determining a particularly serious crime by failing to consider the elements of the underlying substantive offense in the conspiracy conviction. The court also found that the BIA did not properly analyze the CAT claim under the required legal framework and failed to consider eligibility for a waiver of inadmissibility. The court denied the due process claim but vacated the BIA’s decision and remanded for further proceedings, ordering a stay of removal pending the outcome. View "Amos v. Attorney General United States of America" on Justia Law

Natalya Shvets was convicted by a jury in 2014 for healthcare fraud and conspiracy to commit healthcare fraud, stemming from her role as a nurse at Home Care Hospice, Inc. (HCH). Evidence showed she and other employees created false records for high-priced “continuous care” services, resulting in fraudulent bills submitted to Medicare. Shvets was ordered to pay $253,196 in restitution, jointly and severally with eight other defendants, for her involvement in 52 false bills. The broader scheme allegedly caused $16.2 million in losses to Medicare, with seventeen individuals ordered to pay varying restitution amounts.After sentencing in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Shvets moved for an accounting and to declare her restitution judgment satisfied, arguing that payments by herself and her jointly liable co-defendants had collectively exceeded $253,196. The District Court, relying on United States v. Sheets, held that Shvets’s judgment would not be satisfied until she personally paid the full amount or until all defendants collectively paid $16.2 million. The Clerk of Court, using a complex allocation method, also reported Shvets’s balance as outstanding, but the District Court did not resolve whether the Clerk’s method was correct.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The Court held that sentencing judges may issue “hybrid” restitution orders under the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act, combining joint and several liability with apportioned liability. The Court found the District Court erred by applying the Sheets rule, which conflicted with the language of Shvets’s judgment. The Third Circuit directed the District Court to determine whether the Clerk’s accounting method is fair and appropriate, and to decide if Shvets’s restitution judgment has been satisfied. View "United States v. Shvets" on Justia Law

The defendant was previously convicted in North Carolina of indecent liberties with a child, which required him to register as a sex offender under federal law. He complied with federal registration requirements after moving to New York in 2017 and again after moving within New York in 2018. However, he failed to comply with New York’s separate annual address verification requirement after 2018. In 2023, after moving to Pennsylvania, he also failed to update his federal sex offender registration as required by the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). He was indicted and pleaded guilty to knowingly failing to update his federal registration after interstate travel, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a).The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, relying on the Presentence Investigation Report, calculated the defendant’s criminal history score by including three prior sentences from 2010 and 2011. The Probation Office and the District Court reasoned that the “commencement of the instant offense” for purposes of the Sentencing Guidelines’ criminal history look-back period included not only the conduct underlying the federal conviction but also “relevant conduct,” specifically the earlier New York state registration violations. This interpretation resulted in a higher criminal history category and a longer advisory sentencing range.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the District Court’s interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo. The Third Circuit held that the phrase “commencement of the instant offense” in U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(e) unambiguously refers only to the start of the conduct constituting the offense of conviction, not to other “relevant conduct.” Therefore, the District Court erred by including the earlier state-law violations in its calculation. The Third Circuit vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing using the correct criminal history category. View "USA v. Josey" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant broke into two gun stores in 2016, stealing a total of sixty-nine guns, a digital video recorder, and a cash register. Many of the stolen guns were later recovered from the defendant’s residence and vehicle. The thefts caused property damage to the stores, and the stores had to close for a week to recover from the incidents. The defendant pleaded guilty to stealing guns from federal firearms licensees and conspiracy, and as part of his plea agreement, he agreed to pay restitution.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania initially ordered restitution without accounting for insurance payments or the return of some stolen guns. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit remanded the case for recalculation of the restitution amount, instructing the District Court to subtract any reimbursements. On remand, after an evidentiary hearing with testimony from the store owners and a federal agent, the District Court ordered the defendant to pay $57,044.96 in restitution, including the full retail value of the stolen guns and a week’s worth of lost income for each store.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and held that the District Court erred by awarding restitution for lost income, as this resulted in double-counting the value of the stolen guns and included consequential damages not permitted under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act. The Third Circuit vacated the lost-income portion of the restitution award and remanded for correction, but affirmed the remainder of the award, finding that the evidence supported the calculation of the value of the stolen guns and property damage. View "USA v. McCormack" on Justia Law

Rajeri Curry was investigated for drug trafficking after purchasing heroin and fentanyl in bulk from two brothers, Al-Tariq and Shadee Brown. Following a fatal overdose linked to drugs Curry sold, police arrested her and seized her iPhone. After being read her Miranda rights, Curry requested a lawyer. Detectives then asked for consent to search her phone, explaining that refusal would lead to a warrant and possible data loss. Concerned about losing her files, Curry provided her passcode and signed a consent form. The detectives did not question her about the charged offenses during this interaction.Curry was indicted in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey for conspiracy to distribute heroin and fentanyl, possession with intent to distribute, and distribution resulting in death. Before trial, she moved to suppress evidence obtained from her phone, arguing it was inadmissible due to a violation of the Edwards v. Arizona rule. The District Court denied the motion, admitted the evidence, and allowed the prosecution to introduce Curry’s prior drug convictions. After trial, the jury convicted Curry of conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute, but did not reach a verdict on the distribution resulting in death count. The District Court denied Curry’s motion for judgment of acquittal and sentenced her as a career offender to 216 months’ imprisonment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that evidence derived from Curry’s phone was not subject to suppression under Edwards v. Arizona because Curry voluntarily provided her passcode and consented to the search. The court affirmed the District Court’s judgment, finding no error in the denial of the suppression motion, the sufficiency of evidence for conspiracy, the admission of prior convictions under Rule 404(b), and the application of the career-offender sentencing enhancement. View "USA v. Curry" on Justia Law

Marquis Smalls pleaded guilty in 2013 to conspiring to distribute heroin and was sentenced by the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey to 110 months’ imprisonment followed by five years of supervised release. His supervised release was conditioned on compliance with certain terms, including not committing new crimes or illegally possessing controlled substances. After his release in December 2020, Smalls repeatedly violated these conditions, resulting in multiple periods of home detention. In June 2024, he was arrested by state officials on heroin-trafficking charges, and the United States Probation Office charged him with eight violations of supervised release, successfully petitioning for a federal arrest warrant. Upon release from state custody, Smalls was transferred to federal custody and presented before the District Court for an initial appearance, where he was ordered detained pending a final revocation hearing. Smalls waived his right to a preliminary hearing.Smalls later moved for release from custody, citing a district court opinion from the District of Connecticut in United States v. Mercado, which held that no statute authorized pre-revocation detention for supervised release violations. The District Court for the District of New Jersey denied Smalls’s motion, finding it had authority to detain him under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(a)(6) and 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(1), based on flight risk and danger to the community. Smalls appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which denied his motion for release in a summary order. Smalls then filed a petition for rehearing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit granted the petition for rehearing to provide a precedential explanation but again denied Smalls’s motion for release. The court held that 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(1) authorizes detention of a defendant alleged to have violated supervised release pending revocation proceedings, as such detention is part of the execution of the original sentence. The court affirmed the District Court’s authority to detain Smalls pending his final revocation hearing. View "USA v. Smalls" on Justia Law