Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Natalya Shvets was convicted by a jury in 2014 for healthcare fraud and conspiracy to commit healthcare fraud, stemming from her role as a nurse at Home Care Hospice, Inc. (HCH). Evidence showed she and other employees created false records for high-priced “continuous care” services, resulting in fraudulent bills submitted to Medicare. Shvets was ordered to pay $253,196 in restitution, jointly and severally with eight other defendants, for her involvement in 52 false bills. The broader scheme allegedly caused $16.2 million in losses to Medicare, with seventeen individuals ordered to pay varying restitution amounts.After sentencing in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Shvets moved for an accounting and to declare her restitution judgment satisfied, arguing that payments by herself and her jointly liable co-defendants had collectively exceeded $253,196. The District Court, relying on United States v. Sheets, held that Shvets’s judgment would not be satisfied until she personally paid the full amount or until all defendants collectively paid $16.2 million. The Clerk of Court, using a complex allocation method, also reported Shvets’s balance as outstanding, but the District Court did not resolve whether the Clerk’s method was correct.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The Court held that sentencing judges may issue “hybrid” restitution orders under the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act, combining joint and several liability with apportioned liability. The Court found the District Court erred by applying the Sheets rule, which conflicted with the language of Shvets’s judgment. The Third Circuit directed the District Court to determine whether the Clerk’s accounting method is fair and appropriate, and to decide if Shvets’s restitution judgment has been satisfied. View "United States v. Shvets" on Justia Law

The defendant was previously convicted in North Carolina of indecent liberties with a child, which required him to register as a sex offender under federal law. He complied with federal registration requirements after moving to New York in 2017 and again after moving within New York in 2018. However, he failed to comply with New York’s separate annual address verification requirement after 2018. In 2023, after moving to Pennsylvania, he also failed to update his federal sex offender registration as required by the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). He was indicted and pleaded guilty to knowingly failing to update his federal registration after interstate travel, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a).The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, relying on the Presentence Investigation Report, calculated the defendant’s criminal history score by including three prior sentences from 2010 and 2011. The Probation Office and the District Court reasoned that the “commencement of the instant offense” for purposes of the Sentencing Guidelines’ criminal history look-back period included not only the conduct underlying the federal conviction but also “relevant conduct,” specifically the earlier New York state registration violations. This interpretation resulted in a higher criminal history category and a longer advisory sentencing range.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the District Court’s interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo. The Third Circuit held that the phrase “commencement of the instant offense” in U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(e) unambiguously refers only to the start of the conduct constituting the offense of conviction, not to other “relevant conduct.” Therefore, the District Court erred by including the earlier state-law violations in its calculation. The Third Circuit vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing using the correct criminal history category. View "USA v. Josey" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant broke into two gun stores in 2016, stealing a total of sixty-nine guns, a digital video recorder, and a cash register. Many of the stolen guns were later recovered from the defendant’s residence and vehicle. The thefts caused property damage to the stores, and the stores had to close for a week to recover from the incidents. The defendant pleaded guilty to stealing guns from federal firearms licensees and conspiracy, and as part of his plea agreement, he agreed to pay restitution.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania initially ordered restitution without accounting for insurance payments or the return of some stolen guns. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit remanded the case for recalculation of the restitution amount, instructing the District Court to subtract any reimbursements. On remand, after an evidentiary hearing with testimony from the store owners and a federal agent, the District Court ordered the defendant to pay $57,044.96 in restitution, including the full retail value of the stolen guns and a week’s worth of lost income for each store.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and held that the District Court erred by awarding restitution for lost income, as this resulted in double-counting the value of the stolen guns and included consequential damages not permitted under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act. The Third Circuit vacated the lost-income portion of the restitution award and remanded for correction, but affirmed the remainder of the award, finding that the evidence supported the calculation of the value of the stolen guns and property damage. View "USA v. McCormack" on Justia Law

Rajeri Curry was investigated for drug trafficking after purchasing heroin and fentanyl in bulk from two brothers, Al-Tariq and Shadee Brown. Following a fatal overdose linked to drugs Curry sold, police arrested her and seized her iPhone. After being read her Miranda rights, Curry requested a lawyer. Detectives then asked for consent to search her phone, explaining that refusal would lead to a warrant and possible data loss. Concerned about losing her files, Curry provided her passcode and signed a consent form. The detectives did not question her about the charged offenses during this interaction.Curry was indicted in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey for conspiracy to distribute heroin and fentanyl, possession with intent to distribute, and distribution resulting in death. Before trial, she moved to suppress evidence obtained from her phone, arguing it was inadmissible due to a violation of the Edwards v. Arizona rule. The District Court denied the motion, admitted the evidence, and allowed the prosecution to introduce Curry’s prior drug convictions. After trial, the jury convicted Curry of conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute, but did not reach a verdict on the distribution resulting in death count. The District Court denied Curry’s motion for judgment of acquittal and sentenced her as a career offender to 216 months’ imprisonment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that evidence derived from Curry’s phone was not subject to suppression under Edwards v. Arizona because Curry voluntarily provided her passcode and consented to the search. The court affirmed the District Court’s judgment, finding no error in the denial of the suppression motion, the sufficiency of evidence for conspiracy, the admission of prior convictions under Rule 404(b), and the application of the career-offender sentencing enhancement. View "USA v. Curry" on Justia Law

Marquis Smalls pleaded guilty in 2013 to conspiring to distribute heroin and was sentenced by the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey to 110 months’ imprisonment followed by five years of supervised release. His supervised release was conditioned on compliance with certain terms, including not committing new crimes or illegally possessing controlled substances. After his release in December 2020, Smalls repeatedly violated these conditions, resulting in multiple periods of home detention. In June 2024, he was arrested by state officials on heroin-trafficking charges, and the United States Probation Office charged him with eight violations of supervised release, successfully petitioning for a federal arrest warrant. Upon release from state custody, Smalls was transferred to federal custody and presented before the District Court for an initial appearance, where he was ordered detained pending a final revocation hearing. Smalls waived his right to a preliminary hearing.Smalls later moved for release from custody, citing a district court opinion from the District of Connecticut in United States v. Mercado, which held that no statute authorized pre-revocation detention for supervised release violations. The District Court for the District of New Jersey denied Smalls’s motion, finding it had authority to detain him under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(a)(6) and 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(1), based on flight risk and danger to the community. Smalls appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which denied his motion for release in a summary order. Smalls then filed a petition for rehearing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit granted the petition for rehearing to provide a precedential explanation but again denied Smalls’s motion for release. The court held that 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(1) authorizes detention of a defendant alleged to have violated supervised release pending revocation proceedings, as such detention is part of the execution of the original sentence. The court affirmed the District Court’s authority to detain Smalls pending his final revocation hearing. View "USA v. Smalls" on Justia Law

Two employees of a debt-collection firm, one of whom was out sick with COVID-19, collaborated to resolve an urgent licensing issue for their employer. The employee at home, unable to access her work computer, asked her colleague to log in using her credentials and retrieve a spreadsheet containing passwords for various company systems. The colleague, with express permission, accessed the computer and emailed the spreadsheet to the employee’s personal and work email accounts. Both actions violated the employer’s internal computer-use policies. Separately, the employee at home had, over several years, moved accounts into her workgroup to receive performance bonuses, believing she was eligible for them. Both employees also alleged persistent sexual harassment at work, which led to internal complaints, one employee’s resignation, and the other’s termination.After these events, the employer, National Recovery Agency (NRA), sued both employees in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, alleging violations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), federal and state trade secrets laws, civil conspiracy, breach of fiduciary duty, and fraud. The employees counterclaimed for sexual harassment and related employment claims. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court entered judgment for the employees on all claims brought by NRA, finding no violations of the CFAA or trade secrets laws, and stayed the employees’ harassment claims pending appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the District Court’s judgment in full. The Third Circuit held, first, that the CFAA does not criminalize violations of workplace computer-use policies by employees with authorized access, absent evidence of hacking or code-based circumvention. Second, it held that passwords protecting proprietary business information do not, by themselves, constitute trade secrets under federal or Pennsylvania law. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the state-law tort claims. View "NRA Group LLC v. Durenleau" on Justia Law

Two individuals operated a large-scale heroin trafficking operation, transporting significant quantities of heroin from New Jersey to Pennsylvania. Law enforcement, using information from an informant, initiated an investigation that included wiretaps on the suspects’ phones. The wiretap application was signed by the First Deputy Attorney General, acting on the authority of the Pennsylvania Attorney General, who was out of the country at the time. The investigation led to the arrest of both men, the seizure of heroin, cash, and firearms, and the discovery of their involvement in witness tampering, including the murder and attempted murder of two women connected to the case.The United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania denied the defendants’ motion to suppress the wiretap evidence, finding that the First Deputy Attorney General was properly authorized under state law to submit the application. After a jury trial, both defendants were convicted of drug and firearm offenses, with one also convicted of witness tampering resulting in death and attempted murder. The court sentenced one defendant to 380 months in prison and the other to life imprisonment plus additional consecutive terms. Both appealed, raising issues regarding the wiretap’s legality, alleged constructive amendment of the indictment, jury instructions, sufficiency of the evidence, and sentencing errors.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentences for one defendant in full. For the other, the court affirmed all convictions and sentences except for the consecutive 25-year sentence imposed for using a firearm to commit murder under 18 U.S.C. § 924(j). The court held that, in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Lora v. United States, a consecutive sentence is not mandatory under § 924(j), and thus vacated and remanded for resentencing on that count. All other claims for relief were rejected. View "USA v. Perrin" on Justia Law

Carl Rose was serving a term of supervised release after completing a federal sentence for drug and firearm offenses. During this period, he was alleged to have violated the terms of his supervision by testing positive for marijuana, absconding from supervision, and, most significantly, committing aggravated assault and possessing a firearm. The aggravated assault allegation stemmed from an incident in which a victim reported that Rose entered her bedroom, brandished a firearm, demanded money, and stabbed her multiple times before fleeing. Although state charges for aggravated assault were dismissed when the victim failed to appear in court, Rose pled guilty to prohibited possession of a firearm.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held a supervised release revocation hearing. Rose did not contest the firearm possession violation, so the hearing focused on the aggravated assault allegation. The government presented testimony from law enforcement officers and introduced body camera footage showing the victim identifying Rose as her attacker. The victim did not testify at the hearing, and her out-of-court statements were admitted over Rose’s objection. The District Court found that the government had made diligent efforts to locate the victim, who was herself a fugitive, and concluded that her statements were sufficiently reliable and that there was good cause for her absence. The court revoked Rose’s supervised release and sentenced him to 48 months’ imprisonment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed whether the District Court erred in admitting the victim’s hearsay statements without live testimony, considering Rose’s confrontation rights. The Third Circuit held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion. It found the victim’s statements reliable due to corroborating evidence and determined that the government had shown good cause for her absence. The judgment of the District Court was affirmed. View "United States v. Rose" on Justia Law

Philadelphia police officers stopped a car driven by Raphael Ross for having illegally tinted windows in a high-crime area. During the stop, Ross appeared extremely nervous, displaying shaking hands, a stammering voice, and erratic movements with his jacket inside the car. After Ross produced expired insurance and registration and claimed to have left his license elsewhere, Officer Smart complimented Ross’s Rolex watch and asked where he worked. Ross replied that he owned a home health aide business. Officer Smart then returned to his patrol car to check Ross’s information, discovering a recent firearm arrest. Meanwhile, Officer Foreman observed continued nervous behavior and noncompliance with her instructions. After backup arrived, officers frisked Ross and searched his car, finding a gun and drugs.Ross was charged in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania with firearm and drug offenses. He moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the officer’s questions about his watch and employment unlawfully extended the stop under the Fourth Amendment, as interpreted by Rodriguez v. United States. The District Court denied the motion, finding the brief exchange to be permissible small talk aimed at calming Ross and not an unconstitutional extension of the stop. Ross pleaded guilty but reserved his right to appeal the suppression ruling.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that brief, safety-related small talk—such as complimenting a watch and asking about employment—does not violate the Fourth Amendment if it is intended to deescalate tension and does not measurably prolong the stop. The court found that the officers’ actions were reasonable given Ross’s nervous behavior and affirmed the District Court’s denial of the suppression motion and Ross’s conviction. View "USA v. Ross" on Justia Law

Paul Harmon, who had worked for decades as an accountant and controller at a family-owned electrical engineering firm, embezzled over a million dollars from the company. His actions led to significant financial losses for the business and its employees, including legal and accounting costs, overpaid taxes, and the eventual closure of the company. The president of the company detailed these hardships in a victim impact statement and letter submitted at Harmon’s sentencing.After Harmon pled guilty to wire fraud in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, the court imposed an upwardly varied sentence of 72 months, citing the severe impact of his crimes on the victims and the business. The presentence report and the government did not recommend, and the court did not apply, a sentencing enhancement for causing “substantial financial hardship.” In 2024, Harmon sought a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) based on a new, retroactive Sentencing Guideline provision, U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1, which excludes defendants who caused substantial financial hardship. The government did not oppose the motion. The District Court denied the reduction, relying on the earlier victim impact materials to find Harmon ineligible, and did not provide him an opportunity to contest those materials at this stage.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. It held that due process protections under U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3(a)—requiring notice and an opportunity to contest new information—apply to sentence reduction motions under § 3582(c)(2). However, the court concluded that the victim impact statement and letter were not “new information” because they had already been relied upon at the original sentencing to find material facts. Therefore, the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s denial of Harmon’s motion for a sentence reduction. View "USA v. Harmon" on Justia Law