Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Before his trial for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 846, Jackson unsuccessfully moved to suppress evidence of coconspirators’ cellphone calls intercepted as authorized by court orders. The interceptions, pursuant to Title III of the federal Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, comprised a significant amount of the trial evidence, though Jackson was a participant in only a few calls. Intercepted calls were placed and received outside Pennsylvania, but concerned, in part, cocaine trafficking in Pennsylvania. A Pennsylvania state court had authorized wiretaps sought by state law enforcement officers and information obtained from those wiretaps was used in affidavits when federal wiretap orders were sought. Jackson argued that the state court lacked jurisdiction to permit the underlying wiretaps of cellphones outside of Pennsylvania. The Third Circuit affirmed Jackson’s conviction, upholding the denial of the motion to suppress; admission of a case agent’s testimony interpreting the contents of telephone calls; admission of co-conspirators’ testimony about their convictions and guilty pleas for the same crime; and the prosecutor’s mention of a co-conspirator’s Fifth Amendment right not to testify when she was prompted to identify the evidentiary rule that permitted the admission into evidence of what otherwise would have been inadmissible hearsay. View "United States v. Jackson" on Justia Law

Brown and others were charged in a 69-count indictment with crimes related to multiple conspiracies to purchase, transport, and distribute cocaine as part of an enterprise organized by Tapia, a Virgin Islands law enforcement officer. Only Brown and Hill proceeded to trial. Although both were connected to the enterprise, there was no allegation that the two conspired with one another. Brown communicated with and helped deliver cocaine to Tapia, while Hill assisted in the subsequent transportation of the purchased cocaine. Before trial, the court observed that, “[w]hile initially there was an overarching conspiracy, there is none now. And nothing that ties the two defendants together … [o]ut of an abundance of caution,” the court decided to impanel two juries. Counsel agreed. His jury convicted Brown for using a communication to facilitate a drug crime, 21 U.S.C. 843(b); (d)(1); 18 U.S.C. 2. He was acquitted on nine other counts. The court calculated the guideline range of imprisonment as 78-97 months. Because the minimum term under the guidelines exceeded the statutory maximum sentence, the court sentenced Brown to 48 months. Brown did not object. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the use of dual juries violated Brown’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights and that the sentencing court should have solicited objections. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

Douglas was charged with conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 846, and conspiracy to engage in money laundering, 18 U.S.C. 1956(h). While on bail, Douglas booked a flight to Jamaica. The district court did not revoke his bail. Douglas failed to appear for the first day of trial. The next day he submitted documents showing that he had been admitted to the emergency room, with chest pain. Douglas’s EKG revealed possible heart blockage. His blood tests indicated he had an abnormal white blood cell count and an elevated enzyme level that can indicate a heart attack. The court stated that “[t]here’s no solid evidence … that he was suffering from a medical condition.” He was convicted. The PSR recommended that Douglas be held responsible for 450 kilograms of cocaine; a two-level enhancement because Douglas had been convicted of conspiracy to engage in money laundering; a two-level enhancement for abuse of a position of trust; and a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice, resulting in a Guidelines sentence of life imprisonment. The court noted testimony that Douglas smuggled 10-13 kilograms of cocaine, 40-50 times, that Douglas used his airport security clearance, and Douglas’s failure to appear, and imposed a sentence of 240 months’ imprisonment. The Third Circuit upheld the court’s conclusion regarding drug quantity and its application of the enhancement for abuse of a position of trust, but reversed the enhancement for obstruction of justice. View "United States v. Douglas" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, inmates in the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, were each sentenced to death and housed on the death row of his respective institution. Eventually, their death sentences were vacated, but several years elapsed before they were resentenced to life without parole. In the interim, Plaintiffs spent several years in the solitary confinement of death row. They sought damages, alleging violation of their Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process by continuing to subject them to the deprivations of solitary confinement on death row without meaningful review of their placements after their death sentences had been vacated. The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. There is a constitutionally protected liberty interest that prohibits the state from continuing to house inmates in solitary confinement on death row after they have been granted resentencing hearings, without meaningful review of the continuing placement, however that principle was not previously clearly established, so prison officials are entitled to qualified immunity. The court noted scientific consensus concerning the harms of solitary confinement and recent precedent involving non-death row solitary confinement. View "Williams v. Secretary Pennsylvania Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

An informant told a Pennsylvania State Trooper that Steiner, a convicted felon, was staying in a camper on the informant’s property and had a sawed-off shotgun, which Steiner called a “cop killer.” The officer obtained a search warrant and told the informant to drive Steiner to a gas station, where officers would arrest Steiner on a warrant that had issued for Steiner’s failure to appear on an unrelated sexual assault charge. Executing the warrant, police seized a shotgun and ammunition. The informant stated that he had seen missing pieces of the shotgun at Steiner's home; police obtained another warrant for that home, where they found those parts and more ammunition. Steiner was convicted as a felon-in-possession of ammunition, 18 U.S.C. 922(g), and sentenced to an 87-month prison term. The Third Circuit affirmed, upholding admission of the evidence related to the sexual assault warrant and the court’s failure to instruct the jury that it was required to reach a unanimous verdict. Following remand by the Supreme Court, for reconsideration under its 2016 decision, Mathis v. United States, concerning predicate offenses and the “categorical approach,” the Third Circuit affirmed the conviction as unaffected by Mathis, but vacated the sentence. The district court used a 1993 Pennsylvania burglary conviction as a predicate “crime of violence” under the Sentencing Guidelines, which was plain error; Steiner’s Guidelines range should not have been enhanced. View "United States v. Steiner" on Justia Law

Doe was president and “sole proprietor” of Company A, but a 2008 document purports to memorialize Doe’s sale of all shares to Company B for $10,000. Numerous filings and tax documents suggested that Doe maintained control and ownership of Company A after the transfer. Multiple individuals have sued Doe and his businesses in state courts. Doe and the companies were investigated by a federal grand jury. The government obtained access to Doe’s email. Doe filed an interlocutory appeal to prevent its disclosure. While the appeal was pending, the district court granted permission to present the email to the grand jury, finding that although the email was protected by the work product privilege, the crime-fraud exception applied; in 2016, the grand jury returned an indictment, charging conspiracy to violate the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, conspiracy, mail fraud, wire fraud, and money laundering. The Third Circuit initially dismissed an interlocutory appeal, but, on rehearing, reversed, concluding that, while the grand jury investigation continues, it retains jurisdiction, and that the crime-fraud exception did not apply. The court stripped an attorney’s work product of confidentiality based on evidence suggesting only that the client had thought about using that product to facilitate fraud, not that the client had actually done so. An actual act to further the fraud is required before attorney work product loses its confidentiality. View "In re: Grand Jury Matter #3" on Justia Law

Coleman was tried with others for his involvement in a 1989 gang-related shooting in a restaurant. The trial included 76 prosecution witnesses, only one of whom testified as to Coleman’s involvement. Coleman was convicted of first-degree murder, two counts of aggravated assault, criminal conspiracy, and possession of an instrument of a crime, but acquitted of violating the Pennsylvania Corrupt Organizations Act (PCOA). Two years after Coleman’s convictions became final, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held (Besch) that PCOA did not apply to an individual’s participation in a wholly illegitimate enterprise. Under Besch. Coleman could not have been charged with a PCOA violation because the gang was wholly illegitimate. Coleman failed to raise Besch when he twice, unsuccessfully, sought state post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. In 2014, Coleman sought federal habeas relief, arguing that he was denied due process because the evidence introduced against his codefendants was unfairly imputed to him. He asserted that his claim should be considered under the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception to the time limit imposed by the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and principles of equitable tolling. The district court dismissed. The Third Circuit affirmed. Coleman cannot satisfy the actual innocence requirement of the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception to AEDPA View "Coleman v. Superintendent Greene SCI" on Justia Law

In 1996, Gardner and others were convicted of racketeering, racketeering conspiracy, conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance, conspiracy to commit murder, murder in aid of racketeering, carjacking resulting in death, and using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence causing death. Gardner was sentenced to concurrent terms of life imprisonment on each count and 120 months on Count 4. The Fourth Circuit affirmed on direct appeal and, later, denial of his petition under 28 U.S.C. 2255, asserting ineffective assistance of counsel. In 2014, Gardner sought habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2241, citing the Supreme Court’s intervening “Alleyne” holding that “[a]ny fact that, by law, increases the [mandatory minimum] penalty for a crime is an ‘element’ that must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt.” The district court dismissed, finding that Gardner’s claims should have been raised in a section 2255 motion in the court that sentenced him. The Third Circuit affirmed, noting section 2241’s limited scope. Alleyne simply extended the logic of Apprendi to mandatory minimums for criminal sentences; neither makes previously criminal conduct noncriminal. Because section 2255 is not inadequate or ineffective to raise an Apprendi argument, it is not inadequate or ineffective to raise an Alleyne argument. View "Gardner v. Warden Lewisburg USP" on Justia Law

Mateo-Medina, a citizen of the Dominican Republic, was deported in 2012 after serving five months for unlawfully obtaining a U.S. passport. Shortly after his deportation, his common-law wife, Rasuk, a U.S. citizen with whom Mateo-Medina had lived for 15 years, was diagnosed with terminal cancer. Rasuk had two adult sons from a prior marriage, both drug addicts. One lived with the couple; the couple was raising the young child (Angel) of her other son. When Mateo-Medina learned of the diagnosis, he returned to the U.S. to care for Rasuk, who died in 2014. Mateo-Medina became Angel’s sole caretaker. Rasuk’s son reported Mateo-Medina to immigration authorities. He pled guilty to reentry after removal, 8 U.S.C. 1326(a); (b)(2). Mateo-Medina’s PSR calculated a sentence of eight-to-14 months’ imprisonment. Mateo-Medina had a 2000 DUI conviction, the 2012 fraudulent passport conviction, and six arrests that did not lead to conviction. The PSR did not contain any information about the conduct underlying those arrests. The court departed downward one level; the prosecutor and the defense argued for a sentence of time served (six months), the lower end of the Guidelines range. The court sentenced Mateo-Medina to 12 months plus one day. The Third Circuit vacated the sentence, finding that the court mischaracterized Mateo-Medina’s criminal history in a way that affected his sentence. View "United States v. Mateo-Medina" on Justia Law

Robinson robbed a Subway restaurant with a gun. Later that day, he robbed Anna’s Linens store, using a handgun. Both robberies were recorded by video cameras. The next day, the Subway cashier recognized Robinson on the street and notified police. Robinson was arrested. Suspecting that Robinson might have committed the Anna’s robbery, a Philadelphia detective prepared a photo array. The Anna’s cashier identified Robinson. Charged with two counts of robbery by means of actual and threatened force, violence and fear of injury, by brandishing a handgun (18 U.S.C. 1951(a), Hobbs Act), and two counts of using and carrying a firearm during a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c), Robinson sought to proceed pro se. During a hearing, Robinson changed his mind. Later, following his unsuccessful motion to suppress the photo identification, Robinson orally requested to proceed pro se. The court directed him to file a motion. No motion was filed. Robinson was sentenced as a career offender based on a 1990 Pennsylvania robbery conviction and a 2009 Maryland carjacking conviction. The Third Circuit affirmed his conviction, finding that the Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as a crime of violence under the “elements clause” of 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(3)(A) because the two offenses, robbery and brandishing a gun, were tried together and the jury reached a guilty verdict on both. The court upheld the identification and failure to conduct a hearing on Robinson’s motion to proceed pro se, but remanded for determination of whether Robinson was properly sentenced as a career offender. View "United States v. Robinson" on Justia Law