Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

From 2009-2012, the federal government appropriated $150 million annually to the government of the Virgin Islands; Willis was Executive Director of the Legislature for the Virgin Islands, with authority to administer contracts. During Willis’s tenure, the legislature’s main building underwent major renovations. Willis was substantially involved in securing contractors. Three contractors later testified that they gave cash or other items of value to Willis to secure more government work or to ensure payment of their invoices. In 2010, the U.S. Department of the Interior audited the legislature’s administrative section while the renovations were taking place and concluded that the legislature had mismanaged public funds. After an investigation, an indictment issued for Willis’s prosecution on extortion charges (18 U.S.C. 1951(a)) and bribery charges (18 U.S.C. 666(a)(1)). The Third Circuit affirmed his conviction and five-year prison term, upholding admission of evidence of Willis’s prior acceptance of bribes. The indictment adequately alleged all required elements of bribery: the parties, the relevant amounts of money exchanged, where the illegal transactions occurred, that Willis used his public position unlawfully, specific details of each transaction, and improper purposes under the federal statutes. The government proved a sufficient nexus between Willis’s conduct or his status as Executive Director and a corresponding effect on federal funds. View "United States v. Willis" on Justia Law

Baptiste, a native of Trinidad and Tobago, was admitted to the U.S. as a lawful permanent resident in 1972. In 1978, Baptiste was convicted of atrocious assault and battery in New Jersey and was sentenced to a suspended 12-month term of imprisonment. In 2009, Baptiste was convicted of second-degree aggravated assault, N.J. Stat. 2C:12-1b(1): “A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he . . . [a]ttempts to cause serious bodily injury to another, or causes such injury purposely or knowingly or under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life recklessly causes such injury.” The Board of Immigration Appeals ordered his removal as an alien convicted of an “aggravated felony,” 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), defined as a “crime of violence,” 18 U.S.C. 16; and two crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMTs) under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii). Analyzing the statute under the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision, Johnson v. United States, which invalidated the “residual clause” of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), as unconstitutionally vague, the Third Circuit concluded that the section 16(b) definition of a crime of violence is unconstitutionally vague, so that Baptiste was not convicted of an aggravated felony. The court held that Baptiste is nonetheless removable based on the two CIMTs. Baptiste may apply for relief from removal that was previously unavailable to him as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony. View "Baptiste v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

Detectives spotted Henderson, with a firearm, on school property. After he was arrested, Henderson pled guilty to possession of a firearm as a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and 924(e)(1). Henderson’s Presentence Investigation Report revealed that Henderson had at least three qualifying convictions for serious drug offenses within the meaning of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e). Henderson objected to the classification of two of his prior convictions as serious drug offenses. The district court disagreed, referencing charging instruments and other pertinent documents, to find that Henderson had separate convictions under 35 Pa. Stat 780-113(a)(30), for possession with intent to deliver cocaine in 2002; possession with intent to deliver cocaine in 2004; and possession with intent to deliver heroin in 2009. Henderson was sentenced to the mandatory minimum prison term of 15 years. The Third Circuit affirmed, finding that the Pennsylvania statute is “divisible” and subject to the modified categorical approach in light of the Supreme Court’s 2016 decision in Mathis v. United States, and that the district court properly used the modified categorical approach to determine that Henderson had three qualifying predicate offenses under ACCA. View "United States v. Henderson" on Justia Law

Company A was incorporated in Florida in 2008. Doe was its president and “sole proprietor,” but a November 2008 document purports to memorialize Doe’s sale of all shares of Company A to Company B for $10,000. Numerous filings and tax documents suggested that Doe maintained control and ownership of Company A after the transfer. Multiple individuals have sued Doe and his businesses in state courts around the country based on Doe’s business practices. Doe and the companies became the subjects of a federal grand jury. The government obtained access to Doe’s email. Doe filed an interlocutory appeal to prevent its disclosure. While the appeal was pending, the district court granted permission to present the email to the grand jury, finding that although the email was protected by the work product privilege, the crime-fraud exception to that doctrine applied; in 2016, the grand jury returned a 17-count indictment, charging conspiracy to violate the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, conspiracy, mail fraud, wire fraud, and money laundering. The Seventh Circuit dismissed the interlocutory appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The damage of disclosure has already been done. Should a jury convict the defendants, they will have another, equally adequate opportunity to claim privilege. View "In re: Grand Jury Matter #3" on Justia Law

Elonis’s wife left their home with their children. Elonis had trouble at work, leaving early and crying at his desk. Morrissey, an employee Elonis supervised, claimed sexual harassment. Elonis posted on Facebook a photograph, showing Elonis in costume holding a knife to Morrissey’s neck, captioned “I wish.” Elonis was fired. Days later, Elonis began posting statements about “sinister plans for all my friends,” and, concerning his wife, “smothered your ass … dumped your body” that their son “should dress up as matricide” and “I’m not going to rest until your body is a mess, soaked in blood and dying.” Following issuance of a protective order, Elonis posted statements concerning shooting at his wife’s house, using explosives, and “I’m checking out and making a name for myself.” After being visited by federal agents, he posted statements about blowing up SWAT members. Elonis was convicted of transmitting in interstate commerce communications containing a threat to injure another, 18 U.S.C. 875(c). The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that he did not subjectively intend his Facebook posts to be threatening. The Supreme Court reversed, finding the jury instruction regarding Elonis’s mental state insufficient. On remand, the Third Circuit again affirmed Elonis’s conviction, finding the error harmless. The evidence overwhelmingly shows that Elonis posted the messages with either the purpose of threatening his ex-wife, or with knowledge that she would interpret the posts as threats. No rational juror could conclude otherwise. View "United States v. Elonis" on Justia Law

The defendants ran an Atlantic City heroin trafficking organization. For more than two years, law enforcement documented its crimes. Bailey, Davis, Macon, and Venable were among 34 people charged with drug-trafficking offenses. A jury convicted them of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute heroin within 1,000 feet of a public housing complex, 21 U.S.C. 846, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(A), and 21 U.S.C. 860, use or possession of a firearm in furtherance of that drug trafficking offense, 21 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(i), (ii), (iii) and 18 U.S.C. 2, and use of a communication facility to further a drug conspiracy, 21 U.S.C. 843(b). Davis was also convicted of possession of a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions and that the court should have suppressed the government’s wiretapping evidence. While the court violated Federal Rules of Evidence 404(b) and 403 by admitting certain evidence regarding a drug-trafficking-related murder and a drug-trafficking-related assault, given the overwhelming amount of other evidence, the error was harmless. The court also rejected Bailey’s claim that the court erred in admitting evidence of his past convictions for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and possession of a firearm. View "United States v. Bailey" on Justia Law

In 2010, Free, as the sole proprietor of Electra Lighting, filed a voluntary bankruptcy petition. He also owns Freedom Firearms, selling WWII-era guns. After Free fell behind on payments on business-related properties, the lender purchased them in foreclosure; Free purportedly filed for bankruptcy in an effort to “stay” the sale and “work out an agreement.” He had sufficient assets to pay his debts. He then hid assets worth hundreds of thousands of dollars from the Bankruptcy Court. Free was eventually convicted for multiple counts of bankruptcy fraud. His creditors received 100 cents on the dollar. The Sentencing Guidelines increase a fraudster’s recommended sentence based on the amount of loss he causes, or intends to cause. The district court treated the estimated value of the assets that Free concealed and the amount of debt sought to be discharged as the relevant “loss” under the Guidelines. The Third Circuit vacated. On remand, the court must determine whether Free intended to cause a loss to his creditors or what he sought to gain from committing the crime. Free will not necessarily receive a lower sentence on remand. Free’s repeated lying to the Bankruptcy Court and his manifest disrespect for the judicial system may merit an upward variance from the Guidelines. View "United States v. Free" on Justia Law

Singh, a citizen of India, was admitted as a lawful permanent resident in 2009. He ran convenience stores in Clearfield County, Pennsylvania. In 2011, state troopers searched his stores. Singh was charged with “the manufacture, delivery, or possession with intent to manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance,” conspiracy, and “[k]nowingly or intentionally possessing a controlled or counterfeit substance.” A “Negotiated Plea Agreement” described the counts as involving a “PA Counterf[e]it Substance – Non Fed.” At his plea colloquy, Singh pled guilty to “possession with intent to deliver a counterfeit substance under Pennsylvania law but not under federal law” and “criminal conspiracy to commit possession with the intent to deliver … designated a counterfeit substance, under Pennsylvania law but not under federal law. DHS began removal proceedings for being convicted of: an aggravated felony, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(B); “a violation of . . . any law or regulation of a State … relating to a controlled substance,” 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(B)(i); a “crime involving moral turpitude,” 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(i); and an aggravated felony, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). An IJ found Singh removable. Singh filed a stipulation from the Clearfield County District Attorney, indicating that: the Plea form is a standard form that “do[es] not constitute an admission of any specific facts” and that Singh “plead[ed] only to the delivery of an unidentified counterfeit substance under Pennsylvania law.” The BIA held Singh was removable for being convicted of an aggravated felony, without deciding whether Singh was removable under other sections. The Third Circuit vacated. Singh’s conviction does not sufficiently match the elements of the generic federal offense and was not for an aggravated felony. View "Singh v. Attorney Gen. of the United States" on Justia Law

On April 22, 2012, Philadelphia Police Officer Dempsey was on solo patrol in a radio car in North Philadelphia, armed with a baton, a taser, and a handgun. Around 2:00 a.m. and again at 5:30, Dempsey received a call that a naked man was standing in North Mascher Street. Dempsey and other officers responded, but found no one. At 6:00 a.m., a passing motorist informed Dempsey of a naked man at the corner of North Mascher and Nedro Avenue. Dempsey radioed in the information, drove to the intersection, and saw a naked man (Newsuan), standing in front of a residence. Accounts diverge as to what happened next. Ultimately Newsuan, high on PCP, attacked Dempsey, slammed him into multiple cars, and tried to remove Dempsey’s handgun. Dempsey shot and killed Newsuan. The district court entered summary judgment, rejecting excessive force claims by Newsuan’s estate under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Third Circuit affirmed. Regardless of whether Dempsey unnecessarily initiated a one-on-one confrontation with Newsuan that led to the subsequent fatal altercation, Newsuan’s violent attack on officer Dempsey was a superseding cause that severed any causal link between Dempsey’s initial actions and his subsequent justified use of lethal force. View "Johnson v. City of Philadelphia" on Justia Law

A large man, apparently wearing multiple layers of clothing, entered the North Randolph, Pennsylvania PNC Bank, carrying a gun. PNC employees handed him stacks of cash, containing a concealed Global Positioning System tracking device. The robber’s face was completely covered by a ski mask. The device led officers to discover fragments of the GPS in a backyard; they did not recover any fingerprints of evidentiary value. Fulton and Barnes lived separately in a house adjoining the yard. Barnes was unemployed, having been fired as a bank teller. Fulton first told police he had been at work at the time of the robbery. Fulton later admitted that he had lied. He had called in sick and spent day at home. At trial, his landlord’s son testified that Fulton was home and that the two had played video games. A search of Fulton’s residence did not uncover any evidence. Police eliminated Barnes as a suspect because they believed he was on the phone at the time of the robbery. The Third Circuit affirmed Fulton’s conviction for bank robbery. Although the district court improperly admitted certain testimony as lay witness testimony, the error was harmless. The prosecution neither presented improper expert testimony nor misrepresented the testimony of its expert during its closing. View "United States v. Fulton" on Justia Law