Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Doe was president and “sole proprietor” of Company A, but a 2008 document purports to memorialize Doe’s sale of all shares to Company B for $10,000. Numerous filings and tax documents suggested that Doe maintained control and ownership of Company A after the transfer. Multiple individuals have sued Doe and his businesses in state courts. Doe and the companies were investigated by a federal grand jury. The government obtained access to Doe’s email. Doe filed an interlocutory appeal to prevent its disclosure. While the appeal was pending, the district court granted permission to present the email to the grand jury, finding that although the email was protected by the work product privilege, the crime-fraud exception applied; in 2016, the grand jury returned an indictment, charging conspiracy to violate the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, conspiracy, mail fraud, wire fraud, and money laundering. The Third Circuit initially dismissed an interlocutory appeal, but, on rehearing, reversed, concluding that, while the grand jury investigation continues, it retains jurisdiction, and that the crime-fraud exception did not apply. The court stripped an attorney’s work product of confidentiality based on evidence suggesting only that the client had thought about using that product to facilitate fraud, not that the client had actually done so. An actual act to further the fraud is required before attorney work product loses its confidentiality. View "In re: Grand Jury Matter #3" on Justia Law

Coleman was tried with others for his involvement in a 1989 gang-related shooting in a restaurant. The trial included 76 prosecution witnesses, only one of whom testified as to Coleman’s involvement. Coleman was convicted of first-degree murder, two counts of aggravated assault, criminal conspiracy, and possession of an instrument of a crime, but acquitted of violating the Pennsylvania Corrupt Organizations Act (PCOA). Two years after Coleman’s convictions became final, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held (Besch) that PCOA did not apply to an individual’s participation in a wholly illegitimate enterprise. Under Besch. Coleman could not have been charged with a PCOA violation because the gang was wholly illegitimate. Coleman failed to raise Besch when he twice, unsuccessfully, sought state post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. In 2014, Coleman sought federal habeas relief, arguing that he was denied due process because the evidence introduced against his codefendants was unfairly imputed to him. He asserted that his claim should be considered under the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception to the time limit imposed by the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and principles of equitable tolling. The district court dismissed. The Third Circuit affirmed. Coleman cannot satisfy the actual innocence requirement of the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception to AEDPA View "Coleman v. Superintendent Greene SCI" on Justia Law

In 1996, Gardner and others were convicted of racketeering, racketeering conspiracy, conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance, conspiracy to commit murder, murder in aid of racketeering, carjacking resulting in death, and using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence causing death. Gardner was sentenced to concurrent terms of life imprisonment on each count and 120 months on Count 4. The Fourth Circuit affirmed on direct appeal and, later, denial of his petition under 28 U.S.C. 2255, asserting ineffective assistance of counsel. In 2014, Gardner sought habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2241, citing the Supreme Court’s intervening “Alleyne” holding that “[a]ny fact that, by law, increases the [mandatory minimum] penalty for a crime is an ‘element’ that must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt.” The district court dismissed, finding that Gardner’s claims should have been raised in a section 2255 motion in the court that sentenced him. The Third Circuit affirmed, noting section 2241’s limited scope. Alleyne simply extended the logic of Apprendi to mandatory minimums for criminal sentences; neither makes previously criminal conduct noncriminal. Because section 2255 is not inadequate or ineffective to raise an Apprendi argument, it is not inadequate or ineffective to raise an Alleyne argument. View "Gardner v. Warden Lewisburg USP" on Justia Law

Mateo-Medina, a citizen of the Dominican Republic, was deported in 2012 after serving five months for unlawfully obtaining a U.S. passport. Shortly after his deportation, his common-law wife, Rasuk, a U.S. citizen with whom Mateo-Medina had lived for 15 years, was diagnosed with terminal cancer. Rasuk had two adult sons from a prior marriage, both drug addicts. One lived with the couple; the couple was raising the young child (Angel) of her other son. When Mateo-Medina learned of the diagnosis, he returned to the U.S. to care for Rasuk, who died in 2014. Mateo-Medina became Angel’s sole caretaker. Rasuk’s son reported Mateo-Medina to immigration authorities. He pled guilty to reentry after removal, 8 U.S.C. 1326(a); (b)(2). Mateo-Medina’s PSR calculated a sentence of eight-to-14 months’ imprisonment. Mateo-Medina had a 2000 DUI conviction, the 2012 fraudulent passport conviction, and six arrests that did not lead to conviction. The PSR did not contain any information about the conduct underlying those arrests. The court departed downward one level; the prosecutor and the defense argued for a sentence of time served (six months), the lower end of the Guidelines range. The court sentenced Mateo-Medina to 12 months plus one day. The Third Circuit vacated the sentence, finding that the court mischaracterized Mateo-Medina’s criminal history in a way that affected his sentence. View "United States v. Mateo-Medina" on Justia Law

Robinson robbed a Subway restaurant with a gun. Later that day, he robbed Anna’s Linens store, using a handgun. Both robberies were recorded by video cameras. The next day, the Subway cashier recognized Robinson on the street and notified police. Robinson was arrested. Suspecting that Robinson might have committed the Anna’s robbery, a Philadelphia detective prepared a photo array. The Anna’s cashier identified Robinson. Charged with two counts of robbery by means of actual and threatened force, violence and fear of injury, by brandishing a handgun (18 U.S.C. 1951(a), Hobbs Act), and two counts of using and carrying a firearm during a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c), Robinson sought to proceed pro se. During a hearing, Robinson changed his mind. Later, following his unsuccessful motion to suppress the photo identification, Robinson orally requested to proceed pro se. The court directed him to file a motion. No motion was filed. Robinson was sentenced as a career offender based on a 1990 Pennsylvania robbery conviction and a 2009 Maryland carjacking conviction. The Third Circuit affirmed his conviction, finding that the Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as a crime of violence under the “elements clause” of 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(3)(A) because the two offenses, robbery and brandishing a gun, were tried together and the jury reached a guilty verdict on both. The court upheld the identification and failure to conduct a hearing on Robinson’s motion to proceed pro se, but remanded for determination of whether Robinson was properly sentenced as a career offender. View "United States v. Robinson" on Justia Law

From 2009-2012, the federal government appropriated $150 million annually to the government of the Virgin Islands; Willis was Executive Director of the Legislature for the Virgin Islands, with authority to administer contracts. During Willis’s tenure, the legislature’s main building underwent major renovations. Willis was substantially involved in securing contractors. Three contractors later testified that they gave cash or other items of value to Willis to secure more government work or to ensure payment of their invoices. In 2010, the U.S. Department of the Interior audited the legislature’s administrative section while the renovations were taking place and concluded that the legislature had mismanaged public funds. After an investigation, an indictment issued for Willis’s prosecution on extortion charges (18 U.S.C. 1951(a)) and bribery charges (18 U.S.C. 666(a)(1)). The Third Circuit affirmed his conviction and five-year prison term, upholding admission of evidence of Willis’s prior acceptance of bribes. The indictment adequately alleged all required elements of bribery: the parties, the relevant amounts of money exchanged, where the illegal transactions occurred, that Willis used his public position unlawfully, specific details of each transaction, and improper purposes under the federal statutes. The government proved a sufficient nexus between Willis’s conduct or his status as Executive Director and a corresponding effect on federal funds. View "United States v. Willis" on Justia Law

Baptiste, a native of Trinidad and Tobago, was admitted to the U.S. as a lawful permanent resident in 1972. In 1978, Baptiste was convicted of atrocious assault and battery in New Jersey and was sentenced to a suspended 12-month term of imprisonment. In 2009, Baptiste was convicted of second-degree aggravated assault, N.J. Stat. 2C:12-1b(1): “A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he . . . [a]ttempts to cause serious bodily injury to another, or causes such injury purposely or knowingly or under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life recklessly causes such injury.” The Board of Immigration Appeals ordered his removal as an alien convicted of an “aggravated felony,” 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), defined as a “crime of violence,” 18 U.S.C. 16; and two crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMTs) under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii). Analyzing the statute under the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision, Johnson v. United States, which invalidated the “residual clause” of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), as unconstitutionally vague, the Third Circuit concluded that the section 16(b) definition of a crime of violence is unconstitutionally vague, so that Baptiste was not convicted of an aggravated felony. The court held that Baptiste is nonetheless removable based on the two CIMTs. Baptiste may apply for relief from removal that was previously unavailable to him as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony. View "Baptiste v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

Detectives spotted Henderson, with a firearm, on school property. After he was arrested, Henderson pled guilty to possession of a firearm as a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and 924(e)(1). Henderson’s Presentence Investigation Report revealed that Henderson had at least three qualifying convictions for serious drug offenses within the meaning of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e). Henderson objected to the classification of two of his prior convictions as serious drug offenses. The district court disagreed, referencing charging instruments and other pertinent documents, to find that Henderson had separate convictions under 35 Pa. Stat 780-113(a)(30), for possession with intent to deliver cocaine in 2002; possession with intent to deliver cocaine in 2004; and possession with intent to deliver heroin in 2009. Henderson was sentenced to the mandatory minimum prison term of 15 years. The Third Circuit affirmed, finding that the Pennsylvania statute is “divisible” and subject to the modified categorical approach in light of the Supreme Court’s 2016 decision in Mathis v. United States, and that the district court properly used the modified categorical approach to determine that Henderson had three qualifying predicate offenses under ACCA. View "United States v. Henderson" on Justia Law

Company A was incorporated in Florida in 2008. Doe was its president and “sole proprietor,” but a November 2008 document purports to memorialize Doe’s sale of all shares of Company A to Company B for $10,000. Numerous filings and tax documents suggested that Doe maintained control and ownership of Company A after the transfer. Multiple individuals have sued Doe and his businesses in state courts around the country based on Doe’s business practices. Doe and the companies became the subjects of a federal grand jury. The government obtained access to Doe’s email. Doe filed an interlocutory appeal to prevent its disclosure. While the appeal was pending, the district court granted permission to present the email to the grand jury, finding that although the email was protected by the work product privilege, the crime-fraud exception to that doctrine applied; in 2016, the grand jury returned a 17-count indictment, charging conspiracy to violate the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, conspiracy, mail fraud, wire fraud, and money laundering. The Seventh Circuit dismissed the interlocutory appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The damage of disclosure has already been done. Should a jury convict the defendants, they will have another, equally adequate opportunity to claim privilege. View "In re: Grand Jury Matter #3" on Justia Law

Elonis’s wife left their home with their children. Elonis had trouble at work, leaving early and crying at his desk. Morrissey, an employee Elonis supervised, claimed sexual harassment. Elonis posted on Facebook a photograph, showing Elonis in costume holding a knife to Morrissey’s neck, captioned “I wish.” Elonis was fired. Days later, Elonis began posting statements about “sinister plans for all my friends,” and, concerning his wife, “smothered your ass … dumped your body” that their son “should dress up as matricide” and “I’m not going to rest until your body is a mess, soaked in blood and dying.” Following issuance of a protective order, Elonis posted statements concerning shooting at his wife’s house, using explosives, and “I’m checking out and making a name for myself.” After being visited by federal agents, he posted statements about blowing up SWAT members. Elonis was convicted of transmitting in interstate commerce communications containing a threat to injure another, 18 U.S.C. 875(c). The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that he did not subjectively intend his Facebook posts to be threatening. The Supreme Court reversed, finding the jury instruction regarding Elonis’s mental state insufficient. On remand, the Third Circuit again affirmed Elonis’s conviction, finding the error harmless. The evidence overwhelmingly shows that Elonis posted the messages with either the purpose of threatening his ex-wife, or with knowledge that she would interpret the posts as threats. No rational juror could conclude otherwise. View "United States v. Elonis" on Justia Law