Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Adeolu was the part-owner and office manager of a tax preparation company that prepared fraudulent tax returns by encouraging taxpayers to claim false dependents. Adeolu was ultimately convicted of conspiracy to defraud the United States and of aiding and abetting the preparation of materially false tax returns, 18 U.S.C. 371 and 26 U.S.C. 7206(2). At sentencing, the court applied the vulnerable victim sentencing enhancement, U.S.S.G. 3A1.1(b)(1) based upon Adeolu’s fraudulent use of young children’s personal information. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the children were not vulnerable victims because they did not experience “actual” harm. A showing of actual harm is not required under the vulnerable victim sentencing enhancement; the correct test requires a “nexus” between the victim’s vulnerability and the crime’s success. The requirement was met in this case. View "United States v. Adeolu" on Justia Law

Goodwin was arrested pursuant to a warrant for allegedly selling heroin to an undercover police officer. He was indicted, but the charges were eventually dropped. Goodwin brought suit, 42 U.S.C. 1983, for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution against the detectives involved in securing his arrest warrant. He claims that they submitted a false warrant application because they knew or should have known that he was in jail at the time of one of the undercover drug deals. He argues that his incarceration was evident from a booking sheet the detectives had when they applied for his arrest warrant. The detectives moved for summary judgment, asserting qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion, holding that there was a genuine dispute as to whether the detectives possessed the booking sheet when they submitted the warrant. At oral argument before the Third Circuit, defense counsel conceded that the detectives were aware of the booking sheet before submitting the warrant application. The court concluded that booking sheet did not preclude a finding of probable cause. The sheet showed the date on which Goodwin was incarcerated. It did not say when he was released and did not trigger a duty to further investigate. The detectives had probable cause when they applied for Goodwin’s arrest warrant and are entitled to qualified immunity. View "Goodwin v. Conway" on Justia Law

About 20 years ago, Binder pled guilty in a Pennsylvania state court to corrupting a minor, a misdemeanor subject to possible imprisonment for up to five years. Binder was sentenced to three years' probation . Suarez pled guilty in a Maryland state court to unlawfully carrying a handgun without a license, a misdemeanor subject to possible imprisonment for “not less than 30 days and not [more than] three years or a fine.” He received a suspended sentence. Pennsylvania law disqualified both from possessing firearms due to their convictions. The Third Circuit ruled in favor of the men, who brought as-applied challenges to the prohibition. Federal law generally prohibits the possession of firearms by any person convicted of​ a “crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year,” 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), excluding “any State offense classified by the laws of the State as a misdemeanor and punishable by a term of imprisonment of two years or less,” and “[a]ny conviction which has been expunged, or set aside or for which a person has been pardoned or has had civil rights restored.” The court noted its 2010 “Marzzarella” decision, adopting a framework for deciding facial and as-applied Second Amendment challenges. In its 2011 “Barton” decision, the court held that the section 922(g)(1) prohibition does not violate the Second Amendment on its face. In addressing how a criminal offender may rebut the presumption that he lacks Second Amendment rights, the majority concluded that Marzzarella's two-step test drives the analysis: whether the challenged law imposes a burden on conduct falling within the Second Amendment's scope and, if so, whether it survives intermediate scrutiny. View "Binderup v. Attorney Gen. of thel United States" on Justia Law

For five days in September 2013, lane closures on the George Washington Bridge caused extraordinary traffic jams in Fort Lee, New Jersey. The closures were allegedly orchestrated as revenge against the Mayor of Fort Lee for his refusal to endorse New Jersey Governor Christie for reelection. In 2015, a grand jury returned a nine-count indictment against Baroni and Kelly based on the “Bridgegate” political payback scheme. With the exception of Count 9, the indictment alleges that Baroni and Kelly committed their offenses with unidentified “others.” The only other individual identified by name in that indictment is Wildstein, who has pled guilty in a separate case. A consortium of media groups took legal steps to force the disclosure of a letter, authored by one of the prosecutors, that purportedly identifies unindicted co-conspirators. The district court ordered the letter to be disclosed. “Doe” intervened and sought to block public access to the letter. The court denied his request. The Third Circuit reversed, concluding that the letter in question is a part of the general discovery process and not subject to any First Amendment or common law right of public access. View "N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc v. United States" on Justia Law

Curry read a newspaper article that stated there was a warrant for his arrest, related to a theft at a Lower Macungie Township, Pennsylvania Wal-Mart store. Wal-Mart security employee Fitcher identified Curry. Curry insists that he had never been in that store. Curry called the store and spoke to a security employee, who refused to review the surveillance video. Curry called Pennsylvania State Trooper Yachera, who informed Curry that the courts would “figure it out.” Curry was arrested. Unable to afford bail, Curry was jailed, While he was in jail, Curry was charged with “theft by deception – false imprisonment” by Exeter Township Detective McClure, unrelated to the Wal-Mart charges. Two months later, McClure admitted Curry was innocent; his charges were dropped, but Curry remained in jail. During his many months in prison, Curry missed his child's birth and lost his job. Fearing loss of his home and vehicle, Curry pleaded nolo contendere. Curry later filed suit, asserting malicious prosecution, false arrest, and false imprisonment. The court determined that the constitutional claims against Yachera, Wal-Mart, and Fitcher were barred bySupreme Court precedent because their success would imply that Curry's conviction was invalid, and that McClure never “seized” Curry. The Third Circuit affirmed with “reluctance,” noting the inequity bail can create. The court clarified that the dismissal was without prejudice; the statute of limitations begins to accrue when “the conviction or sentence is reversed, expunged, invalidated, or impugned.” View "Curry v. Yachera" on Justia Law

Under the Facebook account name “Billy Button,” Browne began exchanging messages with 18-year-old Nicole. They met in person and exchanged sexually explicit photographs of themselves through Facebook chats. Browne threatened to publish the photos online unless Nicole engaged in oral sex and promised to delete the photos only if she provided him the password to her Facebook account. Using that account, Browne made contact with four minors and solicited explicit photos. Once he had their photos, he repeated the pattern, threatening to publish their images unless they engaged sexual acts. Alerted by the Virgin Islands Police Department, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) agents investigated, arrested Browne, executed a search warrant on his residence, and seized a cell phone from which text messages and photos of the minors were recovered. Browne admitted ownership of the phone and Facebook account. Facebook provided five sets of chats and a certificate of authenticity executed by its records custodian, which were admitted at trial. The Third Circuit affirmed his convictions for child pornography and sexual offenses with minors. While rejecting the government’s assertion that, under Rule 902(11), the contents of the communications were “self-authenticating” as business records accompanied by a certificate from the records custodian, the court found that the record reflected sufficient extrinsic evidence to link Browne to the chats and satisfy the prosecution’s authentication burden under a conventional Rule 901 analysis. View "United States v. Browne" on Justia Law

Carter headed a Pennsylvania drug ring, which he operated from Detroit, sending Cook and Macon to Pennsylvania to oversee the business. Cook was responsible for transporting drugs and readying them for sale. Macon’s responsibility was to keep detailed financial records and pay expenses, including the salaries of “employees.” Carter tasked Earheart with finding a house where Macon could live and run the drug operation. Earheart found the secluded Stoney Run house in Blairsville, Pennsylvania, which did not require a lease or a name on a utility bill. Carter inspected the property and ordered Macon to give Earheart the money for the security deposit and rent. Stoney Run became a base of operations. Carter’s organization maintained a second house; Cook lived at Bedford Street, and processed heroin there for delivery to Stoney Run for distribution, paying rent with funds from Macon, directly authorized by Carter. Following an investigation, which included searches of the premises and recovery of drugs at each location, Carter pleaded guilty under 21 U.S.C. 846. The agreement allowed Carter to challenge application of a two-level sentencing enhancement for maintaining a residence for the purpose of manufacturing and distributing a controlled substance, U.S.S.G. 2D1.1(b)(12). The Third Circuit affirmed Carter’s sentence (180 months), upholding application of the enhancement. View "United States v. Carter" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of first-degree murder. The jury sentenced Defendant to death. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the convictions on appeal, rejecting Defendant’s claims that the prosecution violated Brady v. Maryland. The Supreme Court denied Defendant’s application for postconviction relief. Defendant then filed an application under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court granted Defendant a conditional writ of habeas corpus and directed the Commonwealth to retry Defendant or release him, concluding that the prosecution had breached its obligations under Brady by withholding three pieces of exculpatory and material information. The Third Circuit initially vacated the district court’s order, but subsequently, acting en banc, affirmed. The suppressed Brady material—a receipt corroborating Dennis’s alibi, an inconsistent statement by the Commonwealth’s key eyewitness, and documents indicating that another individual committed the murder — effectively gutted the Commonwealth’s case against Dennis. The withholding of these pieces of evidence denied Dennis a fair trial in state court. View "Dennis v. Sec'y PA Dept. of Corrs." on Justia Law

In 2001, Mary Edmond was shot near a North Philadelphia gas station. She died from her injuries. During the investigation, Garcia gave a confession to the police that was self-incriminating, but indicated that Lambert pulled the trigger. When Lambert and Garcia are jointly tried in Pennsylvania state court, Garcia declined to testify, depriving Lambert of the ability to cross-examine him about the confession. The judge redacted the confession in an effort to comply with the Supreme Court holding in Bruton v. United States (1968). When the jury heard Garcia’s confession, Lambert’s name was replaced with terms like “the other guy.” During closing arguments, however, the prosecutor made statements that the defense believed revealed that Lambert was “the other guy.” The judge denied a motion for mistrial, but instructed the jury that the confession could only be used against Garcia and must not be considered as evidence against Lambert. Both were convicted. The Third Circuit reversed and granted habeas relief, based on the Sixth Amendment violation caused by the closing arguments. The error was not harmless. View "Brown v. Greene" on Justia Law

After a fellow Bucknell University student (Stefanowicz) claimed that Dempsey had sexually assaulted her in his dorm room, the University’s Public Safety Officers (who are police officers) investigated and eventually filed a criminal complaint with an affidavit of probable cause. The charges were later dropped. Dempsey brought a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against Bucknell University, claiming violations of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unlawful search and seizure. The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. In light of the evidence corroborating in substantial part Stefanowicz’s story and the existence of a period of time in which no one disputes the two were alone together in Dempsey’s room, “even taking into account certain facts recklessly omitted from the affidavit of probable cause, a reasonable jury could not find a lack of probable cause.” View "Dempsey v. Bucknell Univ." on Justia Law