Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The defendants ran an Atlantic City heroin trafficking organization. For more than two years, law enforcement documented its crimes. Bailey, Davis, Macon, and Venable were among 34 people charged with drug-trafficking offenses. A jury convicted them of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute heroin within 1,000 feet of a public housing complex, 21 U.S.C. 846, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(A), and 21 U.S.C. 860, use or possession of a firearm in furtherance of that drug trafficking offense, 21 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(i), (ii), (iii) and 18 U.S.C. 2, and use of a communication facility to further a drug conspiracy, 21 U.S.C. 843(b). Davis was also convicted of possession of a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions and that the court should have suppressed the government’s wiretapping evidence. While the court violated Federal Rules of Evidence 404(b) and 403 by admitting certain evidence regarding a drug-trafficking-related murder and a drug-trafficking-related assault, given the overwhelming amount of other evidence, the error was harmless. The court also rejected Bailey’s claim that the court erred in admitting evidence of his past convictions for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and possession of a firearm. View "United States v. Bailey" on Justia Law

In 2010, Free, as the sole proprietor of Electra Lighting, filed a voluntary bankruptcy petition. He also owns Freedom Firearms, selling WWII-era guns. After Free fell behind on payments on business-related properties, the lender purchased them in foreclosure; Free purportedly filed for bankruptcy in an effort to “stay” the sale and “work out an agreement.” He had sufficient assets to pay his debts. He then hid assets worth hundreds of thousands of dollars from the Bankruptcy Court. Free was eventually convicted for multiple counts of bankruptcy fraud. His creditors received 100 cents on the dollar. The Sentencing Guidelines increase a fraudster’s recommended sentence based on the amount of loss he causes, or intends to cause. The district court treated the estimated value of the assets that Free concealed and the amount of debt sought to be discharged as the relevant “loss” under the Guidelines. The Third Circuit vacated. On remand, the court must determine whether Free intended to cause a loss to his creditors or what he sought to gain from committing the crime. Free will not necessarily receive a lower sentence on remand. Free’s repeated lying to the Bankruptcy Court and his manifest disrespect for the judicial system may merit an upward variance from the Guidelines. View "United States v. Free" on Justia Law

Singh, a citizen of India, was admitted as a lawful permanent resident in 2009. He ran convenience stores in Clearfield County, Pennsylvania. In 2011, state troopers searched his stores. Singh was charged with “the manufacture, delivery, or possession with intent to manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance,” conspiracy, and “[k]nowingly or intentionally possessing a controlled or counterfeit substance.” A “Negotiated Plea Agreement” described the counts as involving a “PA Counterf[e]it Substance – Non Fed.” At his plea colloquy, Singh pled guilty to “possession with intent to deliver a counterfeit substance under Pennsylvania law but not under federal law” and “criminal conspiracy to commit possession with the intent to deliver … designated a counterfeit substance, under Pennsylvania law but not under federal law. DHS began removal proceedings for being convicted of: an aggravated felony, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(B); “a violation of . . . any law or regulation of a State … relating to a controlled substance,” 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(B)(i); a “crime involving moral turpitude,” 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(i); and an aggravated felony, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). An IJ found Singh removable. Singh filed a stipulation from the Clearfield County District Attorney, indicating that: the Plea form is a standard form that “do[es] not constitute an admission of any specific facts” and that Singh “plead[ed] only to the delivery of an unidentified counterfeit substance under Pennsylvania law.” The BIA held Singh was removable for being convicted of an aggravated felony, without deciding whether Singh was removable under other sections. The Third Circuit vacated. Singh’s conviction does not sufficiently match the elements of the generic federal offense and was not for an aggravated felony. View "Singh v. Attorney Gen. of the United States" on Justia Law

On April 22, 2012, Philadelphia Police Officer Dempsey was on solo patrol in a radio car in North Philadelphia, armed with a baton, a taser, and a handgun. Around 2:00 a.m. and again at 5:30, Dempsey received a call that a naked man was standing in North Mascher Street. Dempsey and other officers responded, but found no one. At 6:00 a.m., a passing motorist informed Dempsey of a naked man at the corner of North Mascher and Nedro Avenue. Dempsey radioed in the information, drove to the intersection, and saw a naked man (Newsuan), standing in front of a residence. Accounts diverge as to what happened next. Ultimately Newsuan, high on PCP, attacked Dempsey, slammed him into multiple cars, and tried to remove Dempsey’s handgun. Dempsey shot and killed Newsuan. The district court entered summary judgment, rejecting excessive force claims by Newsuan’s estate under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Third Circuit affirmed. Regardless of whether Dempsey unnecessarily initiated a one-on-one confrontation with Newsuan that led to the subsequent fatal altercation, Newsuan’s violent attack on officer Dempsey was a superseding cause that severed any causal link between Dempsey’s initial actions and his subsequent justified use of lethal force. View "Johnson v. City of Philadelphia" on Justia Law

A large man, apparently wearing multiple layers of clothing, entered the North Randolph, Pennsylvania PNC Bank, carrying a gun. PNC employees handed him stacks of cash, containing a concealed Global Positioning System tracking device. The robber’s face was completely covered by a ski mask. The device led officers to discover fragments of the GPS in a backyard; they did not recover any fingerprints of evidentiary value. Fulton and Barnes lived separately in a house adjoining the yard. Barnes was unemployed, having been fired as a bank teller. Fulton first told police he had been at work at the time of the robbery. Fulton later admitted that he had lied. He had called in sick and spent day at home. At trial, his landlord’s son testified that Fulton was home and that the two had played video games. A search of Fulton’s residence did not uncover any evidence. Police eliminated Barnes as a suspect because they believed he was on the phone at the time of the robbery. The Third Circuit affirmed Fulton’s conviction for bank robbery. Although the district court improperly admitted certain testimony as lay witness testimony, the error was harmless. The prosecution neither presented improper expert testimony nor misrepresented the testimony of its expert during its closing. View "United States v. Fulton" on Justia Law

Adeolu was the part-owner and office manager of a tax preparation company that prepared fraudulent tax returns by encouraging taxpayers to claim false dependents. Adeolu was ultimately convicted of conspiracy to defraud the United States and of aiding and abetting the preparation of materially false tax returns, 18 U.S.C. 371 and 26 U.S.C. 7206(2). At sentencing, the court applied the vulnerable victim sentencing enhancement, U.S.S.G. 3A1.1(b)(1) based upon Adeolu’s fraudulent use of young children’s personal information. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the children were not vulnerable victims because they did not experience “actual” harm. A showing of actual harm is not required under the vulnerable victim sentencing enhancement; the correct test requires a “nexus” between the victim’s vulnerability and the crime’s success. The requirement was met in this case. View "United States v. Adeolu" on Justia Law

Goodwin was arrested pursuant to a warrant for allegedly selling heroin to an undercover police officer. He was indicted, but the charges were eventually dropped. Goodwin brought suit, 42 U.S.C. 1983, for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution against the detectives involved in securing his arrest warrant. He claims that they submitted a false warrant application because they knew or should have known that he was in jail at the time of one of the undercover drug deals. He argues that his incarceration was evident from a booking sheet the detectives had when they applied for his arrest warrant. The detectives moved for summary judgment, asserting qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion, holding that there was a genuine dispute as to whether the detectives possessed the booking sheet when they submitted the warrant. At oral argument before the Third Circuit, defense counsel conceded that the detectives were aware of the booking sheet before submitting the warrant application. The court concluded that booking sheet did not preclude a finding of probable cause. The sheet showed the date on which Goodwin was incarcerated. It did not say when he was released and did not trigger a duty to further investigate. The detectives had probable cause when they applied for Goodwin’s arrest warrant and are entitled to qualified immunity. View "Goodwin v. Conway" on Justia Law

About 20 years ago, Binder pled guilty in a Pennsylvania state court to corrupting a minor, a misdemeanor subject to possible imprisonment for up to five years. Binder was sentenced to three years' probation . Suarez pled guilty in a Maryland state court to unlawfully carrying a handgun without a license, a misdemeanor subject to possible imprisonment for “not less than 30 days and not [more than] three years or a fine.” He received a suspended sentence. Pennsylvania law disqualified both from possessing firearms due to their convictions. The Third Circuit ruled in favor of the men, who brought as-applied challenges to the prohibition. Federal law generally prohibits the possession of firearms by any person convicted of​ a “crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year,” 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), excluding “any State offense classified by the laws of the State as a misdemeanor and punishable by a term of imprisonment of two years or less,” and “[a]ny conviction which has been expunged, or set aside or for which a person has been pardoned or has had civil rights restored.” The court noted its 2010 “Marzzarella” decision, adopting a framework for deciding facial and as-applied Second Amendment challenges. In its 2011 “Barton” decision, the court held that the section 922(g)(1) prohibition does not violate the Second Amendment on its face. In addressing how a criminal offender may rebut the presumption that he lacks Second Amendment rights, the majority concluded that Marzzarella's two-step test drives the analysis: whether the challenged law imposes a burden on conduct falling within the Second Amendment's scope and, if so, whether it survives intermediate scrutiny. View "Binderup v. Attorney Gen. of thel United States" on Justia Law

For five days in September 2013, lane closures on the George Washington Bridge caused extraordinary traffic jams in Fort Lee, New Jersey. The closures were allegedly orchestrated as revenge against the Mayor of Fort Lee for his refusal to endorse New Jersey Governor Christie for reelection. In 2015, a grand jury returned a nine-count indictment against Baroni and Kelly based on the “Bridgegate” political payback scheme. With the exception of Count 9, the indictment alleges that Baroni and Kelly committed their offenses with unidentified “others.” The only other individual identified by name in that indictment is Wildstein, who has pled guilty in a separate case. A consortium of media groups took legal steps to force the disclosure of a letter, authored by one of the prosecutors, that purportedly identifies unindicted co-conspirators. The district court ordered the letter to be disclosed. “Doe” intervened and sought to block public access to the letter. The court denied his request. The Third Circuit reversed, concluding that the letter in question is a part of the general discovery process and not subject to any First Amendment or common law right of public access. View "N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc v. United States" on Justia Law

Curry read a newspaper article that stated there was a warrant for his arrest, related to a theft at a Lower Macungie Township, Pennsylvania Wal-Mart store. Wal-Mart security employee Fitcher identified Curry. Curry insists that he had never been in that store. Curry called the store and spoke to a security employee, who refused to review the surveillance video. Curry called Pennsylvania State Trooper Yachera, who informed Curry that the courts would “figure it out.” Curry was arrested. Unable to afford bail, Curry was jailed, While he was in jail, Curry was charged with “theft by deception – false imprisonment” by Exeter Township Detective McClure, unrelated to the Wal-Mart charges. Two months later, McClure admitted Curry was innocent; his charges were dropped, but Curry remained in jail. During his many months in prison, Curry missed his child's birth and lost his job. Fearing loss of his home and vehicle, Curry pleaded nolo contendere. Curry later filed suit, asserting malicious prosecution, false arrest, and false imprisonment. The court determined that the constitutional claims against Yachera, Wal-Mart, and Fitcher were barred bySupreme Court precedent because their success would imply that Curry's conviction was invalid, and that McClure never “seized” Curry. The Third Circuit affirmed with “reluctance,” noting the inequity bail can create. The court clarified that the dismissal was without prejudice; the statute of limitations begins to accrue when “the conviction or sentence is reversed, expunged, invalidated, or impugned.” View "Curry v. Yachera" on Justia Law