Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Dahl placed advertisements on Craigslist seeking sexual encounters with young males. Two undercover law-enforcement agents, acting independently, replied, representing themselves as 15-year-old boys. Through email, Dahl engaged in graphic sexual conversations, requested photographs of the boys, and attempted to arrange in-person sexual encounters. An agent agreed to meet Dahl at his house, ostensibly for a sexual encounter. Dahl was arrested and pleaded guilty to attempted use of an interstate commerce facility to entice a minor to engage in sexual conduct, 18 U.S.C. 2422(b); attempted enticement of a minor to travel in interstate commerce to engage in sexual activity, section 2422(a); and transfer of obscene material to a minor, section 1470. Dahl has Delaware convictions related to sexual activity with minors, including a 1991 conviction of first- and third-degree unlawful sexual contact relating to encounters with two 17-year-old boys and a 2001 conviction of second-degree unlawful sexual contact relating to an encounter with a 14-year-old boy. The court sentenced him under the Repeat and Dangerous Sex Offender guideline, U.S.S.G. 4B1.5, to the top-range sentence of 293 months in prison, with 20 years of supervised release. The Third Circuit remanded, finding that his state convictions are not categorically “sex offense convictions” under the Guidelines, in light of recent Supreme Court rulings. View "United States v. Dahl" on Justia Law

Parkell, a Delaware state prisoner, claims that state officials deprived him of his rights under the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments by subjecting him to unreasonable thrice-daily visual body-cavity searches and harsh conditions and by depriving him of adequate medical care. In his suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court granted the defendants summary judgment, concluding that: Parkell could not pursue damages from corrections officials in their official capacities because of the Eleventh Amendment, and any claim for prospective relief was rendered moot when Parkell was moved; his medical needs Eighth Amendment claim failed because any deficiencies in his medical care did not rise to the level of deliberate indifference to his needs; his conditions-of-confinement Eighth Amendment claim failed because the conditions did not constitute a denial of basic human needs, and the defendants were not personally involved in creating the conditions; and his due process claim​ failed because the conditions of his confinement did not constitute atypical and significant hardship in comparison to general prison conditions. The Third Circuit reversed only as to Parkell’s claim under the Fourth Amendment; that the state defendants lacked personal involvement in past constitutional violations does not preclude Parkell from obtaining prospective injunctive relief for ongoing violations. View "Parkell v. Danberg" on Justia Law

In 1999, Jones fled from Pennsylvania police, who discovered a gun in the area and concluded that Jones had discarded it. Jones was convicted under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1); 924(e) for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The court sentenced Jones under the Armed Career Criminal Act, which requires a sentence of at least 180 months for anyone convicted under section 922(g) who has three convictions for a “violent felony” or “serious drug offense.” Jones had convictions for robbery and aggravated assault, and two controlled substances convictions. The Third Circuit affirmed. Jones was denied post-conviction relief. Jones was released from custody in 2013. Jones was later arrested on state drug charges. The court ordered him returned to prison. Under 18 U.S.C. 3583(e)(3), the maximum permissible revocation sentence depends on the classification of “the offense that resulted in the term of supervised release.” Relying on the Supreme Court’s 2013 "Alleyne" decision, Jones unsuccessfully argued that he was subject to no more than two years’ imprisonment because his offense was properly categorized as a Class C felony. The court concluded that his offense was a Class A felony and imposed a 40-month sentence. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting “ Jones’s efforts to bifurcate his original conviction and sentence from his revocation sentence, and to characterize this appeal as a direct challenge to a classification determination made in imposing the latter.” View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law

With little formal education (a high school GED) Miller passed several securities industry examinations and “maintained a public persona of a very successful entrepreneur.” Miller sold investors over $41 million in phony “promissory notes,” which were securities under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 77b(a)(1), 78c(a)(10), and not exempt from federal or state registration requirements. Miller did not register the notes; he squandered the money, operating a Ponzi scheme. Miller pled guilty to one count of securities fraud, 15 U.S.C. 78j(b), and one count of tax evasion, 26 U.S.C. 7201. He was sentenced to 120 months’ imprisonment. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the court improperly applied the Sentencing Guidelines investment adviser enhancement, U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(19)(A)(iii). The court interpreted the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. 80b-2(a)(11) to apply broadly, with exceptions that do not apply to Miller. The court also rejected arguments that the government breached Miller’s plea agreement and that his sentence was substantively unreasonable. View "United States v. Miller" on Justia Law

In 2002, at a New Jersey wedding reception, Nguyen shot another guest eight times, killing him. Nguyen shot at another guest, but missed. The bullet lodged in the wall. Several eye witnesses, each of whom knew Nguyen, identified him to the police as the shooter and stated that Nguyen fled the scene in a 1996 Honda with Alabama license plates. They provided Nguyen’s Brooklyn address. When officers arrived at his residence, Nguyen barricaded himself inside with his two-year-old son, and stated that he would shoot his son and the officers if they attempted to enter. After a four-hour standoff, Nguyen was taken into custody. Nguyen pleaded guilty to New York indictments and was sentenced to five-to-15 years. A gun found hidden in Nguyen’s car was confirmed to be the weapon used in the wedding shootings. A New Jersey grand jury indicted him for the shootings. After extensive motion practice and three years pursuing an insanity defense, he pleaded guilty, in 2009, to aggravated manslaughter and attempted murder. Nguyen was sentenced to 20 years, to run concurrently with his New York sentence from the date of his New Jersey guilty pleas. The Third Circuit affirmed denial of his habeas petition, in which Nguyen argued ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to raise a Sixth Amendment speedy trial violation and concerning the trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of his post-arrest statements. Counsel had, in fact, raised the speedy trial issue. View "Nguyen v. Att'y Gen. of NJ" on Justia Law

At the request of the Lackawanna County Drug Task Force, federal agents assisted in the search for an elusive heroin dealer. Using confidential sources, physical surveillance, undercover purchases, body wires, and a pole camera, the agents concluded that a hip-hop radio station and recording studio, Hood Promo, was the Scranton hub of a heroin ring. Agents identified Stevenson as a member of the distribution ring. Agents obtained a warrant to search five properties, including Stevenson’s residence, where they found hundreds of glassine baggies of heroin, a loaded handgun (found in Stevenson’s room and later confirmed to be stolen), fraudulent driver’s licenses and credit cards, and other inculpatory items and documents. Eight individuals were arrested in connection with the conspiracy. Only Stevenson did not plead guilty. The prosecution conceded that Stevenson’s Speedy Trial Act rights were violated. The district court dismissed the indictment without prejudice. After trial on a third superseding indictment, Stevenson was convicted and sentenced to 360 months’ imprisonment. The Third Circuit affirmed. The district court did not err in dismissing the first indictment without prejudice, in denying Stevenson’s motion to dismiss the false identification count, in denying his suppression motions, in making a statement obviously geared toward pacifying an emotional witness at trial, or in sentencing Stevenson. View "United States v. Stevenson" on Justia Law

Rengifo pled guilty to heroin offenses, which carried a Guidelines sentencing range, adjusted for acceptance of responsibility, of 15-21 months. Because Rengifo had two controlled substance convictions, the government sought application of the career offender provisions, to increase Rengifo’s sentencing range to 151-188 months. Because Rengifo’s 1999 conviction was more than 10 and fewer than 15 years old, it would count as a prior felony conviction if its sentence of imprisonment exceeded one year and one month. The Pennsylvania court had initially sentenced Rengifo to “time served to 12 months.” Rengifo served 71 days and was paroled. His parole was revoked; he was sentenced to the remaining 294 days. He served another 120 days, was paroled, and again his parole was revoked. He was sentenced to the remaining 174 days. The revocations triggered Guidelines section 4A1.2(k): “[i]n the case of a prior revocation of probation ... add the original term of imprisonment to any term of imprisonment imposed upon revocation.” The phrase “term of imprisonment,” is not defined . Rengifo argued that his term of imprisonment for the 1999 conviction was 365 days: 71 days served prior to parole and 294 days served after his revocations. The government argued that it was 659 days: the initial 365-day maximum sentence plus the 294 days sentenced for the parole violations. The district court agreed with the government, granted a downward variance, and sentenced Rengifo to 120 months. The Third Circuit affirmed, interpreting “term of imprisonment” as synonymous with “sentence of imprisonment.” View "United States v. Rengifo" on Justia Law

In 2009, Javier, a citizen of the Dominican Republic, entered the U.S. as a lawful permanent resident. In 2014 Javier was convicted, in Pennsylvania, for carrying a firearm in public and for making terroristic threats. An IJ concluded that Javier was removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) as an alien convicted of a “crime involving moral turpitude” based on his conviction for terroristic threats and also removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(C) as an alien convicted of a “firearm offense.” The BIA affirmed, based solely on Javier’s terroristic threats conviction, stating that the offense defined by 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 2706(a)(1) involves “an intentional action whose goal is to inflict [] psychological distress [that follows an invasion of the victim’s sense of personal security which] violates the norms of society to such a degree as to constitute moral turpitude.” The BIA concluded that it “need not address” the firearms conviction. The Third Circuit dismissed an appeal. A threat communicated with a specific intent to terrorize is an act “accompanied by a vicious motive or a corrupt mind” so as to be categorically morally turpitudinous. View "Javier v. Attorney Gen. of the United States" on Justia Law

Calabretta pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possess with the intent to distribute marijuana, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); 841(b)(1)(B); 846, and conspiracy to launder the proceeds of drug trafficking activity, 18 U.S.C. 1956(a)(1)(A)(i); 1956(h). Calabretta was subject to a five-year mandatory minimum sentence. The PSR considered multiple prior state convictions, including a 1990 conviction for “Death by Auto” and a 1994 conviction for “Eluding in the Second Degree,” found those two convictions to constitute “crimes of violence” under U.S.S.G. 4B1.2, and designated Calabretta as a “career offender,” increasing Calabretta’s Criminal History Category and his Total Offense Level. With the career offender Guideline, Calabretta’s recommended sentencing range was 188-235 months of imprisonment; without it, his recommended range would have been 108-135 months. The court adopted the PSR’s recommendations, considered the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), and imposed a sentence of 120 months. The Third Circuit vacated. In light of the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision, Johnson v. United States, the district court plainly erred in considering the state conviction for eluding to be a “crime of violence” under the Guidelines. The court noted the need to exercise discretion to correct the error because it increased the sentence without the necessary fact finding and affected the integrity of the proceedings. View "United States v. Calabretta" on Justia Law

Napolitan was arrested in 2007 after police discovered nearly a kilogram of cocaine, drug trafficking paraphernalia, and firearms in his Farrell, Pennsylvania home. In 2008, based on facts uncovered as part of the drug bust, Napolitan was convicted of sexual assault and simple assault and was sentenced under 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. 9712, which increased the mandatory minimum sentence for a “crime of violence” when the judge determined by a preponderance of the evidence that the perpetrator possessed a firearm that was used to frighten the victim. The Pennsylvania Superior Court has since ruled that the statute is unconstitutional under the Supreme Court’s 2013 holding (Alleyne) that whenever the existence of a fact increases a statutory minimum sentence as a matter of law, that fact is an “element” of the underlying crime that must be proven to the fact-finder beyond a reasonable doubt, In 2011, based on the 2007 drug bust, Napolitan was charged possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); (b)(1)(B)(ii), and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(i). On remand, the court applied a sentencing enhancement and imposed a 90-month sentence for the drug conviction, consecutive to Napolitan’s state sentence because the state and federal crimes were distinct. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that a defendant may not challenge the reasonableness of his federal sentence on appeal via a collateral attack on a prior state sentence. View "United States v. Napolitan" on Justia Law