Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Under the Facebook account name “Billy Button,” Browne began exchanging messages with 18-year-old Nicole. They met in person and exchanged sexually explicit photographs of themselves through Facebook chats. Browne threatened to publish the photos online unless Nicole engaged in oral sex and promised to delete the photos only if she provided him the password to her Facebook account. Using that account, Browne made contact with four minors and solicited explicit photos. Once he had their photos, he repeated the pattern, threatening to publish their images unless they engaged sexual acts. Alerted by the Virgin Islands Police Department, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) agents investigated, arrested Browne, executed a search warrant on his residence, and seized a cell phone from which text messages and photos of the minors were recovered. Browne admitted ownership of the phone and Facebook account. Facebook provided five sets of chats and a certificate of authenticity executed by its records custodian, which were admitted at trial. The Third Circuit affirmed his convictions for child pornography and sexual offenses with minors. While rejecting the government’s assertion that, under Rule 902(11), the contents of the communications were “self-authenticating” as business records accompanied by a certificate from the records custodian, the court found that the record reflected sufficient extrinsic evidence to link Browne to the chats and satisfy the prosecution’s authentication burden under a conventional Rule 901 analysis. View "United States v. Browne" on Justia Law

Carter headed a Pennsylvania drug ring, which he operated from Detroit, sending Cook and Macon to Pennsylvania to oversee the business. Cook was responsible for transporting drugs and readying them for sale. Macon’s responsibility was to keep detailed financial records and pay expenses, including the salaries of “employees.” Carter tasked Earheart with finding a house where Macon could live and run the drug operation. Earheart found the secluded Stoney Run house in Blairsville, Pennsylvania, which did not require a lease or a name on a utility bill. Carter inspected the property and ordered Macon to give Earheart the money for the security deposit and rent. Stoney Run became a base of operations. Carter’s organization maintained a second house; Cook lived at Bedford Street, and processed heroin there for delivery to Stoney Run for distribution, paying rent with funds from Macon, directly authorized by Carter. Following an investigation, which included searches of the premises and recovery of drugs at each location, Carter pleaded guilty under 21 U.S.C. 846. The agreement allowed Carter to challenge application of a two-level sentencing enhancement for maintaining a residence for the purpose of manufacturing and distributing a controlled substance, U.S.S.G. 2D1.1(b)(12). The Third Circuit affirmed Carter’s sentence (180 months), upholding application of the enhancement. View "United States v. Carter" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of first-degree murder. The jury sentenced Defendant to death. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the convictions on appeal, rejecting Defendant’s claims that the prosecution violated Brady v. Maryland. The Supreme Court denied Defendant’s application for postconviction relief. Defendant then filed an application under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court granted Defendant a conditional writ of habeas corpus and directed the Commonwealth to retry Defendant or release him, concluding that the prosecution had breached its obligations under Brady by withholding three pieces of exculpatory and material information. The Third Circuit initially vacated the district court’s order, but subsequently, acting en banc, affirmed. The suppressed Brady material—a receipt corroborating Dennis’s alibi, an inconsistent statement by the Commonwealth’s key eyewitness, and documents indicating that another individual committed the murder — effectively gutted the Commonwealth’s case against Dennis. The withholding of these pieces of evidence denied Dennis a fair trial in state court. View "Dennis v. Sec'y PA Dept. of Corrs." on Justia Law

In 2001, Mary Edmond was shot near a North Philadelphia gas station. She died from her injuries. During the investigation, Garcia gave a confession to the police that was self-incriminating, but indicated that Lambert pulled the trigger. When Lambert and Garcia are jointly tried in Pennsylvania state court, Garcia declined to testify, depriving Lambert of the ability to cross-examine him about the confession. The judge redacted the confession in an effort to comply with the Supreme Court holding in Bruton v. United States (1968). When the jury heard Garcia’s confession, Lambert’s name was replaced with terms like “the other guy.” During closing arguments, however, the prosecutor made statements that the defense believed revealed that Lambert was “the other guy.” The judge denied a motion for mistrial, but instructed the jury that the confession could only be used against Garcia and must not be considered as evidence against Lambert. Both were convicted. The Third Circuit reversed and granted habeas relief, based on the Sixth Amendment violation caused by the closing arguments. The error was not harmless. View "Brown v. Greene" on Justia Law

After a fellow Bucknell University student (Stefanowicz) claimed that Dempsey had sexually assaulted her in his dorm room, the University’s Public Safety Officers (who are police officers) investigated and eventually filed a criminal complaint with an affidavit of probable cause. The charges were later dropped. Dempsey brought a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against Bucknell University, claiming violations of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unlawful search and seizure. The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. In light of the evidence corroborating in substantial part Stefanowicz’s story and the existence of a period of time in which no one disputes the two were alone together in Dempsey’s room, “even taking into account certain facts recklessly omitted from the affidavit of probable cause, a reasonable jury could not find a lack of probable cause.” View "Dempsey v. Bucknell Univ." on Justia Law

Dahl placed advertisements on Craigslist seeking sexual encounters with young males. Two undercover law-enforcement agents, acting independently, replied, representing themselves as 15-year-old boys. Through email, Dahl engaged in graphic sexual conversations, requested photographs of the boys, and attempted to arrange in-person sexual encounters. An agent agreed to meet Dahl at his house, ostensibly for a sexual encounter. Dahl was arrested and pleaded guilty to attempted use of an interstate commerce facility to entice a minor to engage in sexual conduct, 18 U.S.C. 2422(b); attempted enticement of a minor to travel in interstate commerce to engage in sexual activity, section 2422(a); and transfer of obscene material to a minor, section 1470. Dahl has Delaware convictions related to sexual activity with minors, including a 1991 conviction of first- and third-degree unlawful sexual contact relating to encounters with two 17-year-old boys and a 2001 conviction of second-degree unlawful sexual contact relating to an encounter with a 14-year-old boy. The court sentenced him under the Repeat and Dangerous Sex Offender guideline, U.S.S.G. 4B1.5, to the top-range sentence of 293 months in prison, with 20 years of supervised release. The Third Circuit remanded, finding that his state convictions are not categorically “sex offense convictions” under the Guidelines, in light of recent Supreme Court rulings. View "United States v. Dahl" on Justia Law

Parkell, a Delaware state prisoner, claims that state officials deprived him of his rights under the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments by subjecting him to unreasonable thrice-daily visual body-cavity searches and harsh conditions and by depriving him of adequate medical care. In his suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court granted the defendants summary judgment, concluding that: Parkell could not pursue damages from corrections officials in their official capacities because of the Eleventh Amendment, and any claim for prospective relief was rendered moot when Parkell was moved; his medical needs Eighth Amendment claim failed because any deficiencies in his medical care did not rise to the level of deliberate indifference to his needs; his conditions-of-confinement Eighth Amendment claim failed because the conditions did not constitute a denial of basic human needs, and the defendants were not personally involved in creating the conditions; and his due process claim​ failed because the conditions of his confinement did not constitute atypical and significant hardship in comparison to general prison conditions. The Third Circuit reversed only as to Parkell’s claim under the Fourth Amendment; that the state defendants lacked personal involvement in past constitutional violations does not preclude Parkell from obtaining prospective injunctive relief for ongoing violations. View "Parkell v. Danberg" on Justia Law

In 1999, Jones fled from Pennsylvania police, who discovered a gun in the area and concluded that Jones had discarded it. Jones was convicted under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1); 924(e) for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The court sentenced Jones under the Armed Career Criminal Act, which requires a sentence of at least 180 months for anyone convicted under section 922(g) who has three convictions for a “violent felony” or “serious drug offense.” Jones had convictions for robbery and aggravated assault, and two controlled substances convictions. The Third Circuit affirmed. Jones was denied post-conviction relief. Jones was released from custody in 2013. Jones was later arrested on state drug charges. The court ordered him returned to prison. Under 18 U.S.C. 3583(e)(3), the maximum permissible revocation sentence depends on the classification of “the offense that resulted in the term of supervised release.” Relying on the Supreme Court’s 2013 "Alleyne" decision, Jones unsuccessfully argued that he was subject to no more than two years’ imprisonment because his offense was properly categorized as a Class C felony. The court concluded that his offense was a Class A felony and imposed a 40-month sentence. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting “ Jones’s efforts to bifurcate his original conviction and sentence from his revocation sentence, and to characterize this appeal as a direct challenge to a classification determination made in imposing the latter.” View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law

With little formal education (a high school GED) Miller passed several securities industry examinations and “maintained a public persona of a very successful entrepreneur.” Miller sold investors over $41 million in phony “promissory notes,” which were securities under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 77b(a)(1), 78c(a)(10), and not exempt from federal or state registration requirements. Miller did not register the notes; he squandered the money, operating a Ponzi scheme. Miller pled guilty to one count of securities fraud, 15 U.S.C. 78j(b), and one count of tax evasion, 26 U.S.C. 7201. He was sentenced to 120 months’ imprisonment. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the court improperly applied the Sentencing Guidelines investment adviser enhancement, U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(19)(A)(iii). The court interpreted the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. 80b-2(a)(11) to apply broadly, with exceptions that do not apply to Miller. The court also rejected arguments that the government breached Miller’s plea agreement and that his sentence was substantively unreasonable. View "United States v. Miller" on Justia Law

In 2002, at a New Jersey wedding reception, Nguyen shot another guest eight times, killing him. Nguyen shot at another guest, but missed. The bullet lodged in the wall. Several eye witnesses, each of whom knew Nguyen, identified him to the police as the shooter and stated that Nguyen fled the scene in a 1996 Honda with Alabama license plates. They provided Nguyen’s Brooklyn address. When officers arrived at his residence, Nguyen barricaded himself inside with his two-year-old son, and stated that he would shoot his son and the officers if they attempted to enter. After a four-hour standoff, Nguyen was taken into custody. Nguyen pleaded guilty to New York indictments and was sentenced to five-to-15 years. A gun found hidden in Nguyen’s car was confirmed to be the weapon used in the wedding shootings. A New Jersey grand jury indicted him for the shootings. After extensive motion practice and three years pursuing an insanity defense, he pleaded guilty, in 2009, to aggravated manslaughter and attempted murder. Nguyen was sentenced to 20 years, to run concurrently with his New York sentence from the date of his New Jersey guilty pleas. The Third Circuit affirmed denial of his habeas petition, in which Nguyen argued ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to raise a Sixth Amendment speedy trial violation and concerning the trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of his post-arrest statements. Counsel had, in fact, raised the speedy trial issue. View "Nguyen v. Att'y Gen. of NJ" on Justia Law