Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Masha was adopted from Russia by Mancuso when she was five years old. During the following five years, Mancuso sexually abused Masha and documented the abuse in photographs and videos, which he distributed online in exchange for media documenting the sexual abuse of other children. Mancuso pled guilty to sexual exploitation of a minor, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a); the government dropped a charge of possession of material depicting the sexual exploitation of a minor, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(4)(B). Mancuso stipulated that the dismissed count could be considered in imposing sentence and agreed to pay “mandatory restitution” under the Victim-Witness Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. 3663, 3663A and 3664, of $200,000 into a trust for Masha’s benefit. In 2013, 10 years after Mancuso’s conviction, Masha filed suit under 18 U.S.C. 2255 (called Masha’s law) against a purported class of defendants, including Mancuso. The Third Circuit reversed dismissal of the case. A restitution award for a criminal offense does not bar a later-filed civil claim under section 2255 based on that same offense. The interests of Masha and the government were not squarely aligned in the criminal proceeding; she had a limited ability to participate in the determination of her restitution and no right to appeal, so application of collateral estoppel would be inequitable and would offend the “deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone should have his own day in court.” View "Doe v. Hesketh" on Justia Law

EMTs found three-year-old Jordan not breathing and without a pulse; there were bruises all over Jordan’s body, particularly severe across his ribs. Jordan’s mother, Candice, blamed the bruising on prior falls and horseplay with Jordan’s four-year-old brother, Kamden. A pathologist concluded that the bruises were too severe to have been caused by a four-year-old; he found gray material and bruising, consistent with being bound with duct tape. Candice lived with her three children and Candice’s mother, Lois. Candice was charged with first- and third-degree murder, aggravated assault, and endangering the welfare of a child. Lois pleaded guilty to endangering the welfare of children, regarding the condition of her home. Before trial, Candice told cellmates different stories about what happened to Jordan. Kamden stated to several people, and in a videotaped interview, that “mommy hit [Jordan] and pushed him . . . he fell down and died.” A judge determined that Kamden was competent to testify. For two years, Lois maintained that she did not cause Jordan’s death. Shortly before trial, Lois admitted to an investigator that she had abused Jordan by repeatedly hitting his ribs with a pipe, throwing him against the wall, and restraining him with duct tape. Lois refused to repeat her confession to the prosecutor or to testify at Candice’s trial. The court refused to admit the hearsay confession. There was testimony that Kamden sometimes referred to Lois as “mommy” and that both women abused Jordan. A jury convicted Candice of third-degree murder, aggravated assault, and endangering the welfare of a child; she was sentenced to 18-40 years imprisonment. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim of violation of Candice’s due process right to present her defense. “Lois’ statements had no indicia of credibility. Lois ... was attempting to have her cake and eat it too.” View "Staruh v. Superintendent, Cambridge Springs SCI" on Justia Law

In 2008 and 2011 Gibson and Thompson separately pled guilty to drug offenses. In each case, the court departed downwards from the Career Offender Guidelines range and sentenced Gibson to 162 months and Thompson to 151 months of imprisonment. The Statement of Reasons indicated that Thompson’s sentence was imposed pursuant to the plea agreement. In 2014, Guidelines Amendment 782 retroactively reduced by two levels the base offense levels assigned to many drug quantities in the Drug Guidelines, including the drug quantities associated with their offenses. They filed unsuccessful motions (18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2)) for sentence reduction. The section permits a court to exercise its discretion to reduce a sentence only if: the sentence is “based on” a Guidelines range that has subsequently been lowered and a sentence reduction would be consistent with the Sentencing Commission’s policy statements. The Third Circuit affirmed the denials. Guidelines Amendment 759 provides that a court may not reduce a sentence under section 3582(c)(2) unless a Guidelines amendment has the “effect of lowering the defendant’s applicable guideline range.” In these cases, pre-departure, pre-variance “applicable guideline ranges” were calculated using the base offense levels for career offenders in Guidelines 4B1.1, which have not been lowered. Amendment 759, although enacted after they were sentenced, is not an ex post facto law. View "United States v. Gibson" on Justia Law

Williams captioned his case as a state habeas action against a prison warden. He alleged claims about the conditions of his confinement, specifically Eighth Amendment claims about the lack of medical care. The Third Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the action, noting that his claims did not challenge to the fact or duration of his imprisonment, which is the essential purpose of the writ of habeas corpus. Williams’s claims would properly be brought in an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, not a habeas petition. When the challenge is to a condition of confinement such that a finding in plaintiff's favor would not alter his sentence or undo his conviction, a civil rights action is appropriate. The court noted that Williams already has a civil rights action pending relating to the same or similar claims and deliberately filed a different type of action. View "Williams v. Warden, Lackawanna County Prison" on Justia Law

New Jersey ATF agents met with Burk, a convicted felon facing forgery charges who was a confidential informant. Questioned about associates who were involved in robberies or violent crimes, Burk responded that Dennis had spoken of conducting home invasions and other robberies. The agents were previously unaware of Dennis. They confirmed that Dennis had several felony convictions relating to drugs and burglary. Burk told agents that Dennis had previously requested his help in robbing a check-cashing operation. At the direction of the agents, Burk tried, several times, to enlist Dennis’ help in various robbery schemes. When Burk told him that the job was necessary to help Burk's mother who had cancer, Dennis agreed. At trial, a defense witness testified that Dennis suffers from neurocognitive impairments, with an IQ score of 74. After the “reverse sting,” Dennis was convicted of conspiracy to rob a narcotics “stash house,” 18 U.S.C. 1951(a), 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), and 841(b)(1)(A), and of carrying a firearm during the commission of the crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(i), and was sentenced to 180 months’ imprisonment. The Third Circuit vacated the conviction; the court should have given an entrapment instruction on the robbery and gun possession charges. The court affirmed on the remaining drug charge. View "United States v. Dennis" on Justia Law

Bedolla illegally entered the U.S. in 1991; he traveled to Mexico and re-entered at least once since then. In 2012, he was arrested for failure to appear on a charge of driving under the influence of alcohol. He was placed in removal proceedings, 28 U.S.C. 1229a, as an alien present without being admitted or paroled. His application for adjustment of status was rejected because Bedolla had departed and reentered without inspection after accruing more than one year of unlawful presence in the U.S., 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(I). Before a scheduled hearing date, Bedolla pleaded guilty to possession with intent to manufacture or deliver cocaine. DHS placed Bedolla in expedited administrative removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. 1228(b). The unsigned Certificate of Service accompanying the notice did not indicate the date or manner of attempted service, but indicated that Bedolla refused to acknowledge receipt. The period for response elapsed without response. A Final Administrative Removal Order (FARO) was signed. Bedolla timely filed a petition for review of the FARO. The Immigration Judge terminated the removal proceeding. The Third Circuit denied a petition for review, rejecting claims of due process violations and that a FARO was inappropriate because Bedolla was not convicted of an “aggravated felony.” View "Bedolla-Avila v. Att'y Gen. of the United States" on Justia Law

Gourzong, a native of Jamaica, was admitted to the U.S. as a lawful permanent resident in 1983. In 1993, having joined the U.S. military, he was convicted by a special court-martial at Camp Pendelton of willfully disobeying a lawful order, 10 U.S.C. 890(2), and “commit[ing] an act of sexual intercourse with a female not his wife who has not attained the age of sixteen years,” 10 U.S.C. 920. Gourzong was represented by counsel and pleaded guilty. He received a sentence of six months confinement, loss of pay, and bad-conduct discharge. The convening authority suspended part of the confinement and withheld executing the bad-conduct discharge until after appellate review procedures, 10 U.S.C. 871(c). An IJ found Gourzong removable, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), having been convicted of an aggravated felony. The BIA affirmed, rejecting his argument that convictions by special courts-martial categorically fall outside the definition in 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(48)(A): “‘conviction’ means, with respect to an alien, a formal judgment of guilt of the alien entered by a court.” Although it is possible that a special court-martial can convene without a legally trained judge presiding, their convictions generally qualify as convictions under the Act. The Third Circuit agreed and, therefore, concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Gourzong’s appeal. View "Gourzong v. Att'y Gen. of the United States" on Justia Law

In 2008 and 2011, the two defendants pled guilty to drug offenses. In 2014, the Sentencing Commission promulgated Amendment 782 to the Guidelines, which retroactively reduced by two levels the base offense levels assigned to many drug quantities, including the drug quantities associated with defendants' offenses. Defendants filed 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2) motions for sentence reduction. That section permits a district court to exercise its discretion to reduce a sentence only if the sentence is “based on” a Guidelines range that has subsequently been lowered and a sentence reduction would be consistent with the Sentencing Commission’s policy statements. The Sentencing Commission’s policy statement prohibits a district court from reducing a defendant’s sentence unless a subsequent amendment to the Guidelines lowers the defendant’s “applicable guideline range.” Amendment 759, promulgated in 2011, provides that a defendant’s “applicable guideline range” is to be determined before any departures and variances. The Third Circuit affirmed denial of their motions, citing Amendment 759. Their pre-departure/pre-variance “applicable guideline ranges” were calculated using the base offense levels for career offenders in Guidelines 4B1.1, which have not been lowered. The court rejected an argument that Amendment 759 is an invalid ex post facto law. View "United States v. Thompson" on Justia Law

Lewisburg Pennsylvania Penitentiary inmate Nerius bit a correctional employee and broke the sprinkler head in his cell, causing a flood. Nerius pled guilty to resisting correctional officers and damaging property, 18 U.S.C. 111(a)(1) and 1363. The PSR base offense level was increased to 17 because the section 111(a)(1) charge was deemed a crime of violence that qualified Nerius as a career offender under U.S.S.G. 4B1.1. Nerius received a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. With a criminal history category of VI, his Guidelines range was 37-46 months’ imprisonment. Nerius unsuccessfully argued that violation of section 111(a) did not constitute a crime of violence. The court considered Nerius’s long criminal history, acknowledged that Nerius had recently improved his behavior, found “that a sentence at the bottom of the [career offender] guideline range is reasonable, appropriate, and is not greater than necessary to meet sentencing objectives,” and imposed a 37-month sentence. While his appeal was pending, the Supreme Court found the Armed Career Criminal Act residual clause void for vagueness. At resentencing, the court found “a sentence at the high end of the [non-career offender] guideline range to be reasonable,” and sentenced Nerius to 36 months. The Third Circuit affirmed. The revised sentence did not trigger the Pearce presumption of judicial vindictiveness; the new sentence was lower than the original. View "United States v. Nerius" on Justia Law

An arrest warrant issued for Rivera, a homicide suspect. U.S. Marshal Duncan received information from another officer and from street informants that Rivera was “staying” or “residing” at a Harrisburg address. Officers arrived at the apartment and knocked. They received no response but heard noises, indicating that a person was inside and forcibly entered the home. Rivera did not live there and was not present. The officers saw Algarin, and, during a protective sweep, saw sandwich baggies, a razor blade, and what appeared to be powder cocaine. An officer obtained a search warrant while the others waited at the apartment. During the subsequent search, officers discovered incriminating items, including car keys, which opened a stolen Mazda found across from the apartment. Algarin, who had no outstanding warrants, was charged with distribution and possession with intent to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A)(ii). During a hearing on a motion to suppress, Duncan testified that he had checked records, but was unable to recall whether he had identified the apartment's renter. The Third Circuit vacated Algarin’s conviction. Officers need an arrest warrant and a search warrant to apprehend a suspect at what they know to be a third party’s home. If the suspect resides at the address, officers need only an arrest warrant and reason to believe that the individual is present. Here, officers acted on information short of the probable cause standard with respect to Rivera’s residence. View "United States v. Vasquez-Algarin" on Justia Law