Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

At the request of the Lackawanna County Drug Task Force, federal agents assisted in the search for an elusive heroin dealer. Using confidential sources, physical surveillance, undercover purchases, body wires, and a pole camera, the agents concluded that a hip-hop radio station and recording studio, Hood Promo, was the Scranton hub of a heroin ring. Agents identified Stevenson as a member of the distribution ring. Agents obtained a warrant to search five properties, including Stevenson’s residence, where they found hundreds of glassine baggies of heroin, a loaded handgun (found in Stevenson’s room and later confirmed to be stolen), fraudulent driver’s licenses and credit cards, and other inculpatory items and documents. Eight individuals were arrested in connection with the conspiracy. Only Stevenson did not plead guilty. The prosecution conceded that Stevenson’s Speedy Trial Act rights were violated. The district court dismissed the indictment without prejudice. After trial on a third superseding indictment, Stevenson was convicted and sentenced to 360 months’ imprisonment. The Third Circuit affirmed. The district court did not err in dismissing the first indictment without prejudice, in denying Stevenson’s motion to dismiss the false identification count, in denying his suppression motions, in making a statement obviously geared toward pacifying an emotional witness at trial, or in sentencing Stevenson. View "United States v. Stevenson" on Justia Law

Rengifo pled guilty to heroin offenses, which carried a Guidelines sentencing range, adjusted for acceptance of responsibility, of 15-21 months. Because Rengifo had two controlled substance convictions, the government sought application of the career offender provisions, to increase Rengifo’s sentencing range to 151-188 months. Because Rengifo’s 1999 conviction was more than 10 and fewer than 15 years old, it would count as a prior felony conviction if its sentence of imprisonment exceeded one year and one month. The Pennsylvania court had initially sentenced Rengifo to “time served to 12 months.” Rengifo served 71 days and was paroled. His parole was revoked; he was sentenced to the remaining 294 days. He served another 120 days, was paroled, and again his parole was revoked. He was sentenced to the remaining 174 days. The revocations triggered Guidelines section 4A1.2(k): “[i]n the case of a prior revocation of probation ... add the original term of imprisonment to any term of imprisonment imposed upon revocation.” The phrase “term of imprisonment,” is not defined . Rengifo argued that his term of imprisonment for the 1999 conviction was 365 days: 71 days served prior to parole and 294 days served after his revocations. The government argued that it was 659 days: the initial 365-day maximum sentence plus the 294 days sentenced for the parole violations. The district court agreed with the government, granted a downward variance, and sentenced Rengifo to 120 months. The Third Circuit affirmed, interpreting “term of imprisonment” as synonymous with “sentence of imprisonment.” View "United States v. Rengifo" on Justia Law

In 2009, Javier, a citizen of the Dominican Republic, entered the U.S. as a lawful permanent resident. In 2014 Javier was convicted, in Pennsylvania, for carrying a firearm in public and for making terroristic threats. An IJ concluded that Javier was removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) as an alien convicted of a “crime involving moral turpitude” based on his conviction for terroristic threats and also removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(C) as an alien convicted of a “firearm offense.” The BIA affirmed, based solely on Javier’s terroristic threats conviction, stating that the offense defined by 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 2706(a)(1) involves “an intentional action whose goal is to inflict [] psychological distress [that follows an invasion of the victim’s sense of personal security which] violates the norms of society to such a degree as to constitute moral turpitude.” The BIA concluded that it “need not address” the firearms conviction. The Third Circuit dismissed an appeal. A threat communicated with a specific intent to terrorize is an act “accompanied by a vicious motive or a corrupt mind” so as to be categorically morally turpitudinous. View "Javier v. Attorney Gen. of the United States" on Justia Law

Calabretta pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possess with the intent to distribute marijuana, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); 841(b)(1)(B); 846, and conspiracy to launder the proceeds of drug trafficking activity, 18 U.S.C. 1956(a)(1)(A)(i); 1956(h). Calabretta was subject to a five-year mandatory minimum sentence. The PSR considered multiple prior state convictions, including a 1990 conviction for “Death by Auto” and a 1994 conviction for “Eluding in the Second Degree,” found those two convictions to constitute “crimes of violence” under U.S.S.G. 4B1.2, and designated Calabretta as a “career offender,” increasing Calabretta’s Criminal History Category and his Total Offense Level. With the career offender Guideline, Calabretta’s recommended sentencing range was 188-235 months of imprisonment; without it, his recommended range would have been 108-135 months. The court adopted the PSR’s recommendations, considered the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), and imposed a sentence of 120 months. The Third Circuit vacated. In light of the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision, Johnson v. United States, the district court plainly erred in considering the state conviction for eluding to be a “crime of violence” under the Guidelines. The court noted the need to exercise discretion to correct the error because it increased the sentence without the necessary fact finding and affected the integrity of the proceedings. View "United States v. Calabretta" on Justia Law

Napolitan was arrested in 2007 after police discovered nearly a kilogram of cocaine, drug trafficking paraphernalia, and firearms in his Farrell, Pennsylvania home. In 2008, based on facts uncovered as part of the drug bust, Napolitan was convicted of sexual assault and simple assault and was sentenced under 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. 9712, which increased the mandatory minimum sentence for a “crime of violence” when the judge determined by a preponderance of the evidence that the perpetrator possessed a firearm that was used to frighten the victim. The Pennsylvania Superior Court has since ruled that the statute is unconstitutional under the Supreme Court’s 2013 holding (Alleyne) that whenever the existence of a fact increases a statutory minimum sentence as a matter of law, that fact is an “element” of the underlying crime that must be proven to the fact-finder beyond a reasonable doubt, In 2011, based on the 2007 drug bust, Napolitan was charged possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); (b)(1)(B)(ii), and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(i). On remand, the court applied a sentencing enhancement and imposed a 90-month sentence for the drug conviction, consecutive to Napolitan’s state sentence because the state and federal crimes were distinct. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that a defendant may not challenge the reasonableness of his federal sentence on appeal via a collateral attack on a prior state sentence. View "United States v. Napolitan" on Justia Law

Masha was adopted from Russia by Mancuso when she was five years old. During the following five years, Mancuso sexually abused Masha and documented the abuse in photographs and videos, which he distributed online in exchange for media documenting the sexual abuse of other children. Mancuso pled guilty to sexual exploitation of a minor, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a); the government dropped a charge of possession of material depicting the sexual exploitation of a minor, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(4)(B). Mancuso stipulated that the dismissed count could be considered in imposing sentence and agreed to pay “mandatory restitution” under the Victim-Witness Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. 3663, 3663A and 3664, of $200,000 into a trust for Masha’s benefit. In 2013, 10 years after Mancuso’s conviction, Masha filed suit under 18 U.S.C. 2255 (called Masha’s law) against a purported class of defendants, including Mancuso. The Third Circuit reversed dismissal of the case. A restitution award for a criminal offense does not bar a later-filed civil claim under section 2255 based on that same offense. The interests of Masha and the government were not squarely aligned in the criminal proceeding; she had a limited ability to participate in the determination of her restitution and no right to appeal, so application of collateral estoppel would be inequitable and would offend the “deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone should have his own day in court.” View "Doe v. Hesketh" on Justia Law

EMTs found three-year-old Jordan not breathing and without a pulse; there were bruises all over Jordan’s body, particularly severe across his ribs. Jordan’s mother, Candice, blamed the bruising on prior falls and horseplay with Jordan’s four-year-old brother, Kamden. A pathologist concluded that the bruises were too severe to have been caused by a four-year-old; he found gray material and bruising, consistent with being bound with duct tape. Candice lived with her three children and Candice’s mother, Lois. Candice was charged with first- and third-degree murder, aggravated assault, and endangering the welfare of a child. Lois pleaded guilty to endangering the welfare of children, regarding the condition of her home. Before trial, Candice told cellmates different stories about what happened to Jordan. Kamden stated to several people, and in a videotaped interview, that “mommy hit [Jordan] and pushed him . . . he fell down and died.” A judge determined that Kamden was competent to testify. For two years, Lois maintained that she did not cause Jordan’s death. Shortly before trial, Lois admitted to an investigator that she had abused Jordan by repeatedly hitting his ribs with a pipe, throwing him against the wall, and restraining him with duct tape. Lois refused to repeat her confession to the prosecutor or to testify at Candice’s trial. The court refused to admit the hearsay confession. There was testimony that Kamden sometimes referred to Lois as “mommy” and that both women abused Jordan. A jury convicted Candice of third-degree murder, aggravated assault, and endangering the welfare of a child; she was sentenced to 18-40 years imprisonment. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim of violation of Candice’s due process right to present her defense. “Lois’ statements had no indicia of credibility. Lois ... was attempting to have her cake and eat it too.” View "Staruh v. Superintendent, Cambridge Springs SCI" on Justia Law

In 2008 and 2011 Gibson and Thompson separately pled guilty to drug offenses. In each case, the court departed downwards from the Career Offender Guidelines range and sentenced Gibson to 162 months and Thompson to 151 months of imprisonment. The Statement of Reasons indicated that Thompson’s sentence was imposed pursuant to the plea agreement. In 2014, Guidelines Amendment 782 retroactively reduced by two levels the base offense levels assigned to many drug quantities in the Drug Guidelines, including the drug quantities associated with their offenses. They filed unsuccessful motions (18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2)) for sentence reduction. The section permits a court to exercise its discretion to reduce a sentence only if: the sentence is “based on” a Guidelines range that has subsequently been lowered and a sentence reduction would be consistent with the Sentencing Commission’s policy statements. The Third Circuit affirmed the denials. Guidelines Amendment 759 provides that a court may not reduce a sentence under section 3582(c)(2) unless a Guidelines amendment has the “effect of lowering the defendant’s applicable guideline range.” In these cases, pre-departure, pre-variance “applicable guideline ranges” were calculated using the base offense levels for career offenders in Guidelines 4B1.1, which have not been lowered. Amendment 759, although enacted after they were sentenced, is not an ex post facto law. View "United States v. Gibson" on Justia Law

Williams captioned his case as a state habeas action against a prison warden. He alleged claims about the conditions of his confinement, specifically Eighth Amendment claims about the lack of medical care. The Third Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the action, noting that his claims did not challenge to the fact or duration of his imprisonment, which is the essential purpose of the writ of habeas corpus. Williams’s claims would properly be brought in an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, not a habeas petition. When the challenge is to a condition of confinement such that a finding in plaintiff's favor would not alter his sentence or undo his conviction, a civil rights action is appropriate. The court noted that Williams already has a civil rights action pending relating to the same or similar claims and deliberately filed a different type of action. View "Williams v. Warden, Lackawanna County Prison" on Justia Law

New Jersey ATF agents met with Burk, a convicted felon facing forgery charges who was a confidential informant. Questioned about associates who were involved in robberies or violent crimes, Burk responded that Dennis had spoken of conducting home invasions and other robberies. The agents were previously unaware of Dennis. They confirmed that Dennis had several felony convictions relating to drugs and burglary. Burk told agents that Dennis had previously requested his help in robbing a check-cashing operation. At the direction of the agents, Burk tried, several times, to enlist Dennis’ help in various robbery schemes. When Burk told him that the job was necessary to help Burk's mother who had cancer, Dennis agreed. At trial, a defense witness testified that Dennis suffers from neurocognitive impairments, with an IQ score of 74. After the “reverse sting,” Dennis was convicted of conspiracy to rob a narcotics “stash house,” 18 U.S.C. 1951(a), 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), and 841(b)(1)(A), and of carrying a firearm during the commission of the crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(i), and was sentenced to 180 months’ imprisonment. The Third Circuit vacated the conviction; the court should have given an entrapment instruction on the robbery and gun possession charges. The court affirmed on the remaining drug charge. View "United States v. Dennis" on Justia Law