Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Bedolla illegally entered the U.S. in 1991; he traveled to Mexico and re-entered at least once since then. In 2012, he was arrested for failure to appear on a charge of driving under the influence of alcohol. He was placed in removal proceedings, 28 U.S.C. 1229a, as an alien present without being admitted or paroled. His application for adjustment of status was rejected because Bedolla had departed and reentered without inspection after accruing more than one year of unlawful presence in the U.S., 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(I). Before a scheduled hearing date, Bedolla pleaded guilty to possession with intent to manufacture or deliver cocaine. DHS placed Bedolla in expedited administrative removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. 1228(b). The unsigned Certificate of Service accompanying the notice did not indicate the date or manner of attempted service, but indicated that Bedolla refused to acknowledge receipt. The period for response elapsed without response. A Final Administrative Removal Order (FARO) was signed. Bedolla timely filed a petition for review of the FARO. The Immigration Judge terminated the removal proceeding. The Third Circuit denied a petition for review, rejecting claims of due process violations and that a FARO was inappropriate because Bedolla was not convicted of an “aggravated felony.” View "Bedolla-Avila v. Att'y Gen. of the United States" on Justia Law

Gourzong, a native of Jamaica, was admitted to the U.S. as a lawful permanent resident in 1983. In 1993, having joined the U.S. military, he was convicted by a special court-martial at Camp Pendelton of willfully disobeying a lawful order, 10 U.S.C. 890(2), and “commit[ing] an act of sexual intercourse with a female not his wife who has not attained the age of sixteen years,” 10 U.S.C. 920. Gourzong was represented by counsel and pleaded guilty. He received a sentence of six months confinement, loss of pay, and bad-conduct discharge. The convening authority suspended part of the confinement and withheld executing the bad-conduct discharge until after appellate review procedures, 10 U.S.C. 871(c). An IJ found Gourzong removable, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), having been convicted of an aggravated felony. The BIA affirmed, rejecting his argument that convictions by special courts-martial categorically fall outside the definition in 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(48)(A): “‘conviction’ means, with respect to an alien, a formal judgment of guilt of the alien entered by a court.” Although it is possible that a special court-martial can convene without a legally trained judge presiding, their convictions generally qualify as convictions under the Act. The Third Circuit agreed and, therefore, concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Gourzong’s appeal. View "Gourzong v. Att'y Gen. of the United States" on Justia Law

In 2008 and 2011, the two defendants pled guilty to drug offenses. In 2014, the Sentencing Commission promulgated Amendment 782 to the Guidelines, which retroactively reduced by two levels the base offense levels assigned to many drug quantities, including the drug quantities associated with defendants' offenses. Defendants filed 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2) motions for sentence reduction. That section permits a district court to exercise its discretion to reduce a sentence only if the sentence is “based on” a Guidelines range that has subsequently been lowered and a sentence reduction would be consistent with the Sentencing Commission’s policy statements. The Sentencing Commission’s policy statement prohibits a district court from reducing a defendant’s sentence unless a subsequent amendment to the Guidelines lowers the defendant’s “applicable guideline range.” Amendment 759, promulgated in 2011, provides that a defendant’s “applicable guideline range” is to be determined before any departures and variances. The Third Circuit affirmed denial of their motions, citing Amendment 759. Their pre-departure/pre-variance “applicable guideline ranges” were calculated using the base offense levels for career offenders in Guidelines 4B1.1, which have not been lowered. The court rejected an argument that Amendment 759 is an invalid ex post facto law. View "United States v. Thompson" on Justia Law

Lewisburg Pennsylvania Penitentiary inmate Nerius bit a correctional employee and broke the sprinkler head in his cell, causing a flood. Nerius pled guilty to resisting correctional officers and damaging property, 18 U.S.C. 111(a)(1) and 1363. The PSR base offense level was increased to 17 because the section 111(a)(1) charge was deemed a crime of violence that qualified Nerius as a career offender under U.S.S.G. 4B1.1. Nerius received a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. With a criminal history category of VI, his Guidelines range was 37-46 months’ imprisonment. Nerius unsuccessfully argued that violation of section 111(a) did not constitute a crime of violence. The court considered Nerius’s long criminal history, acknowledged that Nerius had recently improved his behavior, found “that a sentence at the bottom of the [career offender] guideline range is reasonable, appropriate, and is not greater than necessary to meet sentencing objectives,” and imposed a 37-month sentence. While his appeal was pending, the Supreme Court found the Armed Career Criminal Act residual clause void for vagueness. At resentencing, the court found “a sentence at the high end of the [non-career offender] guideline range to be reasonable,” and sentenced Nerius to 36 months. The Third Circuit affirmed. The revised sentence did not trigger the Pearce presumption of judicial vindictiveness; the new sentence was lower than the original. View "United States v. Nerius" on Justia Law

An arrest warrant issued for Rivera, a homicide suspect. U.S. Marshal Duncan received information from another officer and from street informants that Rivera was “staying” or “residing” at a Harrisburg address. Officers arrived at the apartment and knocked. They received no response but heard noises, indicating that a person was inside and forcibly entered the home. Rivera did not live there and was not present. The officers saw Algarin, and, during a protective sweep, saw sandwich baggies, a razor blade, and what appeared to be powder cocaine. An officer obtained a search warrant while the others waited at the apartment. During the subsequent search, officers discovered incriminating items, including car keys, which opened a stolen Mazda found across from the apartment. Algarin, who had no outstanding warrants, was charged with distribution and possession with intent to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A)(ii). During a hearing on a motion to suppress, Duncan testified that he had checked records, but was unable to recall whether he had identified the apartment's renter. The Third Circuit vacated Algarin’s conviction. Officers need an arrest warrant and a search warrant to apprehend a suspect at what they know to be a third party’s home. If the suspect resides at the address, officers need only an arrest warrant and reason to believe that the individual is present. Here, officers acted on information short of the probable cause standard with respect to Rivera’s residence. View "United States v. Vasquez-Algarin" on Justia Law

The Sunrise Motel's owner told Bensalem Township police that he had seen a woman he believed to be a prostitute being picked up by a green Cadillac. Later that day, a “tip” was called in, that a man at the nearby Knights Inn, driving a green Cadillac, was in possession of drugs. That evening, officers observed a green Cadillac outside the nearby Neshaminy Inn and learned that it was registered to Murray in Room 302. The officers knew that Murray had rented rooms at the Knights Inn, paying cash. Officers knocked at Room 302. A woman wearing lingerie (Burns) answered the door, and asked if the officer was “looking for a date.” The officers then proceeded to the Knights Inn, where they saw the Cadillac in front of Room 158, a woman leaving Room 158, and Murray inside the room. Later, at the Neshaminy Inn, Burns admitted the officers and stated that she was a prostitute and that a drug dealer that provided her with drugs. She later testified that she had made the “tip” call because she felt she was in danger. Murray arrived; officers patted him down and found large amounts of cash and hotel keys. Murray attempted to flee. With warrants, the officers found 192 grams of crack cocaine at the Knights Inn. Murray entered a guilty plea, preserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. The Third Circuit affirmed; the officers did not violate the Fourth Amendment when they entered the room or when they frisked Murray., View "United States v. Murray" on Justia Law

The sole issue at his trial on a charge of possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g) was whether Lopez possessed a gun. The jury heard from Lopez and from arresting officers Martinez and Ramos, who testified that they found a gun in Lopez’s pocket after encountering him leaving the scene of a reported burglary-in-progress. Lopez’s credibility was crucial to his defense. He admitted that when he was taken to the precinct, he gave officers his brother’s name rather than his own and that he had prior felony convictions. During cross-examination and closing arguments, the prosecution emphasized that Lopez did not say that he had been framed by the police or complain about alleged excessive force until he testified at trial. The Third Circuit vacated Lopez’s conviction, based on the government’s use of his post-Miranda silence to impeach him. View "United States v. Lopez" on Justia Law

In 2012, Dellavecchia was convicted of first-degree murder, criminal attempt (homicide), three counts of recklessly endangering another person, and weapons-related offenses. At trial, Ridley Township Lieutenant Willoughby testified that Dellavecchia made an incriminating statement immediately following a bedside arraignment conducted while he was hospitalized for a self-inflicted head injury on the day following his arrest for the commission of the offenses. Dellavecchia made his statement without counsel present and without having been given Miranda warnings; he had not waived the right to counsel. The Third Circuit affirmed denial of his petition for habeas relief, concluding that Willoughby did not deliberately elicit Dellavecchia’s statement and consequently did not violate Dellavecchia’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The court noted that the evidence, even disregarding Dellavecchia’s statement, overwhelmingly supported his convictions, so that any error when Willoughby recounted the statement at trial would have been harmless. View "Dellavecchia v. Sec'y Penn. Dep't of Corrs." on Justia Law

Based on the 2000 shooting death of Clement, Mills was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder, one count of attempted robbery, and two weapons offenses. The district court for the Virgin Islands and the Third Circuit affirmed his convictions. While the prosecutors engaged in serious misconduct by repeated suggestions that the jurors could not be safe in their homes if Mills was free, repeated references to the possibility that the gun Mills discarded would endanger schoolchildren and the community, and the display throughout closing argument of a gruesome crime-scene photo of the victim’s corpse. this misconduct did not render his trial fundamentally unfair. The courts also rejected arguments that the self-defense jury instructions were improper. Mills’s ineffective assistance claim was rejected because the record was not sufficiently developed. View "Gov't of the Virgin Islands v. Mills" on Justia Law

An informant told a Pennsylvania State Trooper that Steiner, a convicted felon, was staying on the informant’s property, was “on the run,” and had a sawed-off shotgun, which Steiner called a “cop killer,” in a camper on the property. The officer obtained a search warrant for the camper, paid the informant $100, and told the informant to drive Steiner to a gas station, where officers would arrest Steiner on a warrant that had issued for Steiner’s failure to appear at a hearing on an unrelated sexual assault charge. Executing the warrant, police seized a sawed-off shotgun, .32 and .38 caliber ammunition, and shotgun ammunition. The informant stated that he had seen missing pieces of the shotgun at a home that Steiner supposedly owned; police obtained another warrant for that home, where they found those parts and various types of ammunition. Steiner was indicted as a felon-in-possession of a firearm and ammunition, 18 U.S.C. 922(g). He was convicted of felony possession of ammunition and sentenced to an 87-month prison term. The Third Circuit affirmed, upholding admission of the evidence related to the sexual assault warrant and the court’s failure to instruct the jury that it was required to reach a unanimous verdict. View "United States v. Steiner" on Justia Law