Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of international drug trafficking and drug trafficking with intent to provide financial support to a terrorist. On appeal, defendant challenged his conviction and life sentence for narcoterrorism. He also claimed that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. The court affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence but remanded for the district court to hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim of ineffective assistance because defendant raised colorable claims under both Strickland prongs and the trial record did not conclusively show whether he was entitled to relief.

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted for conspiracy to distribute narcotics. At issue on appeal was whether the government proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Defendant knowingly entered into the conspiracy with the specific intent to further the unlawful objective of drug distribution. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) there was no affirmative evidence that Defendant knowingly joined the narcotics conspiracy or had the specific intent to further its aims; and (2) given the scope of the government's investigation and the role its witnesses played in the conspiracy, any reasonable jury should have wondered why the government could not find such evidence.

Thirteen years ago, the Government sued several cigarette manufacturers (Defendants) and related industry organizations for civil violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). The suit asserted that Defendants had conspired to deceive consumers about the health effects and addictiveness of smoking, seeking injunctive relief and disgorgement of $280 billion in profits. In this latest round of the lawsuit, Defendants challenged the district court's refusal to vacate injunctions imposed in 2009. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not clearly err when it found Defendants were reasonably likely to commit future RICO violations despite the passage of the Tobacco Control Act; and (2) did not abuse its discretion when it refused to vacate its injunctions under the primary jurisdiction doctrine.

Thirteen years ago, the Government sued several tobacco companies for civil violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). The suit asserted that Defendants had conspired to deceive consumers about the health effects and addictiveness of smoking, seeking, among other things, injunctive relief. The district court granted injunctive relief against the tobacco companies to prevent future RICO violations. The injunction included provisions requiring Appellants to make disclosure to the Government of various marketing data. The parties were unable to agree on the parameters of the disclosure requirement. The district court determined (1) the companies were required to furnish the full range of disaggregated marketing data sought by the Government under its understanding of the injunction; and (2) the Government could disclose the data to other governmental entities subject to the confidentiality provisions in the final order. The tobacco companies sought an interlocutory appeal, claiming that the clarification of the injunction actually effected a modification of the requirements. The D.C. Circuit Court of appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, concluding that the district court did not modify the injunction.

Appellants were executives at the Purdue Frederick Company when it misbranded the painkiller OxyContin a schedule II controlled substance. The Company was convicted of fraudulent misbranding, and the executives were convicted under the "responsible corporate officer" doctrine of the misdemeanor of misbranding a drug. Based upon their convictions, the Secretary of Health and Human Services later excluded the individuals from participation in federal health care programs for twelve years under 42 U.S.C. 1320a-7(b). Appellants sought review, arguing that the statute did not authorize their exclusion and the Secretary's decision was unsupported by substantial evidence and was arbitrary and capricious. The district court granted summary judgment for the Secretary. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the statute authorized the Secretary's exclusion of Appellants, but (2) the Secretary's decision was arbitrary and capricious for want of a reasoned explanation for the length of the exclusions.

In 1993, Plaintiff was convicted of the crimes of threatening to injure a person and manslaughter. In 1997, Congress brought the D.C. parole system under the jurisdiction of the U.S. Parole Commission (USPC). In 2000, the USPC adopted its own regulations regarding suitability for parole. At Plaintiff's parole hearings in 2001 and 2005, the USPC applied the 2000 regulations and denied Plaintiff parole. In 2005, Plaintiff filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that application of the 2000 Regulations, rather than the 1987 Regulations, at his hearings violated his rights under the Ex Post Facto Clause. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's dismissal of Plaintiff's damages suit on the ground of qualified immunity, concluding that application of those regulations did not violate any clearly established constitutional right of which a reasonable official would have known at the time of the hearings.

Defendant was convicted following a jury trial of multiple offenses, including possession of a firearm as a convicted felon, related to the shooting of an undercover agent of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives. Defendant was sentenced to 270 months in prison, and the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. Defendant subsequently filed a motion to modify his sentence, arguing that he was entitled to a reduction and sentence and seeking a hearing to see if his sentence should be reduced. The district court denied the motion. The D.C. Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not clearly err by finding that it reached Defendant's ultimate sentence by starting with Sentencing Guideline 2K2.1, which covers convictions for felons in possession of a firearm.

Carlos Marino, who was incarcerated for a conviction for drug conspiracy, submitted a request to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), seeking documents that Marino alleged belonged to a co-conspirator who testified against him at trial. Marino suspected the prosecution engaged in various forms of misconduct during trial, especially in its dealings with the co-conspirator. The DEA denied Marino's FOIA request. Marino appealed, and the district court granted summary judgment against him, concluding that Marino lacked a sufficient defense to the DEA's summary judgment motion. In its motion, the DEA invoked FOIA exemption 7(C), which allows an agency to withhold information compiled for law enforcement purposes if disclosure "could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." Marino subsequently filed a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), which the district court denied. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the public domain exception provided Marino with a meritorious defense to the DEA's summary judgment motion. Remanded.

Appellant pled guilty to racketeer influenced corrupt organization conspiracy and was sentenced to a term of imprisonment. Appellant appealed, arguing that his conviction was obtained in violation of Kastigar v. United States, that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, and that the government breached his plea agreement. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals remanded for the district court to consider certain of Appellant's claims of ineffective assistance but denied his appeal in all other respects, holding (1) with respect to the Kastigar hearing, there was nothing deficient about counsel's performance; but (2) as to the other claims of ineffective assistance, the cause should be remanded for factual development, as Appellant raised the claims for the first time on appeal, and the Court could not tell from the record whether he was entitled to relief.

Edwina Bigesby was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment for various drug-related offenses, including possession with intent to distribute fifty grams or more of crack cocaine. Bigesby appealed, contending her convictions should be vacated because the trial judge erroneously excluded evidence critical to her defense. Alternatively, Bigesby claimed her sentence should be reduced under the Fair Sentencing Act (FSA), which increased the amount of crack cocaine needed to trigger a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals rejected both arguments and affirmed the judgment below, holding (1) the trial judge did not improperly exclude evidence relevant to Bigesby's defense; and (2) Bigesby was not entitled to re-sentencing under the FSA.