Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Appellee, a government contractor, underwent military detention in Iraq. After his release, he filed this action in the district court alleging claims under the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA), 42 U.S.C. 2000dd et seq., and a Bivens action for violation of his due process rights. Secretary Rumsfeld moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The district court granted the motion as to the claims under the DTA and some other claims, but did imply an action under the Bivens due process theory and denied Rumsfeld's motion to dismiss as to those claims. Secretary Rumsfeld appealed from the denial of his motion, arguing both that the claims were barred by qualified immunity and that the district court erred in implying such a cause of action in the first instance. The court agreed that the district court erred in implying such a cause of action and reversed the order.

Defendants were convicted for their roles in a PCP-distribution enterprise. Defendants challenged their convictions on various grounds. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant Price's motion to sever; in denying defendant Suggs' motion to suppress evidence seized from his house; in denying the recordings obtained from the wiretap of Suggs' cell phone; by allowing an agent to testify as a lay witness; by dismissing a juror because she knew defendant Glover's wife; and by responding to a jury's question. The court also rejected Glover's and Price's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting their convictions. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgments of conviction.

Defendant pled guilty to conspiracy to provide material support to a foreign terrorist organization. On appeal, defendant sought to vacate her sentence and remand the case for a new arraignment. The court rejected defendant's contention that her constitutional rights were violated because she did not enter into her plea knowingly and intelligently, and that she did not receive Spanish translations of all the documents in the case. Finding no error in the district court's acceptance of her plea, the court affirmed the conviction.

Plaintiffs brought an action arising under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against a number of MPD law enforcement personnel, asserting, inter alia, that various officers and their supervisors violated plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment rights by planning and conducting a 4:00 a.m. search on a warrant that did not authorize a nighttime search and breaking and entering into plaintiffs' home without knocking and announcing their presence. At issue on appeal was whether the district court erred in denying defendants qualified immunity on the knock-and-announce and nighttime search claims. The court agreed that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because neither their no-knock entry of plaintiffs' home nor their nighttime search violated clearly established law. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded.

Between defendant's first and second trials, he filed a pro se complaint alleging that federal officials violated the Fourth Amendment by conducting warrantless searches of his apartment and a warehouse leased in his name. On May 28, 2008, after defendant's conviction in the second trial, the district court dismissed his civil case sua sponte under Heck v. Humphrey. More than eight months after that dismissal, on January 31, 2009, defendant filed a document in the district court styled as a "Motion for Leave to File Notice of Appeal pro se by Plaintiff" (January Motion). The district court denied defendant leave to file the January Motion and he responded by filing a document he styled a "Notice of Appeal," which stated that he wished to obtain review of the denial of the January Motion. The court determined that defendant was appealing the district court's denial of leave to file a notice of appeal, and therefore deemed defendant's filing a petition for mandamus. The court held that mandamus was unwarranted because the district court properly denied defendant leave to file. Accordingly, the court denied defendant's petition for mandamus.

Defendant pled guilty to one count of transportation of child pornography and one count of possession of child pornography. On appeal, defendant challenged the duration and conditions of his supervised release. As a threshold matter, the court rejected the government's contention that defendant waived any appeal of the length and conditions of his supervised sentence or "invit[ed]" the alleged error. The court disagreed with defendant's contention that his offenses did not fall within U.S.S.G. 5D1.2 because they were not "perpetrated against a minor." The court found that the district court's reasons for imposing a 40-year sentence to be apparent from the record and rejected defendant's claim that the district court failed to adequately explain his sentence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 3553(c). In light of the particular factual circumstances of the case and the caselaw approving similar sentences, the court found that the district court did not substantively err in ordering a 40-year term of supervised release. The court further held that the district court did not plainly err in imposing any of the challenged conditions, though the court subjected the prohibition on patronizing any place where pornography was available to a limiting construction to prevent it from being impermissibly vague. Finally, the district court held that defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel where counsel made strategic choices in representing defendant. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendant challenged the denial of his motion to suppress evidence and his sentence after he entered a conditional plea to possession of a firearm by a person previously convicted of a felony. The court held that the district court did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress evidence where, upon arresting defendant with probable cause to believe he was driving in possession of an open container of alcohol, the police had a reasonable basis to search the car for evidence of that offense. Given the district court's consideration of the statutory facts and of defendant's arguments in aid of sentencing, and the district court's reasoned explanation of its sentencing determination, there was neither procedural error nor substantive abuse of discretion by the district court. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant was indicted for charges related to a premeditated murder while armed. At issue was whether defendant's statements, which the government conceded the police obtained in violation of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, were nonetheless admissible for purposes of impeachment should he testify at trial. The court held that the government met its burden in demonstrating that defendant's statements were voluntary where, although it was possible that the police could subtly overcome the will of a 33-year-old man even if he was provided water, had no apparent mental impairment, and generally answered questions intelligently, nothing in this case undermined the record evidence of voluntariness. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court.

Defendant pled guilty to a one-count information charging a conspiracy with three objects: bribery of federal officials; money-or-property mail and wire fraud; and honest services mail and wire fraud. Defendant subsequently appealed the district court's denial of his "motion to amend or modify his plea agreement." The court affirmed the denial of the motion because courts were not authorized to order modification or amendment of plea agreements.

Defendant was convicted of illegally possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. Defendant subsequently appealed the district court's dismissal of his habeas petition seeking relief for ineffective assistance of counsel. The court concluded that the district court did not err in finding that counsel told defendant of the plea offer and therefore that counsel made no error on which to base a Strickland claim.