Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Stamatios Kousisis and Alpha Painting and Construction Co. were awarded two contracts by the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDOT) for painting projects in Philadelphia. Federal regulations required subcontracting a portion of the contract to a disadvantaged business enterprise. Kousisis falsely represented that Alpha would obtain paint supplies from Markias, Inc., a prequalified disadvantaged business. However, Markias functioned only as a pass-through entity, funneling checks and invoices to and from Alpha’s actual suppliers, violating the requirement that disadvantaged businesses perform a commercially useful function. Despite this, Alpha completed the projects to PennDOT’s satisfaction and earned over $20 million in gross profit.The Government charged Alpha and Kousisis with wire fraud and conspiracy to commit wire fraud, based on the fraudulent-inducement theory. After a jury convicted them, they moved for acquittal, arguing that PennDOT received the full economic benefit of its bargain, so the Government could not prove they schemed to defraud PennDOT of money or property. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit rejected this argument, affirming the convictions and deepening the division over the validity of a federal fraud conviction when the defendant did not seek to cause the victim net pecuniary loss.The Supreme Court of the United States held that a defendant who induces a victim to enter into a transaction under materially false pretenses may be convicted of federal fraud even if the defendant did not seek to cause the victim economic loss. The Court explained that the text of the wire fraud statute does not mention economic loss and that the common law did not establish a general rule requiring economic loss in all fraud cases. The Court affirmed the Third Circuit’s decision, concluding that the fraudulent-inducement theory is consistent with both the text of the statute and the Court’s precedent. View "Kousisis v. United States" on Justia Law

Douglas Horn, a commercial truck driver, purchased and consumed a CBD tincture called "Dixie X," marketed as THC-free by Medical Marijuana, Inc. After a random drug test by his employer detected THC in his system, Horn was fired for refusing to participate in a substance abuse program. Horn subsequently sued Medical Marijuana under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), claiming that the company's false advertising led to his job loss.The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Medical Marijuana, reasoning that Horn's job loss was a consequence of a personal injury (ingesting THC), and thus not recoverable under RICO, which only allows recovery for business or property injuries. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed this decision, holding that Horn's job loss constituted an injury to his business under RICO, rejecting the "antecedent-personal-injury bar" that precludes recovery for business or property losses derived from personal injuries.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case to determine whether civil RICO categorically bars recovery for business or property losses that derive from a personal injury. The Court held that under civil RICO, a plaintiff may seek treble damages for business or property loss even if the loss resulted from a personal injury. The Court emphasized that the statute's language allows recovery for business or property harms without excluding those that result from personal injuries. The judgment of the Second Circuit was affirmed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Medical Marijuana, Inc. v. Horn" on Justia Law

In 1997, Justin Sneed murdered Barry Van Treese at an Oklahoma hotel managed by Richard Glossip. Sneed claimed Glossip orchestrated the murder to steal Van Treese's money. Glossip denied involvement but was convicted and sentenced to death based on Sneed's testimony. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA) overturned the initial conviction due to ineffective defense counsel but upheld a second conviction despite inconsistencies in Sneed's testimony and new evidence suggesting prosecutorial misconduct.The OCCA initially reversed Glossip's conviction due to ineffective assistance of counsel but affirmed his second conviction, finding sufficient circumstantial evidence to support Sneed's testimony. Glossip's subsequent habeas petitions were unsuccessful. An independent investigation commissioned by Oklahoma legislators raised doubts about the conviction, revealing prosecutorial misconduct, including the destruction of evidence and false portrayal of Sneed. The State disclosed previously withheld documents, including evidence of Sneed's bipolar disorder and false testimony about his lithium prescription.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case, focusing on whether the prosecution violated its constitutional obligation to correct false testimony under Napue v. Illinois. The Court found that the prosecution knowingly allowed Sneed to falsely testify about his lithium prescription and failed to correct it. This false testimony was material, as Sneed's credibility was crucial to Glossip's conviction. The Court held that the prosecution's failure to correct the false testimony violated Glossip's due process rights, warranting a new trial. The judgment of the OCCA was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Glossip v. Oklahoma" on Justia Law

Brenda Andrew was convicted by an Oklahoma jury of murdering her husband, Rob Andrew, and was sentenced to death. During her trial, the prosecution introduced extensive evidence about her sex life and personal failings, which was later conceded to be irrelevant. Andrew argued in a federal habeas petition that this evidence was so prejudicial it violated the Due Process Clause.The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA) upheld her conviction, finding some of the evidence about her extramarital affairs relevant but acknowledging that much of the other evidence was irrelevant. Despite this, the OCCA deemed the errors harmless. Two judges dissented, arguing that the prejudicial evidence undermined the fairness of the trial.In federal court, the District Court denied relief, and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, stating that Andrew failed to cite clearly established federal law. The Tenth Circuit majority acknowledged the precedent set by Payne v. Tennessee but dismissed it as a pronouncement rather than a holding. Judge Bacharach dissented, arguing that the prejudicial evidence deprived Andrew of a fair trial.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that the Tenth Circuit erred in its interpretation. The Court clarified that Payne established that the Due Process Clause can protect against the introduction of unduly prejudicial evidence that renders a trial fundamentally unfair. The Court vacated the Tenth Circuit's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine if the trial court's admission of irrelevant evidence was so prejudicial as to render Andrew's trial fundamentally unfair. View "Andrew v. White" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a Mexican citizen and lawful permanent resident of the U.S., pleaded no contest in a California court under a statute criminalizing “unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor who is more than three years younger than the perpetrator,” defining “minor” as “a person under the age of 18.” He was ordered removed under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(3), as an “alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony,” including “sexual abuse of a minor.” The Supreme Court reversed. Under the categorical approach employed to determine whether an alien’s conviction qualifies as an aggravated felony, the court asks whether the state statute defining the crime of conviction categorically fits within the "generic" federal definition of a corresponding aggravated felony. Petitioner’s state conviction would be an “aggravated felony” only if the least of the acts criminalized by the state statute falls within the generic federal definition of sexual abuse of a minor, regardless of the actual facts of the case. The least of the acts criminalized by the California law would be consensual sexual intercourse between a victim who is almost 18 and a perpetrator who just turned 21. The generic federal definition of “sexual abuse of a minor” requires that the victim be younger than 16 and a significant majority of state criminal codes set the age of consent at 16 for statutory rape offenses predicated exclusively on the age of the participants. View "Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions" on Justia Law

After agents found child pornography on petitioner’s computer, he pleaded guilty to possessing a visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct (18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(4)(B) and (b)(2)), an offense requiring restitution to the victim. The district court imposed a prison sentence and acknowledged that restitution was mandatory but deferred determination of the amount. Petitioner filed a notice of appeal. Months later, the court entered an amended judgment, ordering petitioner to pay restitution to one victim. Petitioner did not file a second notice of appeal, but challenged the restitution amount before the Eleventh Circuit, which held that he had forfeited any such challenge. The Supreme Court affirmed. A defendant wishing to appeal an order imposing restitution in a deferred restitution case must file a notice of appeal from that order. If he fails to do so and the government objects, he may not challenge the restitution order on appeal. Both 18 U.S.C. 3742(a), governing criminal appeals, and Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(a)(1) contemplate that a defendant will file a notice of appeal after the court has decided the issue sought to be appealed. The requirement is a mandatory claim-processing rule, which is “unalterable” if raised properly by the party asserting its violation. Deferred restitution cases involve two appealable judgments, not one; the notice of appeal did not “spring forward” to become effective on the date the court entered its amended restitution judgment. Even if the court’s acknowledgment in the initial judgment that restitution was mandatory could qualify as a “sentence” that the court “announced” under Rule 4(b)(2), petitioner has never disputed that restitution is mandatory. A court of appeals may not overlook the failure to file a notice of appeal. View "Manrique v. United States" on Justia Law

Nelson, convicted of felonies and misdemeanors arising from the alleged abuse of her children, was sentenced to prison and ordered to pay $8,192.50 in court costs, fees, and restitution. Nelson’s conviction was reversed; on retrial, she was acquitted. Madden was also convicted by a Colorado jury. The court imposed a prison sentence and ordered him to pay $4,413.00 in costs, fees, and restitution. Madden’s convictions were reversed and vacated; the state did not appeal or retry the case. The Colorado Department of Corrections withheld $702.10 from Nelson’s inmate account between her conviction and acquittal. Madden paid the state $1,977.75 after his conviction. Once their convictions were invalidated, they sought refunds. The Colorado Supreme Court reasoned that Colorado’s Exoneration Act provided the exclusive authority for refunds and that neither petitioner had filed a claim under that Act; the court also upheld the constitutionality of the Act, which permits Colorado to retain conviction-related assessments until the prevailing defendant institutes a discrete civil proceeding and proves her innocence by clear and convincing evidence. The Supreme Court reversed. The Act’s scheme violates the guarantee of due process. Petitioners have an obvious interest in regaining the money. The state may not retain these funds simply because their convictions were in place when the funds were taken; once the convictions were erased, the presumption of innocence was restored. Colorado may not presume a person, adjudged guilty of no crime, guilty enough for monetary exactions. Colorado’s scheme creates an unacceptable risk of the erroneous deprivation of defendants’ property, conditioning refunds on proof of innocence by clear and convincing evidence, while defendants in petitioners’ position are presumed innocent. When the amount sought is not large, the cost of pursuing a claim under the Act would be prohibitive. Colorado has no equitable interest in withholding petitioners’ money. View "Nelson v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Dean and his brother committed two robberies; Dean’s brother threatened and assaulted the victim with a gun, while Dean searched for valuables. Dean was convicted of multiple robbery and firearms counts, and two counts under 18 U.S.C. 924(c), which criminalizes using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime, or possessing a firearm in furtherance of such an underlying crime. The section mandates a penalty “in addition to the punishment provided for [the predicate] crime,” to run consecutively to any sentence for the predicate crime. A first 924(c) conviction carries a five-year minimum penalty; a second conviction carries an additional 25-year mandatory minimum. For Dean, that meant 30 years, to be served after his sentence for other counts of conviction. The court concluded that it could not vary from the Guidelines range based on the sentences imposed under section 924(c). The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed. Section 924(c) does not prevent a sentencing court from considering a mandatory minimum imposed under that provision when calculating an appropriate sentence for the predicate offense. Guidelines section 3553(a) specifies the factors courts are to consider when imposing a sentence. The sentencing provisions permit a court imposing a sentence on one count to consider sentences imposed on other counts. The 3553(a) factors may be considered when determining a prison sentence for each individual offense in a multicount case. Section 924(c) says nothing about the length of a non-924(c) sentence, nor about what information a court may consider in determining that sentence. Nothing in the requirement of consecutive sentences prevents a court from imposing a 30-year sentence under section 924(c) and a one-day sentence for the predicate crime, provided those terms run consecutively. View "Dean v. United States" on Justia Law

Moore was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death for shooting a clerk during a robbery that occurred when Moore was 20 years old. A state habeas court determined that, under Supreme Court precedent, Moore was intellectually disabled and that his death sentence violated the Eighth Amendment. The court consulted the 11th edition of the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities clinical manual (AAIDD–11) and the 5th edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders and followed the generally accepted intellectual-disability definition, considering: intellectual-functioning deficits, adaptive deficits, and the onset of these deficits while a minor. The court credited six IQ scores, the average of which (70.66) indicated mild intellectual disability. Based on testimony from mental-health professionals, the court found significant adaptive deficits in all three skill sets (conceptual, social, and practical). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (CCA) declined the recommendation, concluding that the habeas court should have used standards for assessing intellectual disability contained in AAMR–9 and its requirement that adaptive deficits be “related” to intellectual-functioning deficits. The Supreme Court vacated. While precedent leaves to the states “the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce” the restriction on executing the intellectually disabled, that discretion is not “unfettered,” and must be “informed by the medical community’s diagnostic framework.” When an IQ score is close to, but above, 70, courts must account for the “standard error of measurement.” The CCA overemphasized Moore’s perceived adaptive strengths—living on the streets, mowing lawns, and playing pool for money—when the medical community focuses on adaptive deficits. The CCA stressed Moore’s improved behavior in prison; clinicians caution against reliance on adaptive strengths developed in controlled settings. The CCA concluded that Moore’s record of academic failure, with a history of childhood abuse and suffering, detracted from a determination that his intellectual and adaptive deficits were related; the medical community counts traumatic experiences as risk factors for intellectual disability. The CCA also departed from clinical practice by requiring Moore to show that his adaptive deficits were not related to “a personality disorder.” View "Moore v. Texas" on Justia Law

During a traffic stop, officers searched Manuel and found a vitamin bottle containing pills. Suspecting the pills were illegal drugs, officers conducted a field test, which came back negative for any controlled substance. They arrested Manuel. At the police station, an evidence technician tested the pills and got a negative result, but claimed that one pill tested “positive for the probable presence of ecstasy.” An arresting officer reported that, based on his “training and experience,” he “knew the pills to be ecstasy.” Another officer charged Manuel with unlawful possession of a controlled substance. Relying exclusively on that complaint, a judge found probable cause to detain Manuel pending trial. The Illinois police laboratory tested the pills and reported that they contained no controlled substances. Manuel spent 48 days in pretrial detention. More than two years after his arrest, but less than two years after his case was dismissed, Manuel filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 lawsuit against Joliet and the officers. The district court dismissed, holding that the two-year statute of limitations barred his unlawful arrest claim and that pretrial detention following the start of legal process could not give rise to a Fourth Amendment claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed. Pretrial detention can violate the Fourth Amendment when it precedes or when it follows, the start of the legal process. The Fourth Amendment prohibits government officials from detaining a person absent probable cause. Where legal process has begun but has done nothing to satisfy the probable-cause requirement, it cannot extinguish a detainee’s Fourth Amendment claim. Because the judge’s determination of probable cause was based solely on fabricated evidence, it did not expunge Manuel’s Fourth Amendment claim. On remand, the Seventh Circuit should determine the claim’s accrual date, unless it finds that the city waived its timeliness argument. View "Manuel v. Joliet" on Justia Law