Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Officer Wheetley pulled Harris over for a routine traffic stop. Wheetley sought consent to search Harris’s truck, based on Harris’s nervousness and seeing an open beer can. When Harris refused, Wheetley executed a sniff test with his trained narcotics dog, Aldo, who alerted at the driver’s-side door, leading Wheetley to conclude that he had probable cause to search. The search turned up nothing Aldo was trained to detect, but did reveal ingredients for manufacturing methamphetamine. Harris was charged with illegal possession of those ingredients. In a subsequent stop while Harris was out on bail, Aldo again alerted on Harris’s truck but nothing of interest was found. The trial court denied a motion to suppress. The Florida Supreme Court reversed, holding that if an officer failed to keep records of field performance, including how many times a dog falsely alerted, he could never have probable cause to think the dog a reliable indicator of drugs. The Supreme Court reversed. Training and testing records supported Aldo’s reliability in detecting drugs and Harris failed to undermine that evidence, so Wheetley had probable cause to search. Whether an officer has probable cause depends on the totality of the circumstances, not rigid rules, bright-line tests, and mechanistic inquiries. Requiring the state to introduce comprehensive documentation of a dog’s prior hits and misses in the field is the antithesis of a totality-of-the-circumstances approach. Field records may sometimes be relevant, but the court should evaluate all the evidence, and should not prescribe an inflexible set of requirements. View "Florida v. Harris" on Justia Law

While police were preparing to execute a search warrant for a basement apartment, detectives in an unmarked car outside the apartment saw two men, later identified as Bailey and Middleton, leave the gated area above the apartment, get in a car, and drive away. The detectives followed for about a mile, then stopped the car. They found keys during a pat-down search of Bailey, who said that he resided in the apartment. He later denied it when informed of the search. The men were handcuffed and driven to the apartment, where the search team had found a gun and illicit drugs. One of Bailey’s keys unlocked the apartment’s door. The district court denied Bailey’s motion to suppress the key and statement, holding that Bailey’s detention was justified under Michigan v. Summers, as a detention incident to execution of a search warrant, and, in the alternative, that the detention was supported by reasonable suspicion under Terry v. Ohio. Bailey was convicted. The Second Circuit affirmed, without ruling on the Terry claim. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for determination of whether Terry applies. The rule in Summers, permitting detention even if there is no particular suspicion that an individual is involved in criminal activity or poses a specific danger to officers, is limited to the immediate vicinity of the premises to be searched. None of the law enforcement interests identified in Summers applies with similar force to the detention of recent occupants beyond the immediate vicinity of the premises to be searched. View "Bailey v. United States" on Justia Law

Smith claimed that drug conspiracy charges under 21 U. S. C.846 and 18 U. S. C. 1962(d), were barred by 18 U. S. C.3282’s five-year statute of limitations. The district court instructed the jury to convict Smith if the government had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the conspiracies existed, that Smith was a member, and that the conspiracies continued within the limitations period. As to the affirmative defense of withdrawal, the court instructed the jury that Smith had the burden to prove withdrawal outside the limitations period by a preponderance of the evidence. Smith was convicted. The D. C. Circuit and the Supreme Court affirmed. Allocating to the defendant the burden of proving withdrawal does not violate the Due Process Clause. Unless an affirmative defense negates an element of the crime, the government has no constitutional duty to overcome the defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Withdrawal does not negate an element of conspiracy but only terminates a defendant’s liability for co-conspirators’ post-withdrawal acts. Withdrawal that occurs beyond the limitations period provides a complete defense to prosecution, but that does not give the prosecution a constitutional responsibility to prove that he did not withdraw. Because the statutes do not address the burden of proof for withdrawal, it is presumed that the common law rule applies.. A conspiracy continues until it is terminated or, as to a particular defendant, until that defendant withdraws and the burden of establishing withdrawal rests upon the defendant. View "Smith v. United States" on Justia Law

Gonzales, an Arizona death row inmate, sought federal habeas relief. Counsel sought a stay, contending that mental incompetence prevented Gonzales from rationally communicating with or assisting counsel, and that 18 U. S. C.3599(a)(2) requires a stay when a petitioner is adjudged incompetent. The district court denied a stay, finding that Gonzales’ claims were record based or resolvable as a matter of law. The Ninth Circuit held that Gonzales had a right to a stay pending a competency determination. Carter, an Ohio death row inmate, initiated federal habeas proceedings but later moved for a competency determination and stay. The district court granted the motion, found Carter incompetent, dismissed his petition without prejudice, and prospectively tolled the statute of limitations. The Sixth Circuit identified a right to competence in 18 U. S. C. 4241 and ordered indefinite stay with respect to claims requiring assistance. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Section 3599 does not provide a state prisoner a right to suspension of federal habeas proceedings when he is adjudged incompetent and that Section 4241 does not provide a right to competence during federal habeas proceedings. Review of record-based claims, 28 U.S.C. 2254(d), is limited to the record before the state court that heard the case on the merits and extra-record evidence concerning such claims is inadmissible. View "Ryan v. Gonzales" on Justia Law

In each of two underlying cases, a 14-year-old was convicted of murder and sentenced to a mandatory term of life imprisonment without possibility of parole. The highest courts of Alabama and Arkansas upheld the sentences. The Supreme Court reversed. The Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile homicide offenders. Children are constitutionally different from adults for sentencing purposes. Their lack of maturity and underdeveloped sense of responsibility lead to recklessness, impulsiveness, and heedless risk-taking. They are more vulnerable to negative influences and lack ability to extricate themselves from horrific, crime-producing settings. A child’s actions are less likely to be evidence of irretrievable depravity. The mandatory penalty schemes at issue prevent the sentencing court from considering youth and from assessing whether the harshest term of imprisonment proportionately punishes a juvenile offender. Life-without-parole sentences share characteristics with death sentences, demanding individualized sentencing. The Court rejected the states’ argument that courts and prosecutors sufficiently consider a juvenile defendant’s age, background and the circumstances of his crime, when deciding whether to try him as an adult. The argument ignores that many states use mandatory transfer systems or lodge the decision in the hands of the prosecutors, rather than courts.

The district court entered a preliminary injunction concerning four provisions of Arizona S. B. 1070, enacted in 2010: Section 3 makes failure to comply with federal alien-registration requirements a state misdemeanor; 5(C)makes it a misdemeanor for an unauthorized alien to seek or engage in work in Arizona; 6 authorizes state and local officers to arrest without a warrant if the officer has probable cause to believe a person has committed any offense that makes the person removable from the U.S.; and 2(B) requires officers conducting a stop, detention, or arrest to attempt, in some circumstances, to verify immigration status. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, holding that Sections 3, 5(C), and 6 preempted. Section 3 intrudes on the field of alien registration, in which Congress has left no room for even complementary state laws. Section 5(C)’s criminal penalty is an obstacle to the federal regulatory system. The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 makes it illegal for employers to knowingly hire, recruit, refer, or employ unauthorized workers, 8 U. S. C. 1324a(a)(1)(A),(a)(2); requires employers to verify prospective employees' status; and imposes criminal and civil penalties on employers, but only imposes civil penalties on aliens who seek, or engage in, unauthorized employment. Congress decided against criminal penalties on unauthorized employees. Section 6 creates an obstacle to federal law by attempting to provide state officers with additional arrest authority, which they could exercise with no instruction from the federal government. Generally, it is not a crime for a removable alien to remain in the U.S. It was improper to enjoin section 2(B) before state courts construed it and without some showing that its enforcement actually conflicts with federal law. The mandatory nature of the status checks does not interfere with the federal scheme. Consultation between federal and state officials is an important feature of the immigration system. It is not clear yet that 2(B), in practice, will require state officers to delay release of detainees for no reason other than to verify immigration status. That would raise constitutional concerns and would disrupt the federal framework, but the section could be read to avoid these concerns.

Defendants, convicted of selling crack cocaine in 2007 and 2008, were not sentenced until 2010, after amendment of the 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act eliminated a 100-to-1 disparity between the amounts of crack cocaine and powder cocaine needed to trigger mandatory minimum sentences. The Fair Sentencing Act, 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)(4)(A)(ii), effective August 3, 2010, reduced the disparity to 18-to-1, lowering the mandatory minimums applicable to many crack offenders, by increasing the amount of crack needed to trigger the 5-year minimum from 5 to 28 grams and the amount for the 10-year minimum from 50 to 280 grams, while leaving the powder cocaine amounts intact. District judges held that the amendments did not apply to those whose offenses were committed before the effective date. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated in a 5-4 decision. The new, lower mandatory minimums apply to the post-Act sentencing of pre-Act offenders. Congress intended the more lenient penalties to apply to offenders who committed crimes before August 3, 2010, but were sentenced after that date. Not to apply the Fair Sentencing Act would preserve a disproportionate status quo and make matters worse by creating new anomalies.

The company was convicted of violating the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act for knowingly storing liquid mercury without a permit "on or about September 19, 2002 to October 19, 2004." Violations are punishable by a fine of not more than $50,000 per day, 42 U.S.C. 6928(d). The probation office calculated a maximum fine of $38.1 million, based on 762 days. The company argued that any fine greater than $50,000 would be unconstitutional under Apprendi v. New Jersey, which held that the Sixth Amendment requires that any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases maximum punishment be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The district court held that Apprendi applies to criminal fines, but concluded that the jury found a 762-day violation and imposed a fine of $6 million and a community service obligation of $12 million. The First Circuit affirmed on the ground that Apprendi does not apply to criminal fines. The Supreme Court reversed. Apprendi applies to criminal fines. The "core concern, to reserve to the jury determination of facts that warrant punishment for a specific statutory offense, applies whether the sentence is a criminal fine or imprisonment or death. Dissenters argued that facts relevant to a fine’s amount typically quantify the harm and do not define a separate set of acts for punishment. The majority rejected the assumption that, in determining maximum punishment, there is a constitutionally significant difference between a fact that is an "element" and one that is a "sentencing factor."

In petitioner's bench trial for rape, the prosecution called an expert who testified that a DNA profile produced by an outside lab matched a profile produced by the state police lab using a sample of petitioner's blood. At issue was whether Crawford v. Washington precluded the expert witness from testifying in a manner that had long been allowed under the law of evidence. Specifically, did Crawford bar an expert from expressing an opinion based on facts about a case that have been made known to the expert but about which the expert was not competent to testify. Also at issue was whether Crawford substantially impeded the ability of prosecutors to introduce DNA evidence and thus could effectively relegate the prosecution in some cases to reliance on older, less reliable forms of proof. The Court concluded that this form of expert testimony did not violate the Confrontation Clause because the provision had no application to out-of-court statements that were not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Therefore, the Court concluded that the expert's testimony did not violate the Sixth Amendment. As a second, independent basis for the Court's decision, even if the report produced by the outside lab had been admitted into evidence, there would have been no Confrontation Clause violation.

This case arose when respondent brought an action against petitioners, two Secret Service agents, and others, under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, claiming that he was arrested and searched without probable cause, in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and that the arrest violated the First Amendment because it was made in retaliation for respondent's criticism of Vice President Cheney. At issue was whether two federal law enforcement agents were immune from suit for allegedly arresting a suspect in retaliation for his political speech, when the agents had probable cause to arrest the suspect for committing a federal crime. The Court held that petitioners were entitled to qualified immunity because, at the time of respondent's arrest, it was not clearly established that an arrest supported by probable cause could give rise to a First Amendment violation.