Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

This case arose when defendant was charged with capital murder for the death of a one-year-old. Before the jury concluded deliberations, it reported that it was unanimous against guilt on charges of capital murder and first-degree murder, was deadlocked on manslaughter, and had not voted on negligent homicide. The trial court told the jury to continue to deliberate. The jury did so but still could not reach a verdict, and the trial court declared a mistrial. All agreed that defendant could be retried on charges of manslaughter and negligent homicide. At issue was whether defendant could also be retried on charges of capital and first-degree murder. The Court concluded that the jury in this case did not convict defendant of any offense, but it did not acquit him of any either. When the jury was unable to return a verdict, the trial court properly declared a mistrial and discharged the jury. As a consequence, the Double Jeopardy Clause did not stand in the way of a second trial on the same offenses. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Supreme Court of Arkansas.

In 1987, petitioner was convicted of murder and other crimes by a Colorado court and sentenced to life imprisonment. Petitioner filed a federal habeas petition in 2008. After receiving the petition, the district court asked the State if it planned to argue that the petition was untimely. In response, the State twice informed the district court that it would "not challenge, but [was] not conceding," the timeliness of the petition. Thereafter, the district court ordered the parties to brief both the merits and the timeliness of the petition. At issue was the authority of a federal court to raise, on its own motion, a statute of limitations defense to a habeas corpus petition. The Court held that courts of appeal, like district courts, have the authority - though not the obligation - to raise a forfeited timeliness defense on their own initiative in exceptional cases. The Tenth Circuit abused its discretion when it dismissed the petition as untimely. In the district court, the State was well aware of the statute of limitations defense available to it, and of the arguments that could be made in support of that defense. Yet, the State twice informed the district court that it would "challenge" the timeliness of the petition. In doing so, the State deliberately waived the statute of limitations defense. In light of that waiver, the Tenth Circuit should have followed the district court's lead and decided the merits of the petition. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded.

Respondent, the chief investigator for a district attorney's office, testified at grand jury proceedings that resulted in petitioner's indictment. After the indictments were dismissed, petitioner brought an action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that respondent had conspired to present and did present false testimony to the grand jury. The district court denied respondent's motion to dismiss on immunity grounds, but the Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that respondent had absolute immunity from a section 1983 claim based on his grand jury testimony. The Court affirmed and held that a witness in a grand jury proceeding was entitled to the same absolute immunity from suit under section 1983 as a witness who testified at trial.

Petitioner filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action in the district court against government entities that ran the jails and other defendants, alleging Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violations, and arguing that persons arrested for minor offenses could not be subjected to invasive searches unless prison officials have reason to suspect concealment of weapons, drugs, or other contraband. The district court granted him summary judgment, ruling that "strip-searching" nonindictable offenders without reasonable suspicion violated the Fourth Amendment. The Third Circuit Reversed. The Court affirmed and concluded that the search procedure at the county jails struck a reasonable balance between inmate privacy and the needs of the institutions, and thus the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments did not require adoption of the framework and rules petitioner proposed.

When petitioner was indicted in a Texas court on drug charges, the State also moved to revoke the probation term that he was then serving for another drug offense. At about the same time, petitioner pleaded guilty to federal drug charges. At issue was whether a district court, in sentencing a defendant for a federal offense, had authority to order that the federal sentence be consecutive to an anticipated state sentence that had not yet been imposed. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. 3584(a), addressed the concurrent-vs.-consecutive decision, but not the situation here, since the District Court did not impose "multiple terms of imprisonment... at the same time," and petitioner was not "already subject to" the state sentence at issue. This did not mean that the District Court lacked authority to act as it did and that the Bureau of Prisons was to make the concurrent-vs.-consecutive decision after the federal sentence had been imposed. It was more natural to read section 3584(a) as leaving room for the exercise of judicial discretion in situations not covered than it was to read section 3621(b) as giving the Bureau what amounted to sentencing authority. Because it was within the District Court's discretion to order that petitioner's sentence run consecutively to his anticipated state sentence in the probation revocation proceeding; and because the state court's subsequent decision to make that sentence concurrent with its other sentence did not establish that the District Court abused its discretion by imposing an unreasonable sentence; the Court affirmed the judgment of the Fifth Circuit.

In this case, a criminal defendant sought a remedy when inadequate assistance of counsel caused nonacceptance of a plea offer and further proceedings led to a less favorable outcome. After the plea offer had been rejected, there was a full and fair trial before the jury. After a guilty verdict, defendant received a sentence harsher than that offered in the rejected plea bargain. The instant case came to the Court with the concession that counsel's advice with respect to the plea offer fell below the standard of adequate assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court held that, where counsel's ineffective advice led to an offer's rejection, and where the prejudice alleged was having to stand trial, a defendant must show that but for the ineffective advice, there was a reasonable probability that the plea offer would have been presented to the court, that the court would have accepted its terms, and that the conviction or sentence, or both, under the offer's terms would have been less severe than under the actual judgment and sentence imposed. Therefore, the Court vacated the judgment of the Sixth Circuit and remanded for further proceedings.

This case arose in the context of claimed ineffective assistance that led to the lapse of a prosecution offer of a plea bargain, a proposal that offered terms more lenient than the terms of the guilty plea entered later. At issue was the constitutional right to effective assistance with respect to those offers. Further at issue was what a defendant must demonstrate in order to show that prejudice resulted from counsel's deficient performance. The Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel extended to the consideration of plea offers that lapsed or were rejected. That right applied to "all 'critical' stages of the criminal proceedings." The Court vacated the judgment of the Missouri Court of Appeals and remanded for further proceedings.

Arizona prisoners could raise claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel only in state collateral proceedings, not on direct review. In petitioner's first state collateral proceeding, his counsel did not raise such a claim. On federal habeas review with new counsel, petitioner argued that he received ineffective assistance both at trial and in his first state collateral proceeding. He also claimed that he had a constitutional right to an effective attorney in the collateral proceeding because it was the first place to raise his claim of ineffective assistance at trial. The Court held that where, under state law, ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims must be raised in an initial-review collateral proceeding, a procedural default would not bar a federal habeas court from hearing those clams if, in the initial-review collateral proceeding, there was no counsel or counsel in the proceeding was ineffective. Therefore, the Court reversed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit.

Respondent was convicted of capital murder and subsequently commenced federal habeas proceedings by filing a request for appointment of counsel under 18 U.S.C. 3599. Section 3599(e) contemplated that appointed counsel could be "replaced . . . upon motion of the defendant," but did not specify the standard that district courts should use in evaluating those motions. The Court held that courts should employ the same "interests of justice" standard that they apply in non-capital cases under a related statute, 18 U.S.C. 3006A. The Court also held that the district court here did not abuse its discretion in denying respondent's motion to change counsel.

Respondents filed an action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against petitioners, police officers, alleging that the officers had subjected them to an unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment to respondents and the Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of qualified immunity. The Court held, however, that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. The Court concluded that the case did not fall within the narrow exception to allowing suit where it would not be entirely unreasonable for an officer to believe that there was probable cause to search for all firearms and firearm-related materials. Regarding the warrant's authorization to search for gang-related materials, a reasonable officer could view Jerry Ray Bowen's attack as motivated not by the souring of his romantic relationship with Shelly Kelly but by a desire to prevent her from disclosing details of his gang activity to the police. The fact that the officers sought and obtained approval of the warrant application from a superior and a deputy district attorney before submitting it to the magistrate provided further support for the conclusion than an officer could reasonably have believed that the scope of the warrant was supported by probable cause. In holding that the warrant in this case was so obviously defective that no reasonable officer could have believed it to be valid, the court below erred in relying on Groh v. Ramirez. Accordingly, the judgment was reversed.