Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Beckles was convicted of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The court imposed a “career offender” sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. 4B1.1(a), finding that his offense qualified as a “crime of violence” under the residual clause. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed his sentence and the denial of post-conviction relief. In the meantime, the Supreme Court held (Johnson v. United States) that the identically worded residual clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), section 924(e)(2)(b), was unconstitutionally vague. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed again. The Supreme Court affirmed. The Sentencing Guidelines, including section 4B1.2(a)’s residual clause, are not subject to vagueness challenges under the Due Process Clause. Johnson held that the ACCA’s residual clause fixed, in an impermissibly vague way, a higher range of sentences for certain defendants; the advisory Guidelines do not fix the permissible range of sentences. They merely guide the exercise of a court’s discretion in choosing an appropriate sentence within the statutory range. Congress has long permitted a “wide discretion to decide whether the offender should be incarcerated and for how long.” The Guidelines have been rendered “effectively advisory” by the Supreme Court. The Guidelines do not implicate the concerns underlying vagueness doctrine: providing notice and preventing arbitrary enforcement. The statutory range, which establishes the permissible bounds of the court’s sentencing discretion, provides the required notice. The Guidelines do not invite arbitrary enforcement because they do not permit a court to prohibit behavior or to prescribe the sentencing ranges available. View "Beckles v. United States" on Justia Law

A Nevada jury convicted Rippo of first-degree murder and other offenses and sentenced him to death. During his trial, Rippo received information that the judge was the target of a federal bribery probe, and he surmised that the Clark County District Attorney’s Office, which was prosecuting him, was playing a role in that investigation. Rippo unsuccessfully moved for the judge’s disqualification. After that judge’s indictment on federal charges a different judge denied Rippo’s motion for a new trial. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that Rippo had not introduced evidence that state authorities were involved in the federal investigation. State courts denied post-conviction relief, reasoning that Rippo was not entitled to discovery or an evidentiary hearing because his allegations “d[id] not support the assertion that the trial judge was actually biased.” The Supreme Court vacated the Nevada Supreme Court’s judgment, stating that due process may sometimes demand recusal even when a judge “ ‘ha[s] no actual bias.’ Recusal is required when, objectively speaking, “the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decision-maker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.” View "Rippo v. Baker" on Justia Law

Buck was convicted of murder; under Texas law, the jury could impose a death sentence only if it found unanimously, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Buck was likely to commit future acts of violence. Buck’s attorney called a psychologist, Dr. Quijano, who had been appointed to evaluate Buck. While concluding that Buck was unlikely to be a future danger, Quijano stated, in his report and testimony, that Buck was statistically more likely to act violently because he is black. The jury returned a sentence of death. In his first post-conviction proceeding, Buck did not argue ineffective assistance of counsel. In the meantime, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment in a case in which Quijano had testified that Hispanic heritage weighed in favor of a finding of future dangerousness. The Texas Attorney General then identified six cases in which Quijano had testified and, in five cases, consented to resentencing. Buck’s second state habeas petition, alleging ineffective assistance, was dismissed for failure to raise the claim in his first petition. Buck sought federal habeas relief (28 U.S.C. 2254). His claim was held procedurally defaulted. The Supreme Court subsequently issued holdings (Martinez and Trevino) under which Buck’s claim could have been heard, had he demonstrated that state post-conviction counsel was constitutionally ineffective in failing to raise a claim that had some merit. The Fifth Circuit affirmed rejection of Buck’s motion to reopen, finding that Buck had not established extraordinary circumstances or ineffective assistance. The Supreme Court reversed. The question was not whether Buck had shown that his case is extraordinary; it was whether jurists of reason could debate that issue. No competent defense attorney would introduce evidence that his client is liable to be a future danger because of his race. There is a reasonable probability that Buck was sentenced to death in part because of his race, a concern that supports Rule 60(b)(6) relief. The Court rejected, as waived, the state’s argument that Martinez and Trevino did not apply. View "Buck v. Davis" on Justia Law

Shaw used identifying numbers of Hsu's bank account in a scheme to transfer funds from that account to accounts at other institutions from which Shaw was able to obtain Hsu’s funds. Shaw was convicted under 18 U.S.C. 1344(1), which makes it a crime to “knowingly execut[e] a scheme . . . to defraud a financial institution.” The Ninth Circuit affirmed. A unanimous Supreme Court vacated and remanded for consideration of whether the district court improperly instructed the jury that a scheme to defraud a bank must be one to deceive the bank or deprive it of something of value, instead of one to deceive and deprive. The Court rejected Shaw’s other arguments. Subsection (1) of the statute covers schemes to deprive a bank of money in a customer’s account. The bank had property rights in Hsu’s deposits as a source of loans from which to earn profits or as a bailee. The statute requires neither a showing that the bank suffered ultimate financial loss nor a showing that the defendant intended to cause such loss. Shaw knew that the bank possessed Hsu’s account, Shaw made false statements to the bank, Shaw believed that those false statements would lead the bank to release from that account funds that ultimately, wrongfully ended up with Shaw. Shaw knew that he was entering into a scheme to defraud the bank even if he was not familiar with bank-related property law. Subsection (2), which criminalizes the use of “false or fraudulent pretenses” to obtain “property . . . under the custody or control of” a bank, does not exclude Shaw’s conduct from subsection (1). View "Shaw v. United States" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Bravo and Martínez of bribery (18 U.S.C. 666), simultaneously acquitting them of conspiring to and traveling in interstate commerce to violate section 666. The only contested issue was whether they had violated section 666; the other elements of the acquitted charges (agreement and travel) were undisputed. The verdicts were, therefore, inconsistent. The convictions were vacated. The First Circuit held that section 666 proscribes only quid pro quo bribery, while the charge had permitted the jury to convict on a gratuity theory. On remand, the defendants moved for acquittal, arguing that the issue-preclusion component of the Double Jeopardy Clause barred retrial because the jury necessarily determined that they were not guilty under section 666 when it acquitted them of the related conspiracy and Travel Act offenses. The First Circuit and a unanimous Supreme Court affirmed denial of the motions. Double Jeopardy Clause issue preclusion does not bar retrial after a jury has returned irreconcilably inconsistent verdicts, where the convictions are later vacated for legal error unrelated to the inconsistency. The defendants bear the burden of showing that whether they violated section 666 has been “determined by a valid and final judgment of acquittal.” A conviction that contradicts their acquittals is plainly relevant to that determination, even if later overturned on appeal for unrelated legal error. A verdict of guilt is a jury decision, even if subsequently vacated. View "Bravo-Fernandez v. United States" on Justia Law

In Booth v. Maryland (1987), the Supreme Court held that “the Eighth Amendment prohibits a capital sentencing jury from considering victim impact evidence” that does not “relate directly to the circumstances of the crime.” In Payne (1991), the Court held that Booth was wrong to conclude that the Eighth Amendment required a ban with respect to a particular type of victim impact testimony, but stated that “admission of a victim’s family members’ characterizations and opinions about the crime, the defendant, and the appropriate sentence violates the Eighth Amendment.” No such evidence was actually presented in Payne. An Oklahoma jury convicted Bosse of three counts of first-degree murder for the 2010 killing of Griffin and her children. The prosecution asked the victims’ relatives to recommend a sentence. They recommended death; the jury agreed. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the sentence, concluding that Payne “implicitly overruled that portion of Booth regarding characterizations of the defendant and opinions of the sentence.” The Supreme Court vacated. Payne “specifically acknowledged its holding did not affect” Booth’s prohibition on opinions about the crime, the defendant, and the appropriate punishment. That should have ended its inquiry into whether the Eighth Amendment bars such testimony; the state court was wrong to go further and conclude that Payne implicitly overruled Booth in its entirety. Supreme Court decisions remain binding precedent until that Court reconsiders them, regardless of whether subsequent cases raise doubts about their continuing vitality. Oklahoma courts remain bound by Booth’s prohibition on characterizations and opinions from a victim’s family members about the crime, the defendant, and the appropriate sentence. The court declined to consider an argument that error did not affect the sentencing determination, and the defendant’s rights were adequately protected by mandatory sentencing review in capital cases under Oklahoma law. View "Bosse v. Oklahoma" on Justia Law

Former Virginia Governor McDonnell, and his wife were indicted on honest services fraud and Hobbs Act extortion charges related to their acceptance of $175,000 in loans, gifts, and other benefits from Williams, the CEO of Star Scientific, which developed Anatabloc, a nutritional supplement made from a compound found in tobacco. Williams wanted McDonnell’s assistance in getting public universities to perform research studies on the product. The government asserted that McDonnell committed (or agreed to commit) an “official act” in exchange for the loans and gifts. An “official act” is “any decision or action on any question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy, which may at any time be pending, or which may by law be brought before any public official, in such official’s official capacity, or in such official’s place of trust or profit,” 18 U.S.C. 201(a)(3). The claimed “official acts,” included “arranging meetings” for Williams with other Virginia officials, “hosting” events at the Governor’s Mansion, and “contacting other government officials” concerning the studies. The district court instructed the jury that “official act” encompasses “acts that a public official customarily performs,” including acts “in furtherance of longer-term goals” or “in a series of steps to exercise influence or achieve an end.” The court declined to give McDonnell’s requested instruction that “merely arranging a meeting, attending an event, hosting a reception, or making a speech are not, standing alone, ‘official acts.’” The Fourth Circuit affirmed the convictions. A unanimous Supreme Court vacated. An “official act” involves a decision or action (or an agreement to act or decide) on “question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy,” by a formal exercise of governmental power. The pertinent matter must be more focused and concrete than “Virginia business and economic development,” and a decision or action is more than merely setting up a meeting, hosting an event, or calling another official. The government’s expansive interpretation of “official act” would raise significant constitutional concerns. Conscientious public officials arrange meetings for constituents, contact other officials on their behalf, and include them in events all the time. The jury instructions, therefore, were significantly overinclusive. View "McDonnell v. United States" on Justia Law

Congress extended the federal prohibition on firearms possession by convicted felons to persons convicted of a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence,” 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(9), defining that phrase to include a misdemeanor under federal, state, or tribal law, committed against a domestic relation that necessarily involves the “use . . . of physical force.” In its 2014 Castleman opinion, the Supreme Court held that a knowing or intentional assault qualifies under section 922(g)(9), but did not address reckless assault. Voisine and Armstrong each pleaded guilty under a Maine law, which makes it a misdemeanor to “intentionally, knowingly or recklessly cause[ ] bodily injury” to another. During later investigations, of Voisine for killing a bald eagle, and of Armstrong, as part of a narcotics investigation, officers discovered that each owned firearms. Both were charged under section 922(g)(9). The First Circuit and Supreme Court affirmed their convictions. A reckless domestic assault qualifies as a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” under section 922(g)(9); the phrase “use. . . of physical force” does not distinguish between domestic assaults committed knowingly or intentionally and those committed recklessly. Reckless conduct, which requires the conscious disregard of a known risk, is not an accident: It involves a deliberate decision to endanger another. Congress must have known it was sweeping in some persons who had engaged in reckless conduct. That was part of the point: to apply the federal firearms restriction to those abusers, along with all others, covered by the states’ ordinary misdemeanor assault laws. View "Voisine v. United States" on Justia Law

Every state has a law that prohibits motorists from driving with a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) exceeding a specified level. BAC is typically determined by analysis of a blood sample or by using a machine to measure the amount of alcohol in a person’s breath. Implied consent laws require drivers to submit to BAC tests. Originally, the penalty for refusing a test was suspension of the motorist’s license. Some states, including North Dakota and Minnesota, now make it a crime to refuse to undergo testing. In consolidated cases, involving defendants prosecuted under such laws, the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment permits warrantless breath tests incident to arrests for drunk driving but not warrantless blood tests. Breath tests do not implicate significant privacy concerns and are no more intrusive than collecting a DNA sample by rubbing a swab on the inside of a person’s cheek; they leave no biological sample in the government’s possession and are not likely to enhance the embarrassment inherent in any arrest. Blood tests, however, require piercing the skin and extract a part of the subject’s body, giving law enforcement a sample from which it is possible to extract information beyond a BAC reading. By making it a crime to refuse to submit to a BAC test, the laws at issue provide an incentive to cooperate and serve a very important function. Imposing a warrant requirement for every BAC test would likely swamp courts, with little corresponding benefit. The states have no satisfactory justification for demanding the more-intrusive alternative without a warrant. In instances where blood tests might be preferable—e.g., where substances other than alcohol impair the driver’s abilities, or where the subject is unconscious—nothing prevents the police from seeking a warrant or from relying on the exigent circumstances exception, if applicable. View "Birchfield v. North Dakota" on Justia Law

The Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) imposes a 15-year mandatory minimum sentence on a defendant convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm who has three prior convictions “for a violent felony,” including “burglary, arson, or extortion,” 18 U.S.C. 924(e). To determine whether a prior conviction is a listed crime, courts apply the “categorical approach,” asking whether the elements of the offense sufficiently match the elements of the generic (commonly understood) version of the enumerated crime. When a statute defines multiple crimes by listing multiple, alternative elements, a sentencing court must discern which of the alternative elements was integral to the defendant’s conviction, by employing the “modified categorical approach” and examining a limited class of documents from the record of a prior conviction. Mathis pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. He had five prior Iowa burglary convictions. Under the generic offense, burglary requires unlawful entry into a “building or other structure.” The Iowa statute (702.12) reaches “any building, structure, [or] land, water, or air vehicle.” The district court applied the modified categorical approach, found that Mathis had burgled structures, and imposed an enhanced sentence. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the Iowa statute’s list of places did not establish alternative elements, but rather alternative means of fulfilling a single locational element. The Supreme Court reversed. Because the elements of Iowa’s law are broader than those of generic burglary, Mathis’s prior convictions cannot give rise to ACCA’s sentence enhancement. The “underlying brute facts or means” by which the defendant commits his crime make no difference; even if the defendant’s conduct fits the generic definition, the mismatch of elements saves him from an ACCA sentence. Construing ACCA to allow a sentencing judge to go further would raise serious Sixth Amendment concerns because only a jury, not a judge, may find facts that increase the maximum penalty. A statute’s listing of disjunctive means does not mitigate the possible unfairness of basing an increased penalty on something not legally necessary to the prior conviction. View "Mathis v. United States" on Justia Law