Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Enacted in response to the high incidence of domestic violence against Native American women, 18 U.S.C. 117(a), applies to any person who “commits a domestic assault within . . . Indian country” and who has at least two prior convictions for domestic violence rendered “in Federal, State, or Indian tribal court proceedings.” The Sixth Amendment guarantees indigent defendants appointed counsel in state or federal proceedings in which a term of imprisonment is imposed, but does not apply in tribal-court proceedings. The Indian Civil Rights Act, (ICRA) which governs tribal-court proceedings, includes a right to appointed counsel only for sentences exceeding one year, 25 U.S.C. 1302(c)(2). Supreme Court precedent holds that convictions obtained in state or federal court in violation of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel cannot be used in subsequent proceedings “to support guilt or enhance punishment for another offense” except for uncounseled misdemeanor convictions for which no prison term was imposed. The Ninth Circuit reversed Bryant’s section 117(a) conviction, finding that the Sixth Amendment precluded use of his prior, uncounseled, tribal-court convictions a predicate offenses. The Supreme Court reversed. Because Bryant’s tribal-court convictions complied with ICRA and were valid when entered, use of those convictions as predicate offenses in a section 117(a) prosecution does not violate the Constitution. Bryant’s sentence for violating section 117(a) punishes his most recent acts of domestic assault, not his prior crimes. He suffered no Sixth Amendment violation in tribal court, so he cannot “suffe[r] anew” from a prior deprivation. ICRA sufficiently ensures the reliability of tribal-court convictions, guaranteeing “due process of law,” providing other procedural safeguards, and allowing a prisoner to challenge the fundamental fairness of proceedings in federal habeas proceedings. View "United States v. Bryant" on Justia Law

Williams was convicted of a 1984 murder and sentenced to death. Philadelphia District Attorney Castille approved a request to seek the death penalty. Williams’s conviction and sentence were upheld on direct appeal, state post-conviction review, and federal habeas review. In 2012, Williams filed a successive petition under Pennsylvania’s Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), arguing that the prosecutor had obtained false testimony from his codefendant and suppressed exculpatory evidence. Finding that the prosecutor had committed Brady violations, the court stayed Williams’s execution. The Commonwealth asked the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, whose chief justice was former District Attorney Castille, to vacate the stay. Without explanation, Castille denied Williams’s motion for recusal and request for referral to the full court; Castille joined an opinion vacating PCRA relief and reinstating Williams’s death sentence. Two weeks later, Castille retired. The U.S. Supreme Court vacated, holding that Castille’s participation violated the Due Process Clause. There is an impermissible risk of actual bias when a judge earlier had significant, personal involvement as a prosecutor in a critical decision regarding the defendant’s case. No attorney is more integral to the accusatory process than a prosecutor who participates in a major adversary decision; the decision to pursue the death penalty is a critical choice. Neither the involvement of multiple actors nor the passage of time relieves the former prosecutor of the duty to withdraw. An unconstitutional failure to recuse constitutes structural error, “not amenable” to harmless-error review, regardless of whether the judge’s vote was dispositive. The Court noted that many jurisdictions, including Pennsylvania, have statutes and professional codes that already require recusal under these circumstances. View "Williams v. Pennsylvania" on Justia Law

Guards (Madigan and Ross) undertook to move Blake, a Maryland inmate, to the prison’s segregation unit. Madigan assaulted Blake, punching him in the face. The prison system’s Internal Investigative Unit (IIU), issued a report condemning Madigan’s actions. Blake sued both guards under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging excessive force and failure to take protective action. A jury found Madigan liable. Ross raised the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requirement that an inmate exhaust “such administrative remedies as are available” before bringing suit. Blake argued that the IIU investigation was a substitute for those procedures. The Fourth Circuit reversed dismissal of the suit, holding that “special circumstances” can excuse a failure to comply with administrative procedural requirements, particularly where the inmate reasonably, although mistakenly, believed he had sufficiently exhausted his remedies. The Supreme Court vacated: “The Fourth Circuit’s unwritten ‘special circumstances’ exception is inconsistent with the text and history of the PLRA.” Mandatory exhaustion statutes like the PLRA foreclose judicial discretion. There are, however, circumstances in which an administrative remedy, although officially on the books, is not available. An administrative procedure is unavailable when it operates as a dead end, with officers unable or consistently unwilling to provide relief. An administrative scheme might be so opaque that it becomes, practically speaking, incapable of use. Finally, a grievance process is rendered unavailable when prison administrators thwart inmates from taking advantage of it through misrepresentation, or intimidation. The record raised questions about whether Blake had an “available” administrative remedy to exhaust. View "Ross v. Blake" on Justia Law

Lynch was convicted of first-degree murder, kidnapping, armed robbery, and burglary for a 2001 killing. The state sought the death penalty. Before Lynch’s penalty phase trial began, Arizona successfully moved to prevent his counsel from informing the jury that the only alternative sentence to death was life without the possibility of parole. The jury failed to reach a unanimous verdict. A second jury was convened and sentenced Lynch to death. The Arizona Supreme Court vacated the sentence because the jury instructions improperly described Arizona law, but did not address Lynch’s argument that the trial court violated the 1994 Supreme Court holding, Simmons v. South Carolina, “where a capital defendant’s future dangerousness is at issue, and the only sentencing alternative to death available to the jury is life imprisonment without possibility of parole,” the Due Process Clause “entitles the defendant ‘to inform the jury of [his] parole ineligibility.’” .On remand, a third penalty phase jury sentenced Lynch to death. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting Lynch’s Simmons claim, while acknowledging that the state suggested that Lynch could be dangerous. The Supreme Court, per curiam, reversed. Under state law, the only kind of release for which Lynch would be eligible is executive clemency. Simmons expressly rejected the argument that the possibility of clemency diminishes a capital defendant’s right to inform a jury of his parole ineligibility. The Court rejected Arizona’s argument that “nothing prevents the legislature from creating a parole system in the future" for which Lynch would be eligible. View "Lynch v. Arizona" on Justia Law

Lee and her boyfriend stabbed two women to death and were convicted of first-degree murder. Lee received a sentence of life without the possibility of parole. In 1999, Lee unsuccessfully raised four claims on appeal. After California appellate courts affirmed, Lee filed a federal habeas petition, 28 U.S.C. 2254(a), raising mostly claims not raised on direct appeal. The court stayed federal proceedings to allow Lee to pursue her new claims in a state habeas petition. The California Supreme Court denied Lee’s petition, citing California’s “Dixon bar,” under which a defendant procedurally defaults a claim raised for the first time on state collateral review if he could have raised it earlier on direct appeal. The federal court then dismissed her new claims as procedurally defaulted. For the first time, Lee challenged the Dixon bar, citing the California Supreme Court’s state habeas denials on a single day. Lee claimed that out of the 210 summary denials on December 21, 1999, the court failed to cite Dixon in nine cases where it should have been applied. The court denied those nine petitions without any citation. Without evaluating that evidence, the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded “to permit the Warden to submit evidence.” On remand, the warden submitted a study analyzing about 4,700 summary habeas denials during a two-year period around the same date: the California Supreme Court cited Dixon in approximately 12% of all denials—more than 500 times. The district court held that the Dixon bar is adequate. The Ninth Circuit again reversed. The Supreme Court, per curiam, reversed, stating that the decision “profoundly misapprehends” what makes a state procedural bar “adequate.” California’s procedural bar is longstanding, oft-cited, and shared by habeas courts across the country. View "Johnson v. Lee" on Justia Law

During jury selection at Foster’s trial, the state (Georgia) used peremptory challenges to strike all four qualified black prospective jurors. Foster was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. The trial court rejected an argument that the strikes were racially motivated, in violation of Batson v. Kentucky. While his state habeas petition was pending, Foster obtained copies of the prosecution’s trial file, including the jury venire list with the names of each black prospective juror highlighted; an investigator's statement comparing black prospective jurors and concluding, “If it comes down to having to pick one of the black jurors, [this one] might be okay”; notes with “N” (for “no”) appearing next to the names of all black prospective jurors; a document with notes about a church, annotated "No. Black Church”; and questionnaires, on which each juror’s response indicating race was circled. The state court denied relief. The Georgia Supreme Court denied a certificate of appeal. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, first holding that it had jurisdiction to review the denial of a Certificate of Probable Cause; there was no indication that denial rested on state law “independent of the merits” of Foster’s Batson claim. The lower court’s application of res judicata depended on a federal constitutional ruling; its decision that Foster failed to show purposeful discrimination was clearly erroneous. Though the trial court accepted the prosecution’s justifications for the strikes, "the record belies much of the prosecution’s reasoning." That a prosecutor’s reasons for striking a black prospective juror apply equally to an otherwise-similar nonblack prospective juror, who is allowed to serve, suggests purposeful discrimination. The Court noted “the prosecution’s shifting explanations, misrepresentations of the record, and persistent focus on race.” Because Batson was decided only months before Foster’s trial, the state argued that the prosecution’s file was an effort to maintain a detailed account should the prosecution need a defense against any suggestion that its reasons were pretextual. That argument, having never before been raised in the 30 years since Foster’s trial, “reeks of afterthought.” View "Foster v. Chatman" on Justia Law

Any alien convicted of an “aggravated felony” after entering the U.S. is deportable, ineligible for several forms of discretionary relief, and subject to expedited removal, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), (3). An “aggravated felony” is defined as any of numerous offenses listed in Section 1101(a)(43), each of which is typically identified either as an offense “described in” a specific federal statute or by a generic label (e.g., murder); the penultimate sentence states that each enumerated crime is an aggravated felony irrespective of whether it violates federal, state, or foreign law. Luna, a lawful permanent resident, pleaded guilty in New York to attempted third-degree arson. An Immigration Judge determined that Luna’s arson conviction was for an “aggravated felony” and that Luna was ineligible for discretionary relief. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The Second Circuit denied review. The Supreme Court affirmed. A state offense counts as a Section 1101(a)(43) “aggravated felony” when it has every element of a listed federal crime except one requiring a connection to interstate or foreign commerce.; state crimes do not need a “jurisdictional hook.” Congress meant the term “aggravated felony” to capture serious crimes regardless of whether they are made illegal by the federal government, a state, or a foreign country. It is implausible that Congress viewed the presence of an interstate commerce element as separating serious from nonserious conduct. View "Luna Torres v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Betterman pleaded guilty to bail jumping after failing to appear on domestic assault charges. He was then jailed for over 14 months awaiting sentence, in large part due to institutional delay. He was eventually sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment, with four of the years suspended. The Montana Supreme Court and U.S. Supreme Court affirmed, ruling that the Sixth Amendment’s Speedy Trial Clause does not apply to post-conviction, presentencing delay. The Speedy Trial Clause right attaches upon a defendant’s arrest or formal accusation, but detaches upon conviction. Before conviction, the accused is shielded by the presumption of innocence, which the Speedy Trial Clause implements by minimizing the likelihood of lengthy incarceration before trial, lessening the anxiety and concern associated with a public accusation, and limiting the effects of long delay on the accused’s ability to mount a defense. The sole remedy for a violation of the speedy trial right— dismissal of the charges—fits the preconviction focus of the Clause; it would be an unjustified windfall to remedy sentencing delay by vacating validly obtained convictions. View "Betterman v. Montana" on Justia Law

Ocasio and other police officers routed damaged vehicles from accident scenes to an auto repair shop in exchange for kickbacks. He was charged with obtaining money from the shopowners under color of official right (Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951), and conspiring to violate the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 371. The court rejected his argument that—because the Act prohibits the obtaining of property “from another”—a Hobbs Act conspiracy requires proof that the alleged conspirators agreed to obtain property from someone outside the conspiracy. The Fourth Circuit and Supreme Court affirmed his conviction. A defendant may be convicted of conspiring to violate the Act based on proof that he reached an agreement with the owner of the property in question to obtain that property under color of official right. The general federal conspiracy statute, under which Ocasio was convicted, makes it a crime to “conspire . . . to commit any offense against the United States.” It is sufficient that the conspirator agreed that the underlying crime be committed by a member of the conspiracy capable of committing it. Ocasio and the shopowners shared a common purpose that officers would obtain property “from another” (shopowners) under color of official right. The Court noted that its decision does not transform every bribe of a public official into conspiracy to commit extortion. View "Ocasio v. United States" on Justia Law

Molina-Martinez pleaded guilty to being unlawfully present in the U.S. after being deported following an aggravated felony conviction. The Guidelines range in his presentence report was 77-96 months. The Probation Office recommended a 77-month sentence; the government requested 96 months. The court, with little explanation, sentenced him to 77 months. On appeal, Molina-Martinez argued for the first time that the range should have been 70-87 months. The Fifth Circuit agreed that the court used an incorrect range but found that Molina-Martinez could not satisfy FRCP 52(b)’s requirement that the error affected his substantial rights, stating that a defendant whose sentence falls within the correct range must, on appeal, identify “additional evidence” showing that use of the incorrect range actually affected his sentence. The Supreme Court reversed. Courts reviewing Guidelines errors cannot apply a categorical “additional evidence” rule where a court applied an incorrect range but sentenced the defendant within the correct range. A defendant who shows mistaken application of an incorrect, higher range will, generally, have demonstrated a reasonable probability of a different outcome, sufficient for relief if Rule 52(b)’s other requirements are met. In this case, given the sentence imposed, and that the court said nothing to suggest that it would have imposed the same sentence regardless of the range, there is at least a reasonable probability that the court would have imposed another sentence had it known that 70 months was the lowest sentence the Commission deemed appropriate. The Court noted that its holding is consistent with the approach taken by most Courts of Appeals and that remanding for resentencing is less costly than remanding for retrial. View "Molina-Martinez v. United States" on Justia Law